













# THE MONIST

DEVOTED TO THE PHILOSOPHY  
OF SCIENCE

VOLUME XXXVI

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## JAMES WARD

(1843-1925)

LONG BEFORE the unhappy accident which led to the death of James Ward, we had planned to devote one complete issue of *The Monist* to the critical estimation, by distinguished philosophers, of the influence of his work and thought. What was to have been a tribute to a great thinker must now be a memorial number.


James Ward was not only a pioneer in psychology but also a philosopher, a man of science, and a generous and stimulating teacher. His philosophical system was, in the words of one of his pupils, constructive: in place of merely negative onslaughts upon science and religion, Ward "applied his comprehensive knowledge of the one and his profound concern with the other to build up a philosophy which went far to meet the needs of all serious thinkers."

To what is here written of Ward's work we need only add that the world is poorer for his loss.









JAMES WARD  
(1843-1925)

Photograph by Palmer Clarke.

# THE MONIST

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## AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

### I. WHAT IS MEANT BY PHILOSOPHY

IN GENERAL, it may be described as "the thinking consideration of things" (*denkende Betrachtung der Gegenstände*), said Hegel. It is, however, neither the only nor the earliest form of thinking: thinking in the first instance, and still for the most part, is practical or rather instrumental to practice. But thinking is prompted at length by the curiosity which leisure brings: necessity may be the mother of invention but "wonder is the mother of Knowledge" as an end in itself.<sup>1</sup> Science and philosophy are alike in so far as, in both, truth for its own sake is said to be what we pursue. Nevertheless, neither the end nor the motive in the two cases is quite the same. In the sense in which we talk of many sciences we do not talk of many philosophies, and in the sense in which we talk of many philosophies we do not talk of many sciences. There are several sciences, because each has a restricted domain, deals with some special class or aspect of things; whereas in that sense philosophy is one, for it purports to embrace the whole of things. On the other hand, while we recognize only one science of physics or chemistry or biology, we find almost as many philosophical systems as there have been philosophers: all of them striving to present an intelligible *Weltanschauung* or "synoptic view" of the concrete whole. It might strike one as odd, but for the familiarity

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982b, 10-27.

of it, that philosophies are often named after their authors, Platonism, Epicureanism, Cartesianism, Spinozism, Hegelianism, etc., while no science ever bears a human name. This difference we may find presently to be due to the fact that philosophy is primarily a personal matter. Science seeks to know the *what* and the *how* of this or that: philosophy seeks to know the *why* or *meaning* of the whole. And meaning in experience varies with the experient: to no two men is the world quite the same.

But much as philosophies have varied, "the philosophic spirit" has been always essentially the same—the habit of reflecting upon one's stock of knowledges<sup>2</sup> in the hope of unifying them all in one concrete "intuition" or "Idea." And to "knowledge" here we must give a wide meaning, including whatever is accepted as true, whether actually true or not. Thales did not philosophize the less, because he regarded the magnet as alive; or Plato, because he believed in the pre-existence of souls; or Aquinas, because he held the doctrine of transubstantiation; or Schelling, because he believed in *clairvoyance*. Given certain materials—knowledges or what are reputed such—the philosophic habit is a species of mental rumination in which the mind endeavors to elaborate the various items of experience into such form and order as to render them an intelligible and organic whole. It is important, then, to distinguish between the "informing" or organizing spirit of philosophy and the outcome in a particular instance: for the latter is often so crude and imperfect that we, with our wider knowledge and clearer insight, may fail to see anything in it deserving to be called philosophic at all. Few, we may suppose, nowadays begin the study of early Greek philosophy without feeling this. Most of us found it hard to see

<sup>2</sup> This "term in frequent use by Bacon (and others), though now obsolete should be revived" (Hamilton, *Metaphysics* I., p. 57 fin.)—a proposal which Herbert Spencer seconded, and which has moreover the support of French and German usage.



anything but absurdity in the doctrine of Thales for instance, that the principle or ἀρχὴ of all things is water; or in the doctrine of Anaximenes that all the variety of nature is due to a thickening or thinning of another primeval element, *viz*, air. Even the more abstract speculation of the Pythagoreans—of whom Aristotle tells us that they regarded number as the essence of all things, and the organization of the universe as but a harmonious system of numbers and their relations—even this will appear as barren and empty from excess of abstraction as the Ionian philosophies seemed crude and confined from defect of it. But very much the same feeling might possess us on observing the earliest attempts at pictorial representation, the rude scratches on mammoth tusks, for example, no more like a man than the conventional diagrams of *Homo sapiens*—full face and profile combined—which school-children draw on their slates. But the point is, both *are* pictures, however bad as likenesses: they are the outcome of the idea of pictorial representation, the result of an artistic purpose. So it was with the earliest attempts at philosophy. Here, too, we must distinguish between the idea and its execution: all the pregnant worth of these primitive essays lay in the idea that there is an ἀρχὴ or first principle; so that all the diversified plurality of the world may be traced to some fundamental One.

## II. PHILOSOPHY AND MYTHOLOGY

We may realize the significance of this early philosophy more clearly by contrasting it with the mythology that preceded it. In that imagination was dominant, and there was no tendency to generalize: behind the concrete facts of sense there were only the concrete creations of fancy. "Mythology ran riot in a plurality or multitude of powers

which it invoked, and to which it assigned the government of the universe; but philosophy, on the contrary, aimed at a unity of agency or causation in all things. [Thus] the very conception of reducing the diversified exuberance, the infinite plentitude, of nature to the unity of one principle, showed a speculative boldness which proved that a new intellectual era was dawning on mankind."<sup>3</sup> Still we must not forget that unity here implies continuity and in fact, looking closer, we find a certain continuity even between mythology and philosophy.

The savage, too, has his metaphysics: as Andrew Lang has well said, "The chief distinction between his mode of conceiving the world and ours is his vast extension of the theory of personality. To the savage . . . all nature was a congeries of animated personalities."<sup>4</sup> This anthropomorphism, so flagrant in the theogonies and cosmogonies of polytheism, we still recognize without difficulty as shaping the literature as well as the art of religion even in the present day.<sup>5</sup> But the like is equally true, though less obvious, in the case of philosophy. Thales for instance not only, according to Aristotle, connected his doctrine with the ancient myth that Oceanus was the father of gods and men, but supposed all things to be full of gods.<sup>6</sup> Even Plato turned old myths to account and invented several new ones, if what is deliberately invented by one man may be called a myth. Altogether, Plato is credited with some dozen myths of one sort or another.<sup>7</sup> We seem justified, then, in maintaining the presence of anthropomorphism or "poetical metaphysics" not only in the speculation of primitive man but even in those of philosophers down to our own time. But "dogmatic anthropomorphism," as Kant called it—which had lingered on both in theology and

<sup>3</sup> J. F. Ferrier, *Lectures on Greek Philosophy*, 1875, pp. 41, 40.

<sup>4</sup> Andrew Lang, "Mythology," *Ency. Brit.*, 11th edn., xix, 132.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik*, 1837, II, pp. 13ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Metaphysics*, 983a; *De Anima*, I, v. 411a.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, 1905.

philosophy, though assuming ever worthier forms as humanity itself advanced—was finally rejected as “not proven” in Hume’s famous *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. Admitting this, Kant nevertheless maintained that “symbolic anthropomorphism,” an anthropomorphism that is to say, based on analogy, is still necessary as furnishing us with “regulative Ideas.”<sup>8</sup> But the philosophies of the Absolute that have been in vogue since Kant’s day and flourish still, claim—at any rate as “barely theoretical”—to have eliminated all such analogies.

Granting this and leaving aside for the present the question how far philosophy can be called “barely theoretical,” we may still point out that the “real categories”—substance and attribute, cause and effect, end and means—which even these philosophies recognize, are themselves anthropomorphic.<sup>9</sup> But here what philosophy has failed to do, positive science claims to have now done. This brings us to a new point.

### III. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Here again we are reminded that unity implies continuity, and again, in fact, we find it. Philosophy presupposes knowledges, even when it essays to take the royal or *a priori* road; but it does not necessarily presuppose science. In western thought indeed philosophy is comparable to a primitive nebula from which the sciences in a certain order were gradually set loose as satellites.

The need for that division of labor which the advance of knowledge has involved was hardly felt before the six-

<sup>8</sup> Cf. his *Prolegomena*, 1783, Secs. 57, 58, pp. 173ff.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. The writer’s *Psychological Principles*, 1918, ch. xiii, sec. 6; and on the question generally, the late F. Paulsen’s essay “Die Zukunftsaufgaben der Philosophie” in *Systematische* (edited by P. Hinneberg), 1908, pp. 407ff.

teenth century. The ancient philosophers in particular were all more or less polymathic: all the general knowledge of their time they knew, and to systematize and extend it was the main business of their lives. But some knowledges took scientific form sooner than others; and there were two sciences in particular—mathematics and logic—which, though developing alongside of philosophy are really, and were from the first, largely independent of it. This independence they owe to their purely abstract form and exact character which seemed to betoken a certain transcendence, complete freedom, in other words, from all the presuppositions which concrete things imply. In consequence, they have themselves powerfully influenced the course of philosophy down to our own day; for reality without restriction is its theme; and logic and mathematics seem to cover everything and yet, as formal, to depend on nothing. It was this exaltation of the exact sciences that led Greek philosophy to disregard the empirical and historical—a strange outcome of the desire to find the meaning of *things*.

Let us try briefly to note how the philosophic spirit was thus first diverted from thinking about things to thinking about *thoughts*. It is perfectly possible, however, to think about both without inverting their relations. But this is not what happened in Greece, where our western philosophy took its rise. Had civilization begun in England or Holland, for example, where industrial and mercantile interests are so absorbing, the history of this philosophy would have been vastly different from what it is.<sup>10</sup> The *intellectus sibi permissus*, that wrong way of attaining truth which Bacon exposed, might then not have retarded the progress of empirical knowledge for two thousand

<sup>10</sup> F. A. Lange thought that even as it was, from the standpoint of Sophists like Protagoras a development of Knowledge was already possible that would have obviated or short-circuited "the great digression (*Umschwung*) which led the world for thousands of years into the false path of the Platonic idealism." *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 3rd ed., 1875, i, pp. 41-43. Cf. J. Herschel, *Preliminary Discourse*, 1838, pp. 105ff.



years. As it was, while the natural sciences were still unborn, the Greek mind gave birth to what is known as dialectic.

1. *Logic*. Beginning with this we may consider first the influence on philosophy of logic, which in fact was the offspring of dialectic. According to Aristotle, dialectic was the invention of the Eleatic philosopher, Zeno: in fact, however, it seems to have been for him a necessity of the situation rather than a method deliberately devised. He was bent on refuting the pluralists who were his philosophical opponents, and he developed the contradictions implicit in their doctrines simply as the most effective way of refuting them. But his negative results were so imposing that it is no surprise to find Socrates—and Plato, still more consciously—employing this dialectical method with the positive aim of eliciting knowledge by turning thought inwards “to recollect itself.” In doing so they exerted an influence on the future of philosophy second to none beside. Ignorant alike of psychology and philology—professing, in fact, to know nothing—nevertheless, Socrates in his endeavor to evoke the meaning or definition implied in words helped at once to prepare the logical instrument of knowledge and to prevent its efficient use. Misconceiving the relation of words to thoughts and of thoughts to things, Plato, the disciple whom he inspired, then propounded his famous “realism”—commonly called the Platonic idealism—thereby inaugurating a philosophical mythology that in one form or another lasted on till its consummation in the *Logic* of Hegel.<sup>12</sup> Plato maintained that “universals” were *entia* prior to and independent of *fientia*, the particulars perceived by sense.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> In the preface to the second edition of his *Logic*, written within a week of his death, Hegel himself refers sympathetically to Plato as his forerunner. Cf. p. 13.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. G. Grote's *Aristotle*, 2nd. ed., 1880, App. I. “The Doctrine of Universals.”

More than that, he also maintained that the one way to knowledge of *entia*, to philosophy that is to say, was the dialectical way of immanent logical development: to empirical knowledge no philosophical validity was to be allowed at all. So, from that day to quite modern times, philosophy, as Bacon said, was engrossed with its own *anticipatio mentis* and diverted from the *interpretatio naturae*; while the empirical sciences, so long as they remained under its step-motherly tutelage, scarcely progressed at all. There were, it came to be assumed, two sources of knowledge, reason and sense, and two kinds of knowledge, that of noumena and that of phenomena—to use the old terminology which Kant revived—the one constituting what he at one time called the *mundus intelligibilis*, the other what he called the *mundus sensibilis*. The former had come to be spoken of as the world *sub-specie aeternitatis*, beyond not merely time but space as well;<sup>14</sup> this was the world of ideas, where alone according to Plato truth could dwell. The latter was the world of nature, the empirical world of change in space and time: this for Plato was the sublunary abode of passing shadows, the domain of opinion and probability at the best.

After all, it may be said, the intelligible world seen by the light of reason, is surely the world that philosophy should strive to understand; can it be that the pursuit of such knowledge will ever be abandoned? At any rate the dialectical method of attaining it has come to be regarded more and more as delusive and unsubstantial—negatively in consequence of continual crises in the history of philosophy itself, and positively in consequence of the progress of science in spite of it.

The first great crisis in the development of philosophy began at once with Plato's own disciple, Aristotle. Dialec-

<sup>14</sup> As regards space, however, perhaps all rationalists were not equally clear—Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, for example, held conflicting views.

tic never meant for Aristotle what it meant for his master. Nevertheless, he improved the imperfect instrument that Socrates and Plato had made out of it. But it is a mistake, although a common one, to identify logic as Aristotle conceived it with the so-called formal logic into which it was ultimately transformed.<sup>15</sup> Aristotle's Logic was no mere instrument (or organon) of that *maïeutic* art which Socrates professed; and Aristotle never regarded it as such. It was that, but it was much more.<sup>16</sup> True, he raised the standard against the Platonic realism, but he only modified it: he never broke with it altogether. As Prantl has said, he was still Platonic, and without Plato would be unintelligible. He still admitted the reality of universals; and denied only that they were independently and antecedently real: their reality for him consisted in their embodiment in particulars. On the other hand, even Plato allowed that the particular had a certain semblance of reality, because it participated in or adumbrated a universal.

As regards particulars then, the two philosophers had some common ground; yet their methods were different: Aristotle started where Plato ended, that is to say, with the actual things with which he found himself surrounded. These were either natural or artificial: he began with the latter first of all as the better known, for man had made them. So he came by his famous doctrine of the four causes—the material, the formal, the efficient and the final. But in the case of artifacts, the three latter are connected together in the individual artisan, who for the sake of the *end* devises the *form* and *effects* its embodiment or materialization. In this *συνθετόν* as Aristotle called it, the form is the determining factor, but the artisan is the indispensable agent or "moving cause." But Aristotle left the effi-

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, I, pp. 135-140.

<sup>16</sup> No sharp line can be drawn between the subject-matter of Aristotle's so-called Logic and that of his metaphysics or "first philosophy"; nor in fact between this and what he called physics. (Cf. Grote's *Aristotle*, pp. 62, 422.)

cient agent—for a time at all events—out of account, and regarded the universal or form as if it were what Prantl describes as *ein schöpferische Wesensbegriff*, or had itself “notional causality,” as Grote translates the term. If we stop here, many thinkers have felt that after all Plato’s position was the better of the two: for according to that, the “ideas” were real anyhow; whereas, according to Aristotle, the forms not being real *per se*, but only notional, could surely not effect their own realization. Merely to deny Plato’s position did not help him to establish his own; for it is inconceivable how two non-entities can effect the synthesis whereby they become τόδε τί, *hoc aliquid*.

So far, Aristotle’s procedure had been primarily analytic. It is, however, only fair to him to say that he did not ignore this further problem concerning the synthesis itself which the particular as compound (σύνολον) implies. Accordingly the correlatives, matter and form, are now supplemented by another pair—bringing the moving cause again upon the scene—*viz.*, potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality or energy (ἐνέργεια). The former correlatives, matter and form, were relevant to the question what the concrete particular is; the latter, potentiality and energy are concerned in the question how it comes to be. The *venue* is thus completely altered: Aristotle now for a time leaves the domain of “logic,” to which change and process are altogether foreign, for that of “physic” or nature,<sup>17</sup> where they are always dominant and at home. The new terms, as we have seen, found their clearest exemplification in mankind; for potentiality means power or faculty, as “latent,” and energy faculty or power, in overt action. Now—since any movement suggests some prior potentiality—we may bring the changes in nature into line with the changes we make.

<sup>17</sup> Etymology, often helpful in revealing conceptual along with lexical roots, may be usefully appealed to here. Cf. φύσις and natura.



But potentiality in Greek has another meaning which Aristotle expressly distinguished, *viz.*, possibility. The two meanings are indeed connected, since potentiality as such implies logical possibility; and Aristotle plays fast and loose with the two. "We must not seek a definition of everything," he says, and here "must be content to grasp the analogy."<sup>18</sup> But what is this analogy? The statue is to the marble block as the man actually studying to the man when he is not. But the relation of the statue to the block of marble is the relation of form to matter, while the relation of the man when he is studying to the man when he is not is the relation of energy to potentiality. The man not studying can study if he likes: the process here starts from the faculty. But the shapeless block cannot begin of itself to take on form: the so-called potentiality then is here no faculty; it is just bare possibility—a fact which Aristotle himself brings out when he follows back the notion of matter to its limit. So far as becoming a statue goes, the block can do nothing. But as mere matter, matter as such is not potential; so pure form, form as such, cannot be actual: to be that it must be real.<sup>19</sup>

How then could Aristotle assume any inherent efficiency in form, and yet refuse to recognize the independent "reality" which Plato attributed to it? This question still awaits an answer. Meanwhile several of Aristotle's ablest commentators have pointed out that his analogy so far from dispensing him from definition hampers him with contradictions of which he seems dimly conscious and yet does not seriously face<sup>20</sup>—contradictions so glaring that a well-meant attempt has recently been made to relieve him of

<sup>18</sup> *Metaphysic* IX, vi, *init.*

<sup>19</sup> These two pairs of correlatives pre-eminently characteristic of Aristotle's philosophy have remained fundamental in the terminology of philosophy till our own day without ever being adequately scrutinized.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Heyder, *Aristotelische u. Hegel'sche Dialektik*, 1845, i, pp. 181ff.; Bonitz, *Aristotle's Metaphysica*, ii, 1849, pp. 379, 395, 569; Zeller, *Aristotle*, Eng. trans., 1897, pp. 373ff.; Gompertz, *Greek Thinkers*, iv, 1912, pp. 85f.

them by attributing all the confusion to his editor.<sup>21</sup> Instead then of demolishing the Platonic structure, Aristotle only remodelled it on the old foundations: he too was still a "realist" but less thorough than his master and less consistent. In short, in a case of "either-or" he was something of a trimmer.

No wonder, then, that this difference between the two master minds lingered on for centuries unresolved by the comparatively feeble thinkers who followed them: no wonder that Platonists and Aristotelians came alternately to the fore, till at length it was assumed that every man must be one or other: no wonder that the chief gain to philosophy of ages of scholastic wrangling was only a certain "precision and analytic subtlety" of language which the ancients did not possess.<sup>22</sup> Words still masked the face of things with a veil like that of Isis, which—till the modern era—there was scarcely an attempt to uplift.

2. *Mathematics.* We come now to the influence on philosophy of the other exact science, that is mathematics. Mathematics is historically the oldest science; and it is the first that everybody has to *learn*—hence perhaps its name, commonly attributed to the Pythagoreans. Like logic it is beyond scepticism and beyond cavil: in this respect it is—conjoined with logic—science as nothing else is. That it should have influenced the course of philosophy profoundly is therefore not surprising: it has, in fact, done so; and that in two ways. First, in respect of *method*—of such influence the classic instance is that of Spinoza; this, however, which we may call its epistemological result, does not for the present concern us. But, secondly, it helped to determine the *content*, the subject matter of philosophy,

<sup>21</sup> Cf. W. Freytag, *Die Entwicklung der griechischen Erkenntnistheorie bis Aristotles*, 1905, p. 85.

<sup>22</sup> A gain, however, that has been generally under-rated. But cf. the mottoes at the beginning of Mill's *Logic*.

notably in the case of Plato. This we may call its ontological result: a remark or two on this seems here in place.

As Plato regarded "ideas" of which things are only imperfect semblances—so the Pythagoreans regarded the numbers of the decad and the geometrical forms which they imagined these to imply. The whole sum of things, modelled accordingly to the principles of number, was a cosmos, as Pythagoras is said to have first called it.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, the similarity between "ideas" as Socrates had led him to conceive them and "numbers" as conceived by the Pythagoreans it was—some have supposed—that finally led Plato to his so-called realism. At any rate he eventually included the Pythagorean theory within his own. So the two so-called "rational sciences" seem to be enthroned as presenting the essence of all things; and Hegel's *dictum*, "all that is real is rational" to have been anticipated. Yet, in fact, the true meaning of reason was thereby only obscured. But of this later. Meanwhile the important point is this syncretism of Plato and Pythagoras, of logical form and mathematical form, which claimed to be in one respect the last truth of things; as if indeed God, as Plato said, "always geometrizes." So we are led naturally from mathematics to physics, where mathematics is "applied."

3. *Physics*. Here Plato's *Timaeus* has an interest for us that is unique; since, as Grote remarked, it is "the earliest physical theory that has come down to us in the words of its author." Having elsewhere expounded his philosophy of what always is and has no becoming—the world of ideas or forms—he here attempts to face the problems of the sensible world with all its bewildering multiplicity of

<sup>23</sup> His discovery of the mathematical proportions of musical intervals as exhibited in the length of the strings producing them (1:2 for the octave, 2:3 for the fifth, 3:4 for the fourth) revealed the connection between number and harmony, which he boldly generalized and applied in all directions. Regarded in the light of number not only was there a "music of the spheres" beyond our sensible ken, but the very chaos of sense itself became a cosmos. Shall we with Bacon call this a *superstitio crassa*; or, reminded of Galileo watching the swinging lamp and Newton the falling apple, shall we call it "a flash of genius"?

transient appearances, where as Heraclitus maintained, all is flux. Certainty is no longer possible, but problems are there none the less. *Wie viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung aufs Sein*, said Herbart; and Plato, unable to deny this implication of being in the phenomenal world, as the Eleatics affected to do, casts about to determine wherein this implication or *Hindeutung* lies. What he required was, so to say, a mediating term between *Sein* and *Schein*, the eternal world of ideas (or *entia*) and the endless diversity of the world of fleeting show (or *fiēntia*). With such a clue the Pythagoreans provided him through mathematics. The sensible world was rational just so far as "God had ordered all things in it by measure and number," as Lotze said.

There was, however, a still older physical theory that bore considerable resemblance to the theory of Plato's *Timaeus*, viz., the atomic theory of Democritus, a man whom Plato never mentions and is said to have detested. According to Democritus the world of the naive man is to be explained by the configurations and motions of innumerable, invisible and unchangeable elements variously aggregated or combined in the sensible objects which are all that he actually perceives.<sup>24</sup> This Democritean world, though unmistakably implied in Plato's *Timaeus* was there so smothered by the myths and fanciful conjectures with which it was overlaid that it could never have been taken for genuinely Platonic doctrine, even if Plato himself had treated it quite seriously. In fact, however, he allowed that imaginary world building was at best a pastime; but one permissible enough when dealing with what after all were only probabilities.<sup>25</sup> But the rejection by Democritus of all teleology marked off his philosophy as essentially mechanical, that is as materialistic: whereas the cornerstone of all Plato's thinking, the idea of the Good as the

<sup>24</sup> These elements or atoms Democritus oddly enough also spoke of as *σχήματα* or *ιδέαι*.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Timaeus*, 59c. Jowett's *Plato* ii, 553.



alpha and omega of his cosmos defined his philosophy as through and through spiritualistic in intent. Again, Aristotle's entire rejection of atomism—the chief defect of his physics—and his own strenuous advocacy of teleology, conjoined with Plato's, sufficed to arrest the steady development of mechanical theories till comparatively modern times—to the great detriment of science, it is needless to say.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, during all this long period Democritean revivals, so to call them, occurred at irregular intervals<sup>27</sup> till Newton's *Principia* led back to atomism as one of the problems involved in what he called natural philosophy. But it was a problem which he himself did nothing to solve. He too was content to deal with the *phenomena* of nature according to mechanical, *i. e.*, mathematical principles, leaving philosophy strictly so-called entirely aside.<sup>28</sup>

4. *Psychology.* The sharp distinction between matter and mind, though now a commonplace, is nevertheless quite a modern acquisition. In the crude anthropomorphism of primitive man, as we have already noted, everything is animated. At the same time, the etymology of such words as ψυχή, *anima*, πνεῦμα, spirit, clearly shows that mind was regarded as but a subtler form of matter: while objects were personified, subjects were reified. In short, the Cartesian dualism, round which so many of our problems nowadays revolve, was at first unknown.

Even for Aristotle, with whom empirical psychology as a science is supposed to have begun, ψυχή answers more nearly to life in a wide sense than to the subjective factor in experience, as now commonly understood. Like the modern biologist, Aristotle contemplates living organisms as advancing from the purely physiological functions of

<sup>26</sup> The use of the term *physicus*, which long prevailed to denote not a physicist, but a *medicus* or physician, as we still call one who prescribes "physic," is a curious confirmation of this fact.

<sup>27</sup> As chief in this catena Epicurus and Lucretius may be mentioned, and then skipping the darkness of the Middle Ages—Giordano Bruno, Galileo and Descartes. (Cf. Lasswitz, *Geschichte der Atomistik*, 1890.)

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Prin.*, Bk. III, init.

plants at one extreme to the purely intellectual functions of man at the other. Again he differs from the modern materialist only in the use he makes of his *Machtspruch*—as a German might call it—his famous doctrine of the four causes, that is to say. The term  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  for him connotes formal, efficient and final, but *not* material, cause. Insofar as cause implies efficiency, and that surely is its primary meaning, matter is neither a cause nor yet an effect. How what according to Aristotle is in itself so entirely negative, can have any part in the wonderful series of definite transformations which in his *De Anima* it is said to undergo, he appears never to have thought of inquiring. However, so long as the organism is concerned—when, that is to say, sense-data are in any way involved, the account given is physiological or rather, strictly speaking, physical. But on reaching intellection as a faculty, Aristotle's definition of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  gives out; for intellection, he maintained, has no bodily organ. Soul instead of being the form of the living body becomes something—or perhaps we should say is replaced by something—essentially disparate from the living body. So Aristotle seems to end where Descartes began, but only by traversing the wide gulf between matter and mind.

For Plato this rational soul was the real soul and immortal, its temporary connection with the body being not a help but a hindrance. So he perhaps might, on account of his semi-mythical speculations, be called the father of "rational psychology"; but that is not science.

For empirical psychology, on the other hand, which aims at being scientific, he had, as has been well said, only a step-motherly regard.<sup>29</sup> His handling of sense-data and whatever is connected with them is more crudely physical than that of Aristotle, as a reference to *Timaeus*, where mainly they are dealt with, would suffice to show.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Cognition*, 1906, p. 42.

5. *Epistemology*. As regards physics and psychology, then, the two main divisions of empirical science, we find that little or no progress was made till they succeeded in liberating themselves from the thralldom of philosophy—to the great advantage of themselves and of it. In the wake of this advance the discussion of questions as to the validity and the limits of knowledge, which had long been debated in a more or less inchoate fashion, at length began to take shape as an independent theory of knowledge or epistemology. This science is often called the propaedeutic of philosophy, since it is now recognized as an indispensable preliminary of philosophy in the stricter sense: the two, however, must obviously be closely connected.

#### IV. THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO HISTORY

History is still frequently and at first was universally regarded as outside the circle of the sciences, and so, as beneath the notice of philosophy. All historical knowledges were merely empirical—confined to “the that” (τὸ ὅτι) but never explaining “the what” (τί ἐστὶ) or “the why” (διότι) of things. “Aristotle therefore calls his empirical work on animals, *History of Animals*; Theophrastus, his empirical work on plants, *History of Plants*; Pliny, his empirical book on nature in general, *Natural History*.”<sup>30</sup>

Similarly Bacon regarded history, both natural and civil, as non-scientific, because it pertains to memory and not to reason;<sup>31</sup> and Hobbes, because “such knowledge is but experience, or authority, and not ratiocination.”<sup>32</sup> Locke and Hume relegated historical knowledge to the region of unphilosophical probability exposed to the devouring tooth of time, from which certain knowledge “depending on the

<sup>30</sup> Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, i. 56.

<sup>31</sup> *Advancement of Learning*, I, i, i-iii, 5.

<sup>32</sup> *Computation or Logic*, i, 8.

agreement or disagreement of ideas" is free.<sup>33</sup> Kant too distinguishes historical knowledge as *cognito ex datis* from rational knowledge as *cognitio ex principiis*, and Schopenhauer contrasts history, confined to particulars, as ever crawling along on the bare ground of experience, while the genuine sciences, embracing universals, soar above it.<sup>34</sup> Finally, Dr. Bosanquet has recently told us that "History is a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any considerable degree of 'being or trueness'."<sup>35</sup>

On the one side were principles, reasoning and "law"; on the other particulars, conjecture and "chance"; there we could know and predict, here we must wait and can only rarely foresee. In a word, even when narrating facts and not telling "stories," history was too like the hurly-burly that Schopenhauer had called it, to engage the attention of philosophers. Not till the eighteenth century was nearing its close do we find a philosophy of History beginning to take its place beside the long standing philosophies of Nature and of Mind. But once in being the progress of this latter-day philosophy was rapid: by the middle of the nineteenth century the new "historical method" was already invading and transforming all departments of thought; and before the century closed, a very competent observer pronounced "a belief in this method" to be "the most widely and strongly entertained philosophical conviction" of the day.<sup>36</sup>

"Nature's routine," its perfection viewed statically as a closed mechanism, has had in fact to yield in importance to the continual "novelty" which the world viewed historically presents. Here it is the open possibilities for development which *der Trieb der Perfectibilität*, the striving for betterment, as Hegel called it, involves, that are being continu-

<sup>33</sup> Locke, *Essay* IV, xv.; Hume, *Treatise* I, iii, 13.

<sup>34</sup> *Welt als Wille u. s. w.*, Bd., ii, ch. 38.

<sup>35</sup> *Individuality and Value*, 1912, p. 78.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. H. Sidgwick on the Historical Method, *Mind*, 1886, p. 203.



ally realized.<sup>37</sup> In short, what history presents is what we nowadays call *epigenesis*, or creative synthesis. So far then as the historical extends, not chance indeed but certainly contingency, enters into the very heart of things—the contingency, that is to say, of the actions of one free agent, relatively to those of others, all alike bent on self-conservation and animated by some idea of the Good. Here first we reach the standpoint whence at length we can see that the world has a meaning which we can understand; whereas from the standpoint of a philosophy of Nature alone it has none: only when regarded as subservient to mind does Nature become intelligible. Here then—and this above all, it is important to remember—the *entia* are not Platonic ideas but living agents, and the *fientia* are not primarily phenomena, but the actual deeds of such agents. How far this historical domain extends, we have no means of empirically deciding. It remains an open question whether there are any *entia* devoid all together of that striving which characterizes life. This is one side of the things which philosophy has to consider.

JAMES WARD.

<sup>37</sup> Hegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, 1837, p. 51.

## WARD AS A PSYCHOLOGIST

### INTRODUCTORY

WARD has dealt with all the main problems of general Psychology; and he has thrown fresh light on every one of them. To do justice to his work it would be necessary to follow him carefully and critically in his treatment of each of these special topics. This is a task which ought certainly to be undertaken soon by some enlightened critic. I hold it to be especially needful, because I am convinced that there is much that is of permanent value in Ward's detailed work which has not yet been assimilated and utilized by others.<sup>1</sup> But within my present limits I cannot attempt anything of the sort. I must confine myself to his general *Psychological Principles*, to the central scheme which gives so remarkable a unity and coherence to his whole procedure.

There are some psychologists of the present day for whom this central scheme is a stumbling block on the threshold which more or less bars understanding and appreciation of Ward's work as a whole. The present article will have fulfilled its purpose if it helps to remove or mitigate difficulties of this sort—at least for those who are not dogmatically prepossessed with the view that Psychology must be merely a special development or application of biology or physiology or any other physical science.

<sup>1</sup> I by no means except myself.

## THE DISTINCTIVE AIM OF PSYCHOLOGY

According to Ward the psychologist is always concerned with some concrete individual experient—"man, mouse or monkey"—who feels, knows, and is active in the way of attending, striving and willing. It is the exclusive business of psychology "to analyze and trace the development of individual experience as it is for the experiencing individual"<sup>2</sup>—the psychological subject. The very being of such an individual experient consists in being cognitive, in being active and in being pleased or the reverse. It is therefore with the knowing, feeling, and striving of the psychological subject that the psychologist is primarily concerned. If he could deal with these alone without reference to anything else, they would by themselves constitute the whole subject matter of his science. But this is essentially impossible. It is even more impossible than it is for the biologist to treat of living organisms without taking account of environing conditions, e. g., food and air. To know is to know something: action presupposes not only a real being which acts but a real being which is acted on and reacts; in feeling we are aware of something as agreeable or disagreeable. Thus psychology no less than common sense and the physical sciences is bound to take account of the objective world. But it considers this world from a standpoint peculiarly its own. The term "objective" tends to be ambiguous—it has two meanings or rather two sides to its meaning, which, though they are mutually complementary, may be and have been each of them one-sidedly emphasized to the exclusion of the other.

<sup>2</sup> *Psychological Principles*, p. 104.

In its most familiar use at the present day, "objective" means what really is in contrast to what appears, but does not appear as it really is. In this sense, the primary qualities of matter have been held to be objective and the secondary to be mere subjective appearances. One-sided emphasis of this meaning easily leads to a second step, in which appearance is not only distinguished from reality but divided from it. "Objective" is taken to mean what really exists independently of its appearing truly or falsely, obscurely or distinctly, to any mind, so that it would have been equally objective if there had been no such thing as mind at all. Whether or not there is any such reality, to call it an object or objective is to do violence to the use of the word object in ordinary language. For common sense, an object is always some one's object: it is the object of some one's attention, desire or aversion, hope or fear, pursuit, or avoidance, etc. It is perceived or thought of by some one; in some way it appears or is presented to them. It may not indeed appear as it "objectively" is. To understand this we must recognize that, to be an object at all is to appear in some fashion to someone, yet the object is not simply identical with its appearance. It is rather that which appears. Hence when it does not appear as it really is, we may say that the appearance is not true to the real nature of the object, i. e., is not "objective."<sup>3</sup>

What Ward means by object is fundamentally the same. He starts from Common-Sense. "Wherever experience is inferred, Common Sense is right in positing a real agent answering to what we know as Self and interacting with another reality which we know as the World." But the object, so concerned, has two aspects. It is (1) something real and really distinct from the self or any modification

<sup>3</sup> Though this use of "objective" is explicable it should be noticed that it is not the original meaning of the word. "Objective" existence in the schoolmen and in Descartes is existence in a mind as distinguished from formal or actual existence.



of the self: but, in order to be an object, it must (2) appear or be presented to a knowing, willing, and feeling subject. There are therefore two ways in which it may be considered according as our leading interest is in the one aspect of its being or in the other. Wherever the interest is not psychological it is directed to objects as these really are; we seek to make appearance more true and adequate, or at least safer guides to efficient action. On the contrary, psychological interest centers in the fact of appearing as such. The psychologist is concerned with the objective world as it is variously presented to different individuals, men or animals, and variously presented to the same individual in different stages and phases of his life history. Ward uses the general term "presentation" to indicate that objects are considered from this point of view. But a presentation is for him always the real object considered as it appears to this or that individual subject. He is therefore untouched by the criticism implied in Professor Strong's epigram: "When I present a lady with a bouquet of flowers, I do not present her with the presentation of the flowers, but only with the flowers."<sup>4</sup> Ward would agree; but he would still insist there is a vital difference between considering the flowers as, e. g., botanical specimens and considering them as a present to a lady. It is only from the second point of view that we have to take account of how the lady as an individual subject is affected by them and how she reacts. It is only from this point of view that the terms present and presentation are properly applicable.

Objects, as presented to an individual subject, undergo changes and enter into relations with each other of which they are otherwise incapable. Inasmuch as they are his objects they have a history which is inseparably one with his history and cannot belong to them independently of him

<sup>4</sup> *The Origin of Consciousness*, p. 37. Quoted by Prof. Dawes Hicks to reinforce a criticism of his own. I do not know whether Strong himself meant to refer to Ward.

as their owner. In asserting that "this house is built of brick," I assert what might be true if I had never existed. It is otherwise if I asserted that "this house reminds me of my home." Here there is a "multiple relation" which essentially involves not merely "this house" and "another house," but also my mind. It is therefore distinctively a psychological fact. So in general are retention, reproduction, assimilation, association, etc. Objects are retained, reproduced, assimilated, associated; but only inasmuch as they are someone's objects—so that what occurs to them occurs to him. Conversely also, "whatever admits of psychical reproduction and association" may be regarded as "an object presented to a subject."<sup>5</sup> From this point of view, different kinds of objects have been distinguished as "sensations, movements, percepts, images, intuitions, concepts, notions."<sup>6</sup> All of these are (1) "more or less attended to and (2) can be variously combined together and reproduced." Ward comprehends all of them under the common term *presentation*.

In Locke, Descartes, and other writers, the term idea was similarly used, but with a very important difference. In them the term idea is initially connected with a theory of knowledge, which not only distinguishes but divides appearances from the reality which appears. So ideas for them are subjective modifications or mere contents of consciousness, and, as such, contrasted with a real existence which they are supposed to represent. The impossibility of finding any satisfactory bridge between such ideas and real existence then leads naturally, as in the transition from Locke to Berkeley, to subjective idealism, for which the distinction between a real existence and appearance to an individual subject is lost and *esse* is identified with *per-cipi*. Now those who held this "epistemological" doctrine, finding an impasse in other directions, were driven,

<sup>5</sup> *Psychological Principles*, p. 48.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

through sheer helplessness, to pursue psychological inquiries and, in large measure, to substitute psychology for philosophy. Hence, "however surely their philosophy was foredoomed to failure, there is no denying a steady psychological advance as we pass from Locke to Hume and his modern representatives."<sup>7</sup>

Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were driven, owing to their philosophical preconceptions, to adopt the standpoint proper for psychology. It by no means follows that the psychologist, as such, is bound to accept their philosophical doctrine or even to use it as a working hypothesis. Certainly Ward does neither: otherwise his fundamental view of subject and object as two real factors really interacting with each other would be impossible. Such criticism as Mr. Pritchard's<sup>8</sup> is therefore based on sheer misunderstanding. When Ward asserts that "of all the facts with which he deals the psychologist may truly say that their *esse* is *percipi*, in so far as such facts are facts of presentation,"<sup>9</sup> it is plain that the statement is essentially qualified by the last clause which I have italicised. It is as if one should say that for an arithmetician the *esse* of things is to be numerable, or that for an election-candidate the *esse* of men and women is to be voters.

I am, however, far from denying that there are difficulties in Ward's position which make misunderstanding excusable. What these are, and how far they can be met, I shall presently consider. But first I must say more about the "standpoint proper for psychology."

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>8</sup> *Mind*, N. S. XVI. Dawes Hicks partly corrects this misunderstanding (*Mind*, N. S., p. 117). But he himself, as I shall point out later, is not free from it.

<sup>9</sup> Italics mine.

## THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND HIS PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBJECT

There is a fertile source of psychological error, named by James "the psychologist's fallacy," which had previously been defined by Ward as "a confusion between the standpoint of a given experience and the standpoint of its exposition."<sup>10</sup> This fallacy has two forms, one direct and the other inverse. In the first, the psychologist unguardedly transfers to the psychological subject knowledge and experience which belong not to it, but to himself. This is exemplified by any attempt to substitute for a psychological treatment of sensation an account of the physiological conditions under which it occurs. The properly psychological question is what sensations are for the individual who experiences them; but for him they are not initially the effect or sequel of a train of antecedent events; they are primary beginnings. They are "what comes first in the individual's experience and is there simply and positively real." Substituting the physiological for this psychological standpoint leads to the view that sensations are modifications of the subject or, at any rate, that they are, like their nervous correlates, inside the body. It then becomes a problem admitting of no solution how the psychological subject can ever know the world outside him and his own body as part of it. Physiology itself therefore ought to be impossible and the physiologist in substituting his own standpoint for that of psychology has committed logical suicide. It is by no means implied that physiological data and conceptions are not in any way useful in psychology. On the contrary, they are very useful indeed. To

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.



deny this is to fall into the inverse form of the psychologist's fallacy, which arises in an uncritical attempt to avoid the direct form. The exclusive business of the psychologist is to give a coherent and truthful account of "the development of individual experience as it is for the experiencing individual." But there is an essential difference between this experience itself and what the psychologist knows and seeks to know about it. His standpoint and outlook cannot be identical with those of the individual he is studying. Otherwise, in order to study a baby's mind he must himself become a baby and so cease to be a psychologist. No data, conceptions, distinctions, hypotheses are illegitimate in psychology, if and so far as they help relevantly to answer properly psychological questions.

It is only at an advanced stage of mental development that the intensity, quality, and extensity of sensations are distinguished from each other. None the less the psychologist is justified in making the analysis which his psychological subject does not make. He is justified, because the sensations as immediately experienced really have this sort of complexity. Psychological analysis is by no means coincident with psychical analysis.<sup>11</sup> According to Ward the same fallacy is committed by those who deny that the contrast of subject and of object is primordial, on the ground that the two are not distinguished by the primitive mind. Because "a subject whose presentations were all sensations would know nothing of the difference between subject and object" it is urged that no such difference would be there.<sup>12</sup> Ward replies that though "we are bound to describe an infant's state of mind truthfully, that is no reason for abandoning terms which have no counterpart in his consciousness, when these terms are only used to depict that consciousness as it is."

<sup>11</sup> "By *psychological* analysis we mean such analysis as the psychological observer can reflectively make, by *psychical* analysis only such analysis as is possible in the immediate experience of the subject observed." *Ibid.*, p. 105 note.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

Professor Dawes Hicks is unconvinced by this reasoning.<sup>13</sup> I presume that according to him the difference as well as the recognition of it is of such a nature that it cannot be primordial. "For my part," he says, "I find it well nigh impossible to assign any meaning to the phrase 'awareness of an object' which does not involve applying to that of which there is awareness a number of predicates—e. g., independence of the act of apprehending—that even in their crudest forms must obviously be altogether beyond the range of the primitive mind." This seems to miss the point at issue. The primitive mind does not apply the predicate. The individual does not initially say to itself: "What I am now aware of may exist when I cease to be aware of it." None the less if what he perceives is such for him that, when due motive and occasion arise, he can regard it as persisting in the intervals of perception and if he can never come to regard pleasure or pain as persisting when they are not felt, we may truly say that from the outset there is a difference for psychological, though not for psychical, analysis between subjective feeling and presented object.

I would add that the most primitive distinction between self and not-self takes the form of a rudimentary distinction between the individual's own body and other things. It must be a very primitive stage of development, indeed, in which this distinction is not apprehended at all. As for a supposed stage in which there is not only no distinction but no experienced difference between the embodied self and its environment, I would not deny that this is abstractly possible. But there is no evidence that it ever exists. Further, if it did exist, there would be an absolute breach of psychological continuity between it and the higher stage at which the difference emerges. Thus the difference would after all be primordial in the sense of

<sup>13</sup> *Mind*, N. S., 117, pp. 16-17.

being an absolutely fresh beginning and not a development.<sup>14</sup>

### PLASTICITY OF THE PRESENTATION CONTINUUM

There is much in Ward's account of the development of individual experience which naturally suggests that he regards presentations as a *tertium quid*, having a separate existence of their own, intervening between the knowing mind and the real world. I am convinced that this is a misunderstanding. But it is one from which, until recently, I was not myself free. I am, therefore, not surprised that even so careful a student of Ward as Dawes Hicks also shares it.

As Dawes Hicks has clearly shown, the question is one which vitally concerns psychology. The psychologist is not indeed bound to have a theory of knowledge which will at all points stand the test of philosophical criticism. It would be rash to assert that any philosopher is in possession of such a theory. But the psychologist must at least have a view which really works in his own undertaking. He sets out to trace the development of the knowledge of the world as it now is for common sense and science. He therefore stultifies his whole procedure if he assumes that the mind cannot apprehend this world and what it contains, but is throughout dealing with an intervening veil. Does Ward really make this suicidal assumption?

All depends on the view taken of sensation as "what comes first, immediately, and alone, in the individual's experience"<sup>15</sup> and answers to reality in the primary sense of

<sup>14</sup> Dawes Hicks, of course, regards sense-experience if it is not a presented object and a *fortiori* does not consist in those discriminated features of an object which he calls apprehended content? Is it the *tertium quid* which he abhors?

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 103.

the term. If I am right, this means (1) that in sense-experience a real existence directly appears to the individual; (2) that it need not and initially does not appear as it really is;<sup>16</sup> (3) that in the development of knowledge it comes to appear more and more truly and adequately;<sup>17</sup> (4) that sensuous appearance or presentation has no distinct existence of its own as a "subjective modification" or *tertium quid*; it is always the reality itself immediately appearing.

How is this view to be reconciled with Ward's account of the development of knowledge as throughout dependent on the interaction of the *real* subject with its *real* object and more especially with the part which he assigns to mere attention in the process? He extends the term Attention to cover both theoretical and practical activity. What is distinctive of practical activity is that Attention is in it directed to "motor presentations" which are thereby translated into actually experienced movements of the body, producing change in its environment. This happens, for instance, when I actually dissect a flower. Now Ward seems to hold as a fundamental principle, that we also produce objective change, though in a very different way, when, by attentively contemplating a strange flower, we gain a more distinct and detailed apprehension of its partial features. On the ordinary view of common sense, we merely distinguish differences which pre-exist; and if in attending we altered the object of attention we should so far defeat our purpose. Ward's view seems essentially opposed to this. According to him there is not merely discrimination of pre-existing differences; new differences actually emerge, through the interaction of subject and object. What was at the outset a relatively vague total presentation is gradually transformed into a definite pat-

<sup>16</sup> If I were dealing with ultimate philosophical problems, I should press the question how any thing can appear immediately and yet not appear as it is.

<sup>17</sup> According to Ward the final truth is that it is really a system of monads.



tern. The process is threefold: (1) There is a partial modification of the relatively vague and blurred whole whereby it becomes more definitely diversified. This is Differentiation. (2) Previous differentiation persists; this is Retentiveness. (3) The persisting modifications are further modified so that there is progressive increase in complexity, comparable to "the advance from the egg to the chicken." This is Assimilation—the growth of new differences out of old. Differentiation, retentiveness, and assimilation taken together constitute what Ward calls "plasticity." Ward describes the whole development of knowledge—apart, at least, from inter-subjective intercourse—as proceeding through progressive changes in a plastic presentational "Continuum" or tissue. Further the process throughout is an interaction of subject and object in which the action of the subject in attending is the formative agency. In attending, the subject *alters* its object: it makes, instead of merely apprehending differences. But, as Dawes Hicks rightly insists, in merely attending to a flower we do not by any action of ours generate the differences between stamens, pistil, etc. If, therefore, the presentation of the flower is plastic, this presentation must have an existence of its own separate from that of the flower, which is not plastic. Differentiation, assimilation, and retention, are not processes which take place in the flower.

Ward, for purposes of exposition, conceives mental development "beginning at the lowest level of life and advancing continuously up to the level of man"<sup>18</sup> as taking place in the life history of a single imaginary individual. This individual has throughout one and the same sensorimotor presentation continuum which is always in some degree qualitatively diversified and always possesses the fundamental characters of intensity, extensity, and protensity. But at the outset definite and specialized complex-

ity is at a minimum both on the sensory and motor side. On the motor side, there is "original diffused mobility, which is little besides emotional expression"<sup>19</sup>—i. e., immediate expression of pleasure or pain. This motor continuum becomes gradually differentiated into comparatively distinct movements which are combined and co-ordinated in more and more special ways in adaptation to environing conditions. What especially interests us here is that, according to Ward, sense experience develops in just the same way. The primitive presentation-continuum approximates in its nature to what we now experience as organic sensation; external stimuli of various kinds modify this in a way corresponding "very closely to what is called the general vital action of contact, light, heat, etc., as distinct from the action of these stimuli on specially differentiated sensory apparatus."<sup>20</sup> It is only through a long process that the specific qualities which we now experience as light and color, sound, touch, taste, and smell, emerge from the primitive background of "general" sensibility. Again, within each of these special modes of sentience there is further differentiation, generating, e. g., the variety of specific colors and sounds. The whole process whereby the presentational continuum becomes more diversified and complex is essentially interaction of a real self with a real not-self; and the directive and formative agency is throughout Attention. But there is not transformation of the real world corresponding to this transformation of the sensori-motor continuum. However differently the environment of an oyster may appear to the oyster itself and to a human observer, it is still the same environment. It would seem to follow inevitably that the presentational continuum, which is plastic, cannot be any part of the real world which is not correspondingly plastic. If we attend

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Ph. 74-75.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50; *Cf.* Ph. 52-53.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110.

to presentations we do not attend to things. Appearance and reality seem to fall apart as distinct existences. This argument seems strengthened when we consider the correlation of psychological and biological development. Ward, following irresistible biological evidence, holds that the differentiation of the presentation continuum is not only analogous to, but strictly correlated and parallel with the progressive differentiation of the sense organs and nervous system. "Wherever there is psychical plasticity, there is also neural plasticity."<sup>21</sup> But there is no such correlation and correspondence between nervous changes within the living bodies of men and animals on the one hand, and changes in their environment on the other. Ward, by his free use of biological data seems compelled to be false to the psychological standpoint from which he started.

The explanation is to be found in his view of the connection of body and mind. This is most compactly expressed in the saying which he quotes from Leibniz: "the point of view of the monad is its body." The reference as he proceeds to explain "is not to the physical aspect of the organism. What is meant is the psychical or 'intentional' aspect of the body as the medium of intercourse with the objective world, its natural and social environment."<sup>22</sup> To explain this position in the form in which Ward states it, we must refer to his metaphysical monadism, and especially to the points in which this agrees, and disagrees, with that of Leibniz. They agree in holding that what really exists as distinguished from its sensuous appearance is, ultimately, a system of monads. Each monad mirrors this real world differently according to its distinctive place in the whole system; and it does so primarily through its sense experience and in terms of sense experience. Each then has its own special "point of view" or special "perspective." The

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 428.

word "mirrors" and the word "perspective" are for both Leibniz and Ward only metaphorical. But they interpret this figurative language in radically different ways. Both indeed emphatically deny that sense-experience is an effect produced in each monad by interaction with others. Here, however, agreement ceases. According to Leibniz each develops according to the law of its own being without any sort of causal relation to the others. The relation between them in virtue of which each internally represents the whole system is one of correspondence and co-variation presupposing a pre-established harmony. According to Ward the monads appear to each other *immediately* by way of sense-experience, although they do not sensibly appear as they really are but only as phenomena,<sup>23</sup> yet there is no *tertium quid* in the way of ideas conceived as vicariously representing their objects. What we apprehend phenomenally as the body of a man or animal is a group of monads related in a peculiarly intimate way to a central monad, the human or animal mind. The relation is such that the rest of the world sensibly appears to this central individual in a manner and an order determined and limited by its appearance to the monads of the body. To speak metaphorically, it is as if the central monad gathered into focus the scattered rays reaching it through the body monads, and were otherwise without communication with the world beyond. Hence, Ward agrees with Leibniz in asserting that "a soul without a body would be a deserter from the general order" and that the point of view of a monad is its body.

This general theory of sensible appearances is by no means inseparable from the metaphysical doctrine with which it is intertwined in Ward. We have only to recognize what in any case can hardly be denied, that the living

<sup>23</sup> Here the contrast between things as they are in themselves and things as they sensibly appear is startling; and it is not smoothed over for Ward as it is for Leibniz by the view that sense is confused thought.



body in its relation to mental process<sup>24</sup> has a function which is hidden from us when we consider it merely as a physical phenomenon. This being understood the essential points are: (1) that in sense-experience the real world appears directly without any intervening *tertium quid*; (2) that none the less it appears differently to different individuals and to the same individual in different stages and phases of his development; (3) that the factor which determines how it shall appear is the particular constitution of the bodily organism and the changes which occur within it. So formulated, the general position might be accepted, *e. g.*, by Mr. Alexander. According to him sensible appearance differs from what really exists only through the processes of "selection" and distortion. But selection and distortion are throughout conditioned by the body.

We can now understand how it is that Ward regards Attention as always involving real interaction between subject and object. The subject acts directly on its own body just as it does in practical activity. But the resulting adaptation of the sense-organs and modifications of the neural process are not merely physical phenomena. They have also an "intentional" aspect. Hence they determine changes in the way in which other things appear to the subject. They alter the objects attended to as presentations to the individual if they alter them in no other respect. Hence they alter the way in which the subject is agreeably and disagreeably affected by presented objects and so determine its practical activity. It is from this point of view that the whole doctrine of the plasticity of the presentation continuum has to be interpreted.

The true drift of this doctrine comes most clearly to light in the very interesting treatment of psychological heredity in Chapters XVII and XVIII of the *Principles*. The constitution of the presentational continuum or psy-

<sup>24</sup> What Ward calls "its intentional or Psychical aspect."

choplasm is there treated as something which is inherited together with the constitution of the body. In neither case is there literal transference from one generation to another. The parent hands over to his offspring neither his own body nor his own mind. What is inherited is always "a likeness to themselves *said* to be bequeathed by forbears to their descendents. The plain fact is simply that like begets like."<sup>25</sup> The mental likeness is the counterpart and correlate of bodily likeness, when the body is considered in its "intentional" aspect. This inherited *Anlage*, as Ward calls it, not only directly preconditions the affective and active self by determining the range and character of organic sensibility and of motor capacity; it also predetermines the way in which the surrounding world shall be sensibly presented. The *Anlage* of this or that individual has a long ancestral history behind it in which, according to Ward, subjective activity plays at every stage, an indispensable part. The living body is "continuous with other such bodies that were in like manner *angelegt* and each in turn further differentiated by the subject whom it invested." This influence of the mind over the body is exerted at every step through the entire line of the individual's descent from some primaeval protozoan to his own immediate forbears.<sup>26</sup>

### SENSE AND UNDERSTANDING

The preceding account of the development of knowledge is admitted by Ward to be essentially incomplete. It consists, as we have seen, in a process whereby a presentation continuum which is primarily sensori-motor is progressively modified so as to become more complex and differ-

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 422.

entiated. But the presentation continuum or "psychoplasm" of each individual is his own private and incommunicable property. As "the point of view of the monad is its body," each individual will have his own particular presentation-continuum just as he has his own particular body related in particular ways, to its environment. According as the bodies of different individuals are similar or dissimilar, the real world which they apprehend will wear a correspondingly similar or dissimilar appearance to each. "A gannet's mind possessed of a philosopher, if such a conceit may be allowed, would certainly afford its tenant very different spatial experiences from those he might share if he took up his quarters in a mole."<sup>27</sup> At our present level such limitations have been transcended. The individual has overleaped his own shadow. The world as now conceived by common sense and science approximates in its character to the world as it might appear to a disembodied subject, to whom all its parts would be equally and in like manner present. Such a subject would, so to speak, look down on what is particular and peculiar in the diverse individual experiences of men and animals, would explain this as due to their bodily organization and circumstances, and in so explaining would discount it as irrelevant to the nature of things as apprehended from his superior and more comprehensive standpoint. This universal outlook characterizes common sense and in a still higher degree science. How is it reached? We cannot account for it merely through progressive differentiation of an original sensory-motor continuum. There must be another factor. This, according to Ward, is just the common sense in which human individuals participate. It is the outcome of that complex social intercourse which language makes possible. Through language "each several mind may transcend its own limits and share the minds of others." The mental development of each is still exclusively a develop-

ment within his own life history. But "the materials for this development no longer consist of nothing but presentations elaborated by a single mind." A transparent and responsive world of minds is added to the dead opaqueness of external things.<sup>26</sup>

It is only as a result of such intersubjective intercourse that "when ten men see the sun or moon" it may, in spite of differences in its sensible appearance to each, be apprehended by all of them as one and the same in its existence and nature. For all, it has, *e. g.*, individually the same shape and size and position in space. This is so inasmuch as space and these spatial characters are conceived not merely perceived; and are conceived only as the outcome of a process in which many individuals compare their experiences and gradually correlate them in a more and more coherent system. The individual thus comes to apprehend the world from what has been called a "trans-subjective" standpoint as contrasted with the "immediacy and immanence with which all experience begins."

But even at this level the common object is still a phenomenon; it is still ultimately conceived in terms of sensible appearance, however much this may be elaborated by intersubjective intercourse. Ward, therefore, denies that we are justified in assuming the world *as it thus appears*, with its characters of extension, shape, etc., to say nothing of color or sound, to exist *per se* independently of its appearance to any subject. It is indeed a natural fallacy to conclude that because a phenomenal object, as such, is independent of this or that individual experient, it is therefore independent of all collectively. But such reasoning "is about on a par with maintaining that the British House of Commons is an estate of the realm independent of each

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 422.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 144. For further illustration and special reference to space, see the context of this passage.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 286 note.



individual member, and that therefore it might be addressed from the throne, for instance, though there were no members."<sup>29</sup>

Ward's position here is easy to misunderstand: and he has not sufficiently guarded himself against misunderstanding. He does not, as I interpret him, mean to say that for individual, as contrasted with trans-subjective experience, the *esse* of things is *percipi*, so that actual existence consists simply in actual appearance and nothing beyond this. On this view, it would be impossible for the individual to apprehend things as continuing to exist during the intervals of perception. But Ward finds no such difficulty at this point as troubled Berkeley. "As we have existed—or more exactly, as the body has been continuously presented—during the interval between two encounters with some other recognized body, so this comes to be regarded as having continuously existed during its absence from us." It is true that, according to Ward, this step is taken only at a stage in which, through the experience of resisted effort we apprehend something extended as exerting a counter effort, and therefore as actively occupying space. But such solidity, or space-occupancy, which is itself incompatible with the Berkeleyan view, is apprehended at the level of individual perception. Neither the apprehension of solidity nor that of persistence presupposes the "universal experience," which arises through intersubjective intercourse.

What Ward takes to be absent in merely individual experience and present in universal experience is the distinction between true and false appearance, between that which is and that which seems. "'It shines, it moves' not 'it appears to shine, it appears to move' would be the language of an individual percipient."<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 171.

<sup>30</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 166. It should be remembered that even true as distinguished from illusory appearance is still only phenomenal.

Ward has certainly done a great service by his massive insistence on the essential importance of social intercourse as giving rise to the human view of the world, as it appears to common sense and science, in contrast to the limitations of the animal mind. What I, in agreement with other critics, find unsatisfactory is the account given of the relation of this trans-subjective stage to the previous course of mental development. Ward himself maintains that the transition is continuous in a way which is psychologically traceable; and he holds that in tracing it he has shown the continuity of sense-knowledge and thought knowledge. Now it seems to me that he does not and cannot show such continuity without presupposing what he ought to account for—without presupposing that something is thought of which does not immediately appear in sense experience.

His critics urged the question—"How, if every subject is confined to his own unique experience, does this inter-subjective intercourse ever arise?"<sup>31</sup> He answers that "as the sensori-motor adjustments of the organism to its environment—*generally*—advance in complexity and range, there is a concomitant advance in the variety and intimacy of its relations—*specially*—with individuals of its own kind."<sup>32</sup> "When its (bodily) self has become an object, the objects which resemble it become other selves or ejects." Here the essential point seems to be missed. Ward takes for granted as a matter of course that the other bodies like its own will be apprehended by the individual as embodiments of other selves like its own. I admit that, *apart from special theories*, this is a matter of course. The question is whether it is so on Ward's view. Up to this point cognitive advance has been supposed to consist merely in the progressive differentiation of an original sensori-motor continuum. The mere increase in the complexity of this original datum cannot alter its fundamental character any

<sup>31</sup> *Psychological Principles*, p. 33.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.

more than an organism can be so differentiated as to cease to be protoplasm. But the sensations experienced by A cannot, *as such*, appear to B as part of the content of his own sense-experience; they are distinguished from his own as being another's. The same holds for A's awareness of B's feelings and strivings. A thinks of, but does not immediately experience, the experience of B. Thought is involved which transcends the immanence and immediacy of sense, abstractly considered. The thought is inseparably blended with sense-presentation and, so to speak, embedded in it. None the less it cannot be accounted for by any differentiation however complex of an original presentation continuum which is supposed to be merely sensorimotor.

If thought first arises after previous stages which can be accounted for without it, it emerges as a radically new faculty: there is a breach of continuity. But if we examine critically Ward's treatment of the development of the individual percipient prior to the beginning of the trans-subjective stage, we find that it already involves in manifold ways thought as well as sense. To apprehend an object as persisting when it is no longer perceived is to think of existence which is not sensibly presented. In discussing perceptual recognition, Ward lays exclusive stress on the familiarity and the practical facility which arise through attention to impressions frequently repeated in a similar way. What Ward has to say here is in itself true and very important. But such familiarity and facility cannot be substituted for, but rather presuppose, that mental attitude which is expressed in language by "another" or "another such." They cannot be substituted for what Ward himself calls "qualitative identification" and treats as more primitive than the apprehension of objects as persisting when not perceived. I might go on to examine from the same point of view Ward's treatment of spatial and temporal

perception and of images as ideas. My space is too limited for this. I shall therefore proceed at once to urge that thought, as I have defined it, is essential to subjective activity—to what Ward calls Attention and Conation.

Ward himself, when at an advanced stage of his work he comes to treat of thought at the trans-subjective level, recognizes that he is not dealing with something radically novel but with a special development of a feature of mental life which was present even in its rudimentary beginnings. He defines thinking as "finding an *ax* that is *b*."<sup>33</sup> It is "always a search for something more or less vaguely pre-conceived, for a clue which will be known when it is found by helping to satisfy certain conditions." He then proceeds: "there is a continuous development from the extreme of mere blind trial and error—where the only clue is 'anything, anything, only not this' towards an opposite extreme where a crucial disjunction 'either . . . or' can be precisely formulated."<sup>34</sup> On this I would remark that the development is not continuous if we suppose that "trial and error" are at the outset merely blind. If this were so, there would be trial and error only in a metaphorical sense and from the point of view of an onlooker. What is sought must be predetermined for the psychological subject himself as a change in the given situation in those respects in which this situation is felt as unsatisfying. This implies that something is thought that is not given in actual sense-experience. The immediacy of sense is so far transcended.<sup>35</sup> If, on the other hand, we begin in chronological order with an experience which is absolutely blind,

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 295.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 294.

<sup>35</sup> Ward says in a note (p. 295) that "at the lowest sensory level there is nothing answering to *b* in the formula an "*ax* which is *b*"; "there is just a subjective state, the pleasure of success and no more." But the subject is dealing with a concrete and specific situation, and *b* is determined as some relevant change in this. Of course, he does not himself analyze his experience as the psychologist analyzes. In dealing with questions of this sort, we must constantly bear in mind the distinction between psychical and psychological analysis.



there is a breach of continuity between this and even the most rudimentary thought. If we use the word Conation for both stages, we are using it in radically different senses.

What has been said of practical conation holds also for attention in its theoretical aspect. What is here sought is more complete apprehension of an object as initially given or presupposed. The tendency is to make the object more distinct and to relate it to its context,—to develop it more fully in consciousness. Even in the most primitive stages of the process there must be some inarticulate counterpart of the question which we should formulate as: What? or What next? or What more?

The view which emerges from such considerations is that so far as mental development can be regarded as continuous, as Ward takes it to be, sense and thought must from the outset inseparably interpenetrate, so as to vary concomitantly and develop *pari passu*. Sense without thought would be, as Kant says, blind, and could not be properly called Knowledge at all. Thought without sense could not exist because there would be nothing to determine its object.

How far Ward, in the end, would agree or disagree with this view, I find it hard to decide. In the passage which I have just quoted he seems largely to agree. But the passage occurs only after he has fully treated of individual experience apart from intersubjective intercourse. In this earlier part of his work he neither expressly states the general principle nor consistently takes it for granted. On the contrary, he tends throughout to conceive the whole development as consisting merely in progressive modification of a sensori-motor continuum. The dominance of this conception makes his treatment of special problems more or less one-sided. What he has positively to say on the sensori-motor aspect of mental process remains, in the main,

as true and valuable as it is original. But his comparative neglect of the other equally essential aspect creates difficulties which form a stumbling block to some readers.<sup>36</sup>

In dealing with spatial perception, the factors and processes which he regards as fundamentally important are really operative and really essential. But, conceived as he explicitly conceives them, they account only for an increasingly complex and definite pattern within the sensorimotor continuum. They cannot therefore, of themselves, result in what is ordinarily understood by spatial perception, in which extension and local relations are apprehended as characterizing something capable of existing and persisting independently of changes in sense-experience, however complex these may be. Ward cannot, indeed, refer such perception wholly to the trans-subjective stage. The contrary is implied at least in his account of projection and space occupancy. But how he can legitimately reach this view on the assumptions from which alone he explicitly starts, remains obscure.

In discussing temporal perception, Ward insists throughout that "it is a long step from a succession of presentations to awareness of succession."<sup>37</sup> It is necessary to awareness of *a* as before *b* and *c* as after *b*, that *a*, *b*, and *c* shall be simultaneously presented. On the other hand "to ask which is temporarily first among a number of simultaneous presentations is unmeaning."<sup>38</sup> It seems to follow that succession cannot be known at all if we mean by presentations merely modifications of the sensory continuum. This is not, however, Ward's view. The difficulty is, he holds, fatal to the possibility of any awareness of succession prior to the stage in which trains of free images emerge. But at this stage it is overcome. It is so "because

<sup>36</sup> More especially to those who like Mr. Pritchard are inclined to identify Psychology with subjective idealism.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214.

with each distinct representation *a, b, c, d*, there is probably connected some trace of the movement of attention of which we are aware in passing from one presentation to another." He calls such residual movements of attention temporal signs. But such temporal signs, even if we admit their existence, are present experiences in the same way as images are. They are not themselves thoughts of experiences which are *no more* or *not yet* actually experienced. Thus the original difficulty recurs. What seems to hide this from Ward and his readers is his use of the words "representation" and "idea" as interchangeable with "image." An image is, according to him, a special and relatively late differentiation or outgrowth of the sensory continuum. In calling it a representation it seems to be further implied that the subject represents something else, *e. g.*, a past or future impression by means of it. This again implies that a present modification of the sensory continuum, though it cannot *be*, may none the less determine the thought of what precedes and follows it. But once this is presupposed, there is no good ground for denying an inarticulate awareness of time transcience of *no more* and *not yet*—long before the stage of free images is reached. Ward himself asserts that the experience of change is ultimate,<sup>39</sup> but how can there be an experience of change which is not an experience of transition. It may be said that the transition may be blindly experienced, without being known. I reply that this can hardly hold good for the passage from conation to what, for the subject himself, is fulfillment or disappointment, or for the change in the appearance of an object in successive phase of the process of attending to it. The dog in the fable who jumped at the bit of meat reflected in the water was surely aware of a transition. If Ward had started with a rudimentary time perception, what he had to say about its later stages

<sup>39</sup> P., p. 212.

would have retained its full value and would have gained in clearness and cogency. Resisting a strong temptation to pursue this topic in further detail, I may sum up as follows. It is misleading to speak, as Ward does, of a continuous development from sense knowledge to thought knowledge. All knowledge and all development of knowledge involves both thought and sense in inseparable unity. A blind sense experience is not knowledge at all and could not become so by any process, however continuous, of differentiation and integration. It is especially important to keep this in view in discussing Ward's view of the nature of the self or "pure ego."

#### THE PURE EGO AS ACTIVE AND FEELING SUBJECT

"By pure ego or subject," says Ward, "it is proposed to denote the simple fact that everything experienced is referred to a self experiencing."<sup>40</sup> But, on further examination, this fact turns out to be anything but simple, if by simple we mean easy to understand. The pure ego, as that which knows, feels pleasantly and unpleasantly and attends, is regarded as a distinct existence, set over against the objective world as presented to it. It is a distinct agent, operating on the presentations which confront it and being in turn agreeably or disagreeably affected by these. It has therefore that relative independence which is implied in interaction. To conceive it aright we must uncompromisingly discriminate, without separating it, from each and all of the objects which it knows, to which it attends, and by which it is consequently affected. How then can it be known at all, seeing that in becoming known, it must become an object and so cease to be pure subject. This is a

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.



difficulty to which Ward is keenly alive. He meets it in principle by saying that though the pure self cannot be known directly yet, in an assignable and traceable way, we may indirectly know of it as implied in the existence of presented objects. But such knowledge is reached only as the final outcome of a long and complex process in which the pure ego becomes gradually disentangled from various presentational wrappings which mask and disguise it. Considered generally, as an account of the development of the self and of self-consciousness, Ward's work is here admirable and ought to be carefully studied by every psychologist. But considered as an attempt to meet his own theoretical problem of how the pure ego, as such, can be known at all, it seems to me to be a brilliant failure.

The self, at the outset, is known only in its sensible appearance as a bodily self. In the most primitive stage, the boundary between it and other things is the skin; perception and action are relations between the organism and its immediate present environment; on the side of feeling, it is marked off from other things as the seat of the massive but ill-defined organic sensations with which our earlier pleasures and pains are directly connected. "The body is the only thing directly set in motion through the reaction of these feelings, the purpose of such movements being to bring it nearer to the things for which there is 'appetite' and to remove it from those for which there is 'aversion'." It is thus distinctively characterized by centrality, permanence, and individuality, and "affords an ever-present double" of the actual feeling and living self."<sup>41</sup>

With the development of free images there is distinguished "An inner zone of self having still more unity and permanence." There is "an intuition not only of the bodily self doing and suffering here and now," but also memories of what it has done and suffered and anticipations

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 365.

of what it will do and suffer. Adaptation is not only to the immediate environment but to situations relatively remote in time and space. From this more advanced point of view, the boundary between self and not-self is no longer the skin. The external organs of sensation and movement are coming to be regarded as its property—as instruments which it uses—rather than as part of its being. It is regarded as placed inside the body where the organic sensations, inseparable from emotional agitation, are apparently localized, i. e., in the midriff. This is the imagining and desiring self.

It is only through the development of social communion among human beings that a conception of self becomes possible in which it is discriminated from its bodily double and ultimately from all objects. "As a member of society each one plays many parts—has many social selves or *roles*—and so he comes first to conceive himself as the actor that sustains or impersonates them all." This actor on the social stage is the *personal self*. The parts which he plays are still only masks or doubles of the pure ego. But they form the last disguise, so that when this vestment is stripped off there is nothing left but the conception of a subject which is subject only and not object. What makes this step possible is "that before he can act, the man has often to think and will, to plan, compare, and rehearse any new part he is striving to play." This presupposes a self behind the scenes which can no longer be identified or confused with any object. Critical reflection on this situation inevitably leads to the conception of a pure ego.

There are two alternative ways of interpreting this account of the development of self-consciousness. In one the transition is taken to be from confused to distinct knowledge. On this view, in apprehending the bodily self we *ipso facto* apprehend the pure self—directly or indirectly. We apprehend it inasmuch as it is indiscriminately in-

cluded in the confused whole—the embodied self. All that is required in order to attain pure self-consciousness is that what is thus confusedly known should be disentangled from its irrelevant setting. But this does not seem to be Ward's view. For him, the empirical self of the lower levels is a "double" which does not include, but is provisionally substituted instead of, the pure ego. Similarly activity and feeling are not originally known either directly or indirectly. Only their presentational substitutes are apprehended. Starting with such assumptions it is quite unintelligible to me how pure self-consciousness can ever be attained. We must not here press the metaphor of a vestment. When we strip off clothes we can see what is inside them, provided that which is inside is not invisible. But the pure ego is supposed to be initially invisible. That is the essential reason why it is not itself supposed to be originally known but only its presentational doubles. How then can it be revealed, directly or indirectly, merely by removing these empirical substitutes.

There is a further difficulty which Ward himself signalizes. The process above described seems to yield only a limiting conception empty of all positive content. "We began with self represented by concentric objective zones, sensory, ideational, personal, spiritual, and end with a *focus imaginarius* as Kant called it."<sup>42</sup> "But that pure subject or Ego which we reach in our analysis of experience at its rational level stands for no abstraction"<sup>43</sup> Ward's attempt to meet this difficulty is to me somewhat obscure; and no attempt which starts from his assumptions can, I submit, be possibly successful. It is not enough to point out that though our conception of the pure ego is abstract, yet we know that it cannot itself, as it really exists, be an abstraction. As *known to us*, it is essentially characterized by feeling and activity. But feeling and activity are as directly

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 377.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 379.

and positively known as anything can be.<sup>44</sup> I know as positively and directly the qualitative difference between being pleased and being pained as I know that between black and white. Yet Ward's primary position, from which to the end he never departs, is that we "know of" feeling and attention "mediately by their effects; we do not know them immediately in themselves."<sup>45</sup> The difficulty is not met by saying that "experience is wider than knowledge" and that feeling and activity are experienced. What is required is that we should know them *as* they are experienced. "Into the empty form of consciousness," says Ward, "our being fits."<sup>46</sup> But how can it be *known* to fit, if all that is known is the empty form, the positive content not being known but merely experienced.

From this intolerable position there seems to be no way of escape unless we give up Ward's conception of a pure ego as a single principle confronting the complex content of presentation. So regarded, its knowing cannot be conceived except as analogous to seeing with the bodily eye; and as the eye cannot see itself, so the pure ego cannot know itself. It is true that we can know indirectly what our own eyes look like, e. g., by seeing reflections of them; but this is only because our eyes themselves belong to the objective world and are connected by objective relations to other objects. But there can be no such indirect knowledge of the pure subject which *ex hypothesi* stands in exclusive antithesis to the objective world as a whole. In like manner, the activity and passivity of the pure self, its doing and undergoing, must consist in a process going on in an agent quite distinct from the presentational continuum, however closely and constantly it may affect and be affected by presentational changes. Hence, feeling and

<sup>44</sup> I admit that they are at first known confusedly, so that it is difficult to discriminate, e. g., pure pleasure and pain from organic sensation; but confused knowledge may be positive and direct.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.



attention cannot be known in their own nature as positively experienced; if known at all, they can only be known through their effects.

We can hardly avoid the conclusion that Ward's view is untenable. On the other hand, we must take care not to throw out the child with the bath. He has, in his insistent polemic against presentationism, at least shown the need for some thorough-going distinction between activity and feeling as characterizing the self in its individual unity and such presentational processes as assimilation, association, etc. The question is whether this distinction can be drawn in a way which is free from the difficulties found in his view of the pure ego.

All turns on the way in which we are to conceive individual unity. Ward seems always to assume that this excludes complexity. His pure self is regarded as a simple being essentially related to a manifold but in principle really distinct from it. The alternative view is that the unity of the individual is the unity of a complex whole, which is indivisible inasmuch as its partial ingredients have not an independent existence of their own, such that the whole could conceivably be constituted by taking them separately and then combining them. Individuality, in this sense, is not confined to mind: it is found, *e. g.*, in organic life. But it is in the mental life that it is, beyond comparison, most fully developed and most clearly recognizable.

The form of unity peculiarly characteristic of mental life is commonly called the unity of consciousness. Ward expressly denies that this can be made to account for what he means by the "psychological subject." He does so on the ground that it is a unity not of consciousness itself, but of the "so-called contents of consciousness"—"ideas, objects or presentations." It thus fails to include "the purely psychological facts of feeling and impulse" and it is just these facts "which compel us to recognize a conscious subject as

well as unity and continuity of the so-called contents of consciousness."<sup>47</sup>

This position follows naturally from Ward's initial assumption that mental development consists in the gradual differentiation of a plastic presentation continuum regarded as, in the first instance, purely sensori-motor. On this view, if we ascribe to the individual subject any activity at all, it can hardly be other than that of an agent operating on a given material. But when once we recognize that thought, however rudimentary, is indispensable to the being of any thing which can properly be called an individual self or "I," his argument seems to break down.

I would urge that there is no unity and identity in attention, conation and feeling, which they do not essentially owe to the unity and identity of their object as such. In attending to a relatively obscure and fragmentary presentation, so as to make it more distinct, detailed, and complete, my attention is throughout one and the same activity only insofar as its object is apprehended as one and the same. So, in attempting to alter a painful situation, there is unity and identity in the conative process only insofar as resulting change is recognized as change in that same situation. It is this sort of unity which is implied when at the level of self-consciousness we refer the various stages and phases of our existence to an identical self. We do not require besides this, and as a precondition of this, a distinct single agent set over against its presentations, as such, and interacting with them. It is true that unity of consciousness if it is taken as merely cognitive is not, of itself, the unity of concrete experience; for mere cognition is an abstraction incapable of existing by itself. None the less, cognitive unity supplies the abstract scheme which is progressively realized in the concrete life of conation and feeling. There is cognitive unity insofar as the several distinct items of

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 381.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

knowledge are apprehended, not in isolation, but as one with a context beyond themselves and as somehow related to each other within this context. There is cognitive unity inasmuch as objective experience is essentially incomplete so as to open a field for seeking or inquiring—for “finding an *ax* that is *b*.” But the actual seeking or inquiring is mental activity—what Ward calls Attention.<sup>48</sup> Attention, in this wide sense, is a function of the self in its individual unity and identity, inasmuch as in and through it the unity of the whole mental life is actively expressed, sustained, and developed. Pleasant and painful feelings are affections of the self as an individual unity inasmuch as they are ways in which experienced activity is qualitatively modified according as it is furthered or thwarted.

I do not, of course, assert that there is nothing corresponding to what Ward calls interaction between subject and object. On the contrary, the process by which the individual maintains and develops its own unity can never be purely immanent. It is always essentially a transaction with the not-self just as vital process is a transaction between the organism and environing conditions. My point is that the subject of this transaction is not what Ward conceives as a “pure ego.” It includes objects insofar as these are already known or thought of, and thus already enter into individual experience at any given moment. On the other hand, what it acts on and reacts on it is objective being, so far as this is not yet fully and determinately presented. When I voluntarily strike a match, it is no adequate account of what takes place to say that the thought or idea of a certain event realizes itself. For the idea is effective only in and through the active process which is a function of the self as a whole. But it is equally true that the peculiar dominance of the idea which leads to its realization is an immanent phase of the whole process

<sup>48</sup> Except that Ward recognizes a primitive form of attention which is non-voluntary, so non-conative. Here I cannot follow him.

and not merely an effect produced by it in something else. The actual striking of the match, on the other hand, involves what may properly be called interaction between the self and the not-self—and primarily between the self and its body.<sup>49</sup>

Such a view as this leaves no room for interaction between presentations, as such, considered as a process distinct from and co-ordinate with the activity of the self. The distinction which Ward thus describes is rather between two mutually supplementary ways of approaching psychological problems, broadly corresponding to the so-called mechanical and teleological points of view in biology. All vital process when considered in its partial details is through and through "mechanical."

As again, the biologist in his piecemeal description of the physico-chemical events and of their relation to each other loses sight of that action of the organism as a whole which determines the concrete interdependence and co-ordination of these partial occurrences—so the psychologist in the piecemeal analysis of presentational changes fails to see the wood for the trees, getting out of line with the inclusive activity which is a function of the self as a whole. In both cases there is a natural temptation to posit a distinct agent operating *ab extra*, so as to direct, control and co-ordinate the partial processes. In biology this supposed factor, known as a "vital principle," is rejected even by these modern biologists who are most strenuous in urging the inadequacy of a purely mechanical treatment of vital process. What I here suggest is that Ward's pure subject is no more indispensable in psychology than "vital principle" is in biology. It is not, it seems to me, required for Ward's own Psychology. Nearly everything which he says about the part played by attention and feeling in

<sup>49</sup> From the standpoint of psycho-physical parallelism, this will have its counterpart in interaction between the neural process immediately correlated with conscious life and other bodily process.



our mental life may be understood and accepted, with some change in the form of statement, without accepting his peculiar doctrine of the pure ego. At least, I have found it so. I have only to add in conclusion, that a close student of Ward can hardly fail to be fully convinced that in some form or other the conception of active subject as an individual unity is essential to anything like an adequate and systematic treatment of psychological problems.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> The unity of the living organism is no tenable substitute: the biologist may indeed be driven to recognize some such unity as required to supplement the inadequacy of the "mechanical" point of view. But he cannot, so long as he consistently adheres to the standpoint of physical science, give any positive meaning to it. It remains vague and mysterious unless he falls back on the analogy of mental life—unless he approaches biology from a psychological standpoint. This is forcibly brought out in Mr. E. S. Russell's recent work, *The Study of Living Things*. So far Russell is in full agreement with Ward.

## WARD'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

THE earliest amongst Ward's philosophical writings which has been preserved is a paper with the title, "Can Faith Remove Mountains?" It was read to a discussion-society in 1879 and, although it has never been published, its argument often reappears in his later writings. By "mountains" the author means those conclusions of modern science and philosophy which seem to render impossible the consummation to which faith in God and the hope of immortality point; and by faith removing mountains he means "realizing its object and so justifying itself by the actual experience and knowledge of what has been hoped for while yet unseen." Two points arise in dealing with the question thus formulated. The former of these concerns the scientific obstacles to faith; the latter investigates the existence of other or extra-scientific grounds for it.

If theistic belief contradicted the results of science, then indeed the question would be settled. "But it is one thing," he says, "to believe a general proposition as inductively established and quite another thing to know all the particulars it will cover. . . . I do not quarrel with modern thought for insisting on physical continuity or on the inconceivability of disembodied spirits. But I must protest against that finality which regards our most general conceptions as if they were handcuffs on a once-vagrant body of facts now at length secure and well-known to the

savant. . . . The very method of all our knowing necessitates ignorance. To know we must abstract, i. e., ignore as comparatively irrelevant details with which we cannot cope, and so we spin over 'the solid ground of nature' the thin webs of our systems and think we have comprehended the universe. The swinging of a church lamp, the falling of an apple, were such irrelevant details till Galileo and Newton saw in them the very foundations of physics. . . . The variation of domestic pigeons was an irrelevant detail till it set Darwin to investigate the origin of species. Surely then, if our boasted uniformity of Nature is worth anything, it should lead us to expect that in the future as in the past innumerable new facts that lie outside the meshes of our present science will furnish the starting points for fresh lines by which we shall comprehend nature more completely without doing any violence to those fundamental conceptions by which alone we can comprehend it at all. Allowing then to the full the continuity of nature, I cannot see that modern science is entitled to the proud boast I once heard made by the German Tyndall (Du Bois Reymond) on her behalf: *endlich haben wir das Universum entgöttert.*"

In these sentences we find more than a hint of the descriptive theory of scientific concepts afterwards formulated by Mach and others and developed by Ward also in later writings. Still more striking, especially in view of his work on the philosophy of religion, are some of his utterances when he goes on "to consider what analogies there are to justify (religious) faith, so far as analogy can justify anything, and under what circumstances such analogies will apply." This section of his argument contains a good deal that he was able to repeat, almost *verbatim*, in the concluding chapters of *The Realm of Ends*. "If we glance at the past history of the organic world as Darwin and Spencer expound it, we shall find that almost every

forward step could be formulated in this way: it was an act of faith not warranted by aught within the ken of the savant at that point. There was little, for example, in all that the wisest fish could know to justify the belief that there was more scope for existence on the earth than in the water and that persistent attempts to live on land would issue in the transformation of his swim-bladder into lungs. And when as yet there was not a bird to cleave the air there was surely little in all that the most daring of saurian speculators could surmise concerning that untrodden element to warrant any risk to his bones to satisfy his longing to soar, although, when he did try, his fore-legs were changed to wings at length and his dim prevision of a bird became incarnate in himself. No doubt with perfect knowledge all this would be otherwise; but the point is that, with such knowledge as ours, the maxim holds: nothing venture, nothing have. We trust and try first and understand after, till at length we are almost at one with Anselm's *credo ut intelligam*. The whole history of man, and indeed of all animate nature, seems to me to teem with instances in which 'mountains' that Reason, or if you will that Science, could see have been surmounted by blind faith, encouraged, it may be, or awakened by vague promptings to which reason, having—as has been well said—eyes but no ears, had no clue and gave no heed. I know nothing more wonderful than this unscientific trustfulness that from the very beginning seems to have been ingrained in things, likening them to Abraham, the type and father of the faithful, who 'when he was called . . . obeyed and went out, not knowing whither he went'."

Of such faith "the only test we can apply from our present point of view is that of success, survival of the fittest." "But the practice which justifies itself by results is also in the end at one with the theory it has helped to complete. . . . As the creatures that strained towards the light now



have eyes to see, whilst those that cleave to the primal slime remain full of darkness, may it not be that those among men who trust their religious impulses will attain in the end an insight as superior to all inferences based on sight as sight itself is to the gropings of the blind? . . . There was a time, the evolutionists tell us, when consciousness had not appeared on the scene; and the development of self-consciousness out of this was a process long and slow. But is self-consciousness the highest form of psychical life conceivable? Is there no meaning in the conception of a God-consciousness too? Those in whom self-consciousness is most developed are the readiest to admit that the light is dim when they seek to penetrate to this self: if this darkness should clear away might there not be something revealed of which our philosophies as yet scarcely dream? And may not the straining after God to which faith in Him leads quicken this new consciousness into life and show at length that it was from Him the impulse sprang? For, if we regard the world as a whole as the Unknown struggling into life, may not religious faith be a higher phase of this struggle; and, if so, is it not as likely to be consummated as those lower and blinder impulses have been?"

Attention has been drawn to these early reflections, partly on account of their intrinsic interest, but mainly because of the light they shed on the author's subsequent work. His two important works on metaphysics start from the discrimination of problems already suggested in his first paper. In *Naturalism and Agnosticism* he faces the scientific demurrer against theistic speculation and elaborates a theory of science which distinguishes its method and conclusions both from the negations of naturalism and from the speculative impotence of agnosticism; he reaches also certain positive results which he himself described as spiritualistic monism (meaning by monism that all reality is ultimately of one kind—spiritual—not that all realities

are merely modes of one being). He even asserts that this conclusion is an essential preliminary to his subsequent inquiries. "I take it for granted," he says in the preface, "that till an idealistic (*i. e.*, spiritualistic) view of the world can be sustained, any exposition of theism is but wasted labor." This is an extreme statement; he did not say, however, that even "the downright dualist who ascribes reality to matter and to mind alike" could not consistently be a theist; but he asserted that unless dualism be refuted we cannot "attain to" theism (that is, I presume, give adequate logical reasons for its acceptance), and he stoutly maintained that such dualism was an offence against the principle of continuity. He saw no fundamental objection to occasionalism, but argued that the "panpsychical or Leibnizian" alternative was preferable, and that when we talk in Hegelian fashion "of *die Natur als Vorstufe des Geistes*, what is meant is not that there is a breach of evolutionary continuity but simply that the level of *self-conscious existence*, of spirit in the narrower sense, is reached continuously by development through earlier stages of more or less conscious life."

The second of the two problems thus discriminated—that of the positive grounds for theistic belief—is investigated in *The Realm of Ends*. The paper on Faith had asked only what analogies there were in organic life to religious faith and what the value of these analogies might be. The analogies reappear in the later work, but it goes far beyond them, covering almost the whole field of the philosophy of religion. So far as any distinction can be drawn between philosophy of religion and philosophical theology it lies in the definite recognition by the former of the facts of religious experience and their possible evidential value. That Ward had this range of experience in view from the first is shown by his preliminary definition of faith in the paper from which I have quoted and in his reference to

"God-consciousness" at its close. The same point is made more explicit in a manuscript note-book on "Philosophy of Religion." "Religion," he there says, "is first and last a matter of experience. As ethics and aesthetics presuppose special experiences, so here. Pure theory—science and theoretical philosophy—have nothing to do with goodness or oughtness or beauty or religious faith: the experiences on which these rest lead to the corresponding ethical, aesthetical and religious concepts; and, since these experiences do not fall within the theoretical domain, theory alone can never legitimate their concepts." To these distinctions, however, an important proviso follows almost immediately: "though we divide knowledge into compartments, yet experience is an organic whole."

Neither in *The Realm of Ends* nor elsewhere did Ward enter upon any elaborate description of the facts of religious experience, such as other contemporary writers have attempted. He would not have described that work as a philosophy of religion; the facts of moral experience are more fundamental for its argument than those of religious experience; but the general features of religious experience have their place in it, and it issues in their justification. Indeed this follows from his general view of experience as an organic whole; religious experience is not isolated but a factor in this whole. Further, as he often insisted, experience is not passive reception of impressions; it is experiment, a process of selection in contact with an environment; through trial and error the subject of experience becomes expert.

Activity and the duality of subject-object are thus involved in all experience. This position is fundamental for Ward's psychology and philosophy, and on this basis his religious philosophy is built up. For this experience is the matter of fact which should be the starting point of all further speculation; subject, taken alone, like object taken

alone, in a one-sided abstraction, without the mark of reality. When Ward came to write *The Realm of Ends*, the vogue of pluralism was at its height, but that was not the reason for its prominence in his work. His own line of thought had been taken long before when singularism (as he called it) was in the ascendant; and it was developed by him in writings on different topics spread over many years. What is striking is the fundamental consistency of his thought during this long period and of the coherence of his final view of reality.

What he offers is a speculative interpretation of experience on the ascending levels of life, mind, morality and religion. Below the level of life—in the thing which is without any subjective aspect—he cannot find reality, only an abstraction from what is real. He starts *in mediis rebus* with the human type of experience; he can conceive higher forms of conscious life; he is familiar with many lower forms, and in these, as we go down the scale, the subjective aspect becomes less and less apparent till we are unable to identify it all. Nevertheless, that it is never absent altogether is an inference from the principle of continuity, and it saves the ultimate unity of the nature of the world: there will be nothing absolutely inorganic. It is a bold inference, however, for the continuity which we observe in nature is never strict or mathematical continuity: the differences between different individuals may be minute, but they are not infinitesimal. Strict continuity such as the mathematical would indeed be hard to reconcile with the doctrine of epigenesis; and epigenesis, as Ward constantly insists and as every biologist recognizes, is the method of evolution: the organism is not “evolved” from the cell, or the mind of a man from the mere subject of experience, without the give and take of interaction with the environment.



The recognition of epigenesis is, of course, the mark which distinguishes all modern pluralism from Leibniz's. The Monads have windows; they interact. But Ward goes on to stress the point that this interaction is not of the nature of mechanical causation; it is a "sympathetic *rapport*" of agents whose nature is (in the wide sense) spiritual. Further, the organization of living bodies and the mechanical connections which we observe in nature are themselves the result of this spiritual activity. "Since," he says, "for pluralism there are no natural laws so to say 'in force' from the beginning, but on the contrary all natural laws are evolved, there will be no rigorous and mechanical concatenation of things such as naturalism is wont to assume: the fixity, so far as it is real, will embody the result of experience; so far as it is apparent, it will be due, as we have seen, to the statistical constancy of large numbers. But, again, in a world consisting of finite individuals no single individual and no community of such can foresee all the consequences of what they do: over and above what was intended much will result that was not intended. . . . As the result of what are aptly called blind impulses, whether due to positive pain or to mere restlessness, the successful individual or race gradually raises itself in the scale of life, shows a "tendency to progression," function perfecting structure, though the end attained may never be foreseen." All automatism is of the nature of a habit—of what is commonly called the secondarily automatic. What is routine for the individual was attained by a devious and tentative route in the experience of the race. This bold generalization is supported by a wealth of biological and psychological detail—sufficient, I think, to justify it as a working hypothesis. Clearly, however, there are much stronger grounds for admitting it within the realm of living beings, which we know to be such, than within the realm of what are commonly called inorganic things—though the pam-

psychist will dispute the distinction. It is only, however, the non-theistic pluralist who is compelled to regard "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of the earth" as consisting of countless numbers of obscure finite centers of life whose early discordant actions after much trial and error have produced the music of the spheres.

Ward's fundamental positions lead him to maintain with Spinoza and Leibniz that "all individual things are animated, albeit in diverse degrees." Their nature lies not in some supposed statical substance, but in their behavior or conduct; and each is distinguished by its characteristic behavior. One mark, however, is common to all; they all seek self-preservation—perhaps, self-betterment. Self-conservation is "the irreducible minimum essential to being in any sense a subject or self at all"; self-development, still the aim of many, "was perhaps at the beginning the aim of all." And, when the conceptual level is reached, what is aimed at is sought *sub specie boni*. The way of conduct is like the way of knowledge; fundamentally they are the same; trial and error are the means by which man attains both to truth and to goodness. And they are further alike in this that, as there is no principle of falsity, so there is no principle of evil. This is the element of validity in the old doctrine of the negative nature of evil: it is a failure to see or to realize what is good; apart from possible goodness there would be no evil; the latter has no place in the world when interpreted as a realm of ends.

If this position can be maintained, there is a further character common to all the countless individuals that make up the pluralist's universe. They are not only active subjects of experience interacting with an environment which consists of other selves; they have also a common *nisus* towards goodness, in spite of the wayward paths by which they seek it. And I think it was chiefly this *nisus* towards the good which he found present, however ob-

scurely, in each individual, that compelled Ward to see the unity of the whole from the theistic standpoint. He tried to make pluralism work and could not; he found it incomplete and unsatisfying, though not charged with inherent contradictions. Nor, on the other hand, did he think that, as a philosophical theory, theism could be proved. Here he follows Kant, and uses a striking illustration which is worth quoting. "Though," he says, "demonstrations of the existence of God are unattainable, it by no means follows that the idea is theoretically worthless. It has even in this respect—to say nothing of its practical value—a 'regulative use' as what Kant called a *focus imaginarius*, a use which he declared to be not only admirable but indispensable. What Kant meant by a *focus imaginarius* it may be worth while to illustrate by an example. Suppose the earth were wrapped in cloud all day while the sky was clear at night, so that we were able to see the planets and observe their movements as we do now, though the sun itself was invisible. The best account we could give of the planetary motions would still be to refer them to what for us in accordance with our supposition would only be an imaginary focus, but one to which was assigned a position identical with the sun's position. The pluralist's universe, according to Kant, answers to the wandering orbs that we see and God to the sun, which we are supposed not to see but merely to conceive as giving to their motions both reason and unity."

The above quotation illustrates his theoretical view of theism. What may be called his moral argument was restated in succinct terms in answer to a critic: "The world has progressed so far that the best of men are dominated by moral ideals, and the question arises: Can these ideals be realized? If they cannot, the world, in spite of this advance, is not rational: if they can, it is. But we know nothing that compels us to say that they cannot. At the

same time theism and its corollary, a future life, would meet all our practical needs and give besides a theoretical completeness to our *Weltanschauung* that it must otherwise lack."

This is all groundwork. What follows upon it in the book is Ward's contribution towards the reconstruction of theology. It makes no pretence of system or completeness; but the topics selected are the most significant in the field of theology. Once the theistic standpoint is adopted, we might say that two questions arise. One is What is God, so far as we can see or infer? The other is What is the universe from the point of view (so to speak) of God? But obviously the two questions are interdependent: our interpretation of the universe will depend upon our view of the nature of God, and what we know of God is itself dependent upon our knowledge of the world whose ground he is. Whatever the topic may be—creation, providence, eternal life—we have to look at it both from the divine side and from the human; and the introduction of the former must profoundly modify our view of the latter.

"Theism," as Ward maintains, "is not simply the possible crown and completion of pluralism: such a transcendent modification will, it may be expected, change all." But it cannot negate the truths of experience which it was introduced to unify and interpret. Man will not be less man, nor the universe of interacting subjects less real, because God has been found: only their significance will be heightened. The problem of God in relation to man and the world is rendered difficult, for the two simplest solutions are seen to be inadequate—pantheism, in which the reality of the finite is lost in God, and deism in which God is separated from the world he has made. Accordingly it is inevitable that the thinker must steer a cautious course between the rocks of deism and the absolutist whirlpool.



In general I think that that is what Ward has done and that—whatever criticisms may be urged against points of detail—he has laid down the lines for a true philosophy of theism. He begins with the concept of creation. Discarding both the temporal and the causal aspects which belong to it in ordinary thought, he finds a useful but imperfect analogy of it in the work of the artist which we call creative; the divine creation, however, implies no antecedent formless matter which needs shaping; nor does the creator stand aside from his work as the artist does. Apart from the world he is as inconceivable as the world is apart from him. But he is the ground (rather than cause) of the world; its existence depends upon him not at one moment only but always. So far, this statement could be interpreted in terms of absolutism, were we not already convinced of the reality of the finite. We are therefore justified in saying that God limits himself in giving existence to freely acting minds.

Similarly with regard to the concept of Providence. The world is a temporal evolution and God cannot be said to be unconcerned with it; on the other hand if he determined every incident in it, the whole view of evolution from which Ward's theism results would disappear; contingency in the behavior of monads, freedom in man, are fundamental. Hence a solution which looks (it must be confessed) something like a compromise: the plan or purpose of evolution must be assigned to God (clearly no finite spirit has determined it) while the details are largely contingent. In this way, again, God limits himself, and those who carry out his purpose may be said to be co-workers with him. "It is," said Ward, "just the power to do and to initiate without being ready-made that constitutes a free agent, a person who can never be reduplicated, as a machine can always be. But it does not follow that with a world of such free agents God will always or ever be liable to sur-

prises. It implies that he will always be interested: indeed he could not be a God of love if he were not. Yet the continuity between the actual and the possible and his complete knowledge of both make his main purpose secure. . . . There is no denying freedom. Substitute providence for prescience, continuous control for eternal decree, and the whole difficulty vanishes and nothing of value is lost."

The crucial problem of evil is discussed on similar lines. No fully satisfactory solution of the power and ramifications of evil is given or attempted, but an explanation of its place in a moral universe is essential. And Ward's explanation is the only one that meets the case. There is no principle of evil, as there is of goodness; but the possibility of evil belongs to the nature of a world in which there is contingency and freedom. It is the "travail of the creature," taking its own way until in the fulness of time the good is discovered and freely chosen.

The doctrine of personal immortality is not a part of theism, but it may be a consequence of it: and that it is such Ward maintains: "Our moral ideals lead not only to faith in God, but also, supported by this faith, to belief in a future life. The question of the rationality of this belief depends, we have allowed, on the value we are entitled to assign to man and to his work." But, granted this ethical postulate, he seems to put immortality on the same level of rationality as theism: "either the world is not rational or man does not stand alone and this life is not all." Now, although this argument from value is the only argument regarded as valid, yet, if immortality be admitted, its place in the theoretical scheme must be investigated. It is impossible to follow Ward's discussion, but one point may be noticed—the question whether immortality involves pre-existence. Ward inclines to an affirmative answer to this question; and certainly it seems to give a more harmonious view, if death is not the end, to say that birth is not the

beginning. But, from the point of view of value, there is a consideration which should not be left out of sight. If the continuity between this life and the future is no greater than that between a pre-natal life and the present—if, in a word, no memory connect the succession of lives—the value of the new life, not merely from the point of view of enjoyment but also from that of the development of consciousness, seems imperilled if not largely lost.

All these topics (that of evil, however, less obviously than the others) involve or fall back upon the perplexing problem of the relation of time to the eternal; and this is the reason why there is always something tentative about the solutions offered. On that problem also Ward has something useful to say: especially the discrimination of the three senses—formal, ontological, and axiological—in which time and eternity are contrasted. But the problem itself remains unsolved and perhaps insoluble. How can we, whose life and thinking are in time, understand the divine experience or experience the divine nature? When he deals with this problem he seems to return to his early question concerning faith and to illuminate his first thoughts by the results of mature reflection. To begin with, faith was represented as blind and groping, but light and direction have come from the experience and ideals of value. "All our good deeds render us more, and all our evil deeds render us less, amenable to divine influence or inspiration." Further, it would seem in harmony with the whole trend of the argument to add that the good deeds lead also to clearer insight into the divine nature and even perhaps to the mystical "God-consciousness" of which he spoke.

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## JAMES WARD'S DOCTRINE OF EXPERIENCE

THE philosophy which James Ward offered to the general public from his fifty-sixth year onward comes to us as a scholarly worked-out system which, starting from the refutation of Naturalism and Dualism, establishes a pure Spiritualism, works out from a panpsychist point of view a whole theory of evolution, shows the necessity of completing that Pluralism by an avowedly theistic doctrine, and justifies finally this latter thesis with reference to the problems of creation, predestination, evil and future life. We abstract from this vast and attractive mental edifice only an apparently humble part, which may however be found to constitute its foundation: namely, the doctrine which deals with the nature of experience. We shall try to set apart the essential characters of that doctrine, and shall then proceed to a rapid examination of its origins and its value.

### I

Ward's theory of experience appears already in his first articles: before he used it for the construction of his metaphysic he made it the basis of his psychology. It is a well-observed fact that in Ward the psychologist we have already eminently Ward the philosopher. Not that he is abandoning the domain of facts for the hazardous specula-



tions of a so-called rational science of the soul, but as a sagacious observer, he never loses sight of the connection between the different problems, he excels in discerning complexes and abstracting "principles." 'Ο συνοπτιχὸς διαλεχτιχός: if Plato's saying remains true, then Ward's psychology represents by no means the least philosophical part of his work. Now the first task that confronted such a mind was to define the object of his enquiry, and to define it without making use merely of conventional distinctions which will not stand the test of the simplest analysis. Yet what value have the current definitions in this respect? Nothing seems more natural at first sight than to define psychology as the science of *inner* or *subjective experience*; but nothing is more artificial than this definition if one goes to the bottom of things. For in spite of the unfortunate expression coined by Locke there is no "internal sense" comparable with external senses. The child who becomes capable of reflecting on himself does not thereby acquire some sixth sense; but he becomes conscious of already experienced sensations as related to his ego.<sup>1</sup> There are then no facts which belong to the inner world exclusively. Locke and his followers have ignored this simple truth, because they retained the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter, simply carrying it over into the field of phenomena.<sup>2</sup>

Now Ward sees in the principle underlying contemporary naturalism a reappearance of this same dualism;<sup>3</sup> modern scientists have just kept the second half, the idea of a material world purely mechanical and completely independent of the mind. The progress of the various sciences (each working out separately the conceptions deemed proper to its own domain) has only accentuated Cartesian dualism,<sup>4</sup> as is shown in the theory of psychological paral-

<sup>1</sup> See article "Psychology" in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol. 20, beginning; and *Psychological Principles*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>2</sup> *P. P.*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>3</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 3rd ed., vol. I, pp. 13, 18, etc.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, vol. 2, pp. 4-5.

lelism. On the other hand it has done nothing to lessen the difficulty of that dualism. Far from it. Ward's learned criticism of the parallelist position is well known.<sup>5</sup> According to this it appears that, when admitting the notion of a self-sufficient material world, one does not arrive at comprehending either the presence or the character of mind. Inversely, a psychology that has for its object a purely subjective life cannot arrive at explaining how we perceive an external world.<sup>6</sup> The dualistic conception leads from either end to a veritable *impasse*. In the presence of such difficulties one ought to raise the question whether this conception is verified by experience.

Now the answer given by the facts is perfectly clear on that point, according to Ward: what characterizes every experience is the "duality in unity of subject and object."<sup>7</sup> There are, then, two distinct but absolutely inseparable factors in our experience. There is no experience which does not imply an object: the subjective modifications to which certain authors would reduce our psychological life are always correlative to certain changes in the objective continuum.<sup>8</sup>

It is well known, besides, how energetically Ward lays stress on the essentially *objective* character of the sensations or more generally still of the "presentations."<sup>9</sup> But neither is there an experience without a subject: every experience is somebody's experience.<sup>10</sup> Just because psychology is the science of concrete experience it cannot leave the notion of the subject out of consideration: this is a proposition on which Ward soon comes to insist. And he has pushed the dispute which he broached over this point with associationism, or to use his own wider term with

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, part 3.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, vol. II, p. 109.

<sup>7</sup> *Ib.*, p. 110; *P. P.*, p. 13.

<sup>8</sup> *P. P.*, p. 30.

<sup>9</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 46-48. *N. & A.*, vol. II, pp. 113-117.

<sup>10</sup> *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 111 and 123.

"presentationism," much farther, not only than Bradley, but also than William James: for he criticizes the conception of the ego developed in the *Principles of Psychology* as being still only an "extraordinary" variation of the doctrine to be rejected. For Ward, every experience implies, always and necessarily, a subject, an individual ego: not a spiritual substance of course, but something very different from a simple series of mental phenomena, even if there were added to it the notion of the unity and continuity of the contents of consciousness.<sup>11</sup> Thus the relation of the subject to the object remains an absolutely final characteristic of our experience—a fundamental characteristic reducible to no other, not even to the relation of causality.<sup>12</sup>

Yet Ward does not conceive subject and object as two terms of a logical and static relationship, but as two real factors in "interaction." From this point of view he has given an original and luminous interpretation<sup>13</sup> of the psychological triad: feeling, cognition and conation are distinct neither as separable and complete states of consciousness, nor as obscurely irreducible elements, but as the divers aspects of a fundamental cycle in which the interaction between subject and object is manifest under an alternating predominance of the one or the other factor.<sup>14</sup> From this same point of view he has again followed the development of individual experience, which he has so profoundly described as the gradual differentiation of an original continuity. For him, experience is in its essence a life, a series of exchanges between subject and object, a progress in the course of which one sees these two factors mould each other.<sup>15</sup> But Ward does not omit to point out that the

<sup>11</sup> *P. P.*, pp. 35-40. As regards the estimation of James's thesis, see also the rather severe critical notice of his *Text-Book of Psychology* by Ward (*Mind* 1892): he characterizes as "logical barbarisms" (p. 536) such expressions: "The thoughts themselves are the thinkers."

<sup>12</sup> *N. and A.*, vol. II, p. 117 sq.

<sup>13</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 52, 125; *P. P.*, p. 13, and 378.

<sup>14</sup> See *P. P.*, pp. 40-59.

<sup>15</sup> *N. and A.*, vol. II, p. 110, 130; *P. P.*, p. 410.

parts played by the two factors are very unequal. In his view the fundamental fact is the activity of the subject, the first factor in every experience;<sup>16</sup> an activity which, however, could not be conceived as purely nor even as primarily cognitive: Ward has insisted with as much emphasis as any pragmatist on the precedence of conation guided by feeling.<sup>17</sup> Moreover he has explained the increasingly perfected structure of our experience as arising from selections and syntheses brought about by this subjective activity:<sup>18</sup> at the beginning of every new acquisition one can trace an act of attention directed by some interest.<sup>19</sup> Thus in the genesis of our knowledge the object furnishes only a material condition especially favorable owing to its plasticity: the *primum movens* must be found in the activity of the subject which is the principle of every initiative and every progress.<sup>20</sup>

Finally Ward has emphasized the transformation of individual experience through social life. The former rises to the latter by virtue of its own progress. When the individual begins to distinguish his body from other objects, he attributes to all similar bodies an ego endowed with faculties analogous to its own.<sup>21</sup> Thus there begins that exchange of experiences which Ward has called, by the term borrowed from Duhring,<sup>22</sup> "intersubjective intercourse." The individual discovers that his experience is partially identical with that of his fellows—not as regards particular qualities of course, but at least as regards relations. He thus comes to conceive "trans-

<sup>16</sup> *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 52-53.

<sup>17</sup> *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 131, 133, 134, 189; *P. P.*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>18</sup> *P. P.*, pp. 412-416.

<sup>19</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 72 and 180.

<sup>20</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 410-411; *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 235, 236, 255, 256.

<sup>21</sup> *P. P.*, pp. 33-34; *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 164-165.

<sup>22</sup> According to Ward's own declaration, in the first of the articles entitled "Psychological Principles," *Mind*, vol. VII, 1883, p. 164. We do not know why the author has not reproduced this reference in his books. The whole passage shows how clearly Ward had conceived the theory, which he did not fully develop before his lectures of 1896-1898.



subjective objects" common to all intelligent beings, but independent of every individual subject: these objects form the content of a new experience, that is, "universal experience."<sup>23</sup> This experience opens to us a whole world of new knowledge; but far from opposing itself to individual experience, it is, according to Ward, nothing but an extension of this. From the idea that trans-subjective objects are independent of each of the subjects *taken by itself* the common thought passes no doubt easily to the idea that they are independent of all subjects *taken together*; and if one adds to this transition in thought the mechanism of introjection, which makes us artificially attribute first to our fellows then to ourselves a life made up of "internal states," then we are led to believe in a dualism of the physical and the mental. But according to Ward this genesis of the belief is by no means a justification. The trans-subjective object is only an elaboration of the perceptual object grasped in individual experience; and, on the other hand, the universal experience must itself have a subject. Is it distinct from the individual subject? In no way, for one finds in the activity of the latter all that is necessary to explain the origin of the categories: this is at least what Ward tries to establish. Thus the experience in which trans-subjective objects are given has no other subject than that of individual experience, raised only through social life to the level of self-consciousness where it reaches a world common to all intelligent beings. This world is never given or conceived apart from any thinking subject.<sup>24</sup>

We have already partially indicated the consequences to which the propositions just exposed will lead. The characteristic unity of every experience leads us to eliminate dualism as much in metaphysics as in psychology. But the duality immanent in this unity should make us reject even more resolutely the theories which uphold only one of the

<sup>23</sup> *P. P.*, p. 32; and especially *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 166-171.

<sup>24</sup> *N. and A.*, lecture 17.

two terms: *viz.*, first, psychology without object, or subjectivism; and then, psychology without subject, or presentationism.<sup>25</sup> Shall we not have to eliminate equally unilateral metaphysics? Here the question becomes complicated. Ward does not hesitate to reject a metaphysics of the pure object, that is the type of Naturalism whose characteristic propositions he has refuted at length. But is he applying a similar rigour with a metaphysics of the pure subject? At first we can see how logic forces him to that impartial severity: he condemns the systems which pretend to reduce objects to "offsets" or "emanations" of the subject, and rejects equally on that account the monadological idealism of Leibniz and the pantheistic idealism of Fichte.<sup>26</sup> One knows, however, that Ward finishes his discussion of Naturalism with a conclusion in favor of a spiritualistic Monism.<sup>27</sup> Is he then contradicting himself here? We shall have to come back to that difficulty. Let us note merely, for the moment, that even this conclusion is nevertheless based on the theory of experience. Ward very naturally appeals, in support of his spiritualism, to that pre-eminence of the subject in the development of experience which his whole psychology has emphasized. To this is added another argument which Ward draws from the teleological character of science: as science is confirmed by experience Ward concludes that nature itself is teleological, and is found to be, at bottom, mind.

Finally, and although Ward drew this last consequence more tardily, one has to add that the consideration of experience brings us towards Pluralism. For what manifests itself in our experience is not an Absolute,<sup>28</sup> but a plurality

<sup>25</sup> Cf. the article "The Present Problems of General Psychology," *Philosophical Review*, 1904, p. 605.

<sup>26</sup> *N. and A.*, vol. II, pp. 119-120.

<sup>27</sup> *Ib.*, part 5. It is to be recalled that Ward employs the term *Monism* in a "qualitative sense" (*The Realm of Ends*, p. 24, n. 2 and 481), and consequently does not at all oppose it to the term *Pluralism*.

<sup>28</sup> This is affirmed more plainly than by Ward by his pupil and disciple C. A. Richardson in his interesting work *Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy*. 1919. In particular, page 3, "Pluralism is the modern outcome of Empiricism."

of active beings in more or less close relationships.<sup>29</sup> If we adopt the principle of continuity we may rightly posit a similar plurality as the fundamental character of Nature.<sup>30</sup> We can equally well imagine a whole scale of beings transcending us; but if we wish to hold to that same principle of continuity, we have to represent to ourselves all these beings as subjects in correlation with objects.<sup>31</sup> Pure object, supreme subject, unity of subject and object in absolute self-consciousness, unity transcending that consciousness itself—these are so many forms of the absolute arrived at by way of abstraction and contradicting the fundamental facts of our experience.<sup>32</sup> Yet, according to Ward the same objections would not serve against a Theism that intended completing the Pluralism without abolishing it:<sup>33</sup> a God, even a creator, does not necessarily swallow up in his being the diversity of individuals; that diversity remains real, if one admits with Professor Howison that such a God "creates creators."<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, in one of his last articles Ward thinks he can see his conception of experience supporting the Christian idea of "eternal Life"; as we raise ourselves from the sensory and individual experience to a world of common intellect which the animal cannot discern, so may there be a still higher world—the spiritual world of eternal values—which the intellect alone cannot comprehend. Thus according to Ward psychology might come to confirm the Graeco-Pauline doctrine of the threefold nature of man.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>29</sup> *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 18-19 and 24.

<sup>30</sup> *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>31</sup> *Ib.*, p. 29.

<sup>32</sup> *Ib.*, lecture 2; in particular p. 41.

<sup>33</sup> *Ib.*, lecture 11.

<sup>34</sup> *Ib.*, p. 271.

<sup>35</sup> "The Christian Idea of Faith and Eternal Life," in *Hibbert Journal*, January, 1925, Vol. 23, pp. 197-198.

## II

It is obvious that the theory of experience occupies a truly central place in Ward's philosophy. How far is it original? In developing it, he has himself clearly referred the origin back to Kant, who first put forward the problem of the nature of experience,<sup>36</sup> indicated the true solution of that problem in insisting on the inseparability of subject and object,<sup>37</sup> finally made the development of all knowledge depend on the subject's activity,<sup>38</sup> and pointed out the mutual implication of objectivity and self-consciousness.<sup>39</sup> Yet whilst he is rendering homage to the master whose work he has penetrated so deeply, Ward does not hesitate to point out the faults of his analysis. Kant isolates and limits to excess that activity of the subject whose importance he has grasped; he seems, sometimes, not to recognize that it does not manifest itself only in reflection, but already in perception; above all he has ignored the essentially selective and conative character of that activity.<sup>40</sup> If he has rightly made a distinction between individual and universal experience, he has not explained how we rise from the one to the other: he has not perceived the part played in the development of knowledge by inter-subjective intercourse.<sup>41</sup> In short, he allowed himself to be dominated too much by his taste for *Architectonic*; he has abused artificial dichotomies and followed the errors of a

<sup>36</sup> *N. and A.*, Vol. II, pp. 109-110.

<sup>37</sup> *Ib.*, and *P. P.*, p. 13.

<sup>38</sup> *Immanuel Kant* (from the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. 10), p. 12; *N. and A.*, Vol. II, pp. 133-134, 186.

<sup>39</sup> *The Realm of Ends*, p. 124.

<sup>40</sup> *Immanuel Kant*, p. 12-13; *A Study of Kant*, p. 83; *N. and A.*, Vol. II, pp. 133-134, 186.

<sup>41</sup> *Immanuel Kant*, p. 14; *A Study of Kant*, pp. 58-59; *The Realm of Ends*, p. 127.



superficial and defective psychology, whilst professing an unfortunate disdain for that science.<sup>42</sup> He especially lacked, like most of his contemporaries, the historic sense of development.<sup>43</sup> But these faults which he points out with so much precision Ward thinks himself able to correct, whilst still adhering faithfully to Kant's central conception.<sup>44</sup>

With the appreciations just alluded to in a summary way Ward has made evident very precisely both his indebtedness to Kant and the transformation which the thesis of his German master underwent in his hands. It will however be fitting to define the latter more accurately, giving some indication of the origin of the differences.

The fundamental thesis itself is, in a sense, more rigorously insisted upon by Ward than by Kant. The latter never broke away completely from the Cartesian dualism,<sup>45</sup> whereas Ward is ever insisting on the unity of experience, and the inseparability of its two factors. He is, besides, by no means the first British thinker who enunciated this truth clearly. Ferrier in particular, as Ward has not failed to point out, has not been less categorical on this subject than Ward.<sup>46</sup> And one might find a fairly analogous position taken up by John Grote.<sup>47</sup> Are these independent disciples differing indeed from their inspirer only in the fact that they bring a superior degree of coherence to the thesis they received from him? To say this would, perhaps, not be going deeply enough into the matter. If the duality tends often to transform itself into dualism with Kant, that has its reason no doubt in the fact that Kant does not consider experience as the final term of reality. We must not forget that, according to him, "the highest

<sup>42</sup> *The Realm of Ends*, p. 125.

<sup>43</sup> *I. Kant*, p. 13; *N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 190.

<sup>44</sup> *Cf. I. Kant*, p. 13; *N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 186.

<sup>45</sup> *Ib.*, p. 114.

<sup>46</sup> *Ib.*, Vol. II, pp. 199-200; *cf.* Forsyth, "The Conception of Experience and Its Relation to the Development of English Philosophy," *Mind*, 1904, N. S. Vol. XIII, pp. 404-405.

<sup>47</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 406-408.

problem of transcendental Philosophy is the following: How is experience possible at all?"<sup>48</sup> A thinker who puts the question thus will without self-contradiction be able to push the analysis of experience even to the discovery of independent factors which might explain experience itself. In order to eliminate even the possibility of such a decomposition, the Kantian thesis had to be interpreted with a feeling of respect for experience which is looked at as the ultimate reality beyond which there is no going. Such feeling is, perhaps, a specifically British characteristic.

Ward modifies Kant's thought more directly when he identifies the subject of knowledge with the individual studied by the psychologist; if he differentiates between epistemology and psychology, he does not do so without bringing the two into close relationship,<sup>49</sup> and if on the other hand it is an exaggeration to maintain that Kant's *Critique* has nothing to do with psychology<sup>50</sup> then the *Bewusstsein überhaupt* to which Kant refers knowledge is nevertheless made to be far removed from the concrete individual. On that point Ward gives a twist to Kantianism in the direction exactly opposite to that which, following Hegel and Fichte, the absolute idealists of Oxford had adopted. It is more evident here than before that he carries on the tradition of the English empiricist school; and one wonders that he should unreservedly join in the common censure launched against that school, that is to have confounded theory of knowledge with psychology,<sup>51</sup> and that he should not give his due to Berkeley with whom he has at bottom more in common than with Kant.<sup>52</sup> In this recon-

<sup>48</sup> *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, 1868, Vol. VIII, p. 536.

<sup>49</sup> *Cf. N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 133.

<sup>50</sup> *Cf. A Study of Kant*, p. 58.

<sup>51</sup> *P. P.*, p. 26. No doubt Ward is to be distinguished from empiricists in that he sharply defines the object of epistemology as being that of *universal* experience, but one recalls that according to him the individual raises himself to that level of experience.

<sup>52</sup> This approach has already been pointed out by R. Berthelot, but only as regards psychology: *Un Romantisme Utilitaire*, Vol. II, p. 150.

ciliation of the Kantian analysis with the empiricist tradition Ward is, however, not the first. One might compare his attitude with that of Shadworth Hodgson and especially with that of Renouvier. But Ward never quotes the first and seems not to have made the acquaintance of the latter till late.<sup>53</sup> We should finally remember that Wundt had already used certain Kantian conceptions in the domain of psychology, and had in particular criticized Kant's definition of the latter as the science of internal experience, pointing out the fundamental unity of experience. It is surprising that Ward never mentions this theory which is so much akin to his own. Without going so far as a French critic who called Wundt "Ward's real guide"<sup>54</sup> one may think that Ward cannot but have experienced his influence in some measure.

As regards the essentially conative character of experience, Ward indicates the origins of this thesis quite clearly: Kant announced it when he proclaimed the primacy of Practical Reason, although he was not able to make that truth fit into his theory of knowledge; Fichte gave it more prominence and breadth; Schopenhauer, finally, defended the thesis in sweeping and forcible argument.<sup>55</sup> To these well-known forerunners Ward adds in another passage British psychologists such as Brown, Hamilton, Bain, Spencer, as well as Maine de Biran.<sup>56</sup> But there is no indication which could make us suppose that he had made use of the work of this French thinker whose position closely resembles his own. On the other hand, he manifestly ignores the voluntarist theory of belief due to Lequier and Renouvier. Yet he could not miss knowing the original development given to it by William James. His

<sup>53</sup> He seems to have quoted and doubtless known only Renouvier's work *Le Personalisme*; *N. and A.*, Vol. I, p. 6, n. 1; *The Realm of Ends*, p. 63, n. 1.

<sup>54</sup> Cantecor, in an article on "Les Tendances actuelles de la Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine," *Revue Philosophique*, October, 1911, Vol. LXXII, p. 390.

<sup>55</sup> *P. P.*, p. 20, n. 2; and *The Realm of Ends*, p. 196.

<sup>56</sup> *N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 191-192.

allusion to that seems, however, to be guarded and only tardily given.<sup>57</sup> Finally, he does not even mention the psychological voluntarism of Wundt and quotes his theory of apperception only to criticize it, and not, of course, without motive.<sup>58</sup> Yet these omissions scarcely need apology. The reading of Schopenhauer alone could suffice to lead a discerning psychologist in the direction which Ward has followed with as much clarity as propriety.

With the theory of the part played by inter-subjective intercourse in the progress of knowledge we come to a more original order of considerations. Ward found this theory in embryo in Herder.<sup>59</sup> He draws, moreover, on E. Caird and Royce<sup>60</sup> for its support. But these two have not preceded him. Without going back to that other forgotten great forerunner Jean Jacques Rousseau, he could have made appeal to Auguste Comte in this matter. He quotes merely a well-known phrase of his.<sup>61</sup> That fact does not attest a direct knowledge of Comte's works, but denotes at least for Ward a feeling of a renewal which the theory of knowledge could derive from the French sociologist. The influence of Schuppe has been pointed out,<sup>62</sup> but in the absence of any indication furnished by Ward we could not say that he is really in any way indebted to that thinker. In short, with regard to the connection between the intellectual and the social, Ward seems to have expressed in a rather personal fashion opinions comparable to those which, with different orientations, were developed by such men as Royce and Baldwin, and also by such as Bergson, Durkheim and especially Lalande. One might add, that such a theory does nothing but carry into the realm of epis-

<sup>57</sup> *The Realm of Ends*, p. 413.

<sup>58</sup> *P. P.*, pp. 310-311.

<sup>59</sup> *Inmanuel Kant*, p. 14.

<sup>60</sup> *The Realm of Ends*, p. 128-129.

<sup>61</sup> *Ib.*, p. 20; and *N. and A.*, Vol. II, p. 139.

<sup>62</sup> See T. Case, "Metaphysics," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., Vol. XVIII, pp. 247-248.



temology the kind of explanation which Adam Smith had introduced in the domain of ethics.<sup>63</sup>

If we consider, finally, Ward's metaphysical conceptions, it is evident that they are in their greater part influenced by the reading of Leibniz and Lotze. It is, however, clear too that in certain respects they lead away from these great inspirers. Thus Ward affirmed, in much more categorical fashion than either of them, both the independence of individuals and their interaction. It may be that the influence of William James helped to bring out this pluralism which springs, besides, quite naturally from his own psychology.<sup>64</sup> But there is another peculiarity which interests us here more particularly; namely, the justification of this pluralistic spiritualism by an argument of the epistemological order. This combination seems to us Ward's own contribution. In this respect one could only find once more in Berkeley a strangely neglected forerunner and a kindred spirit in a contemporary whom he seems not to have known, Emile Boutroux, who also goes to the fountainhead of Kant's *Critique* and Leibniz's *Metaphysic* whilst defending a doctrine of contingency as foreign to the first as it is to the second of his German masters.

It becomes clear that these differing analyses converge to the same conclusion. Ward's theory of experience does not possess, and in no way pretends to possess, a pronounced originality. Although it developed in rather a new fashion the idea of evolution, it is, on the whole, above all, the work of a penetrating continuer. On the other hand, the materials employed by Ward are almost entirely of German origin: yet he uses them for a harmonious and simple construction in which one may find—perhaps he is not aware of it himself—the mark of the best British tra-

<sup>63</sup> Cf. what Ward says of Smith; *P. P.*, p. 369; and *R. of Ends*, p. 367.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. William James on this subject: *Letters*, Vol. II, p. 314. Nevertheless, Ward denied such an influence and even any change in his own thought concerning the problem of Pluralism. See *The Realm of Ends*, 2d ed., p. 481.

dition; a construction which presents, besides, certain remarkable analogies with the systems built up by several of his French contemporaries and forerunners. The most profound of these were also formed in part by the great German thinkers and had perhaps for this reason acquired a keener appreciation of the complex and dynamic character of reality; but they had stamped their borrowings with a transformation analogous to Ward's—led no doubt, like him, by a lively sense of personal activity which they tried, however, to reconcile with the recognition of the universal and the social.

### III

What value may we now assign to this conception of experience? To determine this one ought to answer two different orders of questions: (1) Is the analysis of experience given by Ward a faithful picture?; and (2) Are the consequences which he draws from that analysis legitimate? In Ward's analysis one might examine different elements: there might be room for the question, e. g., whether activity is indeed a given factor of experience?<sup>65</sup> and especially whether inter-subjective intercourse is indeed a fact anterior to the conception of facts independent of the self?<sup>66</sup> We would like to justify the first of these two theses, and, on the other hand, we doubt whether Ward has sufficiently established the second. But we will limit ourselves to the discussion of the most fundamental, if not

<sup>65</sup> One knows that this thesis, which is common to Ward and James has been contested by Bradley. It has been criticized from another point of view by H. Wildon Carr in his article, "The Theory of Subjective Activity," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, N. S., Vol. I, 1901, pp. 191-199. See also: *The New Realism*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>66</sup> This difficulty has been pointed out by different critics: by H. Wildon Carr (in the article quoted already, p. 195-196), by A. K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, 1922, pp. 334-335; by Ritchie, "Nature and Mind," in *Philosophical Review*, May, 1900, pp. 265-266; finally by Charles S. Myers "Naturalism and Idealism," in *Philosophical Review*, Sep., 1901, p. 47.

the most novel, characteristic and ask: Does every experience imply the duality of subject and object?

That it does has long been accepted as self-evident by almost all thinkers; but it will be remembered with what clearness this thesis has been rejected by William James in a very original article that seems to have exercised much influence in the United States and, with the important exception of Mr. Bertrand Russell, very little in other countries.<sup>67</sup> According to the American thinker "pure experience" does not present any kind of internal duality; it is only afterwards that we can find in a single and selfsame fragment of that experience either a known object or a knowing subject according to the context we associate it with; the famous distinction would therefore be in reality an additional and extrinsic one. Can one imagine a more radical antithesis to Ward's conception? We have to ask ourselves, how could two first-class psychologists, akin in so many respects, contradict each other on so fundamental a point?

The opposition is explained and mitigated—so we believe—when it is noted that the two thinkers have not placed themselves at exactly the same point of view. William James calls up experience in its immediate freshness, such as it appears at the moment when it happens. Ward characterizes experience such as reflexion is led to conceive. Now, according to him, every consciousness is not necessarily accompanied by reflection; every consciousness does not imply self-consciousness.<sup>68</sup> This is a point on which Ward parts company clearly if not with Kant himself<sup>69</sup> at least with the majority of his British successors; they—and Ferrier no less than Green—had maintained that there is no knowledge without self-consciousness,

<sup>67</sup> "Does Consciousness Exist?" in *Essays in Radical Empiricism*; see, in particular, pp. 9-15.

<sup>68</sup> *P. P.*, pp. 372-3 and 361; and "The Present Problems of General Philosophy," *Philosophical Review*, 1904, p. 604.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. *A Study of Kant*, p. 54, n.

without thinking about the distinction of subject and object.<sup>70</sup> Ward was led by his profound sense of development to oppose this proposition. In our concrete life self-consciousness appears as a late product, whose gradual formation must be retraced by psychology.<sup>71</sup> Ward goes so far as to declare that the duality of object and subject is of all the experienced relations, the last in the order of knowledge.<sup>72</sup> He admits that the subject is never the direct object of his own experience;<sup>73</sup> even more, that—properly speaking—he is never *known*, for what is known is always an object; the *me* presented, is always different from the real Self.<sup>74</sup> And yet this *Self* nevertheless remains, in Ward's eyes an indubitable reality.<sup>75</sup> Why? By virtue of an epistemological necessity. All knowledge—and even all experience—implies, presupposes, a subject.<sup>76</sup> We have there a reality arrived at by an intellectual process, but anterior to that process and altogether different from a pure abstraction.<sup>77</sup>

It can be seen there is no disagreement here between two psychologists about the immediate facts of experience, but between two philosophers about the interpretations of these facts. Now James' thesis, however attractive in its ingenious simplicity, appears to reveal itself to us, when analyzed, as the more artificial of the two. It is not exactly true that one and the same experience passed through can be taken by

<sup>70</sup> See the texts quoted by James who opposes this proposition: *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 174; and *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 29, n.

<sup>71</sup> *P. P.*, pp. 361-376.

<sup>72</sup> *Ib.*, p. 370.

<sup>73</sup> *Ib.*, p. 380.

<sup>74</sup> *Ib.*, p. 378 (bottom) and article quoted, *Phil. Review*, 1904, p. 604. Richardson is still more categorical on that point: "Knowing is a relation between two entities, so that evidently the subject cannot know itself." *Spiritual Pluralism and Recent Philosophy*, p. 19. He adds, however, "It simply realizes its own existence" and declares somewhere else: "We all *realize* what a self is. This realization is far more than knowledge in the ordinary sense. . . . It is a unique, supreme, intimate fact, and therefore stands in a class of its own." *Ib.*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>75</sup> *P. P.*, p. 38.

<sup>76</sup> *Ib.*, pp. 377, 378, 380.

<sup>77</sup> *Ib.*, p. 379.



us at will, and in turn, now as objective, now as subjective according to the system of relations into which it may please us to press it. In reality, if I call up any event whatever of my life *in its totality*, I can never look at it as purely objective or as purely subjective; I see in it always a personality entangled in certain circumstances. Thus, although he may not perhaps have explained himself completely enough about our knowledge of the subject,<sup>78</sup> Ward seems to us to be right when he retains for experience a character of which it cannot divest itself in the eyes of reflection

Now has one got the right to draw from this remark conclusions bearing on the nature of reality? Could it not be the case that Ward had borrowed here an illegitimate argument from what Professor R. B. Perry has called so happily the "ego-centric predicament?"<sup>79</sup> It is true he does not use it altogether in the manner of true idealists; for, far from making reality depend on thought, he has not hesitated to affirm the priority of being over knowledge.<sup>80</sup> But this being which is anterior to elaborated knowledge is for him always the one which manifests itself in experience; it is therefore always a subject in relation with an object. Ward postulates, then, that the character of every experience is *ipso facto* that of every reality. Might we not contest this and admit with the neo-realists that the things given in experience have a nature independent of it, and in no way demand the relationship with a subject as experience does?<sup>81</sup>

<sup>78</sup> In the article quoted he declares that the existence of the Self cannot be inferred from its knowledge: *Phil. Review*, 1904, p. 606. How then can this affirmation express an epistemological necessity? On the other hand, the subject is not given: "It is not 'there,' but 'here' whereto 'there' is relative," p. 607. This remains enigmatic, although doubtless bringing us nearer to the "realization" of Richardson.

<sup>79</sup> *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 129-130.

<sup>80</sup> Let us quote a particularly typical passage: "We may perhaps venture without fear of metaphysical cavil, to maintain that being is logically a more fundamental concept than knowing," *Phil. Review*, 1904, p. 606. Cf. *P. P.*, p. 377. Ward distinguishes "experience as *known*" and "experience as *real*."

<sup>81</sup> Cf. *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 315-316.

The problem belongs perhaps to those about which dispute will never cease. It seems of course impossible to prove that there exists no reality outside of all experience, no reality of an object not given to a subject; but it seems no less impossible to prove that such a reality exists. I have good reasons no doubt to believe that the objects I perceive are still existing in my absence, and even that they would exist in the absence of all beings like myself. But in this latter case *what* would remain of these objects? Here lies the true difficulty. I can look at them according to Mill's excellent formula simply as "permanent possibilities of sensation" and this seems to be the notion with which we all content ourselves in practical life. But what is such an unactualized possibility? I cannot make the slightest representation of it. Berkeley would have said that we are dealing here with an empty abstraction; such was no doubt Ward's idea too. Let us now suppose that these objects which have escaped our experience are yet got hold of by some other subject: our metaphysical imagination will be satisfied with that condition; i. e., we shall have to renounce the understanding of the nature of the extra-human reality or we shall have to bring it into a system of experiences more or less analogous to our own.<sup>82</sup> So it was not without plausible reason that Ward extended his theory of experience in a panpsychical direction. There is, however, another objection that may come to mind here. Does not Ward in reality break faith with his own theory of experience, when he is working out a spiritualistic metaphysics? According to him the duality of object and subject was fundamental; and now he sacrifices the first term to the second. Is this not a mutilation analogous to that which he had with justice denounced in Naturalism; and is it not as arbitrary? The objection is natural enough,<sup>83</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Cf. W. James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp. 88-89.

<sup>83</sup> It has been formulated expressly by Charles S. Myers, "Naturalism and Idealism," *Philosophical Review*, Sept., 1901, pp. 463-476.

but if we look closely it does not hit all forms of spiritualism equally. Only those are unable to parry it which exclude all real interaction of beings. This is the case in absolute idealism, as it is in the Leibnizian monadism. But a pluralism which puts that interaction in the forefront is interpreting the distinction between subject and object without eliminating it: for a given subject, the object can be simply the action on it of other subjects. Far from suppressing the known object, Pluralism and especially Panpsychism would presuppose in it rather more independence in regard to the subject than the Ward theory of experience may allow.<sup>84</sup>

Thus it appears to us that this theory is not seriously affected by any of the criticisms it can evoke. It presents, in a particularly acceptable form, a thesis which, though it be more than a century old, need not necessarily be taken for antiquated. We believe that it may well deserve to be taken seriously into consideration in our time when so many thinkers appeal to experience in support of their systems without always penetrating sufficiently into the true meaning of that term and into its essential implications.

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<sup>84</sup> Something might perhaps be retained on this point in the criticism of A. K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, p. 333.

## JAMES WARD'S ACCOUNT OF THE EGO

THE duality of subject and object in all experience is a cardinal feature, and in a sense the pivot, of Ward's psychology, of his theory of knowledge, and of his ontological metaphysic. Largely by its means, he tells us, dualism is overcome. There is no "ugly broad ditch" or forbidding battlements between spirit and nature. Instead there is necessary correlation and a bi-polar integrity in place of unintelligible conjunction of disparate substances. With the ruin of dualism, also, goes the annihilation of naturalism. We escape from the contradiction of a self-subsistent *phenomenon* of Nature; and are able to deal faithfully, not with an "epiphenomenal" mind, ornamental and impotent, but with the realities of attention and interest. Dualism itself is a mistaken interpretation of the message of "intersubjective intercourse" and of the "trans-subjective reference" elicited from the same. It rests on the fallacy of taking independence of any particular mind to be independence absolute. The same fallacy taints and corrodes every species of naturalism and, quite peculiarly, its agnostic form.

In this duality, we are told, Nature and those portions of Nature which we select and apprehend, are given to us as objective. They are apprehended, that is to say, as data which confront and may constrain us, not as modifications of our own private being or as appearances situate within our heads. Theories of the latter type depend upon the



"introjection" fallacy according to which we lose sight of the plain deliverance of our experience and sophisticate ourselves in its stead with analogies applied to our own case from what we take to be the predicament of other percipients. Despite this objectivity of phenomenal presented data, however, there is an important sense in which, according to Ward's theory, the subjective pole of this bi-polar integrity takes the lead. Quoting Goethe with approval, Ward tells us that "Man never realizes how anthropomorphic he is."<sup>1</sup> We may add "and ought to be." Even in Nature, the "real" categories of substance, cause and end are, in the last analysis, imputed with assurance because of a certainty borne in upon us from the subjective pole of the bi-polar "experience" which is the governing reality in all these matters. This contention, to be sure, is not an abstract or "high priori" creed in Ward's philosophy. On the contrary, it is enforced and supported by a *sachlich*, searching review of the achievements of mind in its scrutiny of Nature.<sup>2</sup> Its foundation, however, lies in our psychological predicament, and the consequences, philosophically speaking, are momentous. "We find *again* without us," Ward says, "the permanence and individuality, the efficiency, and the adaptation we have found *first of all* within."<sup>3</sup> Or more at length, "The main structure of our concept of Nature is entirely anthropomorphic. The unity of Nature is the ideal counterpart of the actual unity of each individual experience, where synthesis ever precedes analysis, and things are only distinguished relatively to each other so long as they are apperceived together by the one subject. The category of causality we owe to the interaction of active subjects with their environment and

<sup>1</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. II, p. 165. For convenience, I shall refer to this work as N. in the sequel, giving the volume and the page. Similarly, I shall refer to *The Realm of Ends* as R.; to the *Psychological Principles* as P.; and to the *Study of Kant* as K. My references will always be to the first edition of each of these works.

<sup>2</sup> N., II, Lecture 15.

<sup>3</sup> P., 335.

especially with one another, and we attribute it analogically to what we then call the interaction of natural agents. Then as to the regularity of Nature or the universal reign of law, this never has been, and never can be, empirically established, nor does its denial involve any contradiction. It is a postulate that has its root in our primitive credulity: were this *anticipatio mentis* never confirmed, knowledge would be impossible; but confirmed as it is continuously in our earliest experience we thus advance to an *interpretatio naturae* as an orderly and intelligible system, a cosmos that evinces directly or indirectly the all-pervading presence of mind."<sup>4</sup>

I have reminded the reader of these matters (and at some length) in order to show that Ward's account of the subject has an important, and in certain ways, a dominating function in his entire philosophy, and that, in some sense, we must be presumed to have a knowledge of the Ego, or at least an assurance concerning it, which is at least less uncertain than most of the bewildering uncertainties with which we are perplexed in these intricate affairs. This, on the one hand. On the other, it seems plain that the *fons et origo* of this knowledge or assurance must lie somewhere within the ambit of our own psychological experience. Ward, indeed, says so expressly. "We begin our study with our own experience," he tells us, "since other experience can be intelligible only in terms of this."<sup>5</sup> With this preamble, therefore, I think I can explain, and in a certain small degree may even justify, the plan which I intend to follow in these pages. Taking the psychological account of the ego to be the core of this immensely important contention, I propose to devote my attention in the main to the profound and careful analysis which Ward supplies in his *Psychological Principles*, and merely to supplement this inquiry, as need may arise, by references to

<sup>4</sup> R., 11-12.

<sup>5</sup> P., 361.

his other works. This is the best I can do, I think, on so wide a theme when the need for brevity is plain; but I should like to add a further and a more personal explanation. In confining my comments, in this fashion, to a relatively small, if a very fundamental, part of Ward's argument, I cannot even indicate the wealth of knowledge and the extraordinarily adequate equipment which he brings to his task. To a profound knowledge of philosophy and of its history he adds the genius of our foremost psychologist, and he combines with these the sifted and penetrating synthesis of a mind familiar at first hand with the theological, social, biological, physical, and mathematical sciences. To deal with a *part* of his theory is therefore to do it injustice; and those of us who have had the privilege of being his pupils, are continually reminded of the circumstance. We learned more from this amazing adequacy of his equipment than from any more specialized employment of it; and the example which he gave us in this respect (not of set intention but from the character of his teaching) was second only (as we know) to the balance and wisdom of his outlook upon life and to the supreme intellectual candour which none who knew him can fail to have noticed and to have felt. I admit, then, that any partial inquiry is most mischievously curtailed, and that any particular objection is liable to conquest by a completer understanding. Nevertheless, Ward's contentions are argued step by step. He shows us precisely what we must accept if we are to go along with him; and if we baulk at any point he would have been the last to desire to coerce us.

Ward's account of the ego, in its main theoretical structure, is given in the definition and general analysis of his *Psychological Principles*, together with the fifteenth chapter of that work when he deals with the presentation of self, with self-consciousness and with "subjective being." Accordingly, I shall deal with his account of these matters

in this order, and attempt a bald and brief summary of his principle contentions, indicating at the same time the points which seem to me to be either most important or most debatable.

The introduction to the *Psychological Principles*, following the historical method, explains in detail that psychology is not the "science of mind," either in the sense of Descartes' dualism (according to which minds are *res completæ*) or according to the conceptions of a Lockian "internal sense." This "internal sense" is reflection or self-consciousness, and at this level "the so-called object-experience seems clearly implicated in the so-called "subject-experience."<sup>6</sup> Even Kant who, unlike the philosophers before him, recognized the inseparability of subject and object in experience, had too few misgivings concerning this internal sense.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, Kant showed us the way; and if we agree that psychology is to be defined as *individualistic* or as dealing expressly with *individual experience*, we have to ask only how far and in what ways its "subjective" aspect is contrasted with the "objective" aspect of the sciences. Here "we can answer at once: the one is the standpoint of conscious life—or more fully the standpoint of the living subject in intercourse with his special environment; the other is the standpoint of Science in which the characteristics of individual environments are in general ignored."<sup>8</sup> Thus "subjective" and "objective" have different meanings in psychology and epistemology. "In epistemology, 'objective,' we might say, means so much of experience as is common property, and 'subjective' so much as is private property: in psychology, 'subjective' refers to the owner, and 'objective' to the property that he owns."<sup>9</sup> Or again (and advancing the argument),

<sup>6</sup> P., 16.

<sup>7</sup> P., 14.

<sup>8</sup> P., 17.

<sup>9</sup> P., 18.



"The so-called operations and states of consciousness are not mere modes *in vacuo*; they imply an active and affectible subject, and it can only conduce to clearness to make this fact as explicit as possible. The so-called contents of consciousness, again, though not necessarily actions or affections of the subject, are never objects *per se*; to be contents of consciousness they must be objects for a subject."<sup>10</sup> The implication contained in the former of these statements is our main business at this time. It is, however, correlative with the latter; and the latter shows that "the way of ideas" (*i. e.*, of *objects* of the understanding) is the proper path of psychology. These "objects," however, belong to a subject. "By whatever methods, from whatever sources its facts are ascertained they must—to have a psychological import—be regarded as having a place in, or as being a constituent of, *someone's experience*."<sup>11</sup>

Individual experience is, therefore, the experience of a subject which finds its own property confronting it objectively and interacting with it. Indeed, "Every Ego has its own correlative non-Ego";<sup>12</sup> and we dare not deny or forget the Ego through an interest in the "presentations" which are the objects of its attention and interest.

The argument, from this point onwards, is in the main a refutation of presentationism. The Ego is not the soul of pre-Kantian metaphysics. On the contrary "by pure Ego or Subject it is proposed to denote here the simple fact that everything experienced is referred to a Self experiencing."<sup>13</sup> This is an "inexpugnable assumption"<sup>14</sup> even for Hume who treats it as a fiction. Therefore, we had better accept it, and frankly. The Ego is *not* the body, for the body is a phenomenon and therefore someone's phe-

<sup>10</sup> P., 24.

<sup>11</sup> P., 27.

<sup>12</sup> P., 31.

<sup>13</sup> P., 35.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

nomenon; and a self-sufficient representationism is a contradiction in terms. Again, a series of "mental phenomena" or presentations cannot possibly (as Mill suggested) be aware of itself as a series. One part of the series cannot be aware of the rest, since both, *ex hypothesi*, are objects of awareness; and no single privileged phenomenon could ever accomplish what *no* phenomenon can achieve. In short, every phenomenon is the property of a subject and must continue a piece of property. This property, moreover, cannot be elicited from the subjective side, *e. g.*, from "feeling," since feeling is part of "subjective being" not an object of the ego. "The simplest form of psychical life involves not only a subject feeling but a subject having qualitatively distinguishable objective presentations which are the causes of its feeling."<sup>15</sup> Through feeling a change of attention is induced, and this attention, again, is not an object or presentation but belongs to subjective being.

In the final analysis, therefore, the subject attends to and is moved by the presentations of objects. The subject itself is not an object at all. Neither it, nor its feeling, nor its attention, can ever be *known* immediately in themselves.<sup>16</sup> They are known only mediately and through their effects. This, which is a paradox, is also inevitable. For philosophers have acknowledged very widely since the days of Kant that the subjective *qua* subjective cannot be presented.

This paradox is certainly considerable since it seems to imply that neither pleasure nor pain (the two modes of feeling) nor even the difference between them can ever be "*known* immediately in themselves" but only mediately and through their effects; and most of us, I think, would say (with perhaps a trace of stubbornness) that the truth which has been shown is only that in so far as pleasure or

<sup>15</sup> P. 45.

<sup>16</sup> P., 58.

pain are not organic sensations they do not confront us in the same manner as certain other knowable facts (say sense data) do. The statement on a later page of the volume<sup>17</sup> that "feeling as such is, so to put it, matter of being rather than of direct knowledge; and all that we *know* about it, we know either from its antecedents or from its consequents in presentation" may not seem to diminish the paradox appreciably; or even the further statement that feeling is "a unique and ultimate factor in all experience."<sup>18</sup> If we grant its consequences and its reality as a mode of "subjective being," we still may suppose ourselves to have some sort of acquaintance with it; and if this acquaintance is not to be called *knowledge*, the most natural inference would seem to be that "knowledge" is being defined in a technical and peculiar sense. Similar difficulties appear to wait upon the parallel statements Dr. Ward makes concerning attention. The attention process, we are told, has for its modes, the varieties of *remembering*, *perceiving*, *inferring*, *desiring*, *striving*; and so forth.<sup>19</sup> These imply activity as well as object.<sup>20</sup> Yet we are driven to questioning; for if these varieties are, as in the case of feeling, modes of our (subjective) "*being*," we might attempt to conclude (but apparently are forbidden to conclude) that, in part at least, these processes are just what we *are*; and if we distinguish between them (as apparently we do) it is hard to avoid the belief that the distinctions are based upon some kind of immediate acquaintance. If this were not so how could we impute them, anthropomorphically, in the "real" categories we prescribe to Nature: how could we find *again* what we have found *first of all* within? In a word, as we have seen, there is at least a pretext for the suspicion that the term "knowledge" is being used in some special and unnaturally restricted sense.

<sup>17</sup> P., 245.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> P., 60.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

These dubieties, however, may perhaps be dispelled by a fuller understanding of Doctor Ward's account of our knowledge of self or of subjective being. This extended description, as we have seen, is supplied in Chapter XV of the *Psychological Principles*; and so we come to it.

The fundamental fact, here, is the reference of experience to a self that *has it*.<sup>21</sup> This we attribute to all consciousness; and our consciousness of this consciousness, the *je ne connais* of the French, is the special problem of the chapter.<sup>22</sup>

Ward distinguishes sharply between the self which is known (*i. e.*, the Me or the empirical Ego) and the knowing I (or pure Ego). Of all presentations whatsoever we may say, "This presentation is mine; it is my object; I am the subject attending to it."<sup>23</sup> It is the pure Ego to which this ultimate reference of *any* object is made; and the empirical Ego, the self known or presented, can only be one object or presentation among the others. This inexorable circumstance determines the lines of the inquiry.

The earliest nucleus of the Me is the "vital sense" or coenaesthesia; and an obvious and primitive interpretation of this nucleus leads us to think of the self as situated within the body and consisting of somatic appetites and reverberations. Hence we pass to an inner but still bodily self somewhere within the breast, desiring rather than simply appetitive, imagining as well as in present contact, through perception, with its environment. Finally, and more intelligently "we come at length upon the concept which every intelligent being more or less distinctly forms of himself as a person, M or N, having such and such a character, tastes and convictions, such and such a history, and such and such an aim in life."<sup>24</sup> This "inmost self," revealed to us chiefly in social life, is the "thinking and willing" self. But it is not the pure Ego; and the fact remains that this

<sup>21</sup>P., 361.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>P., 363.

<sup>24</sup>P., 368.



"inmost self" is not inward enough, or rather that the pure Ego is of a different order from even the innermost inwardness. For further elucidation a certain symbolism is given us. Assuming that "external perception" is adequately symbolized by  $SpO$  we should symbolize "internal perception" (*i. e.*, self-cognition) as  $I\dot{p}[M\dot{p}'O']$ .<sup>25</sup> Here  $I$  is the pure Ego, and is expressly stated to have the single faculty of attention and the single capacity of feeling, as also (of course) to be itself incapable of being presented.  $M$ , of course, is the empirical Me at whatever stage it is known (but especially at the highest and most usual stage).

In his interpretation of this symbolic structure Ward does not directly discuss the relation of  $S$  to  $I$ ; and he treats  $O'$  as being "a differentiation of  $O$  (*e. g.*, *My* thunder as  $I$  hear it is to be considered a "differentiation" of thunder not so qualified). What he does discuss is the character of  $M\dot{p}'O'$ , the relation of  $\dot{p}'$  to  $\dot{p}$  and of  $M$  to  $I$ . Varying his phrases slightly, but preserving (as I think) his meaning, we may say that the statement  $I$  am conscious of (*myself* as hearing this clap of thunder) is adequate, in his view, to the whole complex situation here set forth for investigation. In this statement every part is significant and must somehow be capable of being explained. I must confess to a doubt, however, whether Ward's interpretation can be sustained.

Let us first consider  $M\dot{p}'O'$ . When we think of "ourselves hearing thunder," we commonly distinguish ourselves from the thunder, but it is not so plain that we distinguish ourselves from our hearing. Certainly, if the  $M$  (ourselves) is taken to be some "inner sense" of our bodies or some still more inward somatic reverberation, we do distinguish *this*  $M$  from  $\dot{p}'O'$ ; but if  $M$  is the "thinking and willing" (although empirical) self it is not at all plain that we draw the distinction except in so far as  $\dot{p}'$  is a

<sup>25</sup> P., 371.

momentary event and M more or less abiding. If this is the whole distinction, however, M might very well be a continuity of  $p$ 's and not distinct from any  $p'$ . [Certain psychologists would hold of course that "sensation" does not contain  $p'$  and O', (sensing and sensum, say) but that it is intrinsically single. I am omitting this, however, and am still very sensible of a difficulty in the remainder.] Again: if  $p'$  is correctly described as *remembering*, *hearing*, *imagining* (and the rest) then not only may M be indistinguishable from a continuity of  $p$ 's but  $p'$  bids fair to be indistinguishable from  $p$ . As we have seen, these very instances of *remembering*, *perceiving* and the rest were stated in an earlier chapter to be instances of attention;<sup>28</sup> and attention, it is here stated (and in general abundantly evident) is a faculty of I (*i. e.*, it is  $p$ , not  $p'$ ).

This leads us, secondly, to the relation of  $p$  to  $p'$ ; and here, as I cannot help thinking, Ward's theory is poised upon a razor edge. As we have noted, the refutation of presentationism in his general analysis depended upon the intrinsic impossibility of precisely that which here he declares to occur. His argument there was that *no* presentation, however privileged, could ever have the relation to other presentations which the subject has to all presentations. Since  $p$  is stated here to be *different* from  $p'$ , consistency is so far retained, but the symbolism at least suggests an important and instructive analogy, and the use of the same term (as *remembering*) to describe both, makes the "analogy," to say the least, very pointed. *Ex hypothesi*, however, M (a presentation) cannot have *at all* the same relation to other presentations as I has to all presentations, and the similarity of the relation, if there is one, must be more misleading than instructive.

In the third place, M *must* be *toto genere* different from I, since M is an object, presentation, or phenomenon while

<sup>28</sup> P., 60.

I is the subject of all objects, presentations or phenomena. Yet M in its inwardness, permanence and observable action points the way to I. In Ward's own words "To identify *I* and *Me* is logically impossible, for, *ex vi terminorum*, it is to identify subject and object."<sup>27</sup> Yet "we know *intellectually* what we are as experients: into the empty "form of consciousness' our being fits";<sup>28</sup> and "that pure subject or Ego which we reach in our analysis of experience at its rational level stands for an abstraction so long as we are content to distinguish it without attempting to separate it from its objective complement, the non-Ego."<sup>29</sup> Again "this concept of the pure Ego, or I, is the limit to which the empirical Ego points."<sup>30</sup>

A limit may certainly lie outside the series which approximates to it, yet if subject and object are always the opposite poles of a bi-polar unity (and so defined by their contrast in complement) it is hard to see how M can ever be so very instructive concerning I; and the analogy which M offers in respect of inwardness, efficacy, and permanence seems particularly precarious. It is admitted that M, at its highest level is only metaphysically "inwards" and that I is perfectly non-spatial. It is declared, again, that activity cannot be observed; and if that is true *no* process can ever be observably active, and any "activities" of M (which seem to be observed) must be totally devoid of genuine efficacy. The case for permanence is still more dubious. M has indeed a certain permanence. We may certainly hold that "I have the same me as I had yesterday"; but we cannot say that "I am the same I that I was yesterday" if all we know is that yesterday's Me was the same Me as today's. I cannot see any reason for the inference. All "objects" imply the ownership of same subject but it does not follow that different enduring objects imply different

<sup>27</sup> P., 379.<sup>28</sup> P., 381.<sup>29</sup> P., 379.<sup>30</sup> P., 377.

owners. (One might as well say that two ponies, if they are owned, imply two owners.) If the objects are owned *at all* the essential condition is satisfied. It would be satisfied, say, if all the Me's were owned by a single *Ich-an-sich*, or by that "consciousness in general" (or *Bewusstsein überhaupt*) of which Ward, taking his cue from Kant, so often speaks. And it would be satisfied in any other system of ownership.

All the three points we have considered, therefore (and none of them is trivial) contain serious difficulties, and their structural combination (or even the strigose symbolism in which, following Ward's lead, we have tried to regard them) does not seem entirely convincing. I would not be misunderstood, however, when I say this. The problem which Ward discusses in these chapters is the most intricate, as it is the central, theme of a reflective psychology; and a psychology which is not reflective and reasoned (but content to deal wholesale in genial *aperçus*, sweeping generalizations or spacious analogies) is unworthy of what ought to be the honored name of psychical science. The systematic architectonic on which Ward has spent so much pains, and to which he has brought so much insight, wisdom and philosophy, is precisely what a developed science of psychology imperatively requires. Anyone, therefore, who dissents from it, for reasons shown, is aware, firstly, that Ward's analytical structure is an extraordinarily able attempt to deal with the *cruces* of the problem; and secondly that any adequate alternative is all but certain to follow the lines he has set forth (at least in great measure) and to fall, somewhere, within the framework which he supplies. Consequently, if we dissent, we dissent with gratitude and with hope. And if we attempt some alternative within the general framework we know that, even if our own constructions are wrong, they are still attempts to answer the right questions, and on the right lines.



Believing, then, as I do, that the most fruitful line of investigation in this important matter is to be found in the further exploration of alternatives within the general framework of Ward's argument, I venture (although with the greatest diffidence) to offer certain reflections upon these cardinal points in the analysis. These are: (1) *p* or the "ownership" of the objects of experience; (2) the nature of *M* or of the "empirical self": and (3) the unknowability of *I*. On the first two of these I shall be very brief. The third point, if not treated very perfunctorily, needs fuller comment.

(1) It is doubtful, I think, whether the relationship of the Ego to its objects is properly to be described as "ownership." What is part of myself may perhaps be called my property, and I am said, more strictly, to "own" anything which I am permitted to use, with or without restrictions, for my own private purposes. It seems to many, however, that the mere fact that I am *acquainted* with this or that does not necessarily imply *possession*, in any intelligible sense. If presentations, although appearing as objects, are ultimately psychical in character (or parts of the "psychoplasm" in that sense) they *would* be personal property; but the revival of realism in the twentieth century appears to show that there is a possibility, at least, that this conclusion does not necessarily follow from the "ego-centric predicament." And the *use* of this property, if it were property, does not seem to correspond to ordinary notions of possession. To the prisoner, judge, turnkey and executioner are *his* objects in the sense that *he* is aware of them—until the drop comes. But they are not at his disposal.

Cognitively, these objects, as Berkeley himself sometimes admitted, are "in the mind" only in the sense that they are "before the mind." In other words they are *my* objects only because *I* attend to them, and some philoso-

phers at least take the plain reading of experience to be that the objects of our experience reveal themselves (for the most part) not to be "ours" at all, but on the contrary facts which do not require *us* (either as sensitive or as intelligent) although we have learned (up to a point) how to inspect and interpret them. This question, in a word, is still in debate; and although our attention, as Ward convincingly points out, is not merely cognitive, but also conational and suffused with feeling, it would not appear that these inducements to, and reconstruction of, our sensitive and intellectual selection, necessarily result in "ownership" of any indubitable sort. Even if every self is confronted in a sense with *its own* non-Ego, it does not follow that this specific non-Ego is a piece of property any more than the fact that a book lies upon *its own* part of the table makes the table a possession of the book.

(2) We said that the relation of M to I presents serious difficulties. In consequence there is a temptation either to deny the existence of one or the other, or to seek for something which is both. Anyone indeed who believes that there is *no* self other than the living mind which *is* our psychological existence is bound to deny any ultimate distinction between the "empirical" and the "pure" Ego. For Ward, such a distinction is ineluctable since the "pure" Ego cannot be known (as a presented object) and yet cannot be gainsaid; and this is the third and last point we are to discuss. Postponing it, therefore, for the moment, we may ask whether the difficulties of the relation between M and I, in Ward's account, may not readily be overcome without any fundamental alteration in the interpretation which he puts upon M and upon I respectively.

Here (as has been suggested) there is at least a plausible way of escape. When M is *bodily* (however inward and, so to say, etherial its zone), it is "presented" and it is *not* I. We have to distinguish, in other words, between the

sight of the mind and the movement of the eye, between our psychical feeling and the somatic resonance which wraps it as in a garment, between intellectual assent or denial and the opening or closing of the glottis. Anyone, at least, who believes that his mind is not a psychical entity or merely a function of breath and blood and nerves, is bound to draw these distinctions and to believe (as Ward does) that his "thinking and willing" (or "spiritual") self can be distinguished from any form of its corporal accompaniments.

Supposing, then, that this restriction can be (and, indeed, must be) drawn, we might attempt to modify Ward's account somewhat as follows. There is an M, we should say, but this M is bodily, and it is not the "spiritual" self. On the other hand, this "spiritual" self is not merely intellectual and volitional. It is also fanciful and desiring, perceptual and appetitive. In other words, at all levels of M, apprehension, feeling and attention must be distinguished from their bodily accompaniments. These accompaniments are *never* spiritual; the psychical processes which they accompany are *always* spiritual.

I believe that this is what the plain man does mean by himself, and what he does distinguish (clearly enough in principle although with hesitation when he is cross-examined) from any zone or echo of his body.

M, in other words, consists, on this view, of organic sensa and their echoes; and these are "presented" in the *melange confus* of mind and body. But M in any other sense is not "presented" (*i. e.*, given as a sensible object) and need not be distinguished from I. In other words, attention and feeling, in their continuity, are the authentic I itself; and if not the whole of it, at least an integral part. This is not Ward's theory; and of course it is at least as disputable as his. It pays regard to his distinctions, how-

ever, is based upon a clear principle, and may perhaps be sustained.

(3) The belief that neither the I nor its feeling and attention can be "directly and immediately *known*" but, on the contrary, that these have to be inferred, indirectly and indeed intellectually, from their effects, is manifestly central to the whole of Ward's analysis, and not the less so because he admits it to be a violent (if inescapable) paradox. Ultimately, however, the paradox and all its consequences are inevitable, in his view, because the principle of them is indubitable. It has emerged, as we have seen, from the history of thought itself being "a more concrete statement of what philosophers have very widely acknowledged in a more abstract form since the days of Kant—the impossibility of the subjective *qua* subjective being presented"<sup>31</sup> and it seems plain that Ward, here even more than in other parts of his doctrine, keeps Kant in mind. It is fortunate, therefore (although not an accident) that in his *Study of Kant* he has dealt with the problem at what, in proportion, is a considerable length; and to this we may turn.

In this critical analysis Ward considers, first of all, Kant's doctrine of the "inner sense." Here the difficulty is that the "inner sense," if there were one, is not parallel to the "outer senses." In the latter the stimulation of a sense organ leads to awareness of a sense-datum. In the former there is no sense organ but the subject, on the contrary, would appear to affect itself.<sup>32</sup> Again, our external senses are usually supposed to be differentiated from an original "*sensus vagus*." Kant, however, produces no evidence of any such differentiation;<sup>33</sup> and he could not, because "out of sensations as mere stuff, order and form can never arise: something ordering and informing is then

<sup>31</sup> P., 58.

<sup>32</sup> K., 141.

<sup>33</sup> K., 143.



implied, and surely this something cannot be devoid of all spontaneity."<sup>34</sup> The attempt to consider "inner" sense as temporal and the "outer" senses as spatial could not succeed. In short, Kant's two kinds of sensibility, the internal and the external, are not comparable and do not run on all fours."<sup>35</sup>

In the *Analytic*, the subject has the role of active synthesis, and this function can never be *given* through objects, but, on the contrary, is presupposed when any object is given. This, Ward tells us, is "the central truth which we have to keep steadily before us"<sup>36</sup> and refrain from confusing, like Kant, with the supposed phenomena of an inner sense. We should also avoid some of the standing puzzles of Kant's *Dialectic*. The problem there was "to hold fast to the *reality* of the self without at the same time repudiating the doctrine of transcendental idealism, *i. e.*, that the self is only "given" by an inner sense and so as *phenomenal*";<sup>37</sup> but Kant persisted in regarding the Ego as "problematic"—a mere "as if"—because he persisted in treating the real subject of experience as an object, although his theory truly implied that the subject is the activity of synthetic judgment itself. He vacillated in consequence between what he did not doubt and what (as he thought) he could not show; and in the end was driven to the statement that the Ego is neither phenomenon nor noumenon. According to Ward the only possible meaning of this statement is that "the Ego is in Aristotle's sense a substantial factor in experience not a mere attribute of it";<sup>38</sup> and Ward concludes that "apperception is not a "presented existence" . . . but the activity of a subject . . . and experience consists in its interaction with objects which are presented existences. The two are correlative, but they do not stand

<sup>34</sup> K., 146

<sup>35</sup> K., 147.

<sup>36</sup> K., 150.

<sup>37</sup> K., 163

<sup>38</sup> K., 170.

on a par. Nevertheless, Kant is continually attempting either to treat of them apart or to regard both as objects. *Together* (in experience) they cannot, however, both be objects alike given in sense—the subject merely as epiphenomenon “attached” to or “accompanying” the phenomena of external sense. . . . *Apart*, on the other hand, they are but empty abstractions; and in that case, it is immaterial whether we designate them, like Locke, as a “something we know not what,” or like Hume, as nothing that we do know at all.”<sup>39</sup>

To this conclusion, and to the grounds for it, certain observations may be pertinent.

(a) The self on any theory cannot be simply an object of sense (external or internal) to be taken in at a gulp by an single set of sensing. Even if it revealed itself to “inner sense” and were a “thing,” it would still be an intellectual construction in the sense that we should require to think out the fleeting revelations of sense in terms of their reference to something relatively permanent. If there were an “inner sense,” however, we might legitimately believe that we could obtain through it genuine if fragmentary revelations of the “thing.”

(b) Sense organs, or the supposed derivation for a simpler and vaguer condition, are at least extrinsic requirements or criteria of the fact of sensation. The “inner sense,” therefore, if there were one, would not necessarily be annihilated by arguments based upon the supposed absence of these; and if by “sense” we mean merely a direct unmediated acquaintance with existential fact, there would appear to be grounds for believing that our acquaintance with the forms and varieties of feeling and attention (as exemplified in the concrete instances of these which Ward supplies) is, in this interpretation of the words, either a sense or, as Locke says “very like it.”

<sup>39</sup> K., 173-174.

(c) The absolute distinction (even if it is a differentiation in unity) between subject and object, leading, as it does, to the conclusion that the "subject" can never be an "object" even to itself, may be disputed. Thus Bradley held that portions of the non-self might be assimilated by the self and *vice-versa*. More generally it does not seem evident that we cannot be immediately acquainted with feeling or attention. These may not confront us as a color does. Perhaps, even, they do not confront us as taste, or nausea, or as an aching tooth does. Nevertheless, we do seem aware of them; and to *find* them within us. To be acquainted with a thing, and to be acquainted with a thing *as an object* (in the wide sense in which "object" is used in these arguments) are perhaps nothing different from one another. In other words the sole question may be whether or not we are immediately acquainted, in a form which may lead to knowledge, with our psychical existence. Our own being, we may conclude, is primarily rather a reference to objects than itself an object. While it is itself it is not, in general, occupied with itself. Yet, as Arnauld used to say, we may always have a "virtual" acquaintance with ourselves; and if this virtual self-acquaintance (very partially, to be sure, but perhaps with immediacy) becomes express self-acquaintance, it need not follow that we turn ourselves inside out, so to speak, in this process, and can never observe what we are.

(d) If "activity" be interpreted, not as a process with which we may be acquainted, but as the governing presupposition of the whole subject-object duality, it is hard to see why it should have any special connection or affinity with either pole of this duality. In so far as "subjective being" is contrasted (within experience) with "objective being," the activity presupposed in *both* would seem, theoretically to be indifferent to *either*. Ward, as we have seen, while regarding "activity" in this light *also* allies it with

"subjective being"; but he does not, and cannot, give a reason. *Per contra*, if we could be acquainted with the processes we call striving, and if these were literally and actually phases of our activity, our "subjective being" might be partially recognized for what it is, in the way most of us assume to be possible. If not, feeling, attention, together with their modes and distinctions, would seem to be *known* only mediately; and there is no obvious connection between the results of *this* mediate knowledge and the *other* intellectual construction according to which (as Ward tells us) we "fit our being" into the "form" of an unpresentable activity presupposed by, but not authentically revealed in, the whole subject-object duality.

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[This was written during Doctor Ward's lifetime when the project of a "Ward Number" of *The Monist* was first broached. In the belief that there is no good reason for saying anything different now that Doctor Ward's eye cannot reach these discussions (if indeed it be true that it cannot) I have left them as they stand. But I would like to express here my admiration for his moral and intellectual character and my deep regret at the calamity of his death. I never met a man so sincere in his aim or so sincere towards others; and his death is our loss and our great calamity although his years were ripe. For his intellectual force was not abated.—J. L.]



## THE APPLICATION OF WARD'S PSYCHOLOGY TO THE LEGAL PROBLEM OF CORPORATE ENTITY

I HAD often hoped to meet Professor Ward, but as that is now impossible, I may perhaps be allowed before entering upon the problem of this paper to acknowledge the debt of gratitude that is due to him from a lawyer who is interested in the nature of law, the nature of society, and the nature of the State, and who believes that psychology holds the key to the solution of such questions. For it is difficult for anyone to pursue studies outside his own professional competence unless he has complete confidence in his guide; and Ward possessed in an exceptional degree those particular qualities which inspire confidence in a lawyer. To begin with, he is consistent and therefore intelligible, and he frankly admits not only the limitations of knowledge but also the consequences that follow. Thus having studied physiology both at Leipzig and Cambridge and having earned the admiration of Sir Michael Foster in that department of science he obviously kept in close touch with its most recent developments. He uses biological analogies with telling effect and is keenly alive to the "effect of the mind on the body"; but when he is pursuing analytical psychology he recognizes the fact that the intellect has not built any reliable bridge of theory by which transition can be made from the mind to the body or from the body to the mind and he therefore works within his

chosen province and never leads his followers into a trap which is not a bridge because it will neither stand nor float. And this fundamental consistency extends to every detail. He never uses a word which will not accept full responsibility for all the weight that can be put upon it. Furthermore, he is comprehensive. His treatment covers practically all the ground, not of course, exhaustively, but in the sense that all the most important matters of principle are systematically and coherently dealt with. And he moves easily and as an equal in the company of the great philosophers of the past and brings the illumination of their thought to bear on each point of his treatment showing exactly where and why he agrees or disagrees with their opinions and giving such a wealth of reference that his work is a kind of psychological encyclopaedia. Perhaps the training of a lawyer makes one unduly responsive to tradition and references, but in every department of learning there is a kind of apostolic succession obtaining at a certain high level which operates profoundly, though not very directly upon all of us. For the lift boy admires the uniform of the commissionaire who respects the office manager who appointed him, and the office manager recognizes business capacity in the director who supervises his department, while the directors appreciate the unique qualities of the chairman under whose guidance the business prospers. Thus there is a kind of indirect recognition not only of power at the top but of the value of those qualities by which it has been acquired and by which it is appraised. And in a learned profession such as the law or the church the vitality and meaning and scope of a great tradition is preserved at the top. For if "we cannot cross the cause why we are born," neither can we cross the cause why, or the form in which, our thoughts are born. To be intelligible an author must use not only the language but the forms of thought which we all inherit,

and before he uses them it is desirable that he should understand them. It is absurd if a man goes into his garden with a telescope to study astronomy without knowing that the heavenly bodies have been under observation for some time and that the sciences of physics and mathematics have already arrived at certain serviceable conclusions. For a bright idea or the picturesque description of a common experience, however interesting it may be to a wide circle of readers, differs as much from a scientific theory as a passing meteor does from Orion's belt; and discoveries like those of Einstein could neither have been made, nor can they be understood, apart from the immense volume of learning upon which they are based. It was thus as heir of the past that Ward became, in the words of *The Times*, "the father of modern English Psychology." His "science of individual experience" opened up a new view and, if an outsider may hazard an opinion, it is a view which people will find themselves driven by the force of logic to accept before further systematic progress can be made: Thus Mr. G. C. Field has shown, in an article which appeared in the thirtieth volume of *Mind*, that the psychology of several particular instincts is open to much the same objections as the discredited psychology of several particular faculties, and the same is true of *Lebensformen*. Of course, the important place occupied in psychology by such words as anger and fear, business and religion, and the like, shows that these are matters with which psychology must deal, but in general psychological analysis such distinctions become insignificant long before the mind comes to the end of its tether. And it is worth observing that the sex specialist Freud when he attempts general psychology is driven to extend his denotation of the word sex till it comprises every conceivable form of vital activity. But however this may be, there can be no doubt at all that forty years of incessant labor and a close study of all the important contem-

porary literature bearing on his subject only confirmed Ward in his convictions; and the general stability and assimilating power of his work will be best appreciated by those who happen to have read his successive articles in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh editions of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* finally consolidated and brought up to date in his *Psychological Principles* of 1918, a book which *The Times* recently described as one of the two most important works on psychology in the English language, the other being William James' *Principles of Psychology*. Indeed, many will subscribe to the opinion expressed by Professor Dawes Hicks in the *Hibbert Journals* and in the *Aristotelian Society's Proceedings* that Ward's *Psychological Principles* is "beyond all question the greatest and most original work on the sciences in the English language."

Of course the practical problems involved in the treatment of nervous disorders, education, propaganda, and the like, which at present engage so much attention, do not fall within the scope of a book on psychological principles, but it would be interesting to many if such matters were sometimes discussed in relation to Ward's psychology which is not like a rag bag into which the tattered fragments of miscellaneous observation can be thrown; for it is an organic whole which either assimilates or rejects, and if it assimilates vitalizes, whatever is presented to it, so that its truth and value can best be tested in its application. Such an undertaking would be peculiarly appropriate to *The Monist* which seeks to bring various branches of study into contact. Not being a pathologist, however, but a lawyer, I propose to attempt something of the kind in regard to a problem in which lawyers have been much interested for it has far-reaching importance in questions with which they are concerned.



## THE LEGAL PROBLEM OF CORPORATE ENTITY

The problem to be discussed in this paper goes by a variety of names. In Germany, where the modern controversy arose, it is known as *Verbandspersönlichkeit* or *Genossenschaftstheorie*; in France it is often called *Personnalité morale* or *Personnalité juridique*; in England the late Vinerian Professor called it Legal personality, and in America it is known as the Entity theory of corporations. Psychologists might call it the problem of the group mind. It is not strictly a legal problem, for a legal problem is always a practical problem, but it bears upon various practical legal problems which about twenty or thirty years ago happened to be very much to the fore not only in Germany and France but also in England and America, so that the number of lawyers who became interested in it far exceeded the rather limited number of those who are ordinarily interested in theoretical questions. The practical problems which were then prominent having been temporarily disposed of without any solution of the theoretical problem, interest in the latter has abated; but it is bound to arise again because it lies at the base of all legal and social and political organization. Not that there is any immediate prospect of a radical solution, for the individuality of a group is rather like the individuality of a single person which, as Leibniz says, envelopes the infinite. But philosophy, which is an ennobling pursuit, would have to be abandoned if philosophers were easily discouraged.

The practical problems to which reference has been made were as follows. In Germany a Civil Code was being settled for the German Empire and general provision had to be made for juristic persons; in France the *campagne*

*laïque* was in progress and the Law of Associations was under heated discussion; in England the Scotch Free Church case and the liability of Trade Unions for the acts of their agents were first before the House of Lords and then before Parliament; and in America there was the great question of Trusts and Corporations. In these various countries the date and bulk and importance of the literature and learning brought to bear upon the theoretical problem follows the order above indicated; but before saying anything about this, one or two general observations may be made.

Law is a social product; it has to do with the social relations of men, and with groups as well as with single men, so that its theoretical basis must be sought in sociology. It is hardly worth quoting authority for these propositions because none in these days disputes them. They are equally applicable whether we consider the beginning or the end; for if, as many people reasonably believe, there is a law eternal in the heavens it cannot be conceived either there or anywhere else apart from social relations. We, in fact, need some concept more general than "the genus of which State and Corporation are species"—one that includes unorganized as well as organized groups. But unfortunately (and here again no authority need be quoted) the science of analytical sociology is not yet on its legs. My own little contribution to that great problem was made before the Aristotelian Society of London last November and as it has appeared in the twenty-fifth volume of their published proceedings it would be superfluous as well as irrelevant for me to attempt again any discussion of the general problem. What we are here concerned with is the theories which lawyers have made in order to account for a concept which is so natural that any unsophisticated person has always used it, and will always use it, without a moment's reflection.

We cannot, of course, expect to find any theory in the *Leges Barbarorum*. Roman law, besides dealing with the practical problems, had significant things to say. A corporation (*universitas*) acts as a person (*personae vice fungitur*); the liability of the corporation remains though the members change, for the name remains (*stet nomen*) and so forth. Roman law had no explicit theory and the question whether any, and what, theory is implicit in its provisions is one that has been discussed for a century at great length with extraordinary erudition but without anything approaching to agreement. On the whole, perhaps, most acceptance is given to Savigny's view that Roman law regards a corporation as a ward and the corporators or officers of the corporation as guardians. An English or American lawyer can easily follow this idea if he thinks of a corporate estate as a trust estate and the corporators or officers of the corporation as trustees. Speaking for myself I am clearly of the opinion that sooner or later lawyers will have to recognize the fact that what is often discussed as the incorporation of men is really the estatification of interests, and that a corporation sole or one man company is an absurdity when regarded in any other light. But I am here anticipating a conclusion of which the psychological foundations will be discussed later, and for the present we are only concerned with the historical development of legal theory. The joint possession and use of common land comes from early times when it was the most important fact of economic life, and it still exists in a very attenuated way up to the present. It is part of the ancient common law of Europe and none troubled about a theory for it until recently when speculative interest arose in another connection. Neither was there any trouble about the contract of partnership (*societas*) derived from Roman law, though in the case of a *société en commandite*, when the property of the partners was entrusted to the manage-

ment of an agent, the situation temporarily created was in many ways very like that of a modern company.

It was in connection with the corporate bodies which were taking shape in the early part of the later middle ages that need for a theory was felt. The eleventh and twelfth centuries were formative not only of institutions but also of general ideas which crystalized in the thirteenth; and it was a lawyer Pope, a contemporary of Aquinas, who is credited with inventing the famous fiction theory. It has often been observed that a theory in order to be effective must have powerful interests behind it; and there can be no doubt that this theory supported the power of the central authorities of church and State—a power which was valuable not only to themselves but also to everyone else in those unsettled times—for it recognized in them and in them alone the faculty of creating corporations. According to the theory a corporation is not a natural entity but a fictitious person (*persona ficta*) created by the State, non-existent unless the State has created it, and only existing in the manner and for the purposes ordained by the State. Whenever and wherever the State was firmly established this view prevailed; not only in the countries which received the Roman law but also in those which did not. From England it went with the common law to America where “a corporation is a franchise.” It was in Germany and in the interests of Germanism as against Romanism that it was first challenged by Beseler in 1843, but chiefly by Gierke whose monumental writings on the subject begin in 1868 and cover about half a century. They were, however, practically complete before 1900 when Maitland epitomized Gierke’s theory in words which are now widely familiar. “Our German Fellowship (*Genossenschaft*) is no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State’s machinery, no collective name for individuals, but a real organism and a real person, with a body and members and a will of its



own. Itself can will, itself can act; it wills and acts by the men who are its organs as a man wills and acts by brain, mouth and hand. It is not a fictitious person; it is a *Gesammperson*, and its will is a *Gesammtwille*; it is a group-person, and its will is a group-will." None read Gierke more carefully or was better able to define his views than Maitland; but if anyone who is not prepared to face the massive volumes of the *Genossenschaftsrecht* and the *Genossenschaftstheorie* desires a somewhat fuller account of the theory than that just quoted he will find it in the section on *Verbandspersonen* in Gierke's *Deutsches Privatrecht*. I will use the phrase corporate body, though unsatisfactory, as the best that I can think of for *Verbands-person*. Gierke says that a corporate body is one which has legally recognized rights and duties as a single whole regarded as distinct from the sum of its members. By its own laws and orders a State may confer the rights of a corporation upon any body of persons as it thinks fit, but (if I may use an illustration of my own) it no more makes the body of persons upon whom it confers corporate capacity than it makes the body of a man upon whom it confers the privilege of nobility. Gierke agrees with a long series of jurists beginning with Puffendorf that though a corporate body is for legal purposes an abstraction it is for those purposes no more of an abstraction than is John Smith. To make this clear it may be observed that though the law touches the life of John Smith at many points, and conditions it in many important particulars, it does not generally affect his life directly as a whole. It is not often interested in his domestic happiness or his indigestion or the numberless other things that he likes and dislikes and that affect his life as a whole and make him what he is. On the contrary, it abstracts from his whole life and conduct such particular actions as have legal significance and deals with him in respect of them through one or more of his various

interests, it may be his interest in half a crown or in a valuable estate or in the accommodation of a club or in a share in a company or in a whole skin or in a living body. Thus Gierke points out that whereas the legal concept of a single person is got by isolating elements which are related to his own being, that of a corporate body is got by concentrating elements which make a number of men into a single being. His own words on the point are so important but so difficult to translate that I give them verbatim. *Indem wir diese unsinnlichen Einheiten gegeneinander abgrenzen und einerseits durch Isolierung die in jedem Menschen auf das eigne Sein bezogene Einheit, anderseits durch Konzentrierung die in vielen Menschen ein gemeinsames Sein wirkende Einheit verselbständigen, belangen wir zum Begriffe der Wesenheiten, die im Rechtsgebiete als Einzelpersonen und Verbandspersonen auftreten.* He says that a corporate body is a living thing that wills and acts as such. Its organs are men but they do not act one for the other, nor one for the others, but each as an integral part of the whole. *Die "Vertretung," die hierbei stattfindet, ist also kein Stellvertretung des Einen für den Anderen, sondern Darstellung des Ganzen durch den Theil.* A corporate body is a social organism and therefore must have a constitution providing for the origin and termination of membership and of office, defining the personality of the corporate body in reference to the members and also defining within what limits the resolutions and acts of the members or officers are to be reckoned as the resolutions and acts of the corporate body. It must further provide for the rights and duties of the members to the corporate body and to one another. A corporate body may be a member of a larger body. It is either a corporation or a foundation. *Die Körperschaft ist ein Verband mit einer ihm selbst entstammenden Persönlichkeit; ihre Seele ist ein einheitlicher Gemeinwille, ihr Körper ein Vereinorganis-*

*mus. Die Anstalt ist ein Verband mit einer ihm von aussen eingepflanzten Persönlichkeit; ihre Seele ist ein einheitlicher Stiftungswille, ihr Körper eine organische Einrichtung, vermöge deren fort und fort Menschen diesem Willen dienstbar werden.* This is perhaps all that it is possible to say here about Gierke's theory unless one should add that he is inclined to attribute a peculiar and admirable quality to the German as opposed to the Roman will in virtue of which it more easily throws off elements which coalesce into a joint will. This claim has been ridiculed by some of his compatriots; but Gierke's thoughts turn a good deal on early Germanic institutions, and if we compare our own early institutions with the more artificial products of today it is easy to follow his meaning. The jury must be unanimous. In old vestry books the resolutions of the parishioners appear to have been unanimous. In Russia, where primitive institutions survive, a village meeting is ultimately unanimous; the dissentients are not out-voted but suppressed or ejected like Thersites of old. All this is far distant from a carefully counted vote and further still from proportional representation but it is so significant that it has been worth a moment's digression to note it. The gist of Gierke's theory, often called the *Willenstheorie*, is that every corporate body, and the same argument would I think apply to every social group, has a joint will distinct from the wills of its members. This theory has certainly not had a decisive victory. A list of the German combattants on each side together with much interesting matter is to be found in a note to section 49 of the last edition of Windscheid's *Pandekten*. Jellinek in his *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (chapter VI, II, B. I.) objects that an organism is essentially a teleological conception, and that every definition of an organism as an objective phenomenon independent of our individual point of view (*von unserer Betrachtungsweise unabhängig*) is

bound to fail; for there is no objective unity analogous to the unity of individual experience. And he claims in a note to the second edition of the same book that Gierke's rectorial address at the University of Berlin, *Das Wesen der menschlichen Verbände* (1902) was directed to this objection and failed to meet it. I notice moreover that in a recent article by Silberschmit in the eighteenth volume of the *Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft*, where the views of many writers on the topic are discussed, no reference is made to Gierke or his theory, although it would have been very appropriate to the subject.

France besides taking careful note, as she usually does, of what is going on in Germany, has produced a literature on the subject which is hardly less voluminous or important; and the most convenient account of the whole matter—historical and analytical, French and German—is to be found in Saleilles' single though substantial volume, *De la Personnalité Juridique*, which was first published in 1910. The second edition of 1922 contains a preface by Professor Capitant suggesting, as appears from other sources also to be true, that Saleilles represents the learned opinion of France. He recognizes the reality of a corporation as an entity for practical and juristic purposes, but he is unable to accept the *Willentheorie*, not only because it is too complicated and refined, but because it fails to give any psychological explanation of a will other than that of a single person. He himself, and also Professor Michoud, follows Ihering in regarding a legal right as an interest protected by law, but adds that a will must be put at the service of the interest in order to make it effective. When the free will of a single individual is inappropriate, or unavailable, a will can be disengaged by means of an organization or what Hauriou calls an *institution*, by which I understand any constituted scheme.



England, like other countries, accepted the fiction theory; but the practical inconveniences were obviated by the use of trusts, supplemented latterly by legislation under which corporate and quasi-corporate bodies are freely erected with statutory rights and liabilities. Some idea of the volume of these provisions may be got by citing (in one of the alphabetical orders in which English law books are written) the articles in Halsbury's *Laws of England* which deal with them. Apart from special forms of public utilities such as electricity, gas, railways, and so forth, there are articles dealing with particular private and public groups and government departments such as building societies, clubs, commons, companies, constitutional law, corporations, friendly societies, industrial societies, literary institutions, local government, loan societies, partnership, public authorities, public health, and trade unions. Then for "foundations" there are articles on charities, ecclesiastical law, education, settlements, trusts, and wills. To these must be added such articles as may bear on the whole subject, such as agency, contract, personal property and real property, and articles on action, practice and procedure so far as they bear on joinder of parties, representative actions, execution against firms, and the like. If then the British Empire were, like Germany, preparing a civil code for the Empire, or even, like France, preparing a Law of Associations, it would not be surprising if questions of principle should assume an interest which they have not yet had in this country. But the English literature bearing upon the theory, though slight in amount, is not insignificant. Pollock and Maitland have pursued historical inquiries and the latter has shown, as none else has done, the illuminating importance of trusts in this connection. Doctor Geldart also made Legal Personality the subject of his inaugural lecture as Vinerian Professor and wrote repeatedly on trade unions. These writers favor the views of

Gierke but they substantially refrain from dealing with a problem which is one of philosophy and two of them (Maitland at the end of his paper on *Moral Personality and Legal Personality*, and Geldart in his inaugural lecture) are content to urge philosophers to do so.

In the English courts, an ancient fiction, though never allowed to obscure facts or to obstruct substantial justice, is often treated with ceremonious respect; but the investigation of modern metaphysics is judiciously ignored. If, however, the English bench and bar had an opinion on the subject, it would, I think quite certainly, be that which was cautiously expressed by Dicey in the *Harvard Law Review* in 1919. "Personally I am not inclined at the present moment to follow out German thought, or misthought, to the startling conclusion that a corporate body has all or nearly all the characteristics of a human being. Whilst I am not prepared without further consideration to treat the important legal fact as grounded on nothing but a legal fiction. . . . My belief increases every day that there are 'natural corporations,' groups of persons who act together for different objects and on account of their acting together have many feelings and do many actions which they would not entertain and which they would not perform were it not for this habit of common action and common sentiment." It is less certain whether the words which follow would command similar adherence; but Maitland had previously regretted the lack of flexibility in our legal ideas of corporate bodies, and both writers were regarded with very exceptional respect in the profession. Dicey continues, "This is what may be called 'corporate consciousness' and in my judgment the gravest mistake made both by English courts and by the British Parliament has been always, where possible, to incorporate such natural corporations when their acts are not injurious to the state, and, on the other hand, to treat such natural corporations

as illegal when their aims are palpably injurious to the state."

In America it may be inferred from Professor Gray's book, *On the Nature and Sources of the Law*, and from articles, reviews and notes of cases which have for many years appeared in the *Harvard Law Review* that the Entity theory is thoroughly disliked both in theory and in practice. Ever since Dicey lectured at Harvard and wrote in the *Harvard Law Review* for 1904 on "The Combination Laws and Opinion," it has been impossible to deny that corporate action is a reality with which the law must reckon. But Mr. Arthur W. Machen probably reflects the general opinion in his article published in 1911 when he says that corporate personality is a natural conception to be used and not analyzed. "To understand and apply the doctrine of corporate personality no other guide is desirable than sturdy common sense." I do not know whether Professor Laski's article in 1916, reciting the well known difficulties of rejecting the entity theory, produced any effect; it did not apparently produce any reply. But I have not met in America, any more than in England, any serious attempt to define or to get to grips with the philosophical or psychological problem. It has, however, been observed in both countries (and I do not think that it can possibly be denied) that from the point of view of philosophical theory there can be no fundamental difference between a large group and a small one, between one which is long established and one which is ephemeral, or between one which is legally recognized and one which is not.

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF THE GROUP MIND

Let us now look at the problem we have been discussing in the light of Ward's psychology. The first necessity is to define the point at issue; but the literature is so vast, views are so various, and so much is conceded on both sides, that this is no easy task. It is perhaps most conveniently put in the form of the question—Is a society (using that word with the widest possible extension) an organism or only an organization? Is it, as Gierke says in his rectorial address, a living organism with a life of its own essentially similar to the life of a man? *Allein wir betrachten das soziale Ganze gleich dem Einzelorganismus als ein Lebendiges und ordnen die Gemeinwesen zusammen mit den Einzelwesen dem Gattungsbegriff des Lebewesens unter.* Or is it, as Stammler says in his *Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft*, merely an organization characterized by the special manner in which the ends of individual men are set and combined as means to one another in the social relation? *In dem Zusammenleben der Menschen werden ihre Zwecke wechselseitig als Mittel für einander gesetzt. Dadurch entsteht ein Unterschied von den Innenleben eines jeden, das es mit seinen wünschenden Gedanken zu tun hat, eine eigene Art der Zwecksetzung. Sie verbindet die Bestrebungen und wird als drittes Wollen über den Begehrungen der verknüpften Menschen gedacht.* And, again, elsewhere, *Der Gedanke von äusseren Regelung* (which "outside regulation," with Stammler, connotes organization), *das ist einem verbindenden Wollen, ist mithin die Form in dem Begriffe Gesellschaft.* As against the organism theory it is urged by Jellinek that it is impossible to give any scientific (*wissenschaftlich*)



definition of an organism except in terms of an individual will, and we have no knowledge of any wills other than those of men; so that it follows that Gierke's theory is merely a profession of faith or, as Max Weber said, *Gierke Gefühlsinhalte hypostasiert*. As against the organization theory all the arguments which have been used against the Social Contract theory are, as it seems to me, available. If the "social organism" is dependent upon our way of looking at things (*von unserer Betrachtungsweise abhängig*), may it not be said with equal truth that our way of looking at things depends upon the "social organism" which has not been made, and is at best very imperfectly understood, by any of us?

Notwithstanding the eminence of Ward's position it appears that a good many people are not very familiar with his writings; neither is it an easy matter to epitomize his views, but an attempt must be made to do so, insofar as this is relevant to our present purpose.

Ward defines psychology as the science of individual experience. Although Hartley as far back as 1748 had defined it as "The Theory of the Human Mind, with that of the Intellectual Principles of Brute Animals," and Hamilton in 1836 as "the science conversant about the phaenomena or modifications or States of the Mind or Conscious Subject or Soul or Spirit or Self or Ego," yet the word came into use in connection with those weird experiences which are so strikingly individual that they find no place in the natural sciences, for the natural sciences rely upon experiences which are common to all. Thus in France until lately psychology meant abnormal psychology, and the Society for Psychical Research which was founded by that name in 1882 is concerned with unusual experiences. But the important distinction nowadays is not between the normal and abnormal (for everyone recognizes that psychology includes both) but between the

subjectivism of Descartes and Berkeley on the one hand and the objectivism of Herbart and the modern behaviorists on the other. In this controversy, Ward maintains that mind itself includes both elements; for at the center of his psychology lies the duality of mind or experience which includes a subject who experiences and an object, or psychologically objective world, which is immediately experienced. Neither is conceivable apart from the other, for we can no more think of a subject without experience than we can of an experience not experienced by someone real or imaginary. This psychologically objective world, which is part of the mind and the private property of the subject, is to be distinguished from the epistemologically objective world of science and history and common sense which is common property. Concerning this outside world it is important not only to realize how much we know but also how little. I am told that the mole cannot live in the daylight, and that the vision of a cow beyond a few inches is blurred. Our own vision even when good is limited; none can hear wireless vibrations without the help of an appropriate instrument. Nevertheless, it is upon the material which may be conveniently described as delivered to the mind by the brain and the senses that experience is "grounded." The problem of psychology is to describe the manner in which the mind elaborates this material into its own world—a world in which the most peculiar abstract conceptions and the wildest delusions of a lunatic are every bit as objective as the experiences which are common to us all. Now if we admit the existence of mind as well as of body, it will be conceded that each one of us starts life with inherited aptitudes both mental and bodily, and it is therefore necessary to trace the development of mind phylogenetically. In order to do this, Ward goes back almost to the origins of life and follows the fortunes of what he calls the psychological individual, meaning thereby a hypo-

thetical individual who begins at the beginning and acquires for himself all the experience which operates in us through our ancestors. Ward conceives mind as having a subjective or functional side and an objective or structural side, both sides having the intimacy and correlation that belong to function and structure. The sole function of the individual is attention, which is guided by its sole capacity which is feeling. The objective side he describes as *totum continuum objectivum* or psychoplasm—both terms having the same meaning. Psychoplasm is analogous to bioplasm and the process of its elaboration by specialization is analogous. Starting as an undifferentiated continuum some vague differentiation is unexplainably effected by the attention of the subject which is directed thereto or attracted thereby, and when once a differentiation has been made a more intelligible process has begun, for the differentiation is retained and becomes the organ of further differentiation as experience proceeds. We may obtain an advanced and high speed illustration of the kind of process involved by taking a few short successive glances at an unfamiliar object.

At each glance there is a retention of what is seen so that the object is seen in greater detail and with greater accuracy on each occasion. The lowest level of experience is that of sensation and movement—the level at which we so to speak make contact with the outside world through our bodies. For just as changes in the physical environment occasion nervous changes which “occasion” sensations; so movements of attention, if sufficiently pronounced and appropriately directed, “occasion” nervous changes by which bodily movements are effected. Thus by differentiation of the psychoplasm, on the one hand, things come to be clearly differentiated and perceived in time and space, and on the other hand out of a general, diffusive, purposeless movement there are differentiated the specific controlled

movements which are found to give satisfaction. The next level with which Ward deals is that of imagination and desire. Out of memories, which have a context in time but not in space, there are developed generic images which are free from context in time or space and thus available for intellectual manipulation. And so too desires, which have not attained the assured prevision of reason, have yet sufficient independence to rise above the present certainty of sense. Lastly, through the acquisition of language and the development of social intercourse we reach the level of intellection and reasoned purpose. Here the presentation of self, the empirical self, becomes the central object of interest and is capable of infinite refinement and nobility. Although Ward dwells on each of the levels referred to he is careful to trace the gradual transition from one to the other so that there is no gap in the development. And, of course, life at a higher level does not supersede life at a lower though the latter may be more or less controlled by the former.

The point with which we are here concerned is this. Development throughout and at every level, and whether it concerns apprehension or movement of attention (which controls not only trains of thought but movements of the body), involves elaboration of the psychoplasm, that is to say it has a psychologically objective or structural side; and this structure is throughout framed by the subjective activity of the psychological individual. As the process becomes more intellectual it becomes, as that word itself implies, more definitely selective. Certain elements, as in a picture or symphony, are integrated by the subject; and again certain aspects or elements of various phenomena are found to be relevant in certain connections and are abstracted by the use of words, which become the instruments of imageless thought and are themselves elaborated into objects of a still higher and higher order. Thus are formed



what Ward calls intellectual systems, a phrase which he prefers to Herbart's "apperception masses" inasmuch as the latter follows the analogy of chemical behavior and ignores the subjective activity. By means of intellectual systems, the building up of which is always motivated by interest, we arrive at general ends which, owing to the value which we put on them (such valuation being itself an intellectual process), may become objects of pursuit and have the same relative independence as an intellectual system regarded as such. Such general ends or sentiments or interests differ from intellectual systems owing to the fact that they are ultimately based on the subjective feeling side, whereas an intellectual system (if, for the purpose of analysis, we eliminate the subjective factors of creative imagination and make-believe) is ultimately based on objective circumstance.

Leaving now the psychological individual and turning to the concrete individual such as you or me, Ward considers that just as our bodies inherit at the moment of conception a certain tendency to develop according to race and parentage, so too the mind on its objective side as psychoplasm has a particular inherited *Anlage* or aptitude of mental development. In the lower forms of animal life, where progress is made by the race rather than the individual, this *Anlage* practically determines what the living thing will make of its experience. But in the human race, and most conspicuously in its more intellectual members, action is determined more by individual subjective selection and less from the objective side, so that conduct supercedes behavior. But apart from inherited aptitude and individual character the social circumstances in which we are educated introduce their formative influence. Language and forms of thought and institution (some elements and combinations of which often go back with a continuous history through Rome and Greece to Asia

Minor and the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt) determine the forms of our thought and of our aims. An intelligent child frequently complains that a foreign language which he is learning is stupid, and offers to make a better; but there are several reasons for using language as we find it. It provides a ready means of intercourse between a large number of people; it is the product of experience, for every word has been the solution of a practical problem and has come into use in order to fill a felt need; and it has also been adapted to needs as they develop so that it is not only the record of accomplishment but the instrument of progress. Without this achievement the artificial devising of Esperanto would have been impossible. And the same is true of all kinds of institution. Thus civilized life is an articulated whole and every man finds his living and maintenance—what Indians call his *Dharma*—as an articulated part of the whole. In a free country an energetic man may have almost as much choice in the direction of his activities as he has in the use of his words, but the requirements of intercourse puts limits upon each. His words and his acts must be adapted to his social environment in order to be effective.

It only remains to consider the bearing of these reflections upon the problem of corporate entity or of the group mind, for it is the philosophical or rather psychological problem with which we are here concerned, and I imagine that the fundamental problem is the same whether we are concerned with the meeting of two friends or the whole fabric of a State. The solution suggested by Ward's psychology is as follows. If mind is the relation of a psychological subject to a psychological object, then subjects may to some intent be integrated by their relation to an object just as objects may to some extent be integrated by their relation to a subject. In the case of an individual mind, such as yours or mine, the unity lies on the subjective side. For

however heterogeneous my experiences may seem to be they derive a certain unity from the fact that they are mine. They are my objects, my interests, my estate. This unity would seem to be somehow based on temporal continuity and not to be *primarily* structural. On the other hand the unity of a group mind lies on the objective side. Provided the experiences themselves form an articulate whole it does not matter who are the subjects who experience them. Provided the chairman of a company is able and willing to perform his duties as such all the rest of his life is irrelevant to the company, and the same is true of his successor in office. The identity of the πόλις (which is mental) lies in the πολιτεία. The unity of a mental structure is essentially logical and in a certain sense spatial rather than temporal. The activities of the members of a group are not necessarily synchronous. The relevancy is not in time. The old firm carries on in the name of the founder though none of that name is a partner in the business; and the church counts among its living members those whose bodies may be lying in the churchyard.

I have had some little hesitation in putting forward this view of the objective unity of the group mind because, although it seems to follow from Ward's psychology, I am not sure that it is quite the same as that which he himself expressed in the sixth of his Gifford Lectures on *The Realm of Ends*. But the problem of Mind and Society with which he is there dealing is somewhat different from that of a mind and a society which troubles a lawyer. The Kantian objectivity of morality and reason rests on their universal character; and although Hegel's *objektiver Geist* is embodied in institutions it has this same universal reference. It may be that there is something universal in individuality wherever found, whether in you or me or in a society or social group, and if so the objective mind would be in every such group; for there would be in it a unity of

the individual and the general, the *Einheit des Einzelnen und Allgemeinen* described in the Addition to section 156 of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*. But the pursuit of that line of thought might lead onto the great circle where one may travel equally well in opposite directions and arrive at the same spot which is also nowhere. What a lawyer wants to discover is the real entity of the John Street Poker Club which cannot be found in morality and reason as understood by Kant. It would seem to belong to the will which is not the completely (*schlechthin*) objective will which is true to its own fully developed nature, but only objective in the sense that it is either determined by and merged in objects, or that it connotes the object which a subject has immediately in view when he acts. Section 26 of Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie* may here be quoted (without the note and addition): *Der Wille* ( $\alpha$ ) *insofern er sich selbst zu seiner Bestimmung hat und so seinem Begriffe gemäss und wahrhaftig ist, ist der schlechthin objektive Wille, ( $\beta$ ) der objektive Wille aber, als ohne die unendliche Form des Selbstbewusstseins ist der in sein Objekt oder Zustand, wie er seinem Inhalte nach beschaffen sei, versenkte Wille—der kindliche, sittliche, wie der sklavische, abergläubische u.s.f.—( $\gamma$ ). Die Objektivität ist endliche die einseitige Form im Gegensatze der subjektiven Willensbestimmung, hiermit die Unmittelbarkeit des Daseins, als äusserliche Existenz; der Wille wird sich in diesem Sinne erst durch die Ausführung seiner Zwecke objektiv.*

We want a sociology similar to the biology which includes the amoeba and the ephemeral fly as well as the elephant and man and the whole world of living things—one which will deal with the smallest and most transient groups as well as the largest and most permanent. For this purpose, I think that it will be necessary to recognize that every man has a number of relatively independent objective interests and corresponding dispositions and that the



grouping and integration of these by and in reference to himself constitute his own personality; whereas the grouping and integration of objective interests as such, involving the corresponding dispositions, but without reference to the persons whose interests and dispositions they may happen to be, constitute the group mind.

### CONCLUSION

In order to emphasize the conclusion arrived at I shall make free use of the researches of those who have devoted their labors to the psychology of advertising. They tell us that language produces a striking effect when striking words are used.

The unity of the group mind is a *psychoplastic unity*. In the group mind subjects are integrated through an object and not objects through a subject. It follows, among many much more important consequences, that a scientific analysis and arrangement of the law relating to corporations should proceed in the manner practically indicated in the Law of Limited Companies, Corporations Sole, Trusts, Bankruptcy, Local Government, and so forth, that is to say, by the *estatification of interests* and not by the pretended incorporation of people.

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## JAMES WARD'S CRITIQUE OF NATURALISM

A QUARTER of a century has elapsed since James Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism* first appeared. From the outset the work was received with applause from many sources. The philosophic journals printed long and favorable reviews. Mr. A. E. Taylor wrote of it in *Mind* in April, 1900: "No more damaging exposure has ever been given of the baseless and uncritical assumptions which materialistic and agnostic thinkers are fond of presenting to us as the demonstrated and established teaching of 'science' about the constitution of the universe and our own position in it." The successive editions through which the work has passed testifies to the influence which it has continued to exercise upon the philosophical thought of England and America.

To a certain extent the argument which Ward develops in *Naturalism and Agnosticism* strikes a reader today as tiresome. At least some of the details of that argument are now almost as wearisome as the petty rejoinders in a seventeenth-century controversy. The type of thought which Ward attacks is essentially a nineteenth-century affair; it belongs to a generation which is gone. *Naturalism and Agnosticism* must be read with sympathetic imagination quick to reconstruct the situation in which Ward was writing. Like many books which are devoted to attack instead of to a constructive world-view, it has become largely of historical interest only. A constructive world-

view, if vividly painted, may charm and attract when it can not convince: it may deserve attention as a bit of human imaginative sentiment when it would not be worth a refutation. But often a book which seeks to refute a certain world-view can not hope to live when it is successful in killing its enemy. It may cease to have an effective appeal after the object of its attack has ceased to exist. And such is largely the case with Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. Doubtless the well-rounded and penetrating criticisms delivered by Ward against Huxley, Spencer, Clifford, *et al.*, are one reason why the book has served its purpose and no longer has the wide interest it possessed when it was published in 1899.

Nonetheless, the broad outlines of Ward's critique of nineteenth-century naturalism are of considerable interest. In the course of his attack on naturalism he gives the prolegomena of a philosophy of science. Of course, Ward did not originate the general line of discussion of the nature of science which he sets forth, and it would be impossible to say exactly how much credit belongs to Ward himself for the development of the position which he and many other recent writers have taken of the metaphysical significance of scientific formulae and concepts. Ward is only one, even if an important one, of a whole school of idealistic writers in whom a certain estimate of the ontological bearings of science is made. But if we can not hope to apportion to Ward his precise share in terminating the curious combination of dogmatic materialism and metaphysical agnosticism which constituted the naturalism of the 1880's and 1890's and in developing a more critical and profound understanding of the philosophical bearings of scientific theories, at least we can not fail today to recognize in his book one clear and forceful exposition of the idealistic philosophy of science.

Ward's philosophy of science is beautifully summed up in a fine passage in the closing paragraphs of *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (pp. 572-573):<sup>1</sup> "Thought gives us only 'science,' not existence; we cannot by piling up propositions secure the simplest 'position.' Thought, again, gives us only the 'universal,' the relational; from the 'particular' which is the 'surd' for it—or the real moving point or subject of relations—it must start, but to this particular it can never return save by traversing an interminable series. But this reality, richer than thought, is experience. Science cannot originate experience; for experience is the source of science, yet always more than its product, so surely as the workman is more than his tools. Science is but the skeleton, while experience is the life; science but a means, and experience the end itself." In this passage are a number of important points through which Ward suggests a philosophical estimate of the nature of science, viz., that science is selective, that science is symbolical, and hence that science can not be taken as a metaphysics. Each of these points deserves special comment.

Fundamental to Ward's whole attitude is the realization that science is selective. The history of science from Descartes to the twentieth century furnishes Ward with abundant illustrations of this truth. Starting from some particular problem which engages his attention, the scientist pushes aside irrelevant considerations and centers his mind upon those aspects of his subject-matter which are pertinent to his problem. Selection is not, however, falsification: science is innocent of any illicit interpretations which metaphysical speculation may draw from its conclusions. Yet such illicit interpretations have often followed upon the success of science in formulating a truth about some phase of nature. Enthusiastic over

<sup>1</sup> References to pages throughout this paper are to the fourth edition of *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 1915, unless specific mention is made of some other work.



the ability to predict change and to explain a causal sequence, many a thinker who has used the results of scientific investigation has reduced the entire rich manifold of experienced objects to the one aspect which has proved significant for his own problem. Descartes' identification of the material world with extension is one instance of this confusion, and the nineteenth century attempt to equate mass and force with reality is another such instance. "The notion of mass leaves far behind it not merely all the diversities of chemical classification . . . not merely the variety of secondary qualities . . . not merely the physical distinctions of solid, liquid, and gaseous states" (p. 50). Every scientific proposition, even when literally true, is one truth which leaves unsaid many other truths which other interests and other problems might lead men to discover and affirm about the same objects. Through the whole field of the natural sciences and the whole field of human history we take up into our formulae or our records what we want to emphasize or as much of the richness of the entire reality as we can: we never take up the full being of things. It is a vital part of any truth about reality that that truth is a partial truth. And if the partial nature of any truth is overlooked, then that truth can not be properly understood; if it is denied, the truth thereby becomes false in its implications and references. Ward quotes with approval the words of Mach: "In reality the law always contains less than the fact itself, because it does not reproduce the fact as a whole, but only that aspect of it which is important to us, the rest being either intentionally or from necessity omitted" (*Realm of Ends*, p. 17).

In addition to being selective science is symbolical. At least science is largely symbolical and has become increasingly so during the last century. Scientific explanations are no longer stated in most cases in terms of concrete causal factors but rather are given in terms of certain

abstract mathematical formulae. The entities defined in scientific formulae are often ideal tools of the imagination into which for purposes of convenience the complex realities of experience are translated. For instance, in Newton's system we have a number of factors none of which exactly describes real objects, but all of which are for that very reason valuable as scientific concepts. Newton speaks of "absolute time" and "absolute motions" and "bodies that by definition are masses and only masses, absolutely determinate and unchangeable," and thus he formulates entities which give him a "mechanical system that is independent and complete" (p. 77). But real time and motions and bodies are not exactly of that sort. Newton's entities are "not real but ideal, not sensibly or empirically given but intellectually conceived or constructed, not ectypal but archetypal, as Locke says of all purely mathematical ideas" (p. 73). There is probably no body in the universe in the exact state described by the first law of motion; yet the first law of motion is, relatively to its purpose and function, absolutely true. There may be and probably is no lever in the universe which is perfectly rigid and lacking in characteristics which introduce extraneous considerations; yet the law of the lever is, relatively to the ideal it seeks to define, absolutely true. Not simply must science select from the manifold of reality if it wishes ever to state any proposition about reality, but also science must simplify, must deal with conceptual entities less complicated than the given reals of experience. Science treats concrete realities in terms of "statistical means and hypothetical mechanism" (p. 114); it is only a pseudo-science which then proceeds to suppose that the statistical means and hypothetical mechanism are the concrete realities.

The philosopher should then be cautious in his treatment of the entities of science. Insofar as these entities are not directly given in experience—and many of them are not—

they can not be given an assured ontological status. Perhaps such entities in some cases exist, perhaps in other cases they do not. At any rate their existence is less certain than the concrete experiences which were the basis of fact from which the entities were inferred, and hence the existence of the scientific entities can not be used as an argument against the reality of the concrete experiences. For example the chemical molecule may exist. "Such things *may* exist or the hypothesis would not be legitimate" (p. 105). But whether they exist or not, they at least "serve, like certain legal and commercial fictions, to facilitate the business of scientific description." Some formula would have to be literally true, whether the molecular theory is so or not. Probability of literal truth is high when the theory has been formulated under a compulsion of experience which seemed to leave no other alternatives. Yet the seeming compulsion in all such instances may be due to lack of sufficient imagination on the part of a scientist and not to the material of experience. And we can never be so sure about the literal truth of any conceptual entity as to use it as a basis of deductive inference concerning the unreality of what is given in experience. In other cases there is no doubt about affirming that the entities of science are purely ideal and symbolical. Such, Ward thinks, is the case with the conception of force. Force is not a thing: it is a name. Force is not an agent which changes the motion of a body: it describes the fact that the motion of a body is changed in particular ways. So far from being a real being, force "means simply the direction in which, and the rate at which, this change takes place" (p. 57). Likewise in regard to all the formulae of science which are stated in terms of entities which lie beyond the direct experience of men, Ward advises us to maintain a healthy ontological scepticism. "We cannot be sure that there is any *a priori* necessity about the particular mechanical principles of

Galileo and Newton; from other fundamental definitions consequences equally exact might be deduced" (p. 77). Yet the utility of scientific formulae is not to be disputed, nor is any disrepute cast upon scientific method. The translation of the concrete realities of experience into the ideal terms of mathematics and into the possibly fictitious terms of imaginative systems is the key of scientific success. An algebraic equation is simpler than a maze of steel scaffolding, and a chemical formula is simpler than a mixture of various salts. The simplicity, taken as an objective reality, is false; but taken as a tool, it is an indispensable condition of control and progress. Only a formula which is approximately rather than exactly true can hope to be relevant to multitudes of cases, and so approximations are in scientific matters often more desirable than entirely accurate descriptions. Ward agrees with Karl Pearson that entities of science are "conceptual shorthand"; and if sometimes they are even more, they are nonetheless also such. If we try to make all our symbols literally true, they become so unwieldy that they lose their value; they then are not more easy to handle than the bulky and intricate realities of concrete experience. Science is wisely symbolical and approximate; it would cover a very narrow range in the effort to be literal and would "become involved in interminable complications in the attempt to be exact" (p. 162).

The selective and symbolical character of science is sufficient evidence for the position that science can not be taken as a metaphysics. This is not of course to say that the metaphysician can ignore science or proceed without a knowledge of science: it is not to say that science has not metaphysical implications. It is simply to say that the part is not the whole and the symbol is not the reality. "Our experience certainly does not embrace the totality of things, is, in fact, ridiculously far from it" (p. 189), and



our science is far from embracing the totality of our experience. Science is thus twice removed from encompassing the whole of being. If we discover that things are extended in space, we can not consequently say that reality is extension. If we discover that we are confronted by and use mechanical devices, we can not therefrom conclude that reality is a mechanism. If we discover instances of evolving forms of life, we can not thence infer that reality is a process of evolution. "The universe then, we may safely say, not only *is* not, but never can be, a single object in this wise" (p. 190). "Experience provides us with instances of evolution and dissolution on the most varied scales, from the grass of the field or the cedars of Lebanon to the solar system or the Milky Way. But of a single supreme evolution embracing them all we have no title to speak: not even to assume that it is, much less to say what it is; least of all to affirm confidently that it can be embraced in such a meaningless formula as the integration of matter and the dissipation of motion" (p. 191). Things happen in the world, but we can not say the world happens. Perhaps we could express Ward's point by saying that our propositions about reality can not legitimately be of the form "Reality is X" but only of the form "X is real" or "There really is such a thing as an X."

The history of modern philosophy is full of ontologies which are due to an incorrect interpretation of the metaphysical significance of science. Ward lingers, with what today is tedious reiteration, on Herbert Spencer; but he puts Descartes down as the offender who in modern times began the unjustifiable method of taking the abstractions of science as the ultimate reals of the universe. The dualism of Descartes arose from a misunderstanding of the selective and symbolical nature of his own science. Extension is a selected aspect of the particular objects of concrete experience. Taken as the real essence of things, it

led him to deny the objective status of all other aspects of experience and to banish those aspects to another realm of being. Similarly seeing, thinking, doubting are particular processes which we find ourselves carrying on. Taken as the essence of mind, they led him to separate these processes from the external world of matter. Thus a dualism of matter and mind arose which has left many deep impresses upon subsequent thought. Each of Descartes' two types of substance represents a certain interest which he sought to satisfy; each is a carefully defined universe of discourse which enables discussion to progress towards the solution of certain problems. Taken as ultimate realities from which then all other aspects of experience must be deduced, they create ontological problems which no one can hope to solve. Since Descartes' time most scientists have been concerned primarily with the world of matter. And though they have changed his conception of matter as bare extension, they have usually retained his division of the universe into the two realms of matter and mind. Unable to account for the dualism and anxious to keep the realm of matter intact from disturbances which are contrary to their definitions of the nature of matter, some philosophers have felt it necessary to reduce mind to an impotent automaton, to a "shadowy concomitant of brain, which is itself but a part of this mechanism inextricably linked in with the rest" (*Realm of Ends*, p. 6). But the original Cartesian dualism and the materialistic developments which have ensued therefrom are alike false to the every-day experience of all men. In experience we find "a duality of object presented and subject affected, of subject striving and object attained," but we never find "a dualism of material phenomena and mental phenomena" (*Realm of Ends*, p. 10). From the dualisms and materialisms of modern philosophy we could never infer the possibility of such experiences as actually are going on constantly: rather we seem forced to

deny that such experiences could really occur. The ontologizing of the selected aspects of experience and of the symbolical terms of scientific control leads thus to a denial of the data upon which all science must rest. Philosophies which start out with an intent to be thoroughly scientific sometimes end up by becoming entirely mythological. The moral which we can obviously draw from the failure of such philosophies is that there is no single formula for the whole of reality within the power of science to state.

"Experience in every case consists in interaction between individual and environment" (p. 346). This interaction is characterized by activity, doing, expression, the "unswerving tenacity of purpose"; also it is marked by passivity, feeling, impression, "aimless drifting." The reality of experience thus defined is not a matter for doubt. rather it is the final test of the truth of all theories. We can select any element of experience as a subject for investigation and scientific inquiry, and we may develop the logical implications of the terms in which we state the character of that selected element. Those implications, however, are significant only as hypothetical predictions to be verified by a return to experience; they are not necessary determinations of reality through which the unreality of some future experience can be established. Not embodying the full nature of experience within any set of selected elements, and not describing the full nature of things in any formulae of science, we can not then deduce from our selected elements and symbolical formulae the other aspects of experience which we chose to disregard temporarily. Much less can we find any warrant for taking the deductions of our partial science as more certain than the direct nature of experience. And it is only ridiculous to suppose that the inconsistencies between the implications of our formulae and the evidence of our experience are to be explained on the basis that the formulae give us

reality and the experience is but "appearance" or "illusion." Yet naturalism does venture "to discredit the plain testimony of experience" (p. 352). Naturalists begin with an interest in the physical, define their terms, take those terms as giving them the essence of reality, find that they can not thence deduce life and mind and purpose, and so feel forced to deny the reality of what is not implied in their closed system of thought. What had priority of interest for them is thus changed into what has priority of being in reality.

Ward is insistent upon the point that science implies rather than denies the presence of teleology in reality. Science is a construction which serves an end and is designed for the end it serves. Its instrumental character is obvious whether it is also literal description of fact or purely symbolical. And its function as instrument implies the reality of ends and the efficacy of endeavor towards those ends. The blindly mechanical and the intelligently guided are two kinds of process which ordinarily we can easily distinguish; hence "insofar as both are compatible with mechanical principles it is obvious that strictly mechanical considerations will not enable us to distinguish between them" (p. 200). The discovery of mechanism, in other words, is its discovery in particular phases of experience in which it is co-ordinate with other phases, and it is not, *qua* mechanism, an explanation of the other phases. It is not the mechanism by which I obtain my ends that furnishes me with the ends to be sought. We can no more reduce the whole of reality to a mechanism than we can reduce it to an evolution. We find many a case of evolution in nature; and every such case is the gradual change of an object under the influence of external forces affecting it. Evolution therefore is change within an environment; and there can be no evolution for what has no environment. The whole of reality may be the scene of many



evolutions, but is hardly itself an evolution. Likewise with mechanism. I may use a mechanism, or I may in turn be part of a social situation which another person seeks to control. But in both cases, mechanism stands in contrast with the teleological aspect of experience. Finding mechanisms in abundance in the real world, we can not hence conclude the whole of reality to be a mechanism. And in no case could the purpose be deduced from the mechanism employed; for the mechanism might serve for another purpose or continue to play in the absence of human purposes altogether. "The complete unravelling of the two sets of factors, teleological and non-teleological, so as clearly to exhibit their respective shares in any given form is probably an impossible task. My concern is only to show that the two sets of factors are there, and that the teleological are indispensable" (p. 289). Mind, purpose, ends are not "collateral products" (p. 376): they are as much given in experience as any other factor. However irrelevant they may be in connection with the development of certain theories of the mechanism of nature, they are presupposed in any consideration as to why such theories are formulated.

Such is the general philosophy of science from the point of view of which Ward launched his attack against naturalism and agnosticism. Throughout the development of the argument Ward gives clear evidences of the idealistic outcome, the spiritualism and the theism, to which he wishes eventually to lead his readers. These elements of his thought have in this paper been left unnoticed. And it would be the contention of this paper that the general conception which Ward held of the nature and function of science was not logically tied up in any way with the idealistic ontological views which he also shares. Indeed if historically it was the idealistic school which inaugurated the philosophy of science which is expressed in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, we find today a similar point of view

expressed by realists, pragmatists, and other non-idealistic groups, most of whom in a broad sense could be called naturalists. Ward's critique of nineteenth-century naturalism might indeed be said to have served one purpose which Ward could never have intended or contemplated in undertaking his work, viz., the formulation of a new type of naturalism which incorporates the lessons concerning science which Ward meant as a death-blow to naturalism altogether. Contemporary naturalism stands with Ward against the uncritical use of science which characterized the closing decades of the last century. Bosanquet wrote in his *Logic* (2nd edition, vol. II, p. 245, note b) that in traveling in the United States in 1892 he met an American philosopher who told him with an air both of rebuke and of great finality, "Sir, the people of these States have endorsed the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer." However extreme the judgment of that American philosopher was for even that moment when the influence of Spencer was at its height, it is a well-known fact that a generation ago there was a widespread and uncritical acceptance of Spencerian naturalism and agnosticism. And today Spencer is in such disrepute that the merits of his work are ordinarily forgotten and he is referred to as an instructive example of the error of turning science too facilely into metaphysics. In the place of Spencer we have men eager to devote philosophy to a criticism of the categories and concepts of science, men who frequently agree with Ward in his judgments as to the selective, symbolical, and non-metaphysical character of science, even though they differ with Ward on most points of epistemology and ontology. A rereading of Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism* is likely to impress one today by the contrast it affords between the naturalism of the 1880's and 1890's and the naturalism of the present day.

Ward defines what he means by naturalism in several passages. In one place he writes: "Naturalism we have taken to designate the doctrine that sets Nature in place of God, subordinates Spirit to Matter, and regards unchangeable law as supreme" (pp. 179-180). Or in another place, "Those who assign the priority to Nature we call Naturalists; those who contend for the priority of free agents we may call Spiritualists" (*Realm of Ends*, p. 3). These definitions are far from clear. In their setting such phrases must find their meaning in the fact that Herbert Spencer is ultimately intended; and so his philosophy furnishes the sense in which the phrases are to be taken. Perhaps, indeed probably, Ward would condemn naturalism of the type prevalent today; but he could hardly do so on the grounds adduced in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. I know of no contemporary naturalist who would have men's worship directed towards an Unknowable behind nature. To put "Nature in place of God" would be equivalent to putting the chemical formula for mixing paints in place of the beauty of a great altarpiece. Or as a friend said to whom I recently quoted Ward's definition: "One might as well speak of putting  $H_2O$  in place of Byron." Contemporary naturalism is prone to distinguish between existential-judgments and value-judgments; and while nature is an inclusive name for the many sorts of existences we discover, God is usually taken as a term through which men strive to integrate their aspirations. Naturalists will perhaps always seem to Spiritualists to deny God; but they can hardly be said today to put nature in place of God. Similarly with the phrase about regarding "unchangeable law as supreme." Many naturalists certainly would deny that the nature of life and mind can be correctly expressed when they are "reduced" to physico-chemical terms. The continuities between inorganic and organic bodies or the continuities between different forms of living things can never

be properly used to express the discontinuities: the similarities are not the differences. Man as a rational animal has characteristics which are not stated by any complications of chemical formulae. "Reduction" is oversight. "Unchangeable law" is what it is found to be and wherever it is found to hold; but there is no warrant to charge most contemporary naturalisms with regarding the "laws" of matter as preventing us from recognizing the qualitatively distinct nature of life and mind. Finally, with the phrase in which Ward says that naturalism "subordinates Spirit to Matter" or makes Nature prior. Naturalists all hold, I presume, that temporally non-living matter was prior to life; and I think most naturalists also hold it as probable that ultimately life will disappear before certain transformations of the material environment. But if "Spirit" means anything we can empirically designate, it refers to a quality of excellence found in all noble human lives and outwardly expressed in all great human achievements of art and imagination. That is, it does not name a distinct entity or existence, but it helps us to appraise values. Professor John Dewey says in his last book (*Experience and Nature*, p. 28): "Nature's place in man is no less significant than man's place in nature. Man in nature is man subjected; nature in man, recognized and used, is intelligence and art." One might perhaps without violence repeat his meaning by saying that man in nature is matter and nature in man is spirit. At least many naturalists of today would find such a statement just to their own positions. And however in the remote past or the problematic future matter may have had and may again come to have a temporal priority of existence, certainly in estimation of values it might be said that spirit alone had any significance.

To summarize the contentions of this paper, the critique which Ward made of nineteenth-century naturalism has



two chief claims on our interest today. In the first place this critique embodies many keen and penetrating remarks about the nature and function of science. These remarks, gathered together, furnish the outlines of a philosophy of science. This philosophy of science does not depend for its validity upon any other part of the system of thought which Ward went on to develop: it is not pledged to Spiritualism or any other single ontological point of view. Rather it is an estimate of the nature of science which has become widely accepted by thinkers in many different schools of philosophy, and indeed constitutes one of the few points which are held in common by many opponents in current controversy. In the second place Ward's critique enables us vividly to see the contrast between the naturalism of a generation ago and the naturalism of the present. To note this contrast is not to disparage Ward's work. It might better be taken as a tribute to the effectiveness of his critique; for seldom has a widespread philosophy so quickly disappeared as the naturalism he exposed. Glimpses which we get today of that curious combination of dogmatic naturalism and agnostic dualism seem like very faded daguerreotypes in which the features are hardly those of friends we know. And the naturalism of the present hour, like the Spiritualism of Ward, begins with the distinction Ward himself emphasized between experience as real and science as a selective and symbolical description in terms of fixed concepts more precise than the experience which they are used to mean. Indeed many naturalists would claim to adhere more faithfully than Ward to the instruction he gives towards a methodology in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. For just as the terms of mathematical and physical science represent, not ultimate forces and beings, but the sequences and structures of experience, so, in their view, the terms of Ward's own idealism and theism represent, not real agents and existences,

but the aesthetic values and moral aspirations which human experience may under proper conditions come to manifest. Supernaturalism, just as much as agnostic dualisms and epiphenomenalisms and dogmatic materialisms, puts reality in things beyond experience, taking terms of interpretation for entities and facts. Contemporary naturalism thus adheres in one sense to the point of Ward's critique of nineteenth-century naturalism and his methodological principles more truly than he himself did in the constructive statement of his own views. But at least the issues between idealism and naturalism are not today what they were when Ward in 1899 published his work on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, and current naturalism has many points in common with Ward

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## THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WARD'S PHILOSOPHY

### I

PERHAPS no single term has so much to answer for in the long history of philosophy, equally for good and for evil, as "idealism." Its origin expressed the highest stages attained by Greek thought, for which the "ideas" were the eternal foundations which sustain the changing universe. Essentially, therefore, they were objective and self-existent, and not in any degree the content—much less the product—of any human mind; and in this respect it is of the first importance to observe that, in spite of the almost complete absence of scientific knowledge, these idealistic principles anticipated in a most remarkable way the standpoint of modern science. For it is only necessary to substitute "natural law," "causation," or "the uniformity of nature" for "ideas," to perceive that Greek thought had intuitively apprehended the basal postulate of modern science—that the ever-changing flux of transient phenomena is the manifestation of a universal order governed throughout by agencies whose character is more and more fully expressible in terms of human thought. This form of statement, of course, at once raises the old puzzles of subjectivity and objectivity. For since all thought necessitates mental processes it is often concluded that its entire content can never be other than purely relative and subjective—a viewpoint represented by the widely accepted contention

that scientific laws are merely conceptual, schematic formulae, highly valuable in economizing intellectual labor and anticipating the course of events, but never to be regarded as corresponding to any real existents. All arguments of this type, however, fallaciously confuse the *process of thinking*, which is necessarily subjective, with the *object or content* of thought, which is fundamentally objective and ontologically real; the fallacy is one and the same as that which neglects to distinguish between the process of perceiving and the thing perceived, or between sensation, as a psychical activity, and the quality or attribute that is sensed.

Thus the true and objective interpretation of current scientific principles is in complete agreement with ancient Greek idealism. The "ideas" were self-sustaining, and did not necessarily exist in any mind at all, either human or divine.<sup>1</sup> But the rise of Christianity, with its insistence on the divine supremacy, finally resulted in "ideas" being regarded as the forms of eternal wisdom and as existent therefore only within God's mind; after which the still further step was inevitable of defining all ideas as contents or objects of mind in general—a standpoint common to Descartes and his successors, and the root alike of the theories of representative perception and of Berkeleian idealism.

Whether Berkeley himself was a subjectivist or not is still a debatable point. But it would seem that only his genius could guard thinkers from the descent into the later unmitigated subjectivism which characterized much of nineteenth-century science, for which ideas became restricted to the individual mind while reality remained always outside or beyond the mind. Thus consciousness became degraded to the epiphenomenal level, and thought

<sup>1</sup> Plato's use of the terms "God" and "creator" is mainly poetic rather than purely philosophic, though this does not imply any absolute dissociation of the two standpoints in his own mind.



to the status of a mere by-product of cerebral changes; whence it followed that Reality was either reduced to the invisible motions of impalpable atoms or relegated to the Limbo of the Unknowable.

But unreservedly to condemn, or even unsympathetically to criticize, this phase of modern thought would be to adopt a totally unjustifiable attitude. For the unending stream of human speculation, like all else in the universe, has its own causal determinants. The philosophy which emerged from the rapid and triumphant progress of last century's science, therefore, can be adequately appreciated only in the light of its own generative precedents. For it regarded itself, in the first place, as the strictly logical development of the earlier Cartesian and Lockean dualism between matter and mind; and burdened with this unfortunate philosophic heritage, it was compelled to choose between the scepticism of Hume and the phenomenalism of Kant. Secondly, it was the natural and inevitable reaction from the earlier crude theories of special creation and divine control that had invaded religion and theology. More and more Nature was revealing herself as self-maintained and self-explanatory, and material energies as increasingly adequate to account for vital or even psychical processes—a tendency that has in our own day gained still weightier significance, although its final implications still remain to be discerned. But in two fundamentally important respects the thinkers of this dawn-period of modern science were prevented, by the very character of their work itself, from apprehending the true perspective of their problems and solutions; for like all other workers, they were too close to their field of inquiry and too deeply immersed in its detailed subject matter.

Hence as uniformity and law became more and more universally apparent in the physical world, it was perfectly natural to conclude that matter was the fundamental or

sole reality while consciousness was scarcely real at all. The alternative suggestion that physical laws were in this way more readily discoverable simply because the material sphere was much less complex than the psychical was completely ignored; it required the still profounder researches of recent biology and psychology to reveal the baffling intricacy of all vital and mental processes. This persistent overemphasis of the importance of the material world, further, radically distorted its relations to the psychic sphere; and this is all the more curious in the light of the evolutionary foundations of last century's knowledge. For the truth that life and mind rest upon an indispensable physical basis was taken to mean that this basis was primary and the superstructures secondary; thus overlooking the possibility that, simply because it *was* a basis, matter itself formed the subordinate instrument whose essential purpose was the development of yet higher levels of immaterial being.

## II

The culmination of this continued stress upon matter and motion, law and causation, is to be found in the enthronement of mechanical necessity; and with this, freedom and purpose seem to vanish from the universe. The reaction within the sphere of ethics and religion is equally patent, and is summarily expressed in the two "isms" which give the title to Ward's first series of Gifford Lectures, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*. Whatever term we may choose to designate them—whether Ideas, universal energies, or scientific laws—all the foundational elements of reality exist within the world of matter—this is the essence of Naturalism; while beyond this phenomenal sphere the human mind can never penetrate, even though

it may bow in mute reverence before the Unknowable—this is Agnosticism; and the same law that rules the realm of the physical dominates human thought and will—these, equally with the atom and the star, are the bondslaves of Necessity.

Looking backwards at this sharp turn of the Meander of speculation from the vantage-point of the wider knowledge of today, it is not difficult to appreciate the peculiar intensity of the difficulties which faced the older systems of thought. For resting as they necessarily did upon the most meagre content of positive knowledge, and appealing in the main to spiritual intuition, religious faith and divine revelation, they suddenly found almost all the contentions of the hostile "isms" consistently supported by the incessant discoveries and new principles of advancing science. Evolution rendered a creative Deity superfluous, just as all-comprehensive Nature left no room for direct revelation; universal law made miracles impossible, while ethics and religion were absorbed within the domain of psychology. Nothing remained therefore except to cling, boldly or despairingly as the case might be, to ancient truths which found their value in their practical success, or in some incomprehensible but indestructible inherence within human nature. It was as yet too soon to discern that the turbulent stream which threatened to undermine the old foundations was in reality a Nile flood which in due time would richly fertilize the arid deserts of ignorance and evil.

Adequately to appreciate Ward's own distinctive treatment of these problems it is necessary to observe that he was content with no such half-measures as perforce satisfied many of his contemporaries. Just as his presentment of psychological principles recast the whole subject, so his philosophic criticism is directed, not against the ascertained results of science, but against the assumptions and

presuppositions which these results were almost universally supposed to establish—conclusions, further, which are recognized from the outset as under the given conditions inevitable; “the naturalistic view of the world seems to stand out clearly of itself.”<sup>2</sup> His analysis of naturalism therefore, taken together with his subsequent constructive superstructure, constitutes one of the principal movements in that counter-attack, initiated by philosophic idealism towards the close of the nineteenth century and vigorously sustained to our own day, which may justly be called the Battle of the Marne in modern speculation.

It is impossible, however, to disconnect the different aspects of Ward's general standpoint from each other. Both his distinctively psychological theory and his treatment of scientific principles as a whole are organically conjoined with his ethics; in a deeper sense than the Kantian, Pure Reason and Practical Reason are essentially one. His initial protest, in the light of some current interpretations of the scientific Theory of Relativity, is still of fundamental significance. For it is frequently contended that the older concrete entities of the physicist—force, gravitation, ether—must now be wholly dispensed with, since all physical processes may be regarded as elements of the universal Space-Time continuum, whose nature finds complete expression in mathematical formulae of adequate complexity, while Space and Time themselves, still further, are nothing more than relativist or even subjective schemata of the observer's mind.<sup>3</sup> Such a standpoint, of course, is but the natural development of an earlier powerful tendency in scientific thought; and in both its earlier and its present-day phases it still remains open to Ward's fatal

<sup>2</sup> *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. 1, p. v; my italics.

<sup>3</sup> I may add that this last argument rests on the confusion between our standards and measurements of spatio-temporal intervals, and Time and Space in themselves. To use a crude illustration, it is the same as saying that because the quart and the *litre* are distinctive national standards of capacity, therefore water and all other liquids are only relative to the individual.



criticism. "There are people," he observes, "who imagine that when they have resolved all that happens into motions of mass-points, traceable by pure mathematical analysis, they have attained to a philosophy of nature." But, he continues, "mechanism is not the one reality behind the veil of phenomena."<sup>4</sup> All such mathematical devices, in short, indispensable though they are as factors within truly comprehensive knowledge, can never do more than accurately express certain aspects of the entire group of phenomena which are disclosed by their acute analysis. These aspects, of course (apart from exceptions for which a complete theory would itself provide), are all essentially *real*; their being abstract does not mean that they are unreal. For in this connection "abstraction" means merely incompleteness—partialness—even (in a degree) superficiality; none-the-less are the "abstract" elements indispensable within the whole to which they belong.<sup>5</sup> But to regard them, as is so frequently done, as being the fundamental or the sole realities is as illogical as to equate the analytical program of a great symphony to the musical composition itself, or the outline which enables us to identify the figures in some famous painting to the picture. For while outline and program are certainly essential to our complete understanding of the artistic qualities of the work, they are obviously far from exhausting its nature; indeed, the purely aesthetic elements which they must perforce exclude are far more valuable than they are. In other words, Art may dispense with these devices, highly instructive though they all are; while without color and form, without harmony and beauty, it would utterly perish. But the same principle is still more profoundly true of the Uni-

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, Vol II, p. 67.

<sup>5</sup> In this respect, Ward's fuller treatment of the problem appears to me somewhat unsatisfactory. He seems to regard the abstractions in question as nothing more than "hypothetical descriptive schemes," pp. 67, *sqq.* They are much more than this in my own opinion, but the point is not directly relevant to his ethics.

verse. It is a universe of essentially concrete reals—of Matter and Energy, Life and Mind, Religion and Law; and while each of these undoubtedly presents abstract aspects which are capable of exact mathematical formulation,<sup>6</sup> these still remain wholly subordinate elements of the entire situation.

### III

Such, then, is the basis of Ward's opposition to all purely mechanical explanations of the nature of Reality—"the world is not fundamentally mechanical";<sup>7</sup> and the alternative which at once arises has both its ethical and its religious implications. For the non-mechanical or super-mechanical—whichever is its truest designation—must operate by means of other than purely necessitarian agencies; some form of liberty of action—of freedom of choice—thus becomes not only possible but actual; and then the further question arises—Can we comprehend this sphere of being in the same sense that we know the world of Nature? Agnosticism maintained the negative; and even Kant, stern moralist though he was, regarded ethical and religious truths as inherently beyond the range of Pure Reason.<sup>8</sup> Thus purely materialist Naturalism is repudiated and Agnosticism directly challenged; and Ward's ground is in both instances one and the same—the substitution of the essential unity of experience in the place of the two-fold dualism implied by these systems—first the dualism between matter and mind, and secondly that be-

<sup>6</sup> As in the complicated statistics of a nation or church, or again—from a slightly different point of view—in the strictly legal aspects of some great constitutional issue such as slavery or prohibition; for while these considerations are of vital importance they can never be primary nor exhaustive.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 67.

<sup>8</sup> It is, however, frequently forgotten that Kant's *Practical Reason* is equally rational.

tween the known and the unknown, or between phenomenal and noumenal. The logical force of such a starting point is at once obvious; for this experiential unity is so primal and fundamental that no actual dualism can ever arise; there can never be anything more therefore than a duality of aspects within one unbroken whole—"the duality in unity of subject and object, present alike in cognition, feeling and volition."<sup>9</sup>

But experience, still further, is not only unified; it is also essentially conative—active—self-conservative. In this respect again we discern another inevitable consequence of the swift expansion of nineteenth-century science—its overemphasis on the intellectual activities of consciousness; and it needs but to insist on the equal importance of its volitional expression to introduce, at the very outset, ethical concepts that are just as fundamental as any scientific concepts. Moral philosophy and religion, of course, had always focussed their consideration upon these principles; only, unfortunately, they necessarily lacked a sound basis in the facts of physiology and psychology; the development of these subjects therefore speedily inaugurated that "conflict between science and religion" which will always characterize the speculation of last century. Ward's treatment, however, restores the balance essential to any adequate presentment of the entire issue. He insists that experience must never be mutilated, and that even cognition itself, in actuality, is inherently conational; experience is "life, self-conservation, self-realization."<sup>10</sup> A purely cognitive being, in short, is not human; and thus worth and value, purposes and ends, goodness and evil, all find their place as inexpugnable elements, not only within so-called "human nature" regarded as isolated, subjective or even epiphenomenal, but still more truly within the real universe which, in consonance with the basal principle of

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 129. Cf., pp. 110, *sqq.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

unity, constitutes the equally indestructible object of all experience. Once this standpoint is accepted the purely abstract character of materialistic naturalism becomes patent, and Huxley's "cosmic process that has no sort of relation to moral ends" reveals itself as the Frankenstein's monster of an over-developed intellectualism.

It is true, of course, that these conational factors undergo an age-long evolution, in precisely the same way that rationality emerges from the instinctive consciousness of animals. No one, and least of all Ward, would maintain that they constitute "innate ideas" explicitly present at the dawn of either individual or social life. This would only revive the crude theories of earlier moral speculation, against which a sane and healthy "naturalism" must always protest. The essential point is that our ruling moral principles and ideals have naturally developed from the primary forms of volition—forms which are, however, so little defined that "volition" can hardly as yet be employed—exactly as our basal scientific concepts have arisen from the perceptual levels of animal experience; so that to accept the second position, while at the same time denying the first, is simply to misread the psychology of the whole situation. But this equivalence both in origin and in development at once carries with it an equivalence of validity; morality, in other words, is just as inherently human as reason.<sup>11</sup> The patent fact that moral ideas lack the coherence, the logical necessity, of intellectual principles in no degree invalidates this conclusion. For in the first place it is by no means true as a matter of fact; some broad ethical truths have always commanded a sufficiently universal acceptance, if only as indispensable factors of social well-being; and we need only recall the ignorance and superstitions of the Middle Ages to perceive that scientific logicity enjoys as yet a painfully brief history and a still more

<sup>11</sup> Once again, for Kant the "Pure" and the "Practical Reason" were alike rational.



restricted application. It is only necessary to realize that logical certainty reigns supreme in pure mathematics to recognize that it is the offspring of systematic abstraction. Its lamentable absence in the sphere of ethics, in other words, is not inherent, but is due to nothing more than the extreme intricacy and difficulty of moral experience, dominated as this is by conflicting tendencies and deeply-rooted personal interests. Gradually and painfully, nevertheless, these are becoming subordinated to the control of the same rationality whose swift advance can be plainly discerned in the simpler—because more abstract—sphere of scientific investigation; and within this (to repeat) most easily in the most abstract sciences—in mathematics, mathematical physics and physical chemistry.

#### IV

The logical implications of these considerations should now be patent. For if ethical principles spring from the same experiential basis as rational truths, and if, still further, their power of controlling behavior is due to an immanent reason, then there can be no such inherent limits to the capacity of human thought as are postulated by agnosticism. Mind—reason—thought—are operative not partially but universally; not only in the realm of knowledge, but equally in aesthetic and in moral experience. And again, simply because it is mind that is thus universal,<sup>12</sup> purely materialistic naturalism proves itself to be just as inadequate as agnosticism. The objection that after all these conclusions can hold good only with regard to experience, but not therefore to the nature of reality, simply cuts the ground from under scientific naturalism itself;

<sup>12</sup> It is a curious fact that (as Ward himself points out) Huxley explicitly recognized this primacy of consciousness; "our one certainty is the existence of the mental world"; *ibid.*, p. 216, *sqq.*

for it plainly implies that logic and rationality—the “Pure Reason” of Kant—are (as indeed Kant himself held them to be) confined to mere phenomena, and so can never attain to the real nature of things; and thus agnosticism invades the realm of science itself and so becomes universal; naturalism, in other words, deliberately commits suicide; “agnosticism” (in Ward’s own words) “proves a treacherous ally for naturalism, and ends by undermining its dogmatic foundations.”<sup>13</sup>

In spite of its patently subjective aspects therefore we must regard the realm of consciousness as being at the least as real as the material world. But conscious experience, still further, is never a matter of merely passive or responsive contemplation, but rather of intense and spontaneous activity which finally attains the level of volitional behavior; and with this we come face to face with what Ward calls “contingency.” It is undeniably unfortunate that “contingency” is almost inseparably associated in general opinion with accident or casualness; Ward, however, expressly rules out these meanings, and connects contingency firstly with freedom and secondly with law. “The contingency is not that of chance, but that of freedom; everything that is is a law in itself, has an end for itself, and seeks the good. In such a world” (it must definitely be noticed) “there is still room for rational necessity. . . . For where rational necessity is supreme, freedom is possible. . . . No sane man resents as a constraint normal laws of thought, normal laws of conduct, normal laws of taste.”<sup>14</sup>

At this point I cannot avoid expressing my own opinion that this conclusion, despite its essential truth, is hardly so simple a matter as it is here presented to be. For both the laws of thought and the principles of art are undoubtedly acknowledged far more readily than are the laws of con-

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 211.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 281.

duct; and the complete unconsciousness, in this last instance, of any "constraint" whatever is so rare that even the saints proclaim it as an almost impossible ideal. The reason for this remarkable contrast lies in the close concord between both intellectual and aesthetic principles and human desires; we avoid error and ugliness instinctively, so that aesthetics and logic enable us to satisfy these powerful natural tendencies with the minimum of effort. In the sphere of practical conduct, on the contrary, we begin by experiencing a fundamental opposition between natural desires and moral laws. Even if we concede that all desire, as such, must be for the good, still the good that is first desired is rarely the highest form of good; and yet it attracts us so forcibly that to abandon it, even for the sake of a good that reason clearly shows us to be higher, is often difficult and occasionally impossible. Each of these great departments of experience, in other words—knowledge, art, and conduct—is incessantly swayed by the tension between desire and necessity—between the "is" and the "ought"; only in the first two, however, do these categories so naturally agree with one another that the reign of necessity is willingly acknowledged;<sup>15</sup> in the last, on the other hand, the acceptance of what Ward here calls "normal" and "sane" involves a conflict so radical as to be almost disruptive of personality. It was, indeed, just this essential feature of moral experience—this inherent opposition between the sensuous and the rational—that constituted for Kant the very basis of the moral imperative.

All this, however, leaves Ward's fundamental principle unimpaired—that is the activity, equally within conscious experience and throughout the universe,<sup>16</sup> of a necessity

<sup>15</sup> It would be beyond the scope of the present article to develop the further implications of this universal dominance of necessity; it must be sufficient to point out that its operation, particularly in art, is too frequently ignored.

<sup>16</sup> It should, of course, be obvious that there can be no separation between these two categories, since all experience must fall within the universe; still their distinction is a useful one, though it is too frequently misunderstood.

which is a *rational* necessity; a necessity, therefore, which can never be adequately described as material or even, in any crude sense, as mechanical, although the mechanicality of material Nature may still be one of its essential aspects. Its rationality, again, makes it identical with freedom—with that freedom of thought and art which would dominate the whole personality were natural desires but subordinated to its demands.

## V

Thus the first series of Gifford Lectures becomes the logical foundation of the second—*The Realm of Ends*. "Mechanism is not the secret of the universe; if it is to have any meaning, it must subserve some end; we accept the spiritualistic standpoint and its Realm of Ends as the more fundamental . . . there is nothing in Nature that is incompatible with a spiritualistic interpretation."<sup>17</sup> I have already observed that the conational aspects of experience are of equal importance to the cognitive, and that the evolution of conation culminates in volition. But this evolution is essentially a natural, and therefore a law-governed, process; the will, on the other hand, is just as essentially free; how then can this apparent antithesis between natural necessity and volitional freedom be overcome? For if this is impossible mankind becomes simply one subdivision of a purely mechanical Nature; "a like necessitation applies both to the events of the so-called physical and to those of the moral world; but that would be tantamount to denying any distinction between them."<sup>18</sup>

Kant's familiar elevation of this distinction to the level of the absolute contrast between transcendental moral

<sup>17</sup>Pp. 13, 20. "Spiritualistic" here, of course, with its pure philosophic meaning as opposed to materialistic.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 273.



freedom and phenomenal natural processes is repudiated by Ward as a "splendid failure." "Thorough-going determinism," he insists, "which denies self-determination *in toto*, refutes itself by overshooting the mark and proving too much; by resolving the subject of experience into an abstraction it denies the reality of experience altogether."<sup>19</sup> Human experience, in other words, is unified throughout, and in such a way as to constitute a self which actively determines its own course, responsive though this undoubtedly is to environmental stimuli; so much is neither a postulate nor a dogma, but a plain fact of modern psychology, which is on this point fully as "scientific" as the physics of the electronic atom. The issue, in short, turns not on the *existence* or non-existence of determination, but simply on its *location*—on the *dominance* of selfhood in its relation to its environment. This means that the focus of the final determinative act has been transferred from without the self to within it; and thus freedom, in its only true sense of self-determination, has become an actual agency in universal development.<sup>20</sup>

I have just observed, however, that human character and conduct still remain "responsive to environmental stimuli." Man's freedom, in other words, in no degree isolates him from the realm of Nature; and at this point we must take into account that fundamental principle which Naturalism, despite all its inadequacies as a final *Weltanschauung*, has indelibly implanted in modern thought—that is the concept of the Universe as ordered—law-governed—systematically interconnected throughout all its being. It is in such a Universe that man must freely direct his own path; not capriciously nor arbitrarily, but always under the sway of laws which his slowly expand-

<sup>19</sup> Pp. 292, 293.

<sup>20</sup> Both in its historical and philosophic aspects the identity of the terms "national freedom" and "self-determination" during the Great War is an extremely interesting, because wholly unconscious, proof of this contention.

ing reason more fully reveals to him, and which he finds operating in the sphere of mind and social intercourse just as unswervingly as in the material world. Universal law, that is, is not only natural but is equally ultra-natural—rational and moral just as truly as it is physical—and it is to this spiritual environment, not simply (as with animals) to the more restricted realm of Nature, that man must incessantly respond. It still remains true, of course, that natural and spiritual are essentially continuous—that man, with all his ultra-natural capacities, has uninterruptedly evolved from the animal level.

This evolution, still further, has always followed the line of social order. Not only man as we know him, but also his semi-human and pre-human ancestors, are organized into society; and hence "with society moral order begins and in society moral evil may arise."<sup>21</sup> It is obviously possible to lay too much stress on these social aspects of human nature—to sever it too absolutely from that wider world which constitutes at once its primary origin and its persistent environment. It must always be remembered therefore that society is but the form under which the universe makes its most direct appeal to each of its individual members—the channel through which its influences flow into each separate personality. To find the ultimate basis of morality, therefore, we must pass beyond society itself to its environing and sustaining universe; "conscience is ever a power working for the righteousness in which alone the world finds its own meaning and its supreme ideal."<sup>22</sup>

Thus we reach the conclusion of Ward's analytical survey of man and the Cosmos. "We take the universe to be spiritual—a realm of ends; it is only from the standpoint of Spirit that Nature can be understood."<sup>23</sup> That such an

<sup>21</sup> *Realm of Ends*, p. 364. Hence, further, "the cardinal principle of moral order is justice: all immorality is injustice"

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 373; "moral order is *the* order of the world," p. 381.

<sup>23</sup> P. 431.

outlook can still be misunderstood and undervalued is due simply to the unfortunate history of the word "spiritual," which still carries with it, along with its finer implications which should never be disregarded, that essentially irrational attitude towards Nature which regards the realm of matter as inherently evil.

Only to the degree that this false interpretation is abandoned in favor of the principle that Nature is the spatio-temporal manifestation of universal Spirit, and the laws of Nature the ordered expression of immanent yet transcendent Reason—only thus can the moral constitution of human nature be properly understood and adequately appreciated. The principles of ethics will then appear as the wholly natural culmination of the evolution of man from animal; not therefore as foreign nor superfluous, but as inherent in the universe as gravitation; and the thought of the future, in my opinion, will ascribe no small part in this reorientation to the work of James Ward.

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## A LIST OF THE WRITINGS OF JAMES WARD

A bibliography of the writings of James Ward was prepared by E. B. Titchener and W. S. Foster, with the help of Dr. L. N. Wilson, Librarian of Clark University, and Professor R. M. Yerkes of Harvard University, and printed in the *American Journal of Psychology* for July, 1912, Vol. XXIII, pp. 457-460. The present list is based on this earlier one; but Professor James Ward himself very kindly made some corrections, just before his death, and brought the whole list up to date.

1874

- (1) "Animal Locomotion." *Nature*, IX., 381-2, March 29, 1874.
- (2) "Animal Locomotion." *Nature*, IX., 440, April 9, 1874.

1875

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1876

- (1) "An Attempt to Interpret Fechner's Law." *Mind*, (O. S.) I., 452-466. (Part of a privately published Fellowship Dissertation, written in 1875.)

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- (1) *Academy*, March 16, and April 20; Review of G. H. Lewes's *Physical Basis of Mind*.

1879

- (1) "Observations on the Physiology of the Nervous System of the Crawfish." *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London*, XXVIII., No. 194, March 6, 1879, 379-383. Communicated by M. Foster. Received Feb. 17, 1879. (Summary of the following paper.)
- (2) "Some Notes on the Physiology of the Nervous System of the Freshwater Crayfish." (*Astacus fluviatilis*) *Journal of Physiology*, II., 214-227.



(3) "Vitality of the Common Snail." *Nature*, XX., 363, August 14, 1879.

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(2) "Psychological Principles." II. "Fundamental Facts and Conceptions." *Mind*, (O. S.) VIII., 465-486). (For III. see 1887.)

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(2) "Mr. F. H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind." *Mind*, (O. S.) VII., 564-575.

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1890

(1) "The Progress of Philosophy." *Mind*, (O. S.) XV., 213-233.

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1892

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(2) "Naturalism." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., XIX., 274-275. (Unchanged from 1902, (1).)

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(2) "Belief, Certainty, and Faith," *Indian Philosophical Review*, I., pp. 14.

## 1919

(1) "Sense-Knowledge, I." *Mind*, N. S. XXVIII, 257-274.

(2) "Sense-Knowledge, II." *Mind*, N. S. XXVIII, 447-462.

(3) "In the Beginning . . .," Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society, *Proc. Aristot. Soc.*, xx., 1-24.

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(2) *The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism: Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews, 1907-1910*. Third edition. Cambridge, University Press, pp. xv., 524.

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(1) *A Study of Kant*, Cambridge, University Press, demy 8vo., pp. vii., 206.

(2) *Immanuel Kant* (Hertz Lecture, British Academy), *Proc. Brit. Academy*, x., pp. 22.

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# THE MONIST

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## PHILOSOPHY IN THE NORTH IN THE LAST DECADES<sup>1</sup>

HAVING been requested to give a characterization of contemporary philosophy in the three Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden), I find a natural starting point in the year 1908, in which year an article of mine treating the same subject appeared in the *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale*. I will therefore confine myself to a particular consideration of those treatises which have appeared subsequently and will refer to previous works only when the connection makes it necessary.

Even though these three countries have in many respects the same culture, and although they have very closely related languages, their philosophies nevertheless exhibit characteristic differences. My presentation will undoubtedly bear evidence of being the work of a Danish writer. Furthermore, the character of it will quite naturally reflect my individual viewpoint; while my critical remarks will be conditioned by the standpoint I have finally adopted as my own.

At Upsala University, the oldest university of Sweden and the whole of Scandinavia, there had developed in the course of the nineteenth century a distinct idealistic-speculative movement which is known, after the actual founder, as *Boströmianism*, and which may be described as a personalistic metaphysics according to which true reality consists

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the Danish by Merrill Egeland.

of a realm of spiritual beings. It was a revival of Plato's theory of the Idea, except that it conceived the Ideas as personal beings. In this way the monad theory of Leibniz could be combined with Plato's theory of the Idea. The movement saw as an error of Kant that he regarded self-consciousness as something merely subjective and did not recognize a perfect self-consciousness, the ideal knowledge, as the actual ultimate reality. Later, in opposition to this movement, a theory of epistemology sprang up which asked with Kant, how the consciousness of an absolute reality is at all possible. But *the new Upsala school*, whose most famous representatives are Hägerström and Phalen, raise against the theory of knowledge, as it had previously developed, a criticism analogous to that which the latter had raised against metaphysics; the new school finds in the theory of knowledge a hidden metaphysics insofar as it presupposes judgments and interpretations of judgments which are not capable of complete analysis. It is maintained that the error consists in false formulations of problems and that therefore a great deal of work is required to correct the premises from which the problems derive. Not only in popular thought but also in science, especially in philosophy, is this error found. Historical conditions constantly influence the manner in which problems are presented; and it is very important by sharp analysis to determine these influences so that the problems can be presented in their true form. According to the position of the new Upsala school such an analysis of concepts is philosophy's true task. The concepts especially requiring analysis, it is believed, are those relating to value and also those of reality and unreality, truth and falsity, positive and negative, and a series of concepts akin thereto. Difficulties arise when *the philosopher's* problems are formulated according to the popular forms of such conceptions. Kant overlooked the fact that both concepts and their com-



ponent elements (perception and reflection) are historical in nature and do not necessarily designate anything real. When, for instance, one defines reality as a certain condition, a certain relation between different elements, one takes for granted that the relation itself refers to something real. Similarly when reality is defined as a complete unity; for the concept of unity needs thorough clarification. It has been overlooked that the concept reality, as a term in a judgment, has no content but only indicates that a judgment refers beyond itself to something that is not a part of its content.

This movement which I have attempted to sketch, following the condensed exposition given by Professor Adolf Phalen in the fifth volume of *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen* (Leipzig, 1924), has, as far as I can see, a clear understanding that no thinking without qualifications is possible.

Even in ancient times the skeptics made this an issue in connection with Carneadeis' attempt to define the concept of reality; and in more recent times, it has been used to prove the impossibility of a theory of knowledge. The fact of the matter is that the problem of knowledge can never be fully solved, as consciousness constantly is given new tasks and more work under different conditions. But it occurs to me that more fruitful than an abstract dialectical discussion would be an investigation of the various ways in which, especially in our time, problems and problem-thoughts are conditioned by the culture of the time, especially by the development of science.

Particular concepts, and precisely those that are the most fundamental, have histories and can only be understood by closely connecting the history of philosophy with that of science. The history of philosophy is neither intelligible nor serviceable except in connection with the history of other sciences. Plato's and Descartes' philosophies were

determined by mathematics, Kant's by Newton's physics. A future theory of knowledge will hardly be able to avoid Einstein's theory. And in the domains of ethics or of the philosophy of religion a philosopher will not be able to escape a consideration of the way in which the subject matter has been affected by the cultural development. French sociology has particularly given itself the task of illuminating this point. The philosopher, then, may not refuse to consider historical influences but must investigate which methods of thought they provide or allow.

As Upsala is the intellectual center of North Sweden, so is Lund of South Sweden. There is evidently a certain contrast in viewpoint between the two schools. It is quite evident that whereas the Upsala school lays the main stress on the analysis of concepts, Hans Larsson, the Lund representative, especially emphasizes intuition. It is Larsson's conviction that reflection and analysis destroy the fundamental unity with which science begins and ends, and that this involves a disadvantage to science and to art as well.

Intuition, for Larsson, does not mean passive perception but an immediate, unitary apprehension, in which one can with ease pass from one datum to the other. All criticism and analysis is a stage between an initial and a final intuition—a stage which, when it becomes too protracted, can precipitate a spiritual crisis. A determining factor in this situation, no doubt, is the fact that the various elements in the unity demand that their intrinsic conditions and qualities be brought clearly to light. But their union is still upheld by intuition. We note here an interesting contrast between Larsson's notion of intuition and Bergson's. While Bergson contrasts intuition with reflection on the ground that the latter is concerned merely with relations, Larsson holds that intuition may be the culmination of reflection in a comprehensive synthesis. As intuition is

for Larsson a reality insistently active, he displays closer kinship with Fichte than with Bergson. According to Fichte, intuition, being of the nature of activity, cannot be completed in a simple perception; it is really a continual presupposition which can never be entirely revealed. In the opinion of Bergson, on the contrary, intuition, when it is freed from all reflection, is an immediate revelation of a higher reality. According to Larsson it is a consideration of utmost importance that intuition can have so large a content that no reflection or analysis can exhaust it; consequently no limited concept of existence can be formed. Through comparative studies of Plato and the romantic philosophy in Germany, Larsson has tried to show that intuition has played an important role in the history of philosophy. There has been developed a more and more definite break between intuition and reflection, between percepts and concepts. His *Critique of Kant's Theory of the Antinomies* is of special interest. According to Larsson the antinomies are unavoidable. For him they do not merely mark the limits of knowledge but become more and more compelling within experience. Our life is a constant struggle to join the unjoinable. The cultural and historical significance of German transcendentalism, according to Larsson, lies in its lesson that life is a *struggle* between contradictions whereas it seeks unification in the world of reality. Schiller was one who notably moved from speculation to cultural philosophy, although it was really in art that he saw the possibility of a harmony of contradictions. Larsson finds that Hegel's "Dialectic" contains this truth, that both thinking and life are a constant struggle of antitheses. It is a common defect of the German philosophers, whose investigations Larsson thinks himself to be continuing, that they confine themselves too much to fundamental problems rather than focus attention upon the

relation between perception and concepts by investigating particular instances.

While Larsson's philosophy is occupied with the antitheses of life and thought, there is one antithesis it has especially attempted to elucidate, that between thought and poetry. His most interesting essay is *The Logic of Poetry* (*Poesiens Logik*; first edition, 1896; fourth edition, 1922; also translated into French). According to his own declaration, his aim in this work is not aesthetic but logical. He wishes to show that intuition, as he views it, is in fact governed by laws of logic—indeed, that it involves a finer logic than thought. It is for this reason that poetry can have its logic. Starting out from this point of view, Larsson presents a series of interesting observations. He gives, e. g., much weight to the fact that our psychological concepts are relative inasmuch as each can include in itself many kinds; there are, for instance, many kinds (or degrees) of sympathy, intuition, and so forth. This must not be overlooked when any such concept plays a part in discussion. Again, he finds the significance of intuition in the fact that it is through immediate perception, rather than through the abstract form of the concept, that knowledge influences feeling and will. From this angle also the necessity of individualizing concepts appears. Of particular interest is Larsson's discussion of what is usually called in grammar "synecdoche," that is a perception in which a whole finds expression through an individual part, with which, however, all the elements of the whole are more or less connected. This is of course what Levy Bruhl later has called participation and which he has demonstrated to be a normal feature of the primitive mind. Psychology has long known it as partial recognition. Moreover, several world views (metaphysical and religious), as I shall later show, take a particular trait or a particular age as an expression of the whole of existence.



In accordance with his interpretation Larsson naturally comes to place great emphasis upon the significance of the picture for perception. On the other hand, a mere abstract concept can not be formed, he holds, without the aid of a graphic scheme. Language is through and through metaphorical. But a distinction must be made between basic metaphors, that is images which by constant use have become mere thought forms, and images of living nature. And further one must distinguish between the abstract and the concrete. Scientific thinking, which goes back constantly to basic metaphors and images, is thus in contrast with poetry, which abides with a living image (a single instance). Poetry by predilection is *personal description* because personality is a unity of such a sort that a single trait may suffice to characterize it. Here, as so often, art more easily than science penetrates into life; with that synthetic quality that art possesses in a higher degree than science, which works through analysis, art attains to life's inner nature, to an inner union of the one and the many.

It is no wonder that Hans Larsson, who so vigorously asserts the relation between perception and thought, has also the impulsion and talent for poetic production which in itself has won him recognition among his countrymen. With his ability to introduce the most stubborn questions into the daily conditions of life, and with his quiet humor, he has become an author of significance in the *Kulturschichte* of his native country; and philosophy at the same time may be enriched by his untrammelled and original thoughts.

In Denmark, the lately deceased Kristian Kroman was the first to become interested in epistemological studies. His main work, *The Conception of Nature* (translated into German), appeared as early as 1883 but its principle ideas have extended their influence into the period we are particularly considering here, in part through his instruction at

the university and also through his later writings. Kroman tries to demonstrate that the first principles of science (the principles of identity and causality) are established in the form of postulates by a spontaneous act. Scientific proofs are derivative from these but they themselves cannot be proven. Psychologically, he recognized that they are necessary conditions (qualifications) for the continuance of life in the world as we find it. Consequently, they satisfy a demand for self-preservation. While Kroman discusses, with untiring penetration, the significance of the postulates and their value for science, he does not go into the more basic problem as to how self-preservation requires the support of just those postulates that express the presuppositions of science. Further reflection upon this question would have led him in the direction of the so-called pragmatism. He would also have been obliged to differentiate between various kinds of self-preservation and to consider the different demands that self-preservation would make under varying circumstances, especially in cases of new experiences.

Kroman's book was reviewed with high praise by Paul Tannery in the *Revue Philosophique*. Other writers found it precarious to stress so strongly the doctrine of postulates. The fundamental principles of science must coincide with the nature of the human mind as it actually is. They must express the various ways in which the human mind inevitably works. The forms which are revealed not merely in the common principles but also in working methods and hypotheses, may not be unchangeable; but they rest not only on volition so that they could be pushed aside when their consequences are to our inconvenience. On the mathematical side, there was doubt about Kroman's polemic against the non-Euclidean geometry (a polemic that he took up again in his later years). In spite of all this, the book nevertheless represents a turning point in Danish

thought; although, prior to it, the postulate point of view had already been made influential by Kierkegaard in his doctrine relating to the conditions of a connected science.

Kroman was early drawn away from a pure philosophical interest and busied himself with pedagogical works, among which must be mentioned an acute and brilliant essay discussing higher education, wherein he vigorously championed the scientific courses in preference to the humanistic.

Whereas Kroman began his authorship with epistemological investigations, the writer of this review did not until later give a detailed discussion of the problem of knowledge. Researches in psychology, ethics, and philosophy of religion had first invited my attention. But it may be seen from the expositions I have elsewhere given of psychology, ethics, and the philosophy of religion (in works earlier than 1908) that I constantly had in mind the significance epistemological theory has for a clear formulation of the basic problems in the fields just mentioned. I have never been an empiricist, although from several sides I have been characterized as such. In my psychology I have always sharply distinguished between the psychological and the epistemological points of view, that is between the description of mental life, especially the *actual* nature of the thought-life, and the question of the validity of its functions. In ethics, the strict principles of scientific proof led me to doubt the possibility of a rational ethic. In my philosophy of religion, epistemology is the basis for my denial of the theoretical significance of religion. In the introduction to my exposition of the history of modern philosophy, I refer to epistemology as the central philosophical problem. And in the essay, *Problems of Philosophy*, I gave a preliminary discussion of the various problems and their mutual relations. Only after these and other preparatory works, did I write

as the exposition of my central thoughts, *The Human Mind, Its Forms and Tasks* (*Den Menneskelige Tanke, dens Former og dens Opgaver*, 1910; later, in German and French). In the present brief account of this work, I shall make use of an exposition which I have previously written in Danish and which has been published in German in the second volume of *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*.

Even before reflection, mental life manifests traces of the forms that scientific thought develops further, specializes and carries through with greater accuracy. Consequently the history of science shows us the various forms through which man in different ages has thought to find his way to true knowledge. The fundamental concepts of science are not at all times the same. It was Kant's fatal error that he believed he could establish once and for all these fundamental concepts (the categories) and arrange them in a closed system. Categories may appear and disappear. A category dies when it can no longer play a part in scientific knowledge. Thus, the category of substance will soon have disappeared, whereas the concept of evolution is still full of vitality. In my exposition of the categories, I discuss first those fundamental concepts with which the popular mind operates: synthesis and relation, continuity and discontinuity, similarity and difference; from these, I pass over to the formal (identity), the real (quality, totality, evolution), and the ideal (value concepts). A theory of categories would, according to this interpretation, be a schematic classification of the sciences. The categories, like the sciences, form a series within which each part presupposes the earlier without being evolved therefrom.

As knowledge is one of the enterprises in which the human mind reveals its nature, the categories contribute to the understanding of the human mind. Kant's great contribution lay in his emphatic assertion that the funda-



mental concepts of science are expressions of the nature of the human mind. But the human mind changes with new tasks and new work, and the categories may therefore undergo corresponding changes. The attractive thing about the study of the theory of knowledge is the insight it yields into the fact that the mind's structure is retained, in part, in new forms, and is changed, in part, in new work. It is through a misunderstanding at this point that William James, whom I remember with heart-felt friendship, in one of his letters, calls me a good pragmatist and pluralist. Pragmatism can indeed show how new tasks can determine new thought; but it fails to appreciate that both the new tasks and the new forms of thought will themselves be conditioned by the structure of the mental life as it then exists. And as far as pluralism is concerned, it represents for me an opposition that must be overcome, not a solution. If existence were an absolute plurality, so that its elements formed chaotic, changing successions, where parts could be arranged in any sort of manner, science would be impossible. The lowest level for scientific research—and this is a level not found within experience—would be a chaotic series of differences; the most favorable conditions—likewise not discoverable within experience—would be an absolute series of identities. The former would denote the impossibility of knowledge; the latter its conclusion.

If I were asked to give my philosophy a name, I could call it critical positivism, for I place great emphasis upon the extent of experience and I consider experience itself a problem. But I could also designate it critical monism, inasmuch as I am striving toward a doctrine of unity but find fundamental difficulties in establishing monism. I consider metaphysics (in its proper meaning) subject to a basic difficulty. Existence cannot, and neither can the thought of it, be given us as a totality. In all metaphysical speculation (as I have already remarked in connection with

Hans Larsson's synecdoche) one confines oneself to a particular part, or branch, of existence and considers it a true expression of the whole. This is poetry rather than philosophy. I confess to a certain sympathy with the statement of the Swedish poet Tegner, that metaphysics is castrated poetry.

The exposition of thought-life and its forms that I offered in *The Human Mind* I have since supplemented by some special investigations in the theory of knowledge. First, I considered the concept of totality (1917). Our minds in thought actively endeavor to form a totality out of the often very diverse details present to them. But whereas experience itself brings us face to face with totalities (atom, organism, personality, community) we can, nevertheless, understand them only by separating them into elements whose mutual relations we must then discover. The value concept is closely allied to that of totality, because all value depends upon the relation between a whole, its parts, and its conditions. In an essay dealing with the concept of relation (1921) I endeavored to describe the significance of this concept at each stage of our thought life. In all our thinking, we put down, as it were, one leg of the compass at one particular spot and seek a place for the other so that the relation between the two places can be determined, perhaps measured. We cannot always find a place for the second leg of the compass; we can ask more than we can answer.

A third investigation concerned itself with the concept of analogy (1923). Both in primitive thought and in science analogy plays an important role, though one that varies in the different sciences. Only the formal sciences are based on identities. Natural sciences, that operate with the elements of experience, are based on rational analogies, that is, on a parallelism between the laws that govern different domains, so that from the relation that exists be-

tween two parts within the one given domain one can learn the relation existing between two particular parts in the other domain. Where rational analogy is not possible, analogies may, nevertheless, play an important role; but in such cases they are poetic or religious symbols, and it is not science that we are discussing. These three essays are all translated into German, and the first two into French (under the common title of *Relativité Philosophique*.)

The history of philosophy is zealously studied in the northern countries. Of recent publications two from Norway should be mentioned. Anathon Aall has produced a history of ancient and medieval philosophy. This subject has been of particular interest for him since he began as a church historian and wrote an important monograph on the Logos concept, a concept that not only played an important part in Greek philosophy but was also used by theologians in connecting Greek philosophy with the doctrines of the church.

More recently Harald Schjelderup has given an account of the history of philosophy from the Renaissance to the present, thus supplementing an earlier exposition (in German) of the development of philosophy from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present time. These works are of interest not only because of their content but also because of their points of view regarding philosophy as a whole.

Schjelderup's introductory remarks appear to me of particular significance. He sees the constant task of philosophy as the attempt to gain a unified view of existence, an understanding of the actual nature of existence, and of the significance and aim of life. In every man there is manifest an urge in this direction, and from this urge philosophy is born as "man's total intellectual reaction, in free thought, to existence." It is therefore the task of philos-

ophy to give us both a world-view, in which it develops points of view for the theoretical comprehension of the world, and a life-view, in which it develops points of view for our practical situations. Philosophy is, therefore, not purely scientific. It has always a personal background. The various philosophers experience their fundamental relations to the world and life in different ways and these differences express themselves in divergent reflections on the problems considered. The particular philosophy a man champions depends, as Fichte has said, on the sort of man he is. Philosophy herein approaches art. A genuine philosophical work can have the same eternal worth as a genuine piece of art. And the history of philosophy, just as truly as the history of art, must illumine its theme by reference to the cultural and historical conditions within which it appeared. Schjelderup's conception of philosophy as thus suggested is one with which I am in hearty sympathy. However, I would emphasize more strongly that the philosophical critic should give prominence to logical consistency and to actual connections even where personal attitudes and the state of contemporary culture may have blinded individual philosophers thereto.

Among the best historical studies in Danish literature is Frithjof Brandt's large and thorough monograph, *The Mechanical Interpretation of Nature of Thomas Hobbes* (*Den Mekaniske Naturopfattelse hos Thomas Hobbes*, 1922). This makes an interesting contribution to our understanding of the so-called "mechanical" interpretation of nature; that is, of that point of view which considers everything that exists in nature as motion, regardless of how it appears to the senses. This point of view originated in the mind of Hobbes before he became acquainted with the founders of the new natural science, and as a result of his own reflection. Making use of earlier writings of Hobbes that had not previously been taken into



consideration, the author with great acumen shows how scholasticism and modern reasoning clashed for Hobbes before he adopted his definite mechanical position. It was only after he had in solitude struggled with this new problem that he came in contact with the science of the day, became Galileo's friend and a critic of Descartes.

I, myself, have in recent years again taken up historical studies after having earlier (1895) published an exposition of the history of modern philosophy. Since my youth I have been much interested in Spinoza. I do not completely subscribe to his doctrine, but I have come independently to adopt several of his basic ideas, and the deep sincere philosophical spirit that animated his works has made him an example for everyone who attributes to the life of thought an actual significance for one's world-view.

As a university professor, I have several times worked through Spinoza's *Ethics* with advanced students. In so doing, I have prepared notes analyzing this, Spinoza's most important, work. For the convenience of those who wish independently to delve into this wonderful treatise I have followed its exposition, publishing my study under the title *Spinoza's Ethics; Analysis and Characterization* (*Spinoza's Ethica, Analyse og Karakteristik*). It appeared in Danish in 1918 and later in German under the auspices of the international *Societas Spinozana*, which is furthering Spinoza research through the publication of essays and of a periodical, *Chronicum Spinozanum*. I have also in recent years turned back to Plato, writing about *Parmenides* (1920) and about *Plato's State* (1924). Finally, in *Leading Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (*Ledende Tanker i det Nittende Aarhundre*, 1920), I have endeavored to characterize the nineteenth century in contrast with the two previous centuries from which our cultural and scientific ideas originated, as an age of corroboration by experience, specialization, and technical application. I seek

to point out the characteristic importance of these features in their bearing upon the scientific, the religious, and the social situation. I consider the greatness of the nineteenth century to lie in the faithful, independent and exhaustive investigation of basic thoughts that unify the mind of modern times.

In the field of psychology, investigation here in the North has proceeded in the last ten years along both descriptive-analytical and experimental lines. Axel Herrlin, in his comprehensive work on the memory (*Minnet*—Stockholm, 1909), has employed the various methods to describe primary psychological phenomena, with special attention to the needs of teachers. In other works he has elucidated the differences between normal and pathological mental life. It is, of course, clear that in many ways the diseased mentality can throw light upon the sound. It is, accordingly, of particular interest that one of Sweden's foremost psychiatrists, Bror Gadelius, has discussed psychology in the light of observations he has been able to make of the abnormal mind. His work, *The Mental Life of Man in the Light of Experience with Insanity* (*Det Männskliga Sjalslivet i belysning af Sindsygeläkarens Erfarenhet*, 1921), represents one of the most able contributions to an understanding of mental life from a psychiatric angle, a contribution for which psychologists should be highly thankful.

Sigurd Naesgaard has embodied the results of an essentially analytical research in a series of books of which *The Form of Conscience* (*Bevisthedens Form*, 1922), is the first. He contrasts the interpretation which holds that the content of consciousness is inseparable from its form on the ground that each of the elements is determined in its nature by the connections in which it appears, with the doctrine, taught particularly by Brentano (not without scholastic influence), that "form" is an expression of the

activity of the mind toward its own content. Naesgaard favors this latter interpretation and attempts to substantiate it in a series of investigations relating to various active attitudes which consciousness may assume. Genetic investigation plays no important part in these studies.

As a sequel to my earlier psychological works (especially to the *Psychology*, which first appeared in 1882) I have investigated several complex mental phenomena. In *The Great Humour* (*Den Store Humor*, 1916; translated into German), I have tried to describe humor by a psychological-historical method as a sort of higher life-feeling which is determined by the relation between a serious background and life's multifarious evils, trifles, and peculiarities. Precisely because the humorist is dealing with the great, he can refer jokingly to the small. In another essay, *Experience and Interpretation* (1918), I found in the comparison between a Spanish mystic of the sixteenth century and a Swiss mystic of the twentieth century an example of how experiences of practically the same nature (ecstatic) may be differently interpreted under different cultural conditions.

In the field of experimental psychology especially, the three northern countries offer an imposing series of works. This results from the fact that at the various universities there are now well equipped laboratories. Alfred Lehman, the Danish scientist, belongs in the foremost rank. He began as a student of natural science but through his study of Fechner's *Elemente der Psychophysik* he gained an interest in psychological questions susceptible of experimental verification. He studied in Wundt's laboratory at Leipzig. Untiringly occupied with research work until his death in 1921, Lehman completed a long series of studies. He was constantly devising new instruments and discovering new methods for the exact determination and measurement of psychological phenomena. Very notice-

able in his books is a growing realization of the significance of the experimental method as well as of its limitations particularly in connection with involuntary and very complex phenomena

Lehman was capable of severely criticising his own work and he did not hesitate to withdraw an hypothesis if it was proved unsatisfactory. In his zeal for bringing psychology into close connection with physiology he had postulated a peculiar form of physical energy as the cause of psychical phenomena; but this suggestion he recalled when it was shown by a critic (myself) that it merely complicated the problem and did not solve it. But in a long series of special experiments upon elementary phenomena he showed his ability to illuminate mental phenomena by scientific methods. More particularly he made very valuable contributions to the theory of sense impressions and feelings. He also investigated hypnotic and spiritualistic phenomena, and occupied himself in addition with experimental pedagogy. His principal work is written in German, *Grundzüge der Psychophysiologie* (1912). While Lehman endeavored to keep his standpoint distinct from philosophy proper, his work is nevertheless of great philosophical significance. He shows how elementary psychical phenomena, through analogy, cast light upon the more complex phenomena, and he endeavors wherever possible to discover the physical conditions that in one way or another accompany them.

Edgar Rubin, Lehman's successor as Professor of Experimental Psychology at Copenhagen, in his important essay on visually experienced figures (*Synsoplevede Figurer*, 1915, translated into German), showed that in the perception of figured plane surfaces one must distinguish two different experiences; that of the surface (background) itself, and that of the form (contour). By an immediate perception of the background a whole with-



out a discernment of parts is given; whereas a perception of contour is received gradually as one follows the edges of the background. One and the same object, accordingly, may be experienced in two different ways under different conditions. Of the two experiences, that of the perception of a contour requires more psychic work than the perception of a surface; and, as a contour perception, is of more significance for knowledge than a surface perception, an interesting fact now appears, namely, that it is the experience requiring most psychical work that is of most significance for our knowledge of the world. Rubin's interesting essay, which has naturally attracted the attention of the mathematicians, contains also suggestions of no mean interest in connection with the theory of knowledge. These suggestions have not been enlarged upon by Rubin, but in a series of shorter essays he has continued his studies in experimental psychology.

In Sweden the late Sidney Alrutz has worked zealously in the furtherance of experimental psychology. After extensive experiments on the sensations of heat and pain, he published a large work on the dynamics of the nervous system. He has described the contents of this work as an experimental investigation in sensibility, mobility, suggestibility, and nervous energy, in waking and hypnotic states (1915-1917). His results will surely be tested by other investigators but it will be admitted that he has done an energetic piece of work. One of the principal points Alrutz endeavored to ascertain was whether the passes of a hypnotist can without contact influence man's sensations and movements. He did not doubt after observation that the answer was necessarily in the affirmative. He was very confident but perhaps he was not quite self-critical enough in a question of this sort. He also devoted a great deal of work to so-called spiritualistic phenomena but he was not always cautious in his conduct of experiments with

them. A posthumous work of this indefatigable investigator of the obscure life of the mind, *The Unconscious* (*Det Ubevidte*), will soon be published. In addition to his research work he also served as a psychological "soul-physician." Many who were suffering from insomnia, nervousness, and mental disorders appealed of their own volition to the widely known psychologist, and came to look up to him as the one who had saved them for life. It is one of the signs of the times that people are now appealing to psychologists in their need. In the Genevan psychologist, Theodore Flournoy, we have another example of one who possesses ability as a psychological "soul-physician."

In Norway, Anathon Aall, to whom I have referred above as a historian of philosophy, has also devoted himself to experimental psychology. He has himself stated (in the 5th volume of *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen*) that his philosophical labors have been concentrated on the history of philosophy and experimental psychology and from the latter he believes it possible to derive a "doctrine of existence." Aall's psychological experiments concern themselves with perceptions of depth, memory, simultaneous impressions and reciprocal checking. In his theory regarding the perception of space, he is a confirmed nativist. In connection therewith, he stresses strongly the ability not only to perceive qualities but also to arrange the various contents of sensations in the different parts of space—an ability which cannot be attributed to mechanical influence and hence indicates a limitation of the mechanical interpretation of existence. Thus does Aall take psychology into metaphysics, especially through his theory of the perception of space; for space is represented as a cosmo-physical magnitude corresponding to the subjectively experienced space values. Aall does not attempt to meet the many and oft-recurring objections to such a leap from psychology to

metaphysics. According to his interpretation it becomes an easy task to construct a metaphysics.

I am not underestimating experimental psychology when I express the opinion that there will always be need for a descriptive-analytical psychology in which, analogously to the manner in which the history of science is utilized by the theory of knowledge, the history of the spiritual life of mankind will be used in its entirety. There will certainly be felt again and again a certain antagonism between investigators who come to psychology from humanistic studies and those who come from the natural sciences. But the work must some day be taken up from both sides and the boundary line between the demands of the two points of view cannot be established once and for all.

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# CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICS IN GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

## I. THE TURN TO METAPHYSICS

1. As regards the attitude and endeavors of contemporary German philosophy, nothing is more characteristic or illuminating than its turn to metaphysics. This metaphysical interest is very pronounced and full of promise. There is a very wide-spread demand that the richly-adorned temple of the sciences be again given its holy of holies, if we may borrow the figure by which Hegel referred to metaphysics in the preface to his *Logic* of 1912.

Only a few decades ago this turn to metaphysics represented little more than blind groping and sporadic efforts characterized by uncertainty and indecisiveness. Not infrequently, indeed, writers on metaphysics entertained certain apprehensions and sought to justify themselves as though they feared to be treading forbidden paths. At the present time, however, the invasion of metaphysics is complete. Not as though we in Germany were as yet in possession of a new and original system of metaphysics, fully elaborated and widely accepted, or capable of affording complete satisfaction to the metaphysical needs and demands and to the requirements set by recent science. What one may affirm, however, is that the various metaphysical efforts which are current converge upon a clearly discernible point, and that they concentrate upon a comprehensive metaphysical achievement. For this reason neither the possibility nor the justification of metaphysics is any longer seriously questioned. Even the neo-Kantian schools are engaging in the effort to develop a metaphysics. In part, this is due to a recognition of the fact that epistem-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.



ology by itself does not exhaust the tasks of philosophy—that systematic completeness makes unavoidable the step to metaphysics. In part, it springs from the insight that a critical epistemology presupposes a critical metaphysics and ontology. Particularly instructive as regards this point is the development of a former student and follower of the Marburg neo-Kantianism, Nicolai Hartmann. In his widely noticed work, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, he has traversed the way from epistemology to ontology. And the present writer also, in his book *Wie ist kritische Philosophie überhaupt möglich?* has sought to exhibit the close relation between critical epistemology and speculative metaphysics within philosophy as a whole. Closely connected herewith are various tendencies to describe Kant himself as a metaphysician, as one of the greatest and keenest, one of the most constructive and fruitful metaphysicians of all time. We might refer, for example, to the *Kant-Festheft* published by the *Kant-Studien* during the commemoration year of 1924. Among its essays are one by Heinz Heimsoeth on *Metaphysische Motive in der Ausbildung des kritischen Idealismus* and another by Nicolai Hartmann on *Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus*. We might further mention the work of Max Wundt, *Kant als Metaphysiker*. The earlier tendency of neo-Kantianism to regard Immanuel Kant as primarily or exclusively a critical epistemologist is everywhere on the decline. To exhibit the metaphysical foundations of Kantianism and to bring to light the metaphysics immanent within the critical philosophy is clearly justified on the basis of systematic as well as present historical interests. Even more than this may be claimed: Failure to participate in the prevailing movement towards metaphysics tends even today to be judged as an indication of philosophical backwardness and of an antiquated point of view. If definite coöperation is not extended, one at least expects explicit approval.

It was in 1904 that Wilhelm Windelband, in association with a number of leading philosophers such as Wilhelm Wundt, Rickert, Troeltsch, Bauch and others, published an admirable *Festschrift* on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of Kuno Fischer. It presented a general survey entitled *Die Philosophie im Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Included within it were comprehensive portrayals, in large outlines, of the contemporary psychology, ethics, logic, æsthetics, philosophy of law and philosophy of history. But it omitted metaphysics. This is not surprising if one realizes that this fundamental philosophical discipline was as yet still somewhat under the cloud of disrespect and of academic distrust. Moreover, would not the established conclusions of metaphysics at that time have been very meager—indeed, altogether paltry? Apart from the last echoes of the philosophy of the epigones, as Windelband has referred to the systems of Fechner, Lotze and Eduard von Hartmann, one could at most have pointed to that form of metaphysical idealism which, at the turn of the century, had already been given wide currency through the efforts of Rudolph Eucken; or also to some of the followers of the classic exponents of constructive idealism—to Adolf Lasson and Paul Deussen. The teaching and studies of these scholars were metaphysical in character. Yet these thinkers were entirely dependent upon either Hegel or Schopenhauer and developed no systems of their own. In the wider circles of the uncritical public, a certain homage was paid to a number of shallow naturalistic writers who found their departure in Ernst Haeckel and Wilhelm Ostwald. That these naturalistic world views, unsecurely grounded as they were, and without any appreciation of the great complexity of the problems under discussion, should very soon be overtaken by fate and succumb to an early death is not at all strange. In connection with their breakdown one must always bear in mind how com-

pletely helpless they were, and had to be, in the matter of interpreting historical life and social phenomena.

2. What were the underlying causes of this turn to metaphysics? Why did it enjoy a revival after long decades of quiescence? As early as September, 1919, I was able to speak of a "duty to metaphysics" in an essay published in *Der Spiegel*. Earlier still indeed, in a paper appearing in the *Kant-Studien* of 1916, I had discussed the "Psychological Presuppositions of Metaphysics." In 1915 I wrote a work entitled *Geltungswert der Metaphysik*. (Cf. also Peter Wust, *Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik*, 1920). For the change thus indicated three distinct lines of determining influences should be distinguished and considered.

In the first place, we would point to the development of the concrete sciences, the natural and the social sciences alike. The tree of the sciences had developed a tremendous wealth of branches. But the wider its expanse the more urgent became the question concerning its presuppositions and roots, and concerning the viewpoints and the principles involved in its magnificent growth. This presented a philosophical question, the problem of the Kantian epistemology. The theoretical and critical spirit that was so successful in the individual sciences inevitably turned to reflect on the bases and conditions of its achievements. But this epistemological orientation did not of itself suffice. For the results of the individual sciences were so extensive that they created a need for philosophical synthesis. It became necessary to exhibit the interconnection of the objects of knowledge by synthesizing the results of the individual sciences into an harmonious system. This gigantic task was undertaken more particularly by Wilhelm Wundt, in his *System der Philosophie*. That the result was not much more than an encyclopedia lies in the very nature of the case. The metaphysical task should not and cannot

be deferred until the sciences have produced their fruits. Otherwise when could it be undertaken? And what philosophical mind is sufficiently vast and informed really to encompass the results of the individual sciences? Nevertheless, the luxuriant development of the positive sciences led to the two tasks just indicated, namely, those of laying the epistemological foundations and of effecting the systematic unification of knowledge. It is clear that this cleared the way for a renaissance of metaphysics. The central task, as we shall presently see, was set not so much by metaphysics and the natural sciences—for in this field Kantianism had already achieved exhaustive and decisive results—as by the social sciences. A very large part of the metaphysical endeavor of today is concerned with the methodology of historical knowledge. And this indeed presents an extraordinary number of the most urgent and fruitful problems. It is necessary, for example, to establish a genuinely critical conception of the nature of the social sciences and to delimit them from the natural sciences. Moreover, one must seek an understanding of the methods by which one may attain to a scientific knowledge of mental phenomena and must ascertain the fundamental categories of such knowledge. Still again one must determine the method by which a theory of knowledge may establish the bases of the social sciences. For it is still a matter of dispute whether one should follow the critical method of Kantianism or adopt a psychological procedure. And there are numerous other problems of a related nature.

We pass to a second line of influences, those arising from the development of philosophy and its inevitable *nisus* toward systematic completion. If we disregard the systems of the above-mentioned epigones, we may say that in the period of scientific positivism, that is, from about 1850 to the end of the century, philosophical endeavor had



likewise split up into a number of special investigations. These related to logic, ethics, æsthetics, and psychology, but especially to the history of philosophy. It was these decades that likewise mark the birth and the early development of so-called neo-Kantianism. Hence it is altogether natural that the early interest of this movement was exclusively epistemological. After the horrible abortion called philosophical materialism had come to the light of day, in about the middle of the past century, and had for a time indulged in its excesses, there was need for a scientific philosophy that would forcefully terminate the nefarious career of the pseudo-philosophy. And thus the construction of philosophy was begun anew from the very foundations. Investigation again turned to the bases of any philosophy that might lay claim to being scientific, and to the validity and the possible scope of such a philosophy. The result was an extraordinarily widespread epistemological movement. Representative of it are a succession of brilliant men of whom we would mention Otto Liebmann and Alois Riehl.

But it was, of course, impossible to stop simply with epistemology. Once the latter had laid the foundations of philosophy and disclosed its immanent presuppositions (as was done so brilliantly by one who fell a sacrifice to the war, the highly-gifted Emil Lask, in his *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre*), thought was bound to turn to the construction and elaboration of a philosophical system. Otherwise epistemology would have achieved a task that was but partial and to a certain extent superfluous. Conditions were precisely as they were in the time of Kant. The founder of the critical philosophy was similarly impelled beyond his epistemology (supplied in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) to a *system* of critical philosophy, created in his later works. But it was not he alone who felt this urge. Every one of his successors saw in the

achievement of Kant only a beginning, that is, the basis from which one must proceed to develop a system of philosophy. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel—each regarded himself, with more or less justification, as the one who continued and carried to completion the task of Kant. Windelband has declared that to understand Kant one must go beyond him. This well-known saying is true also in the sense that every preoccupation with Kant impels one beyond the *Kritik der Vernunft* to the *System der Vernunft*. Confirmation hereof is furnished by the history of neo-Kantianism. This exhibits the irrepressible fruitfulness of the Kantian doctrine and presents a close similarity to the original development from Kant to Fichte and thence to Schelling and Hegel. Epistemological investigation extended its sweep so as to include not merely the natural sciences but also the historical disciplines, and it was thus embarked upon the task of systematization. In view of the enormous wealth of presuppositions and motives involved in the critical philosophy of Kant, it is not unnatural that the development just indicated assumed a variety of forms and adopted divergent paths. Yet while there are, to be sure, very marked differences between the Marburger and the Southwest German schools of neo-Kantianism, both schools aspired to a system—the former in the case of Cohen and Natorp, and the latter in the case particularly of Rickert.

Thus we were indeed justified in contending that the development of philosophy itself tended toward the elaboration of systems. The decisive influences were, on the one hand, the splitting up of philosophy into a number of very fruitful special investigations whose conclusions required synthesis, and, on the other hand, the fact that the particular interest of neo-Kantianism in its early stages was epistemological and led to results that likewise made necessary the advance to a system. The revival of meta-

physical systematization was indeed due in part to movements within philosophy itself.

*Thirdly*, we would stress influences connected with the demand for a philosophy of life and with religious experience. For these two forces made irresistibly for the discovery of a metaphysical orientation and a system of thought capable of affording satisfaction more especially to the human spirit. In this connection, one thinks first of all, among the technical philosophers, of Rudolph Eucken; for this was the task to which he devoted himself. Among his numerous widely known and favorably received works are: *Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt*, *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung*, *Mensch und Welt*, *Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, *Zur Sammlung der Geister*. Graf Hermann Keyserling, though scarcely to be counted in the ranks of technical philosophers, should be mentioned as an energetic and successful exponent of a metaphysics growing out of the need for a world view. Among his more important works are: *Unsterblichkeit*, *Philosophie als Kunst*, *Das Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen*, *Schöpferische Erkenntnis*—the last mentioned of which also indicates the purpose of the *Schule der Weisheit*. Keyserling does not seek to create a scientific and logically established philosophy, capable of formulation in terms of concepts. He aims at the development of a fundamental attitude toward life and reality, or, as he is fond of saying, toward the realization of values. In none of his numerous publications and addresses is he really concerned with intellectual goals or the enrichment of knowledge; he does not attempt to express the nature of things in conceptual formulæ. His primary concern is rather that the excessively busy and intellectual European again acquire wisdom. This also explains his commendations of the Orient. For in the Orient one may find precisely that "wisdom," that poise and repose, that inner

self-control and simplicity which we Europeans have lost because of the disintegrating influence of an extreme intellectualism. Philosophy, in his judgment, should therefore not be an academic discipline concerned with concepts and the attainment of scientific knowledge, but a matter of practical import yielding a world-view. And thus philosophy is for Keyserling an art. It is a form of the art of life, and can be exemplified by him alone who, through self-cultivation, has become a complete, a "wise", man.

The philosophies resulting from these influences throughout have the character of a practical ethics or of a certain religious orientation. The need in Germany today parallels that of other epochs of serious spiritual and moral cataclysms and religious crises. What is required of a new metaphysics is not so much strictly theoretical enlightenment concerning the nature of the world as, much rather, religious edification and inner peace, an indubitable basis for the faith that, despite all horrible disillusionings, the world nevertheless has a rational meaning and a rational goal. Out of the depths of need there has arisen among us the demand and the search for a teleology and a theodicy of history and of human life. And not infrequently academic and scientific philosophy is reproached for its inadequate recognition of this need and for its too exclusive preoccupation with epistemological or other specialized theoretical investigations. For among the general public, the justification and the value of philosophy are very commonly found in its contribution to the amelioration of the worries and troubles of existence. One demands that it shall give to life a clearly discernible value. It enjoys greater confidence than the preachments representing a confession or a church, for the reason that it is supposed to express more than mere faith. Because of its relation to science and of its own scientific character, it is respected even among those who, for some inner or exter-



nal causes or reasons, feel themselves alienated from the official church and religious life, and who place no confidence in doctrines based on faith. And it is because they satisfy these wide-spread yearnings for a world-view that the writings of Eucken and Keyserling, for example, meet with respect and approbation.

3. The particular characteristics of the three lines of influence above described are reflected in the specific metaphysical syntheses to which they give rise. They thus afford a basis for an illuminating classification of the most important and noteworthy attempts on the part of contemporary German scholars to develop a metaphysics.

*First*—From the side of the natural sciences, particularly biology, has come the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch.<sup>2</sup>

*Second*—Psychology has led to the personalism of William Stern.<sup>3</sup>

*Third*—The social sciences, particularly theology and history, have furnished the basis of the so-called *Lebensphilosophie*. It counts many followers. Its real founder and trail-blazer in contemporary life may be said to be Friedrich Nietzsche, if we disregard certain predecessors. The fact that Nietzsche's fame has risen and is now acknowledged even in the strictly scientific world is due fundamentally to the fact that he was one of the founders and promoters of this *Lebensphilosophie*, which is at the present time enjoying an increasing esteem also in scientific circles. In scientific and academic philosophy, the chief representative of this general movement is Wilhelm Dilthey, with his book *Die geistige Welt* and his two-volume work, *Einleitung in die Philosophie des Lebens*. These writings give an historical and psychological portrayal of the philosophy of life which is no less ingenuous than it

<sup>2</sup> *Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und Lehre; Philosophie des Organischen; Ordnungslehre; Wirklichkeitslehre.*

<sup>3</sup> *Person und Sache*, three volumes; *Die Psychologie und der Personalismus; Grundgedanken der personalistischen Philosophie.*

is penetrating. Among the philosophers influenced by Dilthey and particularly versed with the details of historical and social life are Georg Simmel,<sup>4</sup> Ernst Troeltsch<sup>5</sup> and Eduard Spranger.<sup>6</sup>

*Fourth*—Out of the immanent development of philosophy from epistemology to philosophical systematization have emerged the Kantian-Hegelian constructions of the Marburger School. Here we would cite Hermann Cohen's *System der Philosophie*, comprising several volumes. Cohen's renowned exposition of the Kantian system of philosophy itself exhibits a systematic and a systematizing spirit, and to this its great philosophical value is undoubtedly due. Under the present head belongs also the value-metaphysics of the school of Southwest Germany. Heinrich Rickert, its outstanding spokesman, is at present preparing a systematic formulation of his doctrines in his *System der Philosophie*, the first volume of which has appeared under the title, *Allgemeine Grundlegung der Philosophie*. In this connection should be mentioned also Hugo Münsterberg's *Philosophie der Werte, Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung*.

*Fifth*—The problems and needs connected with the demand for a general world-view have given rise to the metaphysically oriented works of Rudolph Eucken and Graf Hermann Keyserling, as already mentioned.

*Sixth*—In addition to these metaphysical tendencies one finds in Germany also neo-Thomism. It draws sustenance from several sources. To be sure it lacks genuine originality and is only a revival, with the fewest possible changes, of mediæval dogmatism. Nevertheless, it is a characteristic feature of the present metaphysical situa-

<sup>4</sup> *Philosophische Kultur; Hauptprobleme der Philosophie*. Penetrating essays relating to the metaphysics of life are to be found in his last work, *Lebensanschauung; vier metaphysische Kapitel*.

<sup>5</sup> *Zur religiösen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik; Der Historismus und seine Probleme; Der Historismus und seine Ueberwindung*.

<sup>6</sup> *Lebensformen; Psychologie des Jugendalters*.

tion. It is bound up with the fact that there is an unmistakable strengthening of the Roman Catholic spirit, whose intellectual aspect, as it were, it represents. This philosophy is the creation of a period scientifically remote from ours; yet, whatever our attitude towards it, its revival is logically intelligible. For the entire history of the human spirit probably presents not another system of thought that develops such a closed world-view and establishes with such radical one-sidedness and energy an imposing unity of the mental life. It asserts an inviolable harmony between the needs of the spirit and the results of knowledge and of science. It denies that cleavage between knowledge and faith from which modern mankind suffers. Through its alleged removal of this conflict neo-Thomism believes that it offers our age spiritual health and frees it in large measure from its afflictions. It is this fiction, primarily, that accounts for the growing influence of this dogmatic world-view. It is a philosophy that rejects the validity and the value of that differentiation between faith and knowledge which had become inevitable as a fateful characteristic of modern Europe. Thereby it at bottom disallows the autonomy of science, though yielding the attractive and welcome illusion of a harmony between that which we can know and that which we can believe and await with hope. The presupposition of this harmony is the basis upon which the metaphysics of neo-Thomism rests. The system is one of harmonization and, as every harmony, it also is pleasing to all who prefer rest and the feeling of security to movement and the restless but fruitful play of dialectic. But because dialectic is lacking to neo-Thomism, the latter stands somewhat aside from that vital and dynamic metaphysics to whose development German philosophers are zealously devoting themselves. Neo-Thomism does not exemplify the fundamental traits characteristic of the metaphysics of Germany.

## II. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF GERMAN METAPHYSICS

We shall not enter upon a detailed consideration of the metaphysical movements thus briefly indicated. Rather would we point out that the turn to metaphysics, taken as a whole, is a development as necessary as it is obvious. Underlying it are factors of a thoroughly objective character. It cannot be ascribed entirely or primarily to subjective needs. To be sure, as we have already pointed out, subjective and emotional influences are in play. It is true that without such needs no metaphysical systems ever arise. But these needs are nevertheless only, as it were, the personal and private presuppositions of metaphysics. Ultimately they neither account for nor explain its origin or its specific character. Really to understand the creation of a metaphysical system one must always turn to the objective presuppositions and developmental forces involved, and not consider merely psychical and subjective longings. What we mean by this will shortly appear.

By disclosing the universal factors that underlie metaphysics, we shall understand not merely the inevitability of the present turn to it but also the general character and the essential nature of the metaphysics which is in process of development. For, numerous and diverse as are the contemporary metaphysical tendencies and constructive attempts, they nevertheless have one trait in common. And this common trait is at once obvious. Negatively, each of them is characterized by the rejection of the mechanistic standpoint and mode of interpretation. None of them attempts to define the structure and the meaning of reality in the terms of the concepts of the natural sciences. None of them conceives the real after the pattern of mathemati-



cal physics; none of them regards it as mathematically calculable or formulable; none of them thinks that phenomena are exhausted by mathematical concepts or dominated by mathematical-physical laws.

Hence none of the metaphysical constructions now under discussion may be regarded as strictly rationalistic, if we take this term in its customary, that is, in its mathematical, connotation. Of the older metaphysical systems none shows slighter evidences of revival than that of Descartes. The fundamental reason for this will soon appear. What we today find is a revival of those older systems that reject the viewpoint of a mechanistic rationalism and set themselves in opposition to it. The survival or the renewal—as the case may be—of the Kantian philosophy is often objected to because of the misunderstanding that Kant's mode of thought is mechanistic and rationalistic—a misconception that appears even in Oswald Spengler's widely-known work, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*. This mode of thought is now regarded as antiquated and as inadequate for the acquisition of a comprehensive world-view.

The universal rejection of the mathematical-mechanistic point of view within metaphysics is associated with a departure from those interpretations which place the entire emphasis, in the case of metaphysical knowledge, upon formal, fixed, limited, logically unequivocal and determinate features. Our thought is turning away from the static toward the dynamic. This anti-mechanistic and dynamic trait of contemporary metaphysics, as it seems to me, mirrors, intellectually and theoretically, a general feature characteristic of our spiritual culture and of its leading representatives. Life itself has discarded the traits of fixity and changelessness and has again assumed its original nature as dynamic. This dynamic character, and the knowledge of it, receives its glorification from no less a thinker than Friedrich Nietzsche. In his dynamic philoso-

phy of life, it acquires its most powerful expression. At the present time we are unquestionably in an era marked by the unlimbering or at least by a certain depreciation and neglect of that which is formal. This holds true no matter whether we have reference to established political constitutions, the maintenance of tradition, feelings of piety and faith in authority, modes of intercourse, social convention and rule, the economic order, theological and ecclesiastical dogma, artistic style, absolute scientific knowledge, philosophical systematization, or any other avenues along which form may manifest itself. The salvation for which we long is today no longer found in the acquisition and preservation of a strictly formalistic attitude of mind and mode of knowledge.

This now brings us face to face with the positive trait common to all the numerous world-views of our day. These are much less shut off from life than was mathematical, formalistic rationalism. They are all touched and influenced by the agitation and by the dialectic of life. Insofar they are all dialectical. This does not mean merely that the richly developed philosophy of life which we now possess has a theoretical interest in life, seeking to master its problematic and irrational details; it means also, and conversely, that life with all its problematic and irrational details impinges upon the rationality of knowledge and thus contributes to the gradual development of a strictly dialectical metaphysics. We now pay more faithful and receptive attention to the intricate complications of reality; we are more mindful of the alluring multiplicity of its forms than was the constructive rationalism and idealism of former times. Our metaphysical interest is directed not to the creation of new connections and forms but to fathoming and illuminating new depths and movements, new structural relations and strata of life. We seek new revelations of content, enrichments of content. Our concern is

not with laws but with that which first receives its form by and in law. We are eager to immerse ourselves in the *life* of problems and are not primarily interested in discovering either conceptual forms or logically justifying categories. Not as though we were in general indifferent to all form or depreciated it. On the contrary, the most serious effort of our metaphysics, as it appears to me, is engaged in gaining and developing a conception of form which, in distinction from the earlier and different notion, makes some provision in its structure for the problematic and dialectical features of life—a conception which, without entirely sacrificing relatively formal determinateness, nevertheless appropriately incorporates the irrepressible dialectic and the luxuriantly problematic features typical of life.

Hence the emerging metaphysics does not neglect expressly and emphatically to set forth its relation to traditional rationalism. We have said that the former is anti-mechanistic. This does not mean, however, that it is thorough-going and anti-rationalistic. No philosophy, no metaphysics, can dispense with rationalism. The modern philosophy of life may not place itself in complete antithesis to rationalism if it is not entirely to renounce the hope of knowledge. What it seeks is simply such a notion of philosophical knowledge as can give adequate expression to the dialectic of life without destroying the guarantees and forms of conception.

The turn to metaphysics and the entire development of metaphysical investigation are therefore without doubt to be regarded as a redirection and a development of rationalism. What is required is an energetic attempt to develop or reconstruct formal and constructive rationalism into a dialectic rationalism. One must advance far beyond even the dialectical interpretation of the concept and the thoroughly dialectic mode of procedure espoused by Hegel.

The Hegelian philosophy is enjoying a renaissance not simply because Hegel was the greatest thinker concerned with the philosophy and metaphysics of history but because he disclosed the dialectic of the concept, because he was the most nearly modern representative of a logic of dialectic and of the dialectic of logic. Nevertheless, the Hegelian dialectic and doctrine of dialectic as yet represented a logic that is altogether too formal and one-sided. In consequence, concepts, in this philosophy, could not take adequate cognizance of the problematic character of reality. Hegel came to his view of dialectic from the side of logic. To be sure, it was a magnificent and a dynamic logic. Nevertheless the approach was too exclusively from logic. Hegel failed to import into his logic, from the beginning and as a matter of principle, the dialectic of history and of historical flux. In his dialectic, this powerful philosopher of history thought in logical, constructive terms. This was indeed an advance, for it disclosed a new aspect of the concept not known to the old formal logic. And yet Hegel had not separated himself widely enough from the latter. If one would adequately understand and do justice to the nature of dialectic, must he not think of it itself in dialectical terms and apply it in a thoroughly dialectical manner? Hegel extracted too little from the endless fertility of the idea of dialectic. As a very natural result of his logistic point of view, he was too impatient an opponent of the Kantian idea of an eternal antinomies, and of the splendid and praiseworthy revival and championship by Kant of the notion of antinomies. However great may have been its dynamic tendency, Hegel's dialectic was nevertheless too static. To show why this was the case does not fall within our present plan. But it seemed fitting, in our general survey of contemporary metaphysics in Germany, to refer to the renaissance of Hegel and briefly to indicate both its justification and also the limits thereof.



It is evident that the revival of metaphysics in general derives not a little strength from this renaissance of Hegel.

Now, however, we confront the important question as to what gave rise to and maintained the anti-mechanistic and dialectical character of the German metaphysics of today. For the turn to metaphysics is a very general feature of present-day philosophy, and this turn has as its clearly-defined and specific trait the character just mentioned.

### III. THE TURN TO THE METAPHYSICS OF HISTORY

The anti-mechanistic and dialectical character of contemporary metaphysics results of necessity from the object of its primary concern. The latter relates, in the main, not to inorganic, physical nature but to organic nature and life—primarily, indeed, to that form of life which we call history. The central tendency of our metaphysics is not in the direction of a mechanistic philosophy of inorganic nature. It aims rather to develop a philosophy of the organic, whether this be biological in character (neo-vitalism), personal (personalism), or historical (metaphysics of history).

It is chiefly attracted, however, by life in the sense of history. If we would not simply lump together diverse tendencies with an excessive disregard of their differences, we must distinguish clearly between two types of the philosophy of life, represented, on the one hand, by vitalism and neo-vitalism, and, on the other, by the metaphysics of history. Though both movements are metaphysical, they are radically distinct in character. Vitalism centers about the biological life, whereas the metaphysics of history concerns itself with historical life.

Now it is the latter that unquestionably enjoys the

ascendency as regards both the interest manifested and its achievements. This is due to circumstances which we will now briefly describe. The rapid development, during the nineteenth century, of the so-called social sciences has made it increasingly clear that man is not alone a living being in the sense of the natural sciences, inclusive of biology, but likewise a member of an historical order, and that the laws of history are no less truly the laws of his being and development than are the laws of so-called nature. This insight, which originated in the social sciences, served in turn constantly to increase both the attention devoted to the latter and the esteem which they acquired. In consequence, there developed an extraordinarily fruitful relation between the social sciences and philosophy. The situation was analogous to that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the outstanding position of mathematics and of the mathematical sciences led to a philosophy that was based on mathematics and the natural sciences and that was oriented accordingly. The results of the social sciences during the nineteenth century, as regards both form and content, could impossibly be disregarded by philosophy once the latter again became conscious of its metaphysical task and sought to gain a comprehensive interpretation of the world. Scientific philosophy and metaphysics have always maintained a close relation with the concrete sciences. Indeed, it is more especially by virtue of this relation that they may be distinguished as scientific and thus be demarcated from all mere dilettantism in the way of metaphysics and the formulation of world-views. So long as mathematics and the natural sciences were in the ascendency as regards both their stage of development and the respect they enjoyed, it was only natural and imperative that metaphysics should primarily base itself upon them and take them into account. But since the first third of the past century the social sciences

have enjoyed an increasingly flourishing growth, and this has made it necessary for philosophy to give the most careful consideration to their formal structure and to their conclusions.

The formal structure of the social sciences raises problems that fall to epistemology and the methodology of the social sciences. To them German scholars have been devoting themselves most assiduously during the last decades. Insofar our philosophy is a theory and methodology of history. This is a field of investigation cultivated by a large number of thinkers. As a matter of fact, it is at present the central concern of scientific philosophy, and to it almost the majority of our best minds have turned. The interpretation of the conclusions of the social sciences is the task of the metaphysics of life and of history. The latter aims at a metaphysical interpretation and systematization of the empirical facts which the social sciences have disclosed concerning the play of historical life and the genesis and the fall of political, legal, economic, ethical, artistic, and religious institutions. Thus our philosophy maintains intimate connections with the social sciences. Whether as epistemology and methodology, on the one hand, or as metaphysics, on the other, it is distinctly a philosophy of history.

It is both obvious and incontestable that in this field philosophy still faces important tasks. If, taking our cue from speculative philosophy, we designate the unitary principle at the basis of historical reality as *reason*, the main task of the philosophy of history becomes what Wilhelm Dilthey called a "critique of historical reason." This would be the continuation and perhaps the completion of the critical philosophy of Kant. For it would supplement Kant's investigations of the foundations of mathematics, the mathematical sciences and biology, with similar investigations relating to the sciences of the historical order. Upon these

epistemological and critical foundations would arise the system of the social sciences. As the continuation of the critical investigations, the latter leads to knowledge of the historical and social world, and may thus be called a developed metaphysics of history. To be sure, neither the critical bases nor the systematic superstructure as yet appear in their finished form in the philosophy of history of any German writer. Considered as a whole, however, the various endeavors and tendencies of our present day philosophy of history appear to center upon the two tasks just described, namely, laying the epistemological foundations of the historical sciences and supplying a metaphysical and systematic interpretation of historical life through an appeal to and a utilization of the facts established by the historical sciences.

Just as there is unity in respect to the tasks of philosophy, so likewise may we discern a high degree of unity in respect to the points of view and methods utilized in their accomplishment. By thus bringing together and unifying the object and the form of all of these activities we shall obtain a clear view of what the metaphysics in Germany aims at and what it has already in part achieved.

#### IV. THE NEW DIALECTIC

Contemporary German metaphysics, as has already been indicated, tends to adopt an anti-mechanical and dialectical procedure. Closely connected as this is with the entire spirit and culture of our times, it prevails very especially in the metaphysics of history. The reason is easy to understand. For in the case of the metaphysics of history, the viewpoint and method of dialectic—thinking in terms of and with antinomies—is unavoidable and indispensable. A real



philosophy of life that would be faithful to the object and the meaning of its task could have no other character.

Not that there is the slightest intention or tendency to condone any form of skepticism or relativism. Practically all of the metaphysical efforts are at one in expressly steering clear of every skeptical and relativistic mode of interpretation as one that eventually always leads to an untenable historicism. Precisely because of its relativistic tendencies, historicism is condensed. It is regarded as unsatisfactory from the standpoint of knowledge and is recognized as a psychological peril—a force undermining that moral spirit which is so indispensable for strict philosophical inquiry. It would be an extremely tempting task to investigate the characteristic ethos of our metaphysics, for it exhibits very clearly the change of temper that has come over our philosophical thinking.

Relativism and historicism are regarded as manifestations of a mental disease, a spiritual crisis. From it one seeks to become free. This I have set forth in some detail in my book, *Die geistige Krisis der Gegenwart*, where the overcoming of relativism is presented as a theoretical and as a moral and practical requirement.

The nineteenth century had acquired a most extraordinarily keen consciousness of the irrationalities and antinomies of existence. The more deeply one penetrated into historical and social life—that is, the greater the advances made by the social sciences—the more clearly one realized the impossibility of formulating in the inflexible forms of abstract conceptions, the many different contradictions of historical life, or the diversity and multiplicity of its mental, moral, artistic, religious, economic and political, of its impulsive and erotic, relations and objectivizations. And yet this metaphysics of history could not permanently and deliberately rely solely upon irrational intuitions and direct experiences of life. For thus the doors would be opened

to an uncontrollable mysticism involving the destruction of all serious and scientific philosophy. However hospitable the metaphysics of history may be to the irrationalities of life, it must nevertheless exhibit their connection with the world of concepts, forms, and categories, for it claims to be knowledge and seeks to be recognized and valued as such. No mere experiencing of life, however deep or overpowering, and no intuitive or impressionistic grasp of historical culture, however rich, can suffice as a foundation for metaphysics. Hence irrationalism itself requires a rationalism that shall provide the form for the vision and give to experience a clear and universally valid methodical structure. Only thus may one acquire conceptually organized knowledge. No metaphysics of history can possibly be constructed without the express employment of critically validated categories and sharply defined concepts.

That such a rationalism differs from the older form whose character was determined by mathematics and natural science has already been indicated. The indisputably dialectical character of all knowledge relating to historical and social life exhibits itself in the fact that rational elements are combined with others that are thoroughly irrational, intuitive, and neither reducible to nor expressible in conceptual terms. The manner of this combination is fundamentally antinomical and paradoxical. Thus the metaphysics of history recognizes and utilizes that particular form of rationalism which may be designated dialectical. It was brilliantly exemplified by Georg Simmel in his book, *Lebensanschauung*. It was employed likewise by Theodor Litt in establishing the metaphysical foundations of pedagogy, as he has presented them in his work, *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart und ihr Einfluss auf das Bildungsideal*. That it offers the most suitable and the most promising method for a systematic metaphysics of history is perhaps beyond all question. It recognizes the reciprocal

relations between life and knowledge. It realizes that constructions proceeding solely from life become unscientific and degenerate into romantic mysticism, whereas, on the other hand, all constructions operating exclusively with formal and logical principles remain suspended in the sphere of high and dry rationalism, abstract and remote from life. It knows well that rationalizing and systematizing processes cannot yield a thoroughly satisfactory or ultimate comprehension or mastery of any phenomenon of life.

The rationalism we are describing at every point admits the possibility of further question; it leaves the way open for a continuation and a deepening of the discussion. Thoroughly alive to the problematical character of life, it does not deaden but it rather strengthens the consciousness that all knowledge is problematical. It thinks of knowledge as endless, not merely in respect to its range—this was recognized even by formal rationalism—but likewise in respect to its depth. At every point it discloses a new profundity, a new intellectual challenge; and thus it generates the necessity for constant reinterpretation.

The task confronting this dialectical rationalism is that of elaborating a doctrine of the categories of historical reason. The unique character of these categories must consist in the fact that they establish the significant yet antinomical interrelation between rationality as the form and the irrationality of life as the content of the metaphysics of history. This means that the principles for a comprehensive and systematic interpretation of the phenomena of historical life must be dialectical and antinomical. Thus an extensive, temptingly beautiful, and extraordinarily fertile field of investigation lies within the horizon of the German metaphysician of history.

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## THE PRESENT STATUS OF LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

WERE one to characterize in a brief phrase the present status, in Germany, of logic and, along with it, also of epistemology, one would be forced to say that the almost unlimited dominance which Kantianism at one time enjoyed has come to an end. The interest and the affiliations of leading investigators are more and more turning to movements that are in express opposition to Kantianism. Before we here enter upon details, however, a number of preliminary remarks are necessary.

It was with intention that we just used the expression, "of logic, and, along with it, also of epistemology." For the two disciplines are very closely related. The latter affords the scientific foundations of the former. Logic, however, as Bolzano was the first to declare, is a discipline relating to scientific knowledge (*Wissenschaftslehre*). To achieve a thoroughly clear distinction between it and epistemology we will do well to fall back upon a relatively external but nevertheless a precisely delimited conception of *Wissenschaftslehre*.

If we compare the various sciences in the form in which they actually exist and are accepted by us, and if we abstract their common features, we will find that they have an identical structure. It is because of their structure that we call them sciences; it is to this that we refer when we use the terms "scientific" or "logical." In every-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.



day life we frequently speak of certain connections as logical. What we mean is precisely the same as when we say that they are such as might find place in a nexus of scientific assertions, or more precisely, of assertions such as are characteristic of science.

A science is a body of assertions (concerning some field of reality) so organized as to induce the conviction that the assertions are true. That is to say, the nature and organization of the assertions must be such as to yield assurances and guarantees of their truth. This is the case when they are related to one another as are conclusions to that which establishes them, and when the truth of that which is simply basic to other assertions and not in itself further confirmable is validated in some distinctive way, perhaps by reference to observable facts. The laws underlying these guarantees of truth are the laws of a scientific or logical structure. We call them logical laws in the widest sense of the term. Any procedure governed by them may be called scientific or logical. Thus considered, every proposition established scientifically is likewise logical.

It follows from what has been said that there must be two very different types of logical laws and therefore also of logical procedure. On the one hand, there are laws of logical confirmation, that is, laws through whose employment propositions may be carried back to others or, differently expressed, may be derived from them. So far as *these* laws are concerned, the truth of the propositions is obviously immaterial—it need only be presupposed hypothetically. What is here significant is simply the correctness of the derivation or deduction. The laws in question are those of formal logic. In this context the word “*logical*” acquires the more restricted meaning of “being properly derived.” The science of that which necessarily belongs in a validly organized body of propositions is formal logic. On the other hand, and in distinction herefrom, we

may characterize as logical those laws through whose employment we may be assured of the truth of those assertions which lie at the basis of others but may not themselves in turn be similarly established. The totality of these laws and the science which elaborates them may be called material logic.

Both divisions of logic are concerned with the actually existing sciences. The fact of their existence and likewise their validity are taken as self-evident. The truth of their pronouncements and the validity of the formal structure within which they have their place are not questioned. But what if these presuppositions are untenable? What if the sciences as they now actually appear are after all not radically different from the "sciences of alchemy and astrology"? What if their truth and the validity of their conclusions are only apparent? It is obvious that the mere presupposition of the validity and the unconditioned reliability of the positive sciences cannot satisfy the final demands of thought. The philosopher insists on knowing whether the conclusions reached by the sciences through their specific procedure may be unconditionally regarded as "objective" truths, at least in the most favorable cases, or whether the things advanced as true by the sciences must, perhaps just because of the procedure of the latter, be thought of as tainted with an unavoidable constant error. Thus the problem arises as to whether the organizing principles of the sciences, as these are exhibited in formal and in material logic, may not in some manner be demonstrated to be unconditionally valid and trustworthy in themselves, that is, independently of any reference to the sciences. In other words, are there guarantees or confirmations with respect to the scientific structures themselves and are these guarantees thoroughly reliable? This is the problem that falls to epistemology.

Inasmuch as it is concerned with the unconditioned, epistemology, far more than logic, is really a philosophic discipline. As a rule, however, the logician has philosophical interests and he therefore tends to develop his subject from the outset from an epistemological point of view. Indeed, this is really always the case, even though frequently to so limited a degree that no one is at first clearly conscious of the fact. Nevertheless, as our preceding discussion has indicated, it must be possible pretty thoroughly to free logic from epistemological accretions. This is particularly true in the case of formal logic, as is clear when we consider mathematical logic or logistic. For, as is well known, we have come to realize that logical relations may be so formulated that it is possible to express them in the language of mathematical formulae and symbols. Thereby the boundaries of mathematics have become extended beyond the field of a mere science of magnitude. But as a result, logic has likewise been expanded. It has ceased to be exclusively such as we have above defined it, namely, the doctrine of scientific knowledge, or—what according to our conception is the same—the doctrine of the laws of inference, and thus, in particular, of the laws regulating the formation of concepts, judgments and syllogisms. For a useful mathematical reconstruction of the logical propositions can be achieved only if logic is applied to those purely objective relations which, on the one hand, lie at the basis of the propositions in question and, on the other, make possible the reconstruction. Inasmuch, however, as these relations must likewise be considered when one is concerned with the foundations of mathematics, mathematics and that type of logic which is carried on from a mathematical point of view may fuse into a single, great, comprehensive science. The basis of the latter is the expanded logic. To be sure, we must here note a fact which is very often overlooked, namely, that, within this compre-

hensive science, the older logic, so far as it in general may adapt itself to mathematical forms, is conserved as the doctrine of the inferences that are exhibited in propositions. And thus this latter type of logic maintains a particular place within the wider field. Might it not have been in closer accord with tradition and linguistic usage to reserve the old name of logic (and likewise the newer one of logistics) exclusively for this more particular field of study? For the total field, perhaps a different name, such as the mathematical theory of objectivity (*mathematische Gegenstandstheorie*), would have been more suitable and less subject to misunderstanding.

Mathematical logic, which has never been very intensively cultivated in Germany, has often been strongly attacked by the philosophers of our country, first of all doubtless by Lotze. These attacks must be regarded as unwarranted insofar as they were directed upon various inadequacies that were of but secondary importance. For these limitations were only natural in a science still so young; they were capable of removal and have indeed already in part been overcome. On the other hand, the attacks were justified insofar as the upholders of mathematical logic identified the latter with logic in general and finally even believed that it could supersede the epistemological interpretation of logic.

Nevertheless, the great reformation in logic which originated in Germany at the beginning of the present century and which, as is at once obvious from what has already been said, likewise had an epistemological aspect, was very closely connected, at least at the outset, with mathematical logic. For at bottom it was but a continuation of ideas first expressed by the Jena mathematician, Gottlob Frege. This prominent investigator has been acclaimed by Bertrand Russell to be the first thinker who correctly understood the nature of numbers. And thus Frege has played



an important role in the philosophy of mathematics as well as in that of mathematical logic, among whose founders he must be counted. His philosophic mind has developed the epistemological consequences of the fundamental thought of mathematical logic, namely, the identical nature of mathematical and logical laws. Thus he arrived at nothing less than the fundamental epistemological problem of logic, particularly of formal logic. What is the nature of logical laws? Where are they to be classified? With what other laws are they most closely related?

At the turn of the century, the answer almost universally given in Germany was that, inasmuch as logical laws are laws of thought, they are laws of thinking and therefore of consciousness. Thus, in the last analysis, they are psychological laws, even though of a unique sort, not to be thought of, for example, on a parallel with the so-called laws of association. This view prevailed, in the main, even in the older neo-Kantianism. Indeed, the chief founder of this movement, F. A. Lange, even championed it in its most extreme form. He, as also Helmholtz, thought of the logical order as conditioned by the psychological organization of man. In several passages of his works, Otto Liebmann approaches close to this view. The realistic Kantianism of Alois Riehl, though otherwise oriented, was yet unable to supply the weapons necessary to destroy the psychologistic conception of logic. It was the leaders of the Marburg school, Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, who first of all brought about the change. They clearly recognized the close kinship between the logical and mathematical orders and they regarded the former as in no wise related to the psychological but as independent and unique. Nevertheless, even they could not directly free logic from the psychological prejudices adhering to it. For such an achievement they were too closely attached to the traditional modes of thought. Indeed—curiously enough,

though intelligible in the light of the tradition of Kantianism—some of their expressions were such as to seem to an uninitiated person like the theses of an outright psychologism. An example of this is Cohen's noted assertion—the basis of his transcendental-logical idealism—that thinking creates things. As one proceeds, one of course comes to learn that thinking here denotes not what is universally understood by the term, but something specifically logical. But why, then, the misleading expression? And why was it necessary to make the attack upon psychologism with anti-realistic propositions?

Nothing of this is to be found in Frege.<sup>2</sup> He exhibits the impossibility of psychological logic by developing the absurd consequences of a favorite supposition of its representatives. The supposition is that there might be beings who think in accordance with logical laws different from ours. In such an event, Frege shows, these beings would obviously be compelled to regard entirely different things to be true than do we. He then continues: "The person who, on the other hand, means by logical laws such laws as prescribe how one ought to think, that is, laws of what is true and not the natural laws underlying ideas as to what is true will ask, 'Who is in the right? Whose laws with reference to what is held to be true are in accord with the laws of what is true?' The psychological logician can not ask this question; otherwise he would acknowledge that there are laws with regard to what is true which are not psychological in character."

But even Frege did not win a complete triumph. He himself had no such expectation. And who would have looked for it at that time (1893) in so secluded a place as the preface of a work on the fundamental principles of arithmetic? Success was achieved first of all by Edmund Husserl, who took up and developed the thought of Frege

<sup>2</sup> Frege, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet*. 2 Bde., 1893, 1903.

in the first volume of his *Logische Untersuchungen*.<sup>3</sup> Husserl's success was unparalleled. The book just mentioned has very rightly been called the most influential philosophical work of the present century. But Husserl's doctrines are not so completely novel as is commonly assumed. The fundamental purpose common to the two volumes of the *Logische Untersuchungen* is to establish a particular order whose significance is not merely logical. This order is conceived by Husserl as consisting of ideal entities which may not be identified with the psychological acts of representation, judgment, etc., and need not necessarily consist of the actual objects to which these acts relate. This conception was expressed also by Frege. He speaks of an order that is objective, but not actual. Lotze advances a similar notion in his critical revival of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. More emphatically still the thought was brought out by Bolzano<sup>4</sup> in his doctrine of truths—as well as of propositions, that is, of the real status of things and of representations—in themselves. Bolzano is a neglected thinker of the first half of the nineteenth century. Originally a Catholic priest, he later became a professor in Prague. He was also a mathematician of importance; indeed his greatness in this field was recognized very much earlier than in that of philosophy. He played a part in extending the bounds of mathematics beyond the confines of a pure science of magnitude. He prepared the way for the theory of classes and championed the doctrine of the non-intuitional nature of geometry, insofar anticipating thoroughly modern ideas. As a philosopher, his position was expressly opposed to that of Kant and of the German idealism of his day, more particularly to that of Hegel.

<sup>3</sup> Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*. 2 Bde., Halle, 1900, 1901. 2. Aufl., 1913, 1921.

<sup>4</sup> Bolzano, *Wissenschaftslehre*. 4 Bde., Sulzbach, 1837. Neudruck von Bd. 1 u. 2, Leipzig, 1914, 1915.

Against the latter this otherwise very mild man expresses very sharp words of criticism.

The credit of being the first among contemporary writers again to call attention to Bolzano may be claimed by the distinguished Polish investigator K. Twardowski. But Bolzano really became known only through Husserl. And then after a delay of more than half a century he began to exercise, upon philosophy as well as upon mathematics, an influence whose magnitude may best be measured by the newly-arising and ever-increasing literature relating to him. But this alone does not tell the story. His strongest influence was exercised upon Husserl—though, in so saying, we in no wise mean to detract from the originality of this outstanding investigator. Husserl's originality is especially pronounced in the second volume of the work to which we have referred. What here aroused the attention of scholars was especially the thorough rejection of the psychological theories of abstraction that had previously been dominant. This involved nothing less than a resumption of the old controversy regarding universals, and its decision in favor of the doctrine which the majority regarded as having long ago been decisively refuted, namely, realism. Prior to this time, German philosophers, linking themselves with British empiricism, were accustomed to deny the existence of universals. According to their view, a universal is in reality something individual that possesses a representative function. It resembles several other things which it represents in idea and which, precisely because of this resemblance and representation, are combined only subjectively and psychologically into a so-called universal, a species or genus. The decisive point is here obviously that of resemblance. Two things, for example, a ball and a die, are precisely alike as regards their color. For example, they may both be a certain shade of red. Both have this color quality in common; qualitatively there



is but a single color for the two objects. But how is this possible? For only individual things are recognized. The color quality inheres in the ball; it comes into being and disappears with the latter. And the same is true of the die. And yet we speak of common possession! Inasmuch as an individual quality can not be a common one, Husserl believes that he is justified in concluding that a non-individual, that is a universal, an ideal, quality is presupposed from the beginning. Thus the theory contains a circular movement of thought: resemblance is not to be taken as final, but, as in the main Bolzano had already realized, it points to an identical ideal element. Thus "there are" universals, "there are" ideas,—indeed, everyone whose eyes are not blurred by false theories may directly intuit them. The assertion that there *are* only things, only individuals, discloses itself as an error arising from an interpretation that is one-sidedly psychological and, to use the language of Frege, that is unwilling to acknowledge entities that are not existential—for, of course, universals may not be said to exist.

Husserl's doctrines, as is, of course, only natural, exercised a fruitful influence upon the other opponents of psychologism. This is particularly true in the case of the Marburg school which stood close to him. Husserl himself had received stimulating suggestions from Natorp and was later appreciatively criticized by the latter. The youngest among the chief representatives of the Marburg school, Ernst Cassirer, who is known primarily through his thoughtful history of the problem of knowledge in modern times,<sup>5</sup> was doubtless led to a new functional theory of the concept primarily by Husserl's critique of theories of abstraction and by Frege's doctrine of the concept. Entirely in accord with the tradition of his school, which is in many respects reminiscent of Hegel, Cassirer, in his doctrine of

<sup>5</sup> Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*. Berlin, 1910.

the formation of concepts, seeks to do away with a static in favor of a developmental point of view. He acknowledges nothing as "given" but contends that everything is resolved in the unending process of knowledge. Clearly noticeable relations to Husserl and perhaps even more so to Bolzano are discernible also in the case of the second of the two great Kantian schools, that is, the so-called Southwest German school. This was founded only a few years after the Marburg school by Wilhelm Windelband, and was developed by his student Heinrich Rickert. For this school the main problem of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, namely, the problem of objective truth and its laws, was from the beginning far more central than it was for the Marburg philosophers.

The latter may be reproached with the fact that they failed to carry their epistemology beyond the position of mere logic. For, in the last analysis, they contented themselves with disclosing the presuppositions of the sciences as they actually lie at hand—"in printed books," as Cohen says. The Southwest German philosophers go further. They assign to philosophy as a whole, and so also to epistemology, an independent field represented by the universally valid values. For them, philosophy must penetrate with its interpretations not merely the sciences but likewise the totality of culture; and, among the sciences, they are concerned to exhibit the methods of those which had been most neglected by the earlier Kantians, as well as by the Marburg thinkers, namely, the historical sciences. That the structure and basic concepts of the latter are fundamentally different from those of the natural sciences, Windelband attempted to show in his studies of nomothetic and ideographic sciences, or the sciences of law and of occurrence.<sup>6</sup> In this work he was a pioneer. Rickert followed with investigations that were comprehensive and aroused

<sup>6</sup> Windelband, *Präludien*. Freiburg, 7.-8. Aufl., 1921.

wide attention.<sup>7</sup> Inasmuch as the historical sciences satisfy the requirements of what others had called sciences of law, the work of Windelband and of Rickert is noteworthy. For these thinkers sought to differentiate the two realms, and to define the unique character of each in terms purely of methodology. The goal of natural science, even where this is not as yet at every turn clearly apparent (as, for example, in the case of geography) is that which is universal, the law; history, on the other hand, is concerned with that which occurs but a single time, with events. Not every event, however, may be characterized as historical, but only such as are important or significant, and this, not for the historian, but in the nexus of other events. This sort of importance, however, ultimately always points to a realm of absolute values which, being on the "yonder side of subject and object," represents the true and central concern of philosophy. Windelband and Rickert sharply distinguish the realm of absolute values from the existential world, as well as from a "third realm," that of meaning, which, in acts of valuation, forms a bond joining the other two orders. With respect to absolute values Lotze himself had already declared that we may predicate not existence but validity. In the last analysis these values are supposed to furnish the measure for everything that may be called valuable, even for life. Thus, in the view of Rickert, life in no wise possesses an independent value. Science is thought of as embodying the absolute values of truth; and these had already been coördinated by Windelband with the absolute values of the good and the beautiful. We may not assert that thoughts *should* be or *ought* to be thought because they are true. The converse obtains. They are true because, on the ground of their value, they *ought* to be thought. At all times, even in cases of error, our thinking proceeds in accordance with psychological laws.

<sup>7</sup> Rickert, *Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*. 4.-5. verb. Aufl., 1921; *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*. 3.-4. verb. Aufl., 1922.

But it may likewise exhibit logical laws, though it does so only when its contents are true. Man, as even Windelband had believed himself to have established, is subject alike to natural and to normative laws. Otherwise expressed, there is manifest in the totality of psychical processes an over-individual consciousness of norms, called by Rickert the transcendental consciousness. To think logically means to think in accordance with this consciousness. And the situation is analogous in the fields of ethics and of aesthetics.

It is thus clear that the entire system of Windelband and Rickert stands and falls with the doctrine of normative laws and of the over-individual values basic to them. Unceasingly, and along constantly fresh lines, these thinkers stress the unique character of normative laws and the unbridgeable chasm which divides them from natural laws. And yet this doctrine is completely erroneous. Indeed, it had already been refuted in advance by Frege. He was the first clearly to point out that the word "law" has a two-fold meaning. Of this duplicity Windelband is scarcely aware; and insofar as it comes to his notice, he at once misinterprets it. "In the one sense," Frege says, "the word law denotes that which *is*, whereas in the other it prescribes that which *ought* to be. . . . Every law which declares what *is* may be regarded as prescriptive—one should think in accord with it, and thus it is a law for thought. This holds true of the geometrical and physical, no less than of the logical, laws. The latter more properly deserve the name "laws of thought" only because they are the most general laws and prescribe how one ought to think on every occasion whatsoever that one thinks."

Thus, according to Frege, all those laws, i. e., the natural laws, which Windelband and Rickert seek to place in sharpest contrast with the logical laws, are on precisely the same plane as the latter. Normative and natural laws



do not represent opposed forms of laws, but only contrasting attitudes toward laws. If I say simply, "Between two points (A and B) a straight line is the shortest," I express the matter in the form of a natural law. If, on the other hand, I say that, "inasmuch as I desire to reach B from A by the shortest path, a straight line is prescribed for me," then I have formulated the same content as above in the form of a normative law. Moreover, it is self-evident that precisely the same holds true of logical laws; they become norms for everyone who seeks the truth. The bold hypothesis of a transcendental consciousness is not at all necessary. And this is all the more gratifying because the hypothesis—in spite of the suspiciously violent attacks which its upholders frequently launch against psychologism—is without any doubt a psychological hypothesis. For how may such an over-individual consciousness be conceived if not in analogy with our individual consciousness?

Thus we must turn from the logic of thought to the logic of objects. The terms *Denklogik* and *Gegenstandslogik*, used to denote these two sorts of logic, were first clearly defined by Honecker.<sup>8</sup> In an admirable little book he weighed them over against each other. *Gegenstandslogik* is bound up with a more universal theory, *Gegenstandstheorie*. The latter investigates everything that may be denoted by the word "object" in the very widest sense of the word—that is, every "something," entirely regardless of whether or not it is represented, whether it is a thing, a condition, a quality, a relation, or a concept, and whether it is physical or psychical, actual or non-actual; indeed, whether even it be impossible and irrational, as, for example, a round square. The founder of *Gegenstandstheorie* was A. Meinong.<sup>9</sup> His colleague, A. Höfler, incorporated the doctrine in his comprehensive presenta-

<sup>8</sup> Honecker, *Gegenstandslogik und Denklogik*. Berlin, 1921.

<sup>9</sup> Meinong, *Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften*.

tion of logic;<sup>10</sup> and Mally, Meinong's successor in Graz, took particular pains to indicate the close relation between *Gegenstandstheorie* and logic.

Nevertheless, the views also of these thinkers, the Graz school, are not free from a psychological strain. This appears most clearly of all in their *Gestalttheorie*. By *Gestalten*, or, to refer to the original term, *Gestaltqualitäten*, Chr. v. Ehrenfels<sup>11</sup> meant such complexes as contain a peculiar "more," that is, something not contained within the parts of which they are constituted. An illustration would be a melody in its relation to its constituent tones. Meinong and his school regard this "more" as "founded" in the parts, and they therefore designate the *Gestalten*, as likewise all relations resembling them, "founded objects," or "objects of a higher order." The process of "founding" is interpreted as a particular sort of productive process. The supposition of the latter, and the attempt to exhibit it by the methods of experimental psychology, is characteristic of the Graz school in the persons of Witasek and Benussi. The more modern investigators of *Gestalt*, however, as represented on the one hand by the group of Wertheimer,<sup>12</sup> Koffka and Köhler, and on the other by the present writer,<sup>13</sup> have been unable to discover such a productive process, even though making the most careful theoretical and experimental studies.

For us, the most noteworthy fact is that the hypothesis of a productive process brings the Graz school, as indeed its representatives clearly recognize, close to the position of neo-Kantianism. For this latter school also, as we know, emphasizes creative processes, syntheses by which

<sup>10</sup> Höfler, *Logik*. 2. sehr verm. Aufl. mit vier Beiträgen als Überleitung zur Logistik von E. Mally. Wien, 1922.

<sup>11</sup> von Ehrenfels, *Über Gestaltqualitäten*. Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., Bd. 14 (1890).

<sup>12</sup> Wertheimer, *Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt*. Psychologische Forschungen, I., 1921.

<sup>13</sup> Linke, *Grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre*. München, 1918. (2. Aufl. in Vorbereitung.)

objects are constituted. Neo-Kantianism, of course, explicitly contends that these processes are logical. This, to be sure, lessens the kinship between the two schools, but it very materially adds to the limitations of neo-Kantianism. For, the nature of the logical, or, let us say, the scientific, is misconceived if one ascribes to it a capacity to create things. Science is creative only in the sense that it creates ways by which we may attain to that which has heretofore been unattainable, and may come to know that which has thus far been unknown. At this point, also, there is a difference between the two schools. For the Graz philosophers, it is only the objects of a higher order that are produced, whereas for the neo-Kantians it is all objects whatsoever. It is precisely this radicalism which the latter proudly seek to maintain to the last. "How is it possible to begin with objects?" they ask their opponents. Transcendental philosophy regards the object itself as a problem; it shows that the object is constituted through the categories. This criticism, however, in no wise touches an upholder of the *Gegenstandstheorie*. For, inasmuch as he identifies "object" with "something," and inasmuch as every category is, of course, also a "something," the process whereby an object is said to be constituted by categories would be a process whereby an object is constituted by objects. Thus we would be in the toils of a *circulus vitiosus*.

The particular point of concern, however, was doubtless the well-known theory that everything temporal and empirical depends upon timeless, super-empirical conditions. Insofar, the new logic, championing as it did the doctrine of timeless truths in themselves, proved very opportune to the Kantians, more especially where the Lotzean traditions were strong, as, for example, in the Southwest German school. The doctrine seemed to have been developed with such clarity and keenness of thought

by Bolzano that the thinkers of this school at once accepted it as a confirmation of their own viewpoint. What was antithetical to their view—and Bolzano, as stated above, always thought of himself as an outright opponent of Kantianism—they disregarded as much as possible. The inevitable result was that precisely the deepest thinkers among them fell into difficulties and conflicts, as is exemplified most conspicuously by Emil Lask, who unfortunately fell a victim to the World War.

More or less closely connected with this turn to objectivity are the activities of other representatives of the same movement. Jonas Cohn, for example, ascribes a decisive importance to non-logical or, as they are sometimes called, irrational factors in the development of the object. This is a tendency that appears more clearly in the Southwest German school than among the Marburg thinkers. It invites a reference to Fritz Münch and especially to Bruno Bauch.<sup>14</sup> The latter, through a thorough study of the historical Kant, and by placing the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* in the foreground, arrived at an interpretation of Kant that was in many respects original. His divergence from Rickert was marked. Though retaining the transcendental consciousness in name, he, in fact, discarded it. In other respects also he energetically sought to develop the philosophy of values and of validity in such a way that it might do full justice to the realistic procedure of the natural sciences and the historical disciplines. Bauch, just as Hönigswald, whose thought is closely allied to that of Bauch, was vigorously stimulated by Rickert. He was, moreover, influenced also by Frege. This decided opponent of idealism, however, who directed very sharp words more especially against H. Cohen, could, of course, not shake Bauch's fundamental position. This perhaps only shows that the terms "idealism" and "realism" have

<sup>14</sup> Bauch, *Wahrheit, Wert und Wirklichkeit*. Leipzig, 1923.



many meanings and must be used with caution. The "realistic" school of Graz and the "idealistic" school of Southwest Germany are in many respects so similar that thinkers such as Hans Pilcher and Ferdinand Weinhandl may with equal justification be counted to either school. The same holds of Friedrich Kuntze, though his alliances, to be sure, are not so much with *Gegenstandstheorie* as with logic.

To me, of course, it seems that there is a completely unspannable gulf between a consistently developed *Gegenstandstheorie* and every form of transcendental idealism.<sup>15</sup> The former alone, in my judgment, is in the right. I charge the latter with "rationalism." By this I mean something quite other than "rationalism." I mean the doctrine that seeks to understand truth and objects in terms of the "ratio" and the logical, instead, conversely, of conceiving the "ratio" and the logical by reference to truth and objects—the only really natural thing to do. For in the widest sense, "ratio" is but the capacity to discover and to establish truth. Truth, and in this contention the Kantians are sound, does not consist in copying objects or in a correspondence with them. It resides within the objects or somethings—indeed, if these are actual things, it is even comprised within actual things. Truth itself is simply the existence (by which we mean the aspect of "in itself") of a status of fact. Meinong calls it an *Objektiv*, this term denoting the fact that a characteristic attaches to an object—the blueness, for example, to the heavens. Truth (that is, an existing factual status) is expressed in propositions; and thus we again establish a connection with the definition above given of logic. Logic indeed presupposes nothing but objects and their characteristics in some wise apprehended. If we are governed in our conscious life by the laws of logical objects, then we think logically.

<sup>15</sup> Linke, *Die Existentialtheorie der Wahrheit und der Psychologismus der Geltungslogik*. Kant-Studien, Bd. 29.

Here, of course, Kantianism springs forward anew with the question as to how such a "direction by laws," such an "apprehension," "comprehension," or "knowing" of objects is at all possible. The question is certainly a legitimate one. Kantianism, however, at once answers it by invoking its dogma that the world is "logically" conditioned. We can achieve a logical mastery of objects, it alleges, only because objects themselves are already of a logical structure and are dependent upon "thinking." This, of course, at the very least presupposes an independent "logical sphere" distinguishable from psychological thinking no less truly than are the objects that are thought. In establishing this view, use is made of the doctrine that truth is timeless or supra-temporal. The true content or status of fact in the proposition, "Socrates was a wise man" is valid throughout all changes of time. Being timeless or eternal, how could it reside within or attach to Socrates, this real being who, in common with everything that is real, is a temporally determined and transient "something"? Socrates has ceased to exist. The truth referring to him, however, abides throughout all time. In reference to an assertion, we say that it *is* true, and not that it *was* true, or *will be* true. Now this is, indeed, the case. But in explanation we need not in the least appeal to a particular sphere conceived as logical validity. The feature to which attention has been called is to be found in the stratum of being and, in the particular case in question, of reality. That to which reference is made in the assertion that Socrates was a wise man, is and remains something that has been; it today no longer exists and it may therefore be contrasted with everything that *now* has being. It may not, however, be contrasted with everything that has being if, as language certainly permits us to do, we include under the head of being all entities to which the character "being" either now does or

once did belong—quite immaterial which; if, in other words, we look aside from the particular temporal locus of being. Thus considered, the status of fact expressed by the affirmation that Socrates was a wise man must most certainly be regarded as being or existing. Such an existing status of fact, however, is called a true status of fact, or a truth. Thus it follows that the particular status of fact which we have been discussing *is* true. Were one to say that it *was* true, one would bring it into contrast with the comprehensive realm of entities that have being, inclusive of those that have been. This would be equivalent to now placing it in the realm of that which is not and has not been, and thus of the untrue. This is the whole secret regarding timeless validity. It is obvious how thoroughly it harmonizes with our contention that truths concerning real entities always lie within them or attach to them. The line of argument above indicated in no wise establishes a logical order that forms a bridge between a thinking consciousness and things that are thought.

All the more insistently, however, there again arises the question as to how thinking arrives at things. Are those philosophers perhaps after all in the right who, after the manner of a psychologistic interpretation of Kant, regard things as complexes of sense data or, at any rate, of conscious contents organized in accordance with law? This indeed seems to promise at least the simplest solution of the problem. Thinking or consciousness, it contends, does not pass out beyond itself, but only experiences, even though in particular modifications, its own contents. E. von Aster, perhaps the keenest and most profound of the present-day representatives of this general tendency of thought, has attempted a new formulation of nominalism.<sup>16</sup> In sharp opposition to Husserl, he conceives a thing as a functional organization of series of expectations. In so

<sup>16</sup> von Aster, *Prinzipien der Erkenntnislehre. Versuch zu einer Neubegründung des Nominalismus*. Leipzig, 1913.

doing, as in his nominalism in general, he carries further the ideas of his master, H. Cornelius. With the latter he has bonds of connection not only in the Kantianism common to them, but also in E. Mach's and R. Avenarius' interpretation of thought in terms of economy, and, in general, in positivism and empirio-criticism as also in the so-called philosophy of immanentism.

All of these movements must be regarded as mere variants of one and the same fundamental tendency, that of conscientianism or empirical-subjective idealism. In Germany this is at the present time on the wane. To some this statement might seem disputable, in view of the unparalleled success of H. Vaihinger's *Die Philosophie des Als-Ob*. In this work the well-known founder of the *Kantgesellschaft* interprets the categories as economical methods of thought, as mere instruments for the mastery of experienced data. Accordingly, he regards all knowledge as a tissue of fictions. Vaihinger's success, we would urge, may be accounted for not merely by the similarity of his doctrines to pragmatism, which had just then appeared in Germany, but even more by the fact that a talented author for the first time brought together a comprehensive body of material exhibiting the role which fictions play in science—a point theretofore but little noticed. This achievement naturally aroused interest quite independently of the author's particular point of view. The only independent representative of German positivism now living is Th. Ziehen.<sup>17</sup> His *Logik* exhibits remarkable learning but it nevertheless shows a surprising failure to understand the logical problems that have today become decisive. For the living science of logic it is therefore no longer of importance.

Joh. Rehmke, the last thinker to uphold the philosophy of immanentism, on the other hand, has long since aban-

<sup>17</sup> Ziehen, *Logik auf positivistischer Grundlage mit Berücksichtigung der Geschichte der Logik*. Bonn, 1920.



done this doctrine. His *Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft* espouses a distinctly anti-psychologistic point of view.<sup>18</sup> In this, as in its denial of a separate logical order, it approximates very closely to the *Gegenstandstheorie* which we have been defending—strange as this may seem in view of the fact that Rehmke appears to acknowledge as “being” only that which is “given.” Günther Jakoby, who was formerly likewise inclined to positivism (more specifically, to pragmatism) has most definitely developed into an adherent of a genuine *Gegenstandstheorie*, or, in his own terminology, into an ontologist.<sup>19</sup> Representing the same tendency is also R. Herbertz. Originally a follower of B. Erdmann, he came to be an outspoken anti-psychologist, thinking of logic as concerned with being. Mention should be made also to the *Kulturphilosoph*, G. Simmel, who died in 1918. Prior even to William James he gave expression to the fundamental thought of pragmatism. Later, however, he became untrue to biological relativism. It must indeed be acknowledged that the striking successes of Einstein’s theory of relativity led to a certain reinforcement of current relativistic and positivistic tendencies. And thus it happened that J. Petzoldt again received attention. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that most investigators are agreed in regarding the theory of relativity as purely a doctrine of physical science and, in the last analysis, as bound up but very loosely with positivism in its epistemological sense.<sup>20</sup> It is also worthy of note that so prominent a scholar as Hugo Dingler, who is as well versed in the physical as in the philosophical aspects of the problem, must be counted among the opponents of the theory of relativity.<sup>21</sup> Hence it is not surprising that, though a student of Mach’s, he developed into an anti-psy-

<sup>18</sup> Rehmke, *Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft*. Leipzig u. Frankfurt, 1910.

<sup>19</sup> Jakoby, *Allgemeine Ontologie der Wirklichkeit*. 1. Bd., Halle, 1925.

<sup>20</sup> *Annalen der Philosophie: Relativitätstheorie-Heft* (Bd. 2. Heft 3.).

<sup>21</sup> Dingler, *Physik und Hypothese. Versuch einer induktiven Wissenschaftslehre nebst einer kritischen Analyse der Relativitätstheorie*. Berlin, 1921.

chologist. In spite of distinctly noticeable strains of earlier tendencies, he must rather be said to approximate to the position of Husserl and of O. Kraus, the latter of whom is the most energetic critic of Einstein among the philosophers.

These various tendencies converge upon the recognition of ontology, the doctrine of being or *Gegenstandstheorie*, as the truly fundamental philosophical science. This has always been the standpoint of scholasticism (as it was that of Aristotle), and it is therefore also that of the so-called Catholic philosophy. In consequence, the latter at the present time enjoys an ever-increasing importance even in non-Catholic circles. As its representatives, so far as our present problem is concerned, we may mention, in addition to Honecker, to whom we have already referred: von Hertling (the former Imperial Chancellor), M. Grabmann, B. W. Switalski, and, especially, Joseph Geyser,<sup>22</sup> who so untiringly strove to deepen his epistemological views. They all are decidedly opposed to Kantianism in any form, though most of all to positivism and the doctrine of immanence. Their viewpoint is that of "critical" realism, and it is in so far not Aristotelian. On the basis of ancient traditions, they champion a doctrine which, after long struggles, is at length again becoming to prevail in non-Catholic Germany, where it is regarded as the truly modern philosophy. In this connection mention should be made of Frischeisen-Köhler,<sup>23</sup> a student of Dilthey, of G. Störing, and of E. Becher, the philosopher of nature. It was particularly, however, Oswald Külpe, unfortunately so early deceased (1915), who strove, in exceptionally thorough studies, to exhibit the untenability of all views opposed to the recognition of things in themselves that are

<sup>22</sup> Geyser, *Erkenntnistheorie*. Münster i. W., 1922.

<sup>23</sup> Frischeisen-Köhler, *Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit*. Sammlung, Wissenschaft und Hypothese, XV., Leipzig, 1912.

knowable and yet not conditioned either psychologically or logically.<sup>24</sup>

To be sure, one must admit that, however successfully Külpe—as, after him, his student, A. Messer—disclosed the weaknesses of Kantianism, he nevertheless failed to appreciate the most fundamental aims of the movement. He gave no adequate answer to the simple question as to how consciousness reaches objects. He indeed had the key to the right answer, yet he did not recognize it as such and so he failed to make adequate use of it. This key was Franz Brentano's well-known doctrine of the "intentional" character of consciousness. We will proceed to sketch it, while at the same time adding certain elements to it. Things exist and exercise an influence upon the psychological subject. As a rule, however, the latter experiences and notices but very little of their direct effect. Rather does a mechanism of which the psychological subject is not conscious effect a transformation that brings into the forefront the object which is at the time exercising the influence. What is directly experienced, or, more accurately, noted in the experience, is not the state of consciousness evoked, for example, by certain vibrations; rather is it that which evokes the states of consciousness, though this, to be sure, is very considerably modified, indeed, is even transposed into a different sphere which once it is experienced, no longer really exercises an influence upon the real subject. In short, it becomes the heard tone.

Here we have the setting of Brentano's doctrine.<sup>25</sup> Phenomenological analysis, it insists, reveals the necessity of distinguishing between two factors: on the one hand, we have the "intentional"—the experiencing, the representing—*act*, instanced in our illustration by the hearing; on

<sup>24</sup> Külpe, *Die Realisierung. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaften*. Bd. 1, Leipzig, 1912; Bd. 2-4 aus dem Nachlasz herausgegeben von A. Messer.

<sup>25</sup> Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*. 1. (einziger) Bd., 2. Aufl. neu herausgegeben u. eingeleitet von O. Kraus, Leipzig, 1925.

the other hand, the "intentional" *object*,—that which is comprehended or represented by the act—instanced in our illustration by the tone. A marked difference between the act and the object is to be found in the fact that the former is *always* actual whereas the latter may or may not be actual. The acts are through and through psychical. Everything, on the other hand, that is not an act, not a process or state of consciousness, is external to consciousness, being perhaps in certain instances physical. Hearing, seeing, representing, recalling, judging, doubting, striving and all kinds of feeling are psychical; colors, tones, figures, landscapes, etc., on the other hand, are physical. And they remain physical under all circumstances. When they are perceived or even only imagined, they do not become "contents of consciousness" or mere "pictures." Even when I as yet do not know whether they are actually present or not, and even when they are as a matter of fact not really present, they, as everything that is represented, are entities that "stand over against" me; they do not belong to the apprehending consciousness. In the process of perception and imagination, consciousness does not draw objects into itself as "contents," as Brentano himself at the outset still believed. It leaves them in their externality; it merely lays hold upon them. They themselves may perhaps be actual, but again they may not, in which latter case, the present writer would add, they are transformed or perhaps even first created by the psychophysical mechanism operative prior to all perception and representation. Whether or not they are actual only empirical investigation is able to determine with any measure of certainty.

The important bearings of this doctrine are not recognized by realists of the ordinary type. In certain cases, indeed, they even combat the doctrine, as does M. Schlick, though his outlook, to be sure, is semi-positivistic. Nevertheless, it is alone the standpoint which we have sketched



that enables realism to face the problem as to how consciousness seizes upon things, and to solve this problem without falling back upon the copy theory—which has already sufficiently been proven to be false—or upon other inadequate doctrines. The problem is an illusory one. Consciousness, or better, the subject, the ego, “has” the things from the very beginning; and the property of “having” things, or, at any rate, objects (that is, an “intentional” character), belongs to its nature. The real problem is that of finding in the objects criteria on the basis of which one may classify them first of all as actual or non-actual and subsequently along other lines in accordance with their particular natures. In brief, the problem consists in placing objects in orderly arrangement.

But now there arises a new and extremely important question which we have hitherto been careful to ignore. To a certain extent I am able correctly to establish the order of actually given things—that is, I can attain to a valid knowledge concerning them—without a direct examination of them. Without reference to trees, hills or any objects of the external world, for example, I can develop the laws of mathematics, and I find to my surprise that these hold true of the external objects. There are, to use a Kantian expression, “a priori” laws, “subjective” conditions of “thought,” that are nevertheless valid for objective experience. May also this, the most important problem of the “transcendental deduction,” be solved on the basis of the new conceptions we have sketched?

It devolves upon an exact descriptive analysis of the given, upon a thorough phenomenology, as Brentano had already designated this standpoint, to give an answer to this question. Husserl, to whom the eyes of all investigators were turned after the publication of his stimulating *Logische Untersuchungen*, had intimated that he would set forth the fundamental principles of such a phenom-

ology. They were awaited with high expectation. When they finally appeared they proved disappointing.<sup>26</sup> Husserl defined phenomenology as "idetic" in character, as the science of essences. To utilize the terminology of others, he conceived of it as concerned not with *Dasein* but with *Sosein*. The latter, Husserl refers to as the "essence" which we can immediately apprehend or intuit; he speaks of *Wesensschauung*. Connected with this doctrine is that of a "pure (transcendental) consciousness" which, after we abstract from all actuality, is supposed to remain as the factor that provides meanings. This is truly a remarkable diversion, and one that renews the errors of transcendental philosophy; indeed, it does this at a time when the chief representatives of the latter had already in reality abandoned the conception of pure consciousness. Husserl was led also to a radical rejection of thorough-going realism. "An absolute reality," he says, "signifies no more than does a round square."

Husserl was a student of Brentano's, as were also Meinong and Ehrenfels. It is he, however, who doubtless deserves the credit of having exposed the weaknesses in his teacher's theory of judgment. For his critique he found a point of departure in the superior doctrines of Bolzano. But, as has lately been shown by O. Kraus,<sup>27</sup> a student of Brentano's as also of Marty's, an earlier student of Brentano's, Husserl misunderstood precisely the most important and profound thought of the extraordinary thinker he was criticizing. He interpreted the "intentionality" and also the pure consciousness described by Brentano as signifying comprehension, or a process of conferring meanings. In antithesis, "sense data"—colors, tones, etc.—he interpreted, in the manner of the traditional psychology, as mere contents of consciousness, as phenomena or "reflec-

<sup>26</sup> Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie u. phänomenologische Philosophie*. Halle, 1913; (auch im Jahrbuch f. Phil. u. phän. Forschung, I.).

<sup>27</sup> Kraus, *F. Brentano*, München, 1919.

tions," which come to constitute objects only through "intentional acts." O. Janssen<sup>28</sup> and the present writer have shown that this is untenable. Sense data—very misleadingly called "sensations"—are already themselves intentional objects; they are *given* to us, precisely as are actual objects, as something distinct from the consciousness "having" them. That they are nevertheless dependent upon the subject is revealed only by experience.

It follows that the purely objective aspect of the phenomenological situation—called by Husserl himself "noema"—possesses a thoroughly overshadowing importance in comparison with the act-aspect, called "noesis." Instead of Husserl's act-phenomenology we reach an object-phenomenology, and this appears to the present writer to be only the method of the *Gegenstandstheorie* now familiar to us. The fundamental thought of object-phenomenology is that whatever we find or intuit in any specific *Sosein* in general, quite regardless of whether or not it is actual, must also be present in the corresponding actual *Sosein*. For *Sosein* in general is related to actual *Sosein* precisely as is, for example, the ball in general to a red ball. Just as everything included within the ball in general must also be present in the red ball, so likewise must everything in a specific *Sosein* in general be discoverable in all corresponding actual instances. In the case of *Sosein* in general one need not take into account whether or not the aspect of actuality is to be found. Hence it may be adequately intuited in imagination; we are not dependent upon observations of anything actual, and thus not upon empirical facts. By reference to any merely imagined movement I can determine that movement is impossible without direction and velocity. We have here a connection purely of *Sosein*. I am, however, totally unable to determine, by reference to a merely imagined movement,

<sup>28</sup> Janssen, *Vorstudien zur Metaphysik*. Halle, 1921.

that every actual movement gradually comes to an end and is eventually transformed into heat. For here we have a connection of empirical facts. The connections of *Sosein* represent for us the justifiable kernel, though of course also an important modification, of Kant's a priori, of his forms and categories. What has been said implies so clear and simple a solution of the problem from which we set out that it is superfluous specifically to formulate it in words. It likewise follows from our position that the categories must be valid not only within experience but also beyond it, and thus for all being. Here again it appears that the categories are to be found within being itself, representing simply the most general characteristics of it. The logical ground falls within being; the supposition of a separate logical sphere is superfluous. We may even say that the "universal" is in a certain sense within things, which means that Husserl has refuted only the psychological and not all theories of abstraction. *Gegenstandssphä-  
nomenologie* has been applied to the philosophy of nature by Leo Hartmann.<sup>29</sup>

It is a characteristic fact that Husserl's doctrine of a pure consciousness found no echo even among his immediate followers. It was not acknowledged by A. Reinach, who fell a victim to the War; nor was it by M. Geiger or M. Scheler, the latter of whom rather approximates to the *Gegenstandssphä-  
nomenologie* which we have been sketching. And the *Logik* of the Husserl school, the text-book by A. Pfänder, also finds no place for a pure consciousness. Nevertheless Pfänder introduces an independent logical order in the form of "thoughts"; and, as Mally has already emphasized, he refuses to admit the fundamental importance of an objectively oriented logic. The same is true of Külpe, who in a similarly one-sided way introduces the notion of "meanings."<sup>30</sup> While we chance to be speaking of

<sup>29</sup> Hartmann, *Sind Naturgesetze veränderlich?* Halle, 1926.

<sup>30</sup> Külpe, *Vorlesungen über Logik*, Leipzig, 1923.



comprehensive treatments of logic, we would mention, in addition to the works of Höfler and Ziehen described some distance above, the book of von Kries.<sup>31</sup> Its orientation is Kantian. Its importance, however, lies in the fact that its author is a student of nature, a physiologist, and exhibits an often amazingly penetrating understanding of the logical problems immanent within the sciences.

Hans Driesch holds a position similar to *Gegenstandsphänomenologie*.<sup>32</sup> His starting point reminds one of Descartes. The further development of his ideas, however, is most apt to call to mind J. Volkelt's well-known doctrine of the self-certainty of consciousness,<sup>33</sup> and, in so far also, Brentano. The proposition, "I have consciously something," is for Driesch the basis of all philosophical certainty. This something is ordered; it stands over against us as ordered. Very properly Driesch identifies thinking and knowing not, as it were, with an ordering activity, as is done by Kantianism and, with especial emphasis, by P. Menzer, but exclusively with intuiting the order that already prevails. Thus this prominent thinker likewise is in disagreement with Kant. He calls his basic science *Ordnungslehre* (also *Logik*) and he regards the latter as the propaedeutic to metaphysics, which he also designates as *Wirklichkeitslehre*. Driesch's science of order includes his doctrine of the categories. He enriches the categories by adding that of individuality. The latter has to do with the relation of a whole to its parts and is regarded by Driesch as the basis of his renowned vitalistic theory. In contrast with the doctrine we uphold, he maintains that the categories can not be demonstrated to be valid beyond experience. Driesch, whose thoughts we

<sup>31</sup> von Kries, *Logik. Grundzüge einer kritischen u. formalen Urteilslehre*. Tübingen, 1916.

<sup>32</sup> Driesch, *Ordnungslehre. Ein System des nichtmetaphysischen Teiles der Philosophie*. 2. umgearb. Aufl., Jena, 1923.

<sup>33</sup> Volkelt, *Gewissheit und Wahrheit. Untersuchung der Geltungsfragen als Grundlage der Erkenntnistheorie*. München, 1918.

have been able to present but very partially, has also made contributions to the doctrine of causality. Along with the students of Brentano, of whom, in addition to Kraus, we would mention A. Kastil, he must be counted among those who reject the theory of relativity.<sup>34</sup> He belongs to that now ever-increasing group of thinkers who regard logic as the mere propaedeutic to metaphysics. Very similar to his view is that of T. K. Oesterreich,<sup>35</sup> also significant as a religious philosopher.

This revival of metaphysics, so thoroughly characteristic of our times, is very naturally in particular evidence within the camp of new realism. It had already manifested itself in the thought of Külpe. More remarkable is the fact that it is to be found also among the Kantians. We might here mention A. Liebert of the Marburg school and, very especially, the theologian E. Troeltsch, recently deceased (1923). At first under the influence of Windelband, Troeltsch gradually drew away from Kantianism and, with an orientation primarily religious and historical, more and more adopted Leibnizian and Hegelian ideas.

Most significant of all is the fact that one of the men most thoroughly informed in the traditions of Kantianism, Nikolai Hartmann, a student of Natorp's and the latter's successor in Marburg, came to espouse both metaphysics and realism at the same time.<sup>36</sup> In sharpest contrast to the rest of the school with which he has been associated, he has even come to regard epistemology itself as a metaphysical discipline. On the other hand, it must be admitted that he still exhibits a surviving bit of Kantian influence in that he conceives the primary task of metaphysics to be a scientific comprehension of problems that are in themselves insoluble. The importance of analyzing such prob-

<sup>34</sup> Driesch, *Relativitätstheorie und Philosophie*. Karlsruhe, 1924.

<sup>35</sup> Oesterreich, *Die Phänomenologie des Ich*. Leipzig, 1910.

<sup>36</sup> Hartmann, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. 2. Aufl., Berlin, 1925.

lems and others related to them (that is, the significance of aporetics, to use the term which he has derived from Aristotle) is very properly emphasized by him. He subsumes aporetics, along with phenomenology, under what he calls the analysis of phenomena (*Phänomenanalyse*). Thus he is led to lay strong emphasis upon the irrational factors of knowledge. Insofar as "irrational" denotes simply that which is purely actual and is not reducible to logical terms, his position is thoroughly tenable; but it ceases to be so insofar as the reference involves the logical elements as well. For, in the latter case, we have but a remnant of the old mystical interpretation of the logical and of knowledge. As a matter of fact, Hartmann conceives the logical as an independent order. He holds, moreover, that the question as to how consciousness draws the object within itself, that is, overcomes the transcendence of the object—a question falsely formulated, as we know—presents an almost insoluble difficulty.

Because of his emphasis upon the aspect of irrationality, Hartmann has a kinship with all the various movements that stress the presence of an intuitive factor in the knowledge process. But one must consider what is to be understood by the latter. The phenomenologists to whom we have already alluded speak of a direct consciousness (*Schauen*) of the object. Distinguishable therefrom, in the second place, is the emphasis sometimes placed upon intuitive comprehension, that is, upon reproducing in one's own experience, through an act of sympathy, the experiences of others and the spiritual complexes within historical life. We already find this in Th. Lipps, Brentano, and J. Volkelt. But it was W. Dilthey who first saw in the doctrine something novel, namely, its important bearing on the problem as to the logical foundations of the social sciences. Of his students it was particularly E. Spranger,<sup>37</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Spranger, *Lebensformen*. 3. verb. Aufl., Halle, 1922.

and Th. Litt who worked further in the same direction. The point of view of K. Jaspers and Th. Erismann likewise shows a kinship with that of Dilthey. In the third place and finally, intuition is sometimes identified with that romantic and irrational attitude which approaches precisely the decisive and fundamental problems of life naively and instinctively, and thus fundamentally renounces the endeavor for scientific certainty—indeed, in the manner of pragmatism frequently renounces all objective truth. This attitude is indeed intelligible as a reaction against antiquated methods. In the absolute form in which it commonly appears, however, it represents a serious spiritual danger, perhaps the greatest danger that now threatens our culture. For it gives the right of way, not to the truth of an idea but to the suggestive power of its expression. Thus it defers to the suggestibility of those who are intellectually inferior and these, of course, everywhere constitute the majority, even among persons interested in philosophy. Moreover, it makes portentous concessions to that tendency to confusion of thought now so widespread precisely in Germany. Here one might mention the epistemological views of O. Spengler. Reference might be made with a certain justification also to Graf. H. Keyserling and R. Müller-Freienfels; and likewise to some of the Protestant theologians, most definitely perhaps to F. Gogarten and K. Barth, similar to whose position is that of E. Griesebach. The school of Husserl likewise has of late here and there made concessions to the view we have indicated.

L. Nelson, though not hostile to scientific procedure in the attainment of knowledge, as are the thinkers just mentioned, nevertheless attacks epistemology, at least verbally. His attacks, however, are due to a misunderstanding of the tasks of epistemology. For Nelson has, as a matter of fact, doubtless devoted himself to epistemology,



that is, in its psychologistic form. Ever since his youth he has held with remarkable persistence to the uncommon view that the system of the Kantian Fries (died in 1843) offers the only key to philosophical truth. Nelson founded a neo-Friesian school which includes a number of thinkers, such as G. Hessenberg and O. Apelt, who, with the outlook of their master, are active particularly in the fields of mathematical, of legal and of political philosophy. In spite of what his psychologism might lead one to expect, Nelson is not at all a relativist, but precisely the opposite. With superb irony his keen thought discloses the pseudo-brilliant absurdities with which the fool's philosophy of Spengler's *Untergang des Abendlandes* so successfully capitalized the craving for sensation prevalent among the culture-crazed German philistines.<sup>38</sup>

To summarize: German logic and epistemology at present exhibit a fairly universal tendency more and more to draw away from Kant; to overcome "rationalism," psychological as well as anti-psychological; and, in consequence, to construct, on the basis of a pure *Gegenstandstheorie*, a logic that no longer places obstacles in the path of a scientific and critical realism and of metaphysics. The men who deserve the greatest credit for the increasing success of this tendency are B. Bolzano and F. Brentano. Both of them were opponents of Kant and of German idealism. Indeed, the epoch of the latter was always regarded by Brentano as a period of extreme philosophical decadence. Both Bolzano and Brentano, it is worthy of mention, were pacifists and hostile to all narrow-spirited nationalism.

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<sup>38</sup> Nelson, *Spuk. Einweihung in das Geheimnis der Wahrsagekunst O. Spenglers*. Leipzig, 1921.

CONCERNING THE MOST RECENT GERMAN  
PUBLICATIONS ON THE HISTORY  
OF PHILOSOPHY AND ITS  
METHODOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

THE last ten years, which we propose to survey in this paper, have certainly not been favorable as regards furnishing steady nourishment for the growth of the historiography of philosophy in Germany. That we can here report really notable contributions in this field speaks well of the spirit of the German people. There are two reasons why the break caused in our life by the war has not been felt more severely. The more peaceful times that followed did not have to return to successful traditions of pre-war times, for the coming of the war coincided with a stage in the historiography of philosophy that harbored matured principles and invited the initiation of a new phase of development. One reason for this state of affairs lies in the fact that the generation that had brought the writing of the history of philosophy to a culmination during the second half of the nineteenth century had either passed away or was devoting itself, in its old age, to original thought. Men like Trendelenburg, Brandis, Prantl, Zeller, Kuno Fischer and Ueberweg come to one's mind as representing the beginning of the past generation, while the works of Cohen, Windelband and Natorp characterize its end. The new generation, of which we are to report here, is linked with the old in the person of Cassirer, who is at the same time also the leader of the new. His influence extends over all

<sup>1</sup> Translated by Hans Kurath and Edward L. Schaub.

the active forces in the historiography of philosophy on account of the immense scope of his knowledge and his refined aesthetic sense. The other reason for the condition referred to is connected with the intensified interest in the methodology of historiography and its peculiar problems. I refer the reader to the excellent paper by Julius Stenzel on *Zum Problem der Philosophiegeschichte* (*Kant-Studien*, 1921, pp. 416-453), and the article by Hans Hess concerning *Epochen und Typen der philosophischen Historiographie* (*Kant-Studien*, 1923, pp. 340-363) where this idea is advanced.

Let us turn to the *studies* in the history of philosophy before taking up the *problem* of a history of philosophy. We do not propose to give an exhaustive catalogue of all the literature that has appeared in recent years. We only wish to call attention to some of the recent publications from which we ourselves have drawn information and inspiration.

First we must mention the new printing of the second edition of a work of pre-war times which is as yet unexcelled in certain respects, the *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, which appeared as part of *Kultur der Gegenwart* (Teubner, Leipzig). The section dealing with modern philosophy is by Windelband. It is a masterpiece of refined diction and artistic sense, plastically presenting the various minds, each in its own peculiar cast. We do not fail to see the dangers that lurk in the virtuosity of this type of historiography. We are apt to admire the large bold lines while the problems discussed evade our attention and fail to take root in us. Windelband's contribution thus makes enjoyable reading but it does not show clearly how inexhaustible the problems of the history of philosophy are. The patristic and Christian philosophy is treated by Baeumker, the philosophy of Islam and the Jews, by Goldziher. Both were abreast of their times in their respective

fields. Baeumker's work is still important because of the wealth of his knowledge and his exact formulations. In Hans von Arnim's treatment of the history of European antiquity I consider his discussion of the Stoics the best. As the critical study of the sources in this field has still not arrived at definite conclusions, even the most recent treatises on the Stoics are heavily indebted to Arnim's work.

Starting with this comprehensive history of philosophy one comes to realize that the work of the new generation must measure up to a very high standard if it is to compete with that of the older. A large collective work on the history of philosophy is now being published by de Gruyter & Co., Berlin. I have before me Hönigwald's *Die Philosophie von der Renaissance bis Kant* (Vol. VI of this series, 300 pages), Bauch's *Immanuel Kant* (Vol. VII, 3rd ed., 482 pages), Nicolai Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, Part I: *Fichte, Schelling und die Romantik* (Vol. VIII, 282 pages). Hönigwald's book is a history of the problems of philosophy; it is designed to reveal in the constant flux of the historical forms of philosophic thought "the intrinsic connection between objective motives." To be sure, "the presentation is interspersed with references of a biographical nature and allusions to the times" in order to do justice to individual philosophemes. It is in the very nature of philosophy, as Hönigwald says, "that its history must be approached again and again," to which one should add that each new approach should be made with increased vigor and improved strategy. Anyone who has mastered Cassirer's books on the problems of epistemology will not refer to Hönigwald's book; but his book will be welcome to those who are in need of a simpler statement of approximately the same problems.

Bauch's Kant is a book of different dimensions. It has as predecessors the classic book of Cohen and innumerable



other attempts at an "interpretation of Kant." There is, for example, Cassirer's work representing the last volume of the Marburg edition of Kant's works. This volume excels through the usual energy of the author in carrying a striking and illuminating idea through a maze of historical facts—in this case, the idea that the work of a genius must be comprehended from the point of view of his life. At the present time a book on Kant must have a novel viewpoint if it is to receive attention. Bauch finds a new basis for constructive procedure in the consciousness to which Kant had attained in his *Kritik der Urteilkraft* regarding the systematic character of the critical philosophy as a whole. From this basis Bauch attempts to understand Kant's system in its entirety. The "problem of experience" is thus relieved of the burden imposed on it by reason of its having been generated by the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* which centered upon the peculiar character of mathematical science. Because of the problems set by the faculty of judgment the merely theoretic scope of experience had to be expanded to include the teleological structure of biological experience, inasmuch as "nature" must be "the totality of all objects of experience." And thus Bauch finds the transition to the *praktische Vernunft*. For, firstly, theoretic teleology is only an aspect of teleology in general; and secondly, the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is regarded by Bauch under the "aspect of value, validity, norm." To the latter it remains subordinated down to its very culmination in the teleological "idea of systematic unity." Thus it appears that the scope of the theoretic is included in that of the practical; and that the primacy of the practical asserts itself. Bauch's path indicates that he is a follower of the Kantians of the Windelband—Rickert school and insofar we depart from him. We see in his generalization of the concept of values but another sort of one-sidedness, a criticism which he urges against the Marburg school of

Kantian interpretation in connection with their separation of pure reason from practical reason. The idea of values is, in his interpretation, carried so far as to lose all its significance. In an account of Kant's system, if anywhere, the distinct significance of the idea of values ranging between price and dignity must be scrupulously observed, otherwise one imports into Kant a mode of thought entirely foreign to him. How the clearness of the Kantian system suffers through the use of a generalized concept of values appears clearly in Bauch's attempt to subsume various significant realms of value under one head, namely, those of ethics, religion, law, and the State, so that "practical philosophy" is differentiated into ethics, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of law and of the State. Here Kant's highly important philosophy of history is practically overlooked. Indeed, in the appendix to the third edition, Bauch even justifies the omission by claiming that Kant's philosophy of history has no importance for his philosophic system as such. We are of a different opinion. In Bauch's procedure, then, branches are joined together that are independent in their worth. To treat the philosophy of religion as a chapter of practical philosophy does violence to its place within the system of thought, even though Kant himself treated it thus; for Bauch emphasizes repeatedly that "this book on Kant is intended to be historical, to be sure, but wholly in the interest of critical idealism" inasmuch as it aims to smooth the way "to philosophy itself, by pointing out the shortcomings and the weaknesses of the Kantian philosophy." We can not enter upon a detailed criticism of Bauch's book. Our evaluation of it may be summarized as follows: The selection of the *Kritik der Urteilkraft* as the point of departure for systematic construction was a happy thought. As a result many things are seen in a new light, as, for instance, the relation of the concept of the *Ding-an-sich* to the "particular object." But Bauch's gen-

eralized idea of values betrays him into a closed system of too simple a structure. On the other hand, Bauch has such an intimate knowledge of Kant's ideas that even where we must reject his not always dignified polemic and where we object to his one-sidedness we find his book suggestive and provocative of new thought. So one may assert that Bauch's work must be reckoned as an important contribution to the vast literature on Kant.

Vorländer's *Immanuel Kant, der Mann und das Werk* (2 vol., Leipzig, Felix Meiner) is of a different nature. This author had the intention of filling a serious gap by giving the German people a comprehensive, scientific, and yet easily readable, story of Kant's life, showing how Kant's work grew out of his life and his personality and the background of his times. Kant's life is told in great detail and in the objective fashion characteristic of Vorländer. His description of Kant's philosophy in its three branches is not intended to be a contribution to philosophy; it is purposely limited to a presentation of the fundamental motives in simple form. The reader's interest is again and again aroused by significant anecdotes and terse, striking statements. The beginning of the second volume is devoted to Kant, the man, at the height of his intellectual powers, while the larger part of it deals with "the aged Kant." The chapters on Kant's conflict with the government regarding his treatise on religion and on Kant as a *Politiker der Freiheit* are written with delightful sympathy (at this point so utterly lacking in Bauch's book) and are especially well done. The chapter concerning the significant and but slightly known *Opus Postumum*, soon to be published by de Gruyter & Co., aims to give some idea of its importance and its fate. The last stage of the latter, one may hope, is Adickes' prodigy of scholarship relating to this as yet unpublished manuscript of Kant's. Incidentally I may state that Vorländer is mistaken when he con-

siders himself the first to point out "that idealism as a method is most emphatically retained precisely in this posthumous work." In my *Aristoteles und Kant*, reviewed by Cassirer in the *Kant-Studien*, this point is brought out in detail. Vorländer's two volumes contain two good contemporary pictures of Kant. All in all, they represent a very thorough popular treatise, as well as a scientific contribution of the first rank to Kant biography.

Before taking up Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, we shall consider another book on the same subject. Kroner published through Mohr, Tübingen, a work of two volumes entitled *Von Kant bis Hegel* (Vol. I, 612 pages, in 1921; Vol. II, 526 pages, in 1924). Kroner attempts to show the unity of this entire development. His work is characterized by his slogans: "To understand Kant is to go beyond him" and "To understand Hegel is to see that one can in no way get beyond him; if there is to be a post-Hegelian philosophy, a new start must be made." He is especially concerned to interpret the Hegelian system; and as this can best be done by following the path taken by German Idealism, Kroner begins with Kant. For the same reason he slights the rationalistic in favor of the anti-rationalistic aspect of the Dialectic, "even at the risk of bringing about new misunderstandings through this sort of emphasis." So it is but natural that Kant becomes a mere mile-stone in the history of philosophic problems, the study of which opens a scientific gateway to the problems of metaphysics. For in Hegel's philosophy the intentions of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling find their fullest realization. If we are to understand Hegel by following Kroner, we must accept the view that we can not get beyond him. To essay a new beginning, not to mention a new development with Kant as a starting-point, lies outside both the intention and the hope of Kroner. Hegel must then be our guide in sounding the depths through



which our own present is to be interpreted, for there is a *philosophia perennis* according to Hegel, and, says the author, "in this respect I agree with him."

One easily understands that Bauch's and Kroner's works on Kant have no essential traits in common, unless it be the methodic and systematic utilization of the primacy of the will. While Bauch's book is the work of a Kantian, Kroner gives a fundamentally wrong view of Kant's place in the history of philosophic problems. He plays the glaring searchlight of the Hegelian mind on Kant's field of ideas and as a result his picture is full of high lights and shadows, totally unlike the real Kant.

But in spite of all this I must confess that no other book has of late so powerfully impelled me to reflection. By its stimulating and skillful employment of antitheses it has forced me to a conceptual opposition even more than have outright philosophical opponents. The work is least of all suitable as a text. It is rather a book of confessions by an Hegelian desirous of settling the doctrinal conflicts of the present through the power of his philosophical master. I regret that I can do no more within the scope of this article than simply set my views over against those of Kroner. Although I am sure that the philosophy of the Marburg school to which I adhere can never lead to Hegelianism, I feel it my duty to recognize Kroner's book as a significant indication of the speculative tendencies of the time. I shall therefore briefly portray Kroner's attitude toward Kant.

Kroner says that Kant was the first to introduce into logic the concept of self-reflection; that he substituted for the philosophy of ideas represented by Plato and Aristotle the philosophy of the self; that he made the self the creator of the causal order of the universe. Was it this that made Kant the critic of Hume and the disciple of Newton? Kroner's view is disclosed in his statements that Kant's ideal-

ism was essentially ethical and religious, being derived from the same source as the mysticism of Eckhart, the piety of Luther, and even the mysticism of Boehme; that he places the individual self in every respect above the objective order of things, the individual soul above the visible church, the person above the State, conscience above science; that in his philosophy the spirit for the first time triumphs over perception and understanding, the will over ideas, action over being, the practical reason over theoretic reason. Does, then, the historian Kroner attach no value at all to the self-reflection of the *thinker* as such?

In his critical observations, appended to the discussions of all the philosophers except Hegel, Kroner contends that Kant treated the *a posteriori* as absolutely opposed to the *a priori*, as separated from the latter by an unspanned gulf. When he further contends that the Kantian forms fulfill their function by impressing their *a priori* nature on matter and thus transforming the *a posteriori* into something *a priori*, Kant's short-comings indeed blaze forth. Kroner presents us also with the only possible remedy: "Consciousness resolves the antithesis between itself and its object through its own activity." At this point no comparison is possible between Kroner as the advocate of post-Kantian idealism and the critical philosopher of the Marburger school. "Absolute consciousness" and all absolute concepts are conceptual perversions of correlations or members of correlations. "Objectivity" cannot be annulled by "consciousness." It must be regarded as a *correlative category*. It must not merely be retained in its correlativity with laws but it must also be given a part in the correlative-categorical determination of the unity of experience. There is a *principium rationis sufficientis*, but there is also a *principium individuationis*. One is not absorbed in the other, but serves rather to determine its significance by functioning in reciprocity with it as a factor of correlation. To seek

a deeper basis for this correlativity in an "absolute consciousness" or "ego" may indeed afford delight to the metaphysician. For the criticist, however, these are pretentious but empty words. He is concerned with the unity of a system of correlations, i. e., the unity of experience, and not with dependence upon an "absolute." Maimon's concept of "complete determination," and with it annulment of objectivity, by an "infinite reason," and the further development of this thought by Fichte and Hegel are speculative attempts that are indeed imposing but that fail to reach their goal. The procedure of scientific experimentation and that of an "axiomatics" seeking bases through deductive and reductive reasoning are alike dominated by a demand for totality; they are not reducible but are polar correlatives. Hermann Cohen says that the individual is the most difficult problem of logic; Kroner, the Hegelian, that it can completely be absorbed by the "ego." Problems like that of the so-called constants of nature, or of the requirement for the translation in terms of one another of different systems of interpretation of one and the same fact are of such a nature that no help can be found in an appeal to an "infinite understanding" with *its* powers of complete determination. Kroner follows Hegel also in not seeking close contacts with "empirical" science but in holding himself aloof. And this explains many things in his book, among others his attitude to the Marburg school. Kroner says: The study and interpretation of Kant during the nineteenth century was as yet too much under the influence of a materialistic age to see the unity of Kant and the philosophers following him. The natural sciences were so dominant and their methods seemed so authoritative for all the sciences that the interpretation of Kant's philosophy fell a victim to their overpowering influence. The critical theory of knowledge was turned into a handmaid of the natural sciences, designed to safeguard their existence. The

Marburg school, too, did not entirely escape the danger of regarding the reasoning of the transcendental logic in the light of the mathematical natural sciences. It is not to be denied that all these elements are to be found in Kant; or even that his personal attitudes may perhaps at times have been similar to that of his interpreters. Yet the "real essence," the "deepest significance" of his philosophy is lost in the type of interpretation characteristic of the nineteenth century.

Such statements must not be made by a historian. Otherwise he risks losing his reputation even if his critics allow him considerable latitude because of his interest in the history of philosophical problems. The "philosopher in himself" is but a poor creature; philosophy will be respected as part of the work of the human spirit only insofar as it respects the work of the sciences, not that of the natural sciences alone, to be sure, and yet not excluding this. All thought, philosophy not excepted, has but *one* problem: to achieve the unity of experience. According to Kant's immortal formulation of the question, this problem is set for philosophy by the multiplicity of the specific sciences. This requires a close linking of the efforts of all. This multiplicity compels philosophy to inquire into the conditions of its unity and thus of the unity of the multiplicity of experience itself. And so the philosophy of today may rejoice over the wealth of problems presented to it because of the powerful originality of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian mathematics and natural science. This insight the Marburg school, which has its origin in the philosophy of Kant, will continue to maintain; thus will it fulfill the "true mission" of philosophy at the present time.

In conclusion, let us turn to a brief consideration of Kroner's treatment of Hegel, which forms the culmination of his volume. The slight attention given to the so-called romantic philosophy as it appears in Herder's *Ideen*, in



Schleiermacher's *Monologne* and in several of his later academic addresses, for instance in *Über den Begriff des grossen Mannes*, seems to me a defect. These writings give expression to an idea which furnished the vague "aesthetic idealism" with its central principle of method: the idea of the *Lebensstil*. In it is to be found the indestructible energy of the experience of self and Herder's conception of "happiness"; from it, and not from religious experience, sprang the pantheistic conception of totality. The decisive feature in Kroner's interpretation of Hegel is his section on *Grundzüge der Philosophie des Geistes*. Here the aim is to apply the results obtained in the introductory portion of the book to the main problems, and thus to furnish an introduction to Hegel's philosophy. The section is divided into three parts, dealing, respectively, with Hegel's relation to Kant's critique of reason and Fichte's critique of science, with Hegel's most characteristic work, his *Logic* and with the methodical role of contradiction as the central problem connected with dialectic procedure.

The nucleus of Kroner's interpretation of Hegel may be indicated by reference to the following contention: The logical-metaphysical root of the identity of the mind that manifests itself in art and religion becomes evident only if the All exhibits itself in logic not only as the All but likewise as a Self inclusive of all determinations, if the Logos is understood not merely as a work of art but also as a creative personality which comprehends itself in the wealth of its thoughts.

The discussion of the dialectic process is naturally introduced by a discussion of identity. Identity is regarded under the form of  $A=A$ , and it is shown that the principle of identity involves that of contradiction. For in  $A=A$ ,  $A$  identifies itself with itself. In this process  $A$  first differentiates itself from itself and then annuls this differentiation. This is the dialectics of the *principium identitatis*

*indiscernibilium*; but here, in contrast with the thought of Leibniz, it is turned into a principle of (speculative) logic. Unfortunately, I can not enter into a discussion of this matter, but the reader may be referred to Cohen's criticism in his *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*.

Kroner distinguishes between empirical and speculative contradiction. The former finds application, for instance, in the sciences; the latter, in the philosophy of the mind. For in the sciences, including mathematics, cognition is not self-knowledge aware of itself as such; it thinks contents only as contents; it expresses itself in principles without positing itself in antithesis thereto, that is, without contradicting itself. In the realm of the sciences (that is, empirically) the principle of contradiction has significance only as a prohibition, not as a command. In its speculative use, on the contrary, the "principle of contradiction" signifies a "principle for the avoidance of a (mere) freedom from contradiction." Here lies the weakness of the Hegelian dialectics. Each sphere of thought requires the principle of contradiction as a principle of destruction; Hegel himself is a master in such destroying judgments, and not least so in his logic. The homogeneity of any sphere of thought must be secured by some principle, and that principle is the Aristotelian principle of apophasis. All else that is represented as contradiction is enantiosis; the one is "rejection," the latter, "opposition," *contrast*. Why does not Hegel formulate his central dialectic principle as the "principle of contrast" rather than as the "principle of contradiction"? The principle of contrast is creative, especially in the sciences (that is, in the empirical realm). I would refer to the genesis of non-Euclidean geometry. The problems relating to contradiction and contrast are very complicated, much more so than they appear in Kroner. Here, too, the limits of space preclude further discussion. In concluding my discussion of Kroner's book, I would repeat

that it has greatly fascinated me. In spite of its bold one-sidedness it is a notable contribution, and it will certainly have a deep influence upon our times.

If we now turn to Hartmann's *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*, we find a work of calm historical investigation. One is strongly impressed by the wide difference in intention between this and Kroner's work when Hartmann states it is not his purpose to enter upon the grandiose one-sidedness of the point of view of the great masters but rather the multiplicity of the problems they discuss and the power of their penetration. From this it appears that Hartmann does not write in defense of any one philosopher or group of philosophers but aims to exhibit the immanent movement of philosophic thought expressed in the writings of the post-Kantian period. Hartmann is clearly conscious of his contrast with Kroner. He refers to the latter's first volume as a pioneer work in method, which for the first time presents a dialectically thorough analysis of the problems of the early Fichte and Schelling, and is based entirely on a fresh investigation of the materials. It must certainly be unpleasant for Hartmann to present his conception of Hegel so shortly after Kroner's *legerdemain* (the present volume is concerned only with Fichte, Schelling and Romanticism; Part II, Hegel, has not yet appeared). But considering his penetrating mind, Hartmann will certainly produce a very valuable book on Hegel. We hope that it will disclose those formative influences on Hegel that are too much neglected by Kroner because of his decided slant: namely, the systems of Aristotle and Spinoza. Kroner, in his second volume, praises Hartmann's book for the emphasis it gives to Romanticism in this period of German philosophy. But despite this more thorough presentation in Hartmann's book, I, here too, as in the case of Kroner's treatment, find grounds for dissatisfaction. Hartmann, as well as Kroner, fails to

grasp the essence of Schleiermacher's philosophic significance in this speculative period and in the history of philosophic systematization as well. Schleiermacher understands, with all the one-sidedness of the genius, the "idioma," the problem of the *Lebensstil*, and that of the unique "personality." Up to his time aesthetics as a philosophic discipline had dealt only with the genius of the artist, in contrast with whom all others were merely receptive lovers of art. The Romanticists, beginning with Herder, treat personality (the moral ego is called "person") as a principle of creative activity and a subject for systematic philosophy. To deal satisfactorily with it the earlier methodology of aesthetics is too narrow. (I may here refer, for example, to my own work, *Die Idee der Glückseligkeit* in the Natorp *Festschrift*, published by de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.) But, as already stated, this criticism is not leveled specifically at Hartmann's book. It is a very useful handbook because of its plastic delineation and the objective poise of its thought.

Let us now turn to the co-operative work edited by Dessoir under the general title of *Lehrbuch der Philosophie* (Ullstein, Berlin, 1925). This work falls into two parts, one dealing with the separate branches of philosophy, the other with the history of philosophy. We are concerned only with the latter, *Die Geschichte der Philosophie* (645 pages), in which Cassirer treats Greek philosophy down to and including Plato; Ernst Hoffmann, Aristotle and late antiquity; Geyser, medieval philosophy; von Aster, modern philosophy, while the late Frischeisen-Köhler offers an outline of the philosophy of the present. According to Dessoir's preface, the book aims to give the "essentials of what can be taught and learned in philosophy." The leading idea was "to limit the treatment to the established facts" and "to sacrifice all non-essentials in order that the important points might stand out with the utmost



clearness" It was the intention to establish a vital connection with the systematic portion of the work. Thus this history of philosophy was designed to be an "introduction to philosophy." It is its task to show "how metaphysical thought unfolds in controversy and exercises a decisive influence on philosophic thought even today." Cassirer tends to emphasize this "unfolding," whereas Hoffmann, extremely cautious, lays more stress on the "established results"; Geyser and von Aster lean toward the usual type of the cursory manual; Frischeisen-Köhler realizes that he is on the threshold of history and living speculation where the task of the historian becomes illusory.

Cassirer sets himself the most fascinating task. Incidentally, his treatment seems like a protest against Kroner's removal of Greek philosophy far from the present—the result of his claim that the philosophy of the *ego* begins with Kant. Kroner says, for example: "In the Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics, logical self-analysis and knowledge of the objective world are confused. There is no recognition that the two are distinct; reflection on self and knowledge of being are not distinguished. The relation between logico-ontological essences and sensuous objects must on this basis remain an insoluble problem. For the metaphysics of the ontological *ideai* and *eide*, the two spheres dissolve into each other. Greek thought failed to reach an abstract and pure conception of the logical." In contrast with this view, Cassirer, disregarding all that is irrelevant to his purpose, treats the history of Greek philosophy precisely as the "history of the self-discovery of the logos" on which is based in all clarity philosophy's self-consciousness of its nature as pure knowledge. It is not possible here to follow out Cassirer's splendid line of argument. But for the sake of setting it off against Kroner's conception we quote two sentences from his discussion of Plato: "Not how objects are possible in space and time or

how they have come into being is Plato's problem, but from what sources we derive our knowledge, our understanding of these objects." "The ideas are not simply data of consciousness, creations of our ego; the situation is rather the reverse, for our true ego can only be conceived, can only be constructed, on the basis of these ideas."

Hoffmann's *Aristoteles* unfortunately does not continue this direction of thought. His lines are all clear, sharp, exact. For this reason his exposition does not really develop problems as does that of Cassirer with its dramatic verve. I realize that Aristotle is a philosopher of a different type from Plato. Yet, he, too, is part of the philosophic drama of the Greek mind, and the history of the problems of the *philosophia perennis* must remove him from his rationalistic, sharp lines into the dimmer light of the motive forces of the human spirit. To mention but a single point in this connection, I would call attention to the fact that the constructive-dialectic intent of the principles of contradiction, opposition and excluded middle, which furnish our metaphysical conclusions with their dialectic justification, lead directly by way of scholasticism to Hegel. Hoffmann's chapter on Aristotle's criticism of Plato's doctrine of ideas is likewise very illuminating. Hoffmann has also published a remarkably solid and exemplarily careful, scientific outline of *Die griechische Philosophie bis Plato* in the valuable Teubner series *Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*.

I would refer further to three additional works recently published on ancient philosophy. All of them, though for different reasons, are important publications. Joel's great *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie*, Volume I, carries the account through Socrates. This book, which is part of the series including Kroner's volume, is a simply astounding piece of work. The material, which is thoroughly elaborated in the light of the results of other historical scholars, is presented in a remarkably fine style. Philosophy is rep-

resented as the flower of the mind that grows out of the total life of the age. Economic, political and cultural life furnish the conditions that receive their homogeneous, cosmic form in philosophy. From this point of view, time and temporal life, together with philosophy, are seen as an infinitely active and significant whole. Joel has a style that enables him to make the deepest thoughts and the most sublime speculations appear as the natural issue of events strikingly real and intimately connected with life. Were I asked to name a book that would arouse in the highest degree a sense of the value of philosophy for our times and our civilization—I am thinking of the modern man of general culture, not versed in technical philosophy—I could think of none better than that of Joel. It at all points seeks analogies to our own times; in illustration, I mention only the brilliant reference to the kinship between Heraclitus' and Robert Mayer's mentalities.

The other two books above referred to are *Die Philosophie des Aristoteles als Naturerklärung und Weltanschauung*, by Rolfes (Meiner, Leipzig, 1923; 380 pages), and *Geschichte der Aristotelischen Philosophie im protestantischen Deutschland*, by Petersen (Meiner, Leipzig, 1921; 542 pages). Rolfes, long esteemed as a translator and interpreter of Aristotle, characterizes his book, as well as himself, by saying in his preface that he seeks not indeed tacitly to assume the truth of the Aristotelian teachings but primarily to confirm it. "The philosophy of Aristotle is historically the philosophy of educated mankind; if it is at fault, the basis of all science sought, is still to be and this without the hope of finding it. The Aristotelian system is the unshifting basis of all sound speculation." Aristotle's logic, ethics and politics are not treated, but reference is made by Rolfes to the notes in his various translations. This book discusses only the Aristotelian philosophy of nature and metaphysics, which bear close relations with each

other. In direct connection with the freely quoted Aristotelian text it presents Aristotle's doctrines of knowledge, nature and God, together with the numerous proofs for the existence of God and his attributes.

Petersen's *Habilitationsschrift* is a work of earnest scholarship on a new subject. It for the first time gathers all the material relating to the influence of Aristotle on Protestant Germany. For this reason it is of extraordinary value. On reading it one is impressed by the fact that for constructive and critical power Protestantism can in no way compare with Catholicism. As regards his bearing upon the religious (or, better, the ecclesiastical) interest, Aristotle was fully exhausted by Catholicism. So Protestantism could not compete with the tremendous achievements of Scholasticism. It had sprung from different sources. But this is in no wise derogatory to the task which Petersen very fortunately set himself, and which at some time called for attack.

Let us now turn briefly to the current methodology of the history of philosophy. Here I shall refrain from expressions of personal views, even by way of criticism, and shall simply report. In volume one (pp. 17ff.) of the work above discussed, Kroner distinguishes three types of historiographic methods in the field of philosophy. One proceeds from the standpoint of cultural development, as does Joel in the book reviewed above; another is biographic, as is Cassirer's *Kants Leben und Lehre* (Vol. XI of Bruno Cassirer's edition of Kant); and the third is systematic, combining historical and critical aims, as does Kroner. The systematic method, which today doubtless enjoys the preference, is sometimes referred to as the history of problems. It permits of two procedures. One may subsume the multiplicity of problems under several general problems and then, having determined which of these is dominant in a certain period, select it for historical treatment. This is the



method pursued by Windelband in his *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Mohr, Tübingen, 11th ed., 1924, prepared by Rothacker). Windelband divides Greek philosophy into three periods: the cosmological, the anthropological, and the systematic; and the Hellenistic-Roman philosophy into the ethical and the religious periods. Kroner, from his point of view, remarks concerning this method: "The substantial advantages in thus viewing and organizing the problems is not to be underestimated. But the development of German Idealism offers no real opportunity for this sort of grouping. In the section which he devotes to it, Windelband adopts a three-fold division: the *Ding-an-sich*, the system of reason, and the metaphysics of the irrational. But in fact the problem of the *Ding-an-sich* can not be sundered from that of the system of reason. Hence the particular head under which the ideas of Fichte for example, are brought, must be arbitrarily determined. Through such separations the systematic nucleus of problems is obscured rather than clarified. Nor is any other division of the subject-matter—into theoretical and practical philosophy, for example, or the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of the mind—tenable. For the relation between these groups of problems undergoes changes in the course of development, and it is precisely the nature of these changes that constitutes the essential feature of the development." For this reason, Kroner concludes that the second method, namely, the chronological unfolding of the whole set of problems, including their entanglements and their disentanglements, is the only practical one for the particular period of his study.

After these methodological remarks of Kroner, written largely *pro domo*, we must in conclusion consider a study of Stenzel's devoted solely for its own sake to the methodology of the historiography of philosophy. Stenzel's central question is: What is the relation of philosophy

to the history of philosophy? He approaches it from two extreme positions: (1) Philosophy bears the same relation to its history as the special sciences bear to theirs. But can philosophy dispense with its history as can, for instance, mathematics? (2) Philosophy is not an exact science, but a view of life (*Weltanschauung*). The history of philosophy would then be merely a description of existing philosophemes. But the phenomenon of manifoldness must be rendered intelligible by reference to the concept of truth and science as found in philosophy. Philosophy thus has problems connected with the specific approaches of the various sciences to empirical facts; also with extra-scientific subjects, namely, morality, art and religion; and, lastly, in general with the consciousness that is aware of an outer world.

Scientific history of philosophy begins with Hegel. He harmonizes the historical and the systematic interests. Philosophy becomes historical and vice versa; the development of philosophy (and culture) is the unfolding of the objective mind. In this there is danger of arbitrary construction, of "metaphysical teleology." Philosophy must exhibit the individual, unique, concrete facts of history. Windelband, to be sure, recognizes that his task has two aspects, the philosophic and the historical, but he takes up only the one, namely the history of problems. Cohen is the first to realize the weight of the question: namely, the "actual significance" (*tatsaechlichen Sinn*) of a fact of the past. The historical itself becomes a direct problem. Even in history philosophic content does not lie at hand, needing simply to be read off. It comes into being only through the relations into which individual data are put. "This hitherto disregarded and seemingly insignificant fact is of the greatest importance!" The individual datum must be considered as an element with significant interrelations. By virtue of his philosophic method the observer

(that is, the historian) discerns a new meaning in this or that series of motives of a philosopher.

Is it admissible to base historical investigation on a particular philosophical system? Or is there such a thing as "pure" historio-philological history of philosophy? All history is interpretation, and one must be "free" in one's interpretation if one is to be "faithful." Interpretation is possible only when there is an anticipated sense of the whole (cf. Schleiermacher's "anticipation of the whole"). Without a system of one's own, one must rely, in the study of a philosopher, upon the problematic power of intuition or empathy. He who lacks a system is subject to a merely empirical time-consciousness.

The history of special problems is of the greatest importance for the history of philosophy. For systematic clearness regarding the place of these problems in the whole of philosophy, and in their nexus with other problems, alone exhibits their ramifications and obscurity, and reveals the role of the philosopher in the evolution of truth. The concern with the history of problems is therefore a prerequisite for research in the history of philosophy, and represents its earliest form. The history of philosophical problems must never lose sight of fundamental historical requirements. It must assume stages that appear in individuals or periods. It aims to establish connections between philosophers, even though not describing the individual systems as such. But the movements immanent within thought at all times have an historical index. And therefore, attention to the history of problems is one of the coördinates of historical writing in philosophy.

But what is the criterion of historical truth? And to what extent were the various philosophers whose ideas are treated in the history of problems conscious of the latter? Our procedure here must be to determine whether the consequences that the problem has for us can be reconciled

with the utterances of the philosophers in question. One must always try to grasp the earlier consciousness as a system free from contradictions, as an immanent, concrete, unique complex. The significance of the history of philosophy stands or falls with the idea that the problems in some way always form a totality; that one problem or another of this totality presses forth into conscious attention, but is determined to some extent, and shaped, under the influence of those not consciously present. In part still retaining their original connections, the problems emerge, obstruct and illuminate one another. An infinite number of connections result, all of which, however, must be referred to a general system if they are to enter into consciousness and be at all understood. This view of the systems of thought is individual as regards the arrangement and the selection of the problems, but its underlying idea of the oneness and the wholeness of mind has universal validity. It opens up the inexhaustible task of understanding systematic possibilities as such.

Complementary to an account of the development of problems is the history of the systems of philosophy. This discloses the degree of consciousness to which any specific problem attains in the case of any one philosopher. The aim of a history of philosophy that aspires to historical concreteness is thus two-fold, namely, historical and philosophical. First, it is through the history of the problems, which is a *conditio sine qua non*, that the history of *philosophy* is delimited within the general field of history; second, it is through its application to historical individualities that the *history* of philosophy becomes historically defined. The individual whole in its specific consciousness, must be fixated within the flux of the history of problems. The two approaches, namely the history of problems and the history of systems, mutually condition each other. The former accepts historically fixed stages whereas the latter



presupposes connections that link the present formulations of problems with those of the past. Both approaches are based on the system involved in the inquiry as to what questions may rationally be raised, that is in the search to ascertain the scope and the content of what can intelligently be investigated. They are thus based on the same conception of system that must be attributed to every true philosopher of the past, if we are to understand the whole of his conscious mental life as a totality.

The study of the history of philosophy has its value, not in affording comparisons with current doctrines, but in disclosing systems which exhibit in their own peculiar illuminations and shadings the problems that likewise stir our minds and which thus clarify and enrich our problems. The wealth of the thought of the past is at the basis of our own thought. If we grasp the former we also comprehend the latter, and vice versa. Hence the task of the history of philosophy is unending. Every age must translate the past into its own language, and so the old text is ever read afresh. But, on the other hand, a certain age may lack the key to a certain philosophy of the past. The close connection between philosophy and its history does not indicate a systemless relativism. It rather serves to overcome the temporal limitations to which the point of view of every age is subject; and thus philosophy is spared the necessity of perpetually starting anew.

Let us conclude with an assertion which, in view of the subject we are discussing, may seem strongly paradoxical: the ability to forget is an indispensable condition for the maintenance of the energy of life. It is, of course, true that life never really discards anything. Forgetting is merely a technique of memory in the regulation of life. It is the wonderful process of removing that which thought has achieved; through it the rigidity of present experiences is resolved into the rich flux out of which creative thought

ever rises anew. Just as the essential content of "what was" reverts from its individual existence into the depth whence all its powers are derived (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι), so the mind, in forgetting, removes its eternal content from the accidental conditions of the present in order to justify life eternally in the face of the present. It is the passing that cradles the future; the present has only the hardness of the accidental.

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# THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE IN GERMANY

## I. INTRODUCTION

THE concept of a *philosophy of nature* depends on the concept you have of philosophy in general, and this concept varies according to whether you admit the possibility of *metaphysics* or not. If you do not admit metaphysics, philosophy remains a mere theory of order and cannot be more: the logical schema or structure of all that I consciously possess, of my "objects" in the broadest sense of the word, is its only theme, and this in particular with regard to the objects of nature. But if you admit that the words *absolute* or *in itself* have a meaning and, more, that the quality of the absolute may be known, to a certain extent at least (in other words, if you admit the possibility of a metaphysics) not only the structure of nature but also the *meaning* of nature is the object of discussion.

Until about 1900 most philosophers of recent times denied that metaphysics is possible. There were many who did not even admit that the word "in itself," i. e., "not only for myself," has any meaning at all. And of those who were of the opinion that "absolute" or "in itself" are legitimate concepts, the majority were to such an extent influenced by the philosophy of Kant that they regarded the investigation of the quality of the absolute as an impossibility. These were the real agnostics: for them the absolute exists, but is unknowable.

This attitude has changed in all countries since about 1900. Subjectivism or, rather, solipsism, as well as agnos-

ticism, has broken down. The "in itself" does not only exist, but we may even know a little of it; this is the opinion of almost all modern philosophers. We may therefore study the actual state of the philosophy of nature from the logical as well as from the philosophical point of view. Our own conception of both, of logic and of metaphysics, will, of course, be explained in full.

Let us begin with *logic* in the broadest meaning of the word. Logic is the *theory of order*. There cannot be any doubt that logic must stand before metaphysics; for, in order to know what the meaning of *essence* of nature is, one must first know in its very details the structure of that which is supposed to possess an absolute meaning or essence.

Much discussed in our days is the old problem of a sound starting-point of all philosophy. And this with the result that Augustine and Descartes are seen to have been right in putting the *scio* or *cogito* in the first place. Personally, I have proposed to translate these words by the phrase, *I have consciously something*, the word "have" being designed to exclude any sort of activity on the part of the conscious "ego." For such a conscious activity certainly does not exist; as to this almost all modern thinkers are agreed. An unconscious mental activity must, of course, be admitted; but this is a theoretical concept, and is not anything that is immediately experienced.

The *cogito*, though indubitable, can yet not be the foundation of philosophy without a certain addition. And this addition is possible: for I know by intuition that the something which I consciously possess is *ordered*, and I also know what *order* means, though I am unable to define the word. And now the first theme of philosophy has appeared: In what respect is there an *order* in the midst of my "something"? To make this out is the endeavor of logic.



Logic, in the first place, has to deal with a number of indefinable concepts, such as *this*, *not*, *such*, *relation*, *so many*, *because*, *whole* and *part*; and with systems of relations prevailing in the realm of these concepts. It finds the principles of identity, contradiction and *exclusi tertii*; it prepares the formulations of syllogism, arithmetic, geometry, etc. In these fields logic has to do exclusively with what I call *immediate objects*, i. e., with objects which "exist" only insofar as they are consciously possessed by an "ego." Some authors deal with all these subjects in a neo-Platonic or neo-realistic way—in the scholastic sense of the word "realism"—but I believe that neo-realism is hidden metaphysics and must not stand at the beginning of philosophy. I have "somethings" in order; and I try to discover this order in detail—that is all at first.

From immediate objects I proceed to *mediate* objects. For I see by intuition that there is more of *order* in the realm of the "something," if I say that certain—not all!—of my immediate possessions *mean* or *denote* or *indicate* somethings or objects, as if they existed in an independent way. Part of these mediate objects I call mental (unconscious) objects, such as "associative affinities," "determining tendencies," etc.; they form the basis of all psychology. The other part I call *objects of nature*.

An object of nature, then, is a something which I *mean* by an immediate conscious possession or content, such as a perception or thought, *as if* it existed independently. Note the "as if": it is designed to *exclude* metaphysics at this point. Natural objects continue to remain my objects; something absolute or "in itself" does not yet stand in question.

It is a rather difficult problem, the problem of a so-called theory of knowledge, to find out *which* of my immediate possessions *may* denote objects of nature and which may

not. In other words: what is the difference between objects of nature and objects of dreams?

The concept of nature being established, logic proceeds to define the concepts of being, becoming, causality, etc.; and here it comes into clear contact with science proper. Science, in fact, may be defined as a part of logic; and the scientist is a logician, even if he himself does not know it.

## II. LOGIC OF NATURE

### I

The main questions of discussion in the field of a logic of nature are, at present, the following:

First, the question concerning the value of the concepts *substance* and *causality*; this is more or less a question of method.

Second, the theory of so-called matter and force in the inorganic world.

Third, the problem of life, both personal and superpersonal. The question "mechanism or vitalism" here stands in the center of interest.

"Thing" and "cause" are popular concepts; and they are at the same time concepts that can withstand logical criticism. They are concepts that have quite a clear and definite logical meaning; the one being, under the name of *substance*, the purely logical concept of *identity* thrown out, so to say, into the realm of Nature and the other, the natural correspondent to logical *consequence*.

Mathematical physicists of today usually reject these concepts. And there are even some who call them mystical or mythological. And they put mathematical equations in their place, conceiving nature under the aspects of a system of such equations. This means that they only know

and apply the concept of functional dependence in the mathematical sense, but nothing more.

What I object to in mathematical physics, if it believes itself to be the last word about nature, is this: causality means more than mere functional dependence. And, since this "more" is possible in a legitimate way, as general logic is able to prove, it must be recognized. There is the one change, which is later, and the other change, which is earlier; and between the two stands the "why," i. e., causality. It would be absurd, of course, to deny the value of mathematics as applied to physics and chemistry. But mathematics applied in this way can only deal with relations of quantity which accompany causal natural events, but never with the *propter* in the causal sense. Mathematical formulation, therefore, is never the last word in physics and chemistry.

Think of what "pushing" means—the clearest instance of a truly causal event. I do not forget that every equation may be read from both sides. This fact alone is sufficient to show, so it seems to me, that the concept of functional dependence can never replace causality. Mathematical physics is not "wrong," of course, but it leaves open many questions, which *are* legitimate logical questions; and among them is the question as to *why* the one occurs *after* the other has happened. Mathematics is even unable to deal with the concept of *becoming*; the more is it unable to replace causality.

Einstein's so-called theory of relativity must shortly be mentioned in this connection. It shows where mathematical physics may lead the mind. While being mathematically beyond any doubts, Einstein's theory is in strict contradiction with ontology (or phenomenology, as you may like to call it). It speaks of "many times," measured, however, by different unities; and it speaks of a so-called meta-geometrical space. But time is one by its essence; and

space is ontologically Euclidean. Of course, you may speak of an  $n$ -dimensional manifoldness and of "curved" manifoldness in the general theory of relations; but space is a thing for itself. No objections are to be made here if you only say that we are *practically* unable to know about simultaneity in a definite way. But the Einsteinians prefer to make statements about essence and not only about practical possibilities. Quite rightly most *philosophers* have declined to follow the theory of Einstein, if it sets itself up as more than a mathematical formulation of what we are able to observe. For time and space in their very *essence* are not matters of "observation."

## 2

The second problem of a philosophy of nature as part of logic relates to what may briefly be called *matter* and *force*; the concepts of substance and causality being conceived now as legitimate concepts.

The main result in this field is this: there are only very few really elemental sorts of matter, namely the positive electron, the negative electron and, perhaps, ether. Probably even the electra may be nothing but specific states of the latter. We are on the way to a theory of matter that operates with but one sort of material element—the dream of the old atomists.

Chemistry, in this way, has become a part of physics. The modern "metachemistry" is a wonderful thing.

And, on the other hand, there is but *one* kind of physics. The old doctrine of various so-called "forces of nature," as advocated by Schelling and Schopenhauer, but also by many physicists in earlier times, has been completely given up. There is one sort of matter and one sort of "force." And what seem to be differences of forces are only



“subjective”; our psycho-physical organism accounts for them. For this organization can only be affected by certain special distinct areas of “force,” in the electromagnetic fields for example; every area giving us specific sensations. Thus there is a break only in the realm of psychophysics, but not in the realm of physics; for qualitative differences in inorganic Nature do not exist.

We may call this doctrine the doctrine of *physical continuity*. There exist in nature *all* possible forms of, say, wavelengths, but some give us the sensation of light, some that of heat, while others may only be known by their physical effects (Hertz waves, X-rays, etc.).

Theoretically this doctrine is old, but for a long time it could not be proved. And for a short period at the end of the last century it even seemed as if the theory of qualitatively different “forces of nature,” under the form of qualitatively different forms of “energy,” might be the last word of physics. Ostwald has advocated this view. But at the present time the doctrine of one matter and one “force,” i. e., the doctrine of physical continuity may really be said to be proved.

The question is merely what the “one” matter and the “one” force are; or, mathematically, of what form the fundamental equations are, whether of that of Newton-Lagrange, or of Maxwell, or of some other sort. Yet the hope that Newtonism will some day be the last word of physics must not be given up. For Newtonism is the most rational form of physics, i. e., that form which we should “like” to find realized—the word “like” taken in the logical sense.

## 3

We leave inorganic nature and proceed to the organic world.

Here, no doubt, vitalism is the original theory, if, at least, one includes under "theory" the view of the unscientific man. Primitive peoples and also primitive individuals of our day regard everything as "living." This sort of an all-vitalism prevails even in the system of Aristotle. By and by the concept of the "non-living" is created. And then science comes and finds that it can "understand" only that which does *not* live. Dogmatic mechanism is the result: life is nothing *sui generis*, but only a very complex sort of mechanics. The living does not "live," for living is not a thing for itself and is not bound to specific laws of its own.

This attitude of dogmatic mechanism in the field of biology began with Descartes—although he excepted the conscious actions of man—and with but very few exceptions (E. von Hartmann, Bergson) prevailed in science and philosophy until about 1900.

In 1899 the writer of this article tried to show by a proof *per exclusionem* that certain embryological facts are opposed to any "mechanical" explanation whatever. The word "mechanical" is taken here in its widest sense, irrespective of any particular physical theory. We mean that the facts in question cannot be explained in what might be called the summative way, i. e., the way which goes from the parts to the whole.

Other proofs were added to the first one; and today we may say that but very few philosophers defend mechanical

biology. And there is no biologist who pretends that he can explain the phenomena of life on a mechanistic basis.

The way in which a vital individualizing or totalizing agent—called *entelechy* by the present writer, *élan vital* by Bergson, *das Unbewusste* by E. von Hartmann—may act upon the material world, may be formulated in various ways, and even in such a way that the principle of the conservation of energy is not violated.

Of great importance is the logical justification of such a conception as entelechy. Here the present writer has tried to show, first, that *individuality* is a real category in the Kantian sense, and that it may even be “deduced” from the “table of judgments,” if only you add the “complete-conjunctive judgment” ( $S \text{ is } P_1 \text{ and } P_2 \text{ and } P_3 \text{ and } \dots P_n$ ) to the list as given by Kant; and, second, that we are able to deduce *a priori*, from the very essence of the concept of “causality,” the *possibility* of four different forms of natural causality, one of them being *individualizing causality*.

The vitalistic biology breaks nature into two parts. There are “two sciences of nature,” biology and physics, as J. A. Thomson has well formulated the matter. Here, then, we have a great gap in nature, whilst we are unable to admit any such gap in its inorganic part. The adoption of a vitalistic biology carries with it a rejection of the theory of ordinary, or psycho-physical, parallelism in the field of psychology. I say “ordinary,” because a certain sort of parallelism between what is “natural” and what is conscious must also be accepted by the vitalist: conscious living goes parallel with the (unconscious) action of entelechy. But there is no parallelism between conscious life and a mechanics of the brain. For the brain, as the whole living organism as an object of nature, is, though a natural, yet not a mechanical system, i. e., not a “machine.”

But all this does not belong to the sphere of this article, which has to do solely with a philosophy of *nature*. Let me

then only add that there are still many other special objections to the common form of parallelism, and let me close with the remark that among psychologists proper the number of mechanical parallelists is decreasing from year to year. It may suffice to mention the names of E. von Hartmann, W. James, W. McDougall, Bergson, Külpe, Becher, Husserl, Volkelt, Scheler and Krüger.

There is one strange doctrine that is, so to speak, beyond the diversity of mechanism and vitalism. I refer to the view, inaugurated by Leibniz and advocated in our days most consistently by Julius Schultz, that the whole material world is one inorganic "machine" of absolute precision. According to this view there is no "law of nature," as there are no independent cases of becoming that form a "class." Each single event is what it is in a predetermined whole. Each single movement is nothing but itself. And now Schultz tells us that the totality of events in the One World-Machine is nothing but the realm of conscious life with all its "values" seen from the other side. I myself, though admiring the consistency of the theory in question, feel unable to appreciate how the events in a machine might form that realm "from the other side." And, besides, all experimentation becomes valueless under this view. For the experimenting scientist, taken as a body, is part of the One World-Machine. In the case of embryological experiment, then, you would therefore have to assume that there exists a predetermined harmony between the experimenter and the *particular* object with which he is working. The experimenter is not allowed to say: "I have worked upon this egg, separating the blastomere and getting two whole organisms; I *might* have worked upon another one." Nothing of "I might"! But from the beginning of things it has been determined that the experimenter A works on the egg B and that this very egg was determined by its structure to give two organisms, whilst all other eggs were



determined by their structure to give but one. The theory of the One World-Machine cannot be properly refuted. But it can be led into absurdities, as we believe to have shown.

As to the suprapersonal problems of biology, i. e., the phylogenetic ones, not much is really *known* at the present time, and probably this accounts for the fact that phylogeny has ceased to be popular. We know that the factors introduced by Darwin and Lamarck are only secondary agents. But what the primary evolutionary agent in phylogeny is, we do not know. And we shall *never* know this agent. For there is but *one* phylogeny, and of this we ourselves form a part. Hence we cannot "experiment" with phylogeny. To compare phylogeny with *one* embryological case—of a suprapersonal nature, of course—is the only thing we can do. And we say that most probably there is at work a suprapersonal entelechy, making all living things basically one. This is the view of Bergson, Becher and myself. But we have here only suggestion, not knowledge.

At the end of all biological problems stand those connected with so-called "psychical research." It is my opinion that the physical phenomena established in this realm, i. e., levitation, telekinesis, etc., *are facts*. But the time is not ripe for theory. A sort of supravitalism is in question; that is all we can say. Psychical phenomena, such as telepathy, do not belong to the field of a philosophy of nature.

## III. METAPHYSICS OF NATURE

## I

The second part of philosophy, as we have said, or, rather, the second philosophical aspect of that which is consciously given, is metaphysics. There are those who begin with it without any critical justification. In my opinion metaphysics must be derived, so to speak, from logic, or the theory of order, and this in the following way: A good deal of order can be found within the realm of nature (as well as within the realm of the mind or soul), but *why* there is such a thing as *nature* (and soul) at all, or, otherwise put, how it comes *that* the concept of *nature* (and soul) may be established among the "somethings" which I consciously have or possess—this question is unanswerable for logic as such. But I see intuitively<sup>1</sup> that the concept *real* or *in itself* has a clear meaning, and that by admitting it I get more of order than without it.

The theory of order or logic, therefore, is led beyond itself by the *ideal* of "order." It becomes theory of reality or metaphysics. And the whole content of so-called experience, in the widest sense of the term, may *now*, but not earlier, be called *appearance*, namely, appearance to the ego of something that exists in itself.

The method of metaphysics can only be induction, for that which we have, appearance, is like a "consequence" of which we are in search of the "reason." And, according to a well-known logical principle, the way from the consequence to the reason is never univocal.

<sup>1</sup> In German I should say: *Ich schaue*.

The relation between reality and appearance, however, must not be taken as a form of causality, as if there were reality *and* something else, the ego. This would simply be nonsense. That relation may be called a "function" of the relation *consequence* ( $f(c)$ ), causality being another "function" of it ( $p(c)$ ). In other terms: Reality is such that parts of it appear to other parts, the egos, under the forms of experience.

## 2

Now with respect to nature in particular, we may say that what we call space, time, matter, and causality in logic, have each a corresponding system of relations in reality, the *suchness* of which in itself we are unable to know. We may speak of a real S-, T-, M-, and C-system. And the only thing we know about these systems of relations in reality is that they contain at least as many specificities and differences as are contained in the corresponding systems of relations in experience. In other terms: cube and tetrahedron, ellipse and parabola in the realm of appearance mark differences and specificities, of an unknown *suchness* in itself, in Reality and are not in the last resort "the same."

Here, as you will have seen, we do not agree with Kant who has said that space, time, etc., are of a *merely* subjective nature. It may be that our space is not "space" in itself—we are unable to decide that—but differences in space *are* "real" differences. This was the view held by Herbart and Lotze. It rests, of course, upon one foundation, which is merely a postulate, namely, that Reality is *rational*, or, rather, approachable in a rational way. But without this postulate—and this eliminates all mystics—metaphysics is impossible.

Vitalism is not in itself metaphysics but a mere doctrine of order. But if you accept vitalism, you have at once gained a very important metaphysical conclusion, for vitalism tells you that appearance so far as it is spatial does *not* characterize Reality in *full*, but only in part. And this conclusion is in contradiction to the philosophy of Spinoza according to which all *modi* of the absolute *extensio* are a *complete* expression of the *substantia* or the *natura naturans* or *deus*.

## 3

The only point where we approach Reality *as it is*, is in our conscious possession, our knowing of what "consciously possessed" or "knowing" means. Knowing knows itself *as it is*. In my knowing or consciously having, Reality, or, at least a part of Reality, knows itself in its very suchness.

And we know about real knowing also in an indirect way. Wherever we find wholeness or individuality in appearance and, in particular, wherever we meet acts of totalizing or whole-making or individualizing causality, we have "knowing subjects" among our objects. Some of these "knowing subjects," namely, the other human egos, we understand. But there are forms of knowing which we understand only in part, e. g., the egos of higher animals—while all instinctive and entelechial "knowing" is quite incomprehensible to us. We only know that the *genus* "knowing" is in question here, but we are unable to understand the *species*.

Reality, therefore, is such that it knows itself in various forms, only one of which—I may call it the "ego-knowing"—is comprehensible to me. And I am myself a part of Reality.



Spirituality, thus, personal and suprapersonal, pervades Reality everywhere. But it only pervades Reality. Reality is not throughout spiritual. For there is matter; and there is no basis for the hypothesis that the "real" correspondent of that which appears under the form of matter is something spiritual. Leibniz, Schelling, and Schopenhauer have advocated such a monistic view. But I seen no reason for it; in any case, it is not self-evident.

## 4

This, now, brings us to the question of *dualism*. Dualism, in our opinion, must be the last word of metaphysics, even if we should like to be monists. But we cannot be monists with a good conscience. For there *is* the diversity and discrepancy between what is *whole* and what is *not-whole*, or contingent; the logical contradiction between wholeness and contingency being, in our opinion, the very foundation of all dualism.

Empirical dualism is an illustration of logical dualism: individuality (a frog) and mere sum (a heap of stones), healthy and sick, truth and error, good and bad are forms in which the fundamental logical dualism is empirically illustrated. And there is nothing in nature which is *quite* free from contingency (in the sense of non-wholeness). For, even if you accept vitalism, entelechy guarantees only the type in general; the position of the single cells in the different organs are contingent and are different in each individual.

*Why* is wholeness never pure? *Why* does it mix itself with the principle of non-wholeness, i. e., with that side of Reality which appears in the form of *matter*? Or, exists there even a principle that is not only *non-whole*, but *anti-whole*? Let us leave this question also and let us admit,

hypothetically, that there is merely the Whole-making, the "Spiritual," and the "Neutral," i. e., matter. Or, in Aristotelian form, εἶδος and ὕλη. In any case there *is* dualism. *Why* must it be?

## 5

Here we meet the highest problems of all metaphysics: the problems of death, of freedom and of God, all of them being very legitimate *problems*, even if answers are not possible.

We may speak here of a metaphysics of the second degree in contrast with the metaphysics of the first degree which we have thus far treated. The first metaphysics inquires only concerning "the real" in general, starting from its "consequence," i. e., experience. But the second metaphysics must take into consideration the possibility that there may be various phases of Reality, following one another in timeless "sequence" and having their ultimate source in an all-embracing One.

Let me speak a word about this second metaphysics insofar only as the interpretation of nature is concerned. The problem of *freedom* is in a certain way the connecting link between the two types of metaphysics. Causality in appearance means something real metaphysically. So it is at least with regard to inorganic causality and to biological causality, so far as the individual is in question. Vitalism does not break the principle of universal determinism. But what about suprapersonal biology, i. e., phylogeny, and about its continuation, history? Here the determining factor, supra-entelechy, endowed with a fixed *essentia*, is only postulated by logic, but cannot be discovered; for we have before us a "class" with but "one" case, as we have said before. It *may* be that phylogeny is a process that "makes itself in freedom," as Bergson believes of his *élan vital*, of

the *dieu qui se fait*. I have shown elsewhere that the problem of freedom is insoluble, both cosmologically and psychologically, i. e., when it relates to the so-called freedom of the will.

What is usually called pantheism, as for instance the theory of Spinoza and Schelling in his younger years, is by no means a theory of freedom. For the *substantia* or the *Absolute* of these thinkers has a fixed *essentia* out of which the world "*sequitur*." Bergson's *dieu* has *no* *essentia*, but is "making" it!

Half-way between Bergson's freedom and determinism stands what we may call the freedom of *realization*, or, in short, the freedom of the "that" (not of "such"). This means that it is thinkable that the *suchness* of the world is determined by the *suchness* of God, but that a free act of God determines whether there will *exist* a world or not. The same relation may prevail between the *suchness* of willing in men and the realization of that willing.

We must never forget that the word "freedom" is used in a rather easy way by many philosophers. Freedom *ought* always to denote indeterminism. But when Spinoza (also Kant) speak of freedom, they only mean behavior according to the proper essence, and nothing more. Real freedom, however, negates *essence*. It is very interesting to note that the problem of real freedom has now again become quite central after having been put almost completely aside during the materialistic and mechanistic period.

## 6

About death and immortality no proper answers are possible. But the problem of immortality has also again become popular, and by no means among spiritualists exclusively. Vitalism has opened the door to it, as Uexkull has

once well said. I believe that in a certain sense immortality may even be regarded as a fact, for wholeness and knowing are inherent attributes of the real and are therefore indestructible. But whether there is a personal immortality we cannot know, nor can we know whether there are phases or states of Reality which are not bound to that system of relations which we call "time" in the form of appearance.

And, finally, the problem of the all-embracing or God. There are many possibilities, and dualism is the greatest crux for them all. If we agree to call God, or at least a side of God, the whole-making and knowing essence of Reality, we may even say the existence of God has been proved. But this covers only one part of the general theological problem. The rest is mystery. And dualism remains a mystery. Is contingency in God or extraneous to Him? And if it comes from Him, why does it? If it exists without Him, in the appearing form of matter, why does the knowing wholeness of Reality mingle with it? Why does it not remain in purity?

Here the word is given to religion. Our short survey of the present state of the philosophy of nature must end at this point. And perhaps you may say that we have already gone beyond our boundaries.

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## AESTHETICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART IN CONTEMPORARY GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

THE two disciplines mentioned in the title have, at the present time in Germany, reached a certain degree of independence. This manifests itself even externally, namely in the fact that for the last twenty years there has been published a journal<sup>2</sup> devoted exclusively to æsthetics and to the general science of art; that in Berlin two congresses<sup>3</sup> have been held; and that now again there has been launched a society for aesthetics and the general science of art<sup>4</sup> as a continuation of an organization existing prior to the war. It might thus appear that we are here concerned with an object of investigation which has emancipated itself from philosophy. Nevertheless, this is not the case in the true sense of the word. For the most reliable indication of such an independence, namely, the establishment of separate professorships in the universities, is still lacking. Among the European countries, France, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have special professorships for aesthetics; in Germany, however, the philosopher still carries also the main responsibility for aesthetic

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> *Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und Kunstwissenschaft*, herausgegeben von Max Dessoir. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart. Bd. Iff., 1906ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Kongress fuer Aesthetic und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, Berlin, 7-9, Oktober, 1913. *Bericht herausgegeben vom Ortsausschuss*. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1914. *Zweiter Kongress fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, Berlin, 16-18, Oktober, 1924. *Bericht herausgegeben vom Arbeitsausschuss*. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1925.

<sup>4</sup> *Gesellschaft fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft (E. V.)*. *Anfragen und Anmeldungen sind zu richten an den Ersten Schriftfuehrer*. Dr. Werner Wolffheim, Berlin W. 9, Bellevuester, 16-18.

instruction. This undoubtedly has its drawbacks, but, as in the similar case of psychology, it likewise has its advantages. For, as a result of this connection with philosophy, the aesthetician is compelled to keep his investigations within the nexus of the mental life as a whole. Just as, up to the present time, German psychology has not suffered, at least in my opinion, as a result of having retained its connection with philosophy, so likewise I see no disadvantage in the fact that aesthetics remains conscious of its original place within philosophy. What most gives rise to question is doubtless the fact that the interpretation of art demands an inner relation to the arts, a direct comprehension of artistic values, such as not every philosopher possesses. An intimate understanding of music, more especially, is possessed by only few philosophers. And so it may occur that one philosophizes about art not from within the subject itself but from a point of view extraneous to it. And, therefore, it is cause for distinct gratification that German historians of art, of literature, and of music are devoting themselves in an ever-increasing degree to aesthetic problems. In our exposition, therefore, we will first refer to philosophic tendencies insofar as they are reflected in aesthetics and then to the contributions to aesthetics for which we are indebted to the specialized sciences of art.

There are few comprehensive expositions of the field if, as is necessary in this instance, we disregard the smaller handbooks. We must mention the large work of Hermann Cohen,<sup>5</sup> who regards aesthetics as the doctrine of pure feeling. Alongside of this theory of pure feeling are the theories of pure cognition and of pure will. Pure feeling is first of all feeling with reference to form, and, indeed, to rhythmic form. It is also, however, feeling with reference to content and, insofar, is love and communication.

<sup>5</sup> Cohen, Hermann: *Asthetik des reinen Gefuehls*. 2 Bde. Verlag Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, 1912. 2. Auflage, 1923.

From these fundamental principles Cohen derives specific conclusions, the most valuable of which, to be sure, could also hold good, as it seems to me, apart from the former. On a different basis is erected the aesthetics of Theodore Lipps.<sup>6</sup> As even the subtitle of his volume indicates, the theory maintains a strictly psychological character—not in the sense of a purely experimental psychology, but of the Lippsian psychology in general. With a unique energy and with an unexcelled plasticity of thought as well as of exposition, Lipps develops the theory of empathy (*Empfindung*), that is, the doctrine according to which aesthetic value and aesthetic experience involve the transference to the object of the subject's feeling. Volkelt,<sup>7</sup> likewise, makes fruitful use of the empathy theory in his three-volume work. But he distinguishes between psychological and normative aesthetics and is more unbiased than Lipps in his evaluation of facts; moreover, he does not center his attention so exclusively on the formative arts as does Lipps but is particularly happy precisely in his choice of poetic illustrations and analyses. I myself<sup>8</sup> have attempted to bring together into a volume the conclusions yielded by my own experience and by the critical examination of other doctrines. I stress the thesis that aesthetics and the science of art do not coincide; and in aesthetics I attempt to carry through an objectivism which insures to the object an existence of independent worth. Following these views, Emil Utitz<sup>9</sup> wrote his work, *Fundamental Principles of the General Science of Art*, which contains everything that may be said with reference to the world of art, the structure of the art object, and the creative activity of the artist.

<sup>6</sup> Lipps, Theodor: *Asthetik. Psychologie des Schoenen und der Kunst*. 2 Bde. Verlag Leopold Voss. Hamburg u. Leipzig, 1903, 1906. 3. Auflage, 1923.

<sup>7</sup> Volkelt, Johannes: *System der Aesthetik*. 3 Bde. Verlag C. H. Beck, Muenchen, 1905, 1910, 1914.

<sup>8</sup> Dessoir, Max: *Asthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1906. 2 Auflage, 1923.

<sup>9</sup> Utitz, Emil: *Grundlegung der allgemeinen Kunstwissenschaft*, 2 Bde. Verlag Ferd. Enke, Stuttgart, 1914, 1920.

I now turn to a brief portrayal of the influence of the main philosophical tendencies upon the problems of aesthetics. The school of Cohen has only of late occupied itself with aesthetic problems. Ernst Cassirer has published single essays on the science and philosophy of art<sup>10</sup> and has recently devoted himself to the connection of art and the myth.<sup>11</sup> He points out that the beginnings of art are to be found in the immediate and undifferentiated unity of the myth-consciousness; and he explains further that this connection is not merely genetic in character. According to the principle of neo-Kantianism, even ordinary thinking concerning being and objectivity involves a system of synthetic formal principles which invest every object with its objectivity and give it a place in the system of nature. Insofar, now, as art also exists and, indeed, exists as something distinctive, it can not free itself from the laws of space and time and of causal connection. Even the creative activity in the soul of the artist is not conceivable without reference to the synthetic principles fundamental to theoretical reasoning.<sup>12</sup> Thus the point of departure is here a fact which is particularly striking in the realm of the formative arts, namely, that every statue, for example, certainly constitutes a part of empirical reality, fills a space which belongs to real space, and belongs to the same temporal order and is subject to the same causality as an unformed block of stone. In addition to this relation between art and empirical reality, the relation of art to historical reality is a favorite topic of the Marburger philosophers. The conception of the will to art (*Kunstwollen*) has led to a history of art which calls itself interpretative science and which seeks to connect the theory of art with a purely

<sup>10</sup> Cassirer, Ernst: *Idee und Gestalt, Goethe, Schiller, Hoelderlin, Kleist*. Verlag Bruno Cassirer, Berlin, 1921. 2. Auflage, 1924.

<sup>11</sup> Cassirer, Ernst: *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*. 1 Teil: *Die Sprache*, 1923. 2. Teil: *Das mythische Denken*. 1925. Verlag Bruno Cassirer, Berlin.

<sup>12</sup> Vgl., Pavet, Hans: *Konrad Fiedler. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XVI, 1922, S. 320ff.



empirical history of art. Here, also, the viewpoints and the empirical orientation of the neo-Kantianism founded by Cohen and Natorp have remained authoritative.<sup>13</sup>

These typical references may suffice, and we now raise the question as to the results for aesthetics of the philosophical movement founded by Windelband and led by Rickert. Inasmuch as this southwest German school of neo-Kantianism finds its central concern in the problem of value and locates value in the transcendent sphere of the *ought*, it must first create a transition to the actualities of art. This transition is achieved by presupposing that things possess a meaning which connects the realm of values with the realm of actuality. Whereas the mere perception of a color, for example, is void of meaning and significance, the aesthetic impression of a color in itself contains a non-theoretical meaning—that is to say, we understand the color and take pleasure in it without conceptually reflecting upon it. Upon this simple basic thought the attempt has been made to erect a value-aesthetics<sup>14</sup> which, to be sure, exhibits a weakness in the fact that it must be based upon intuition.

As concerns the influence of the phenomenological school<sup>15</sup> upon aesthetics, this is to be found less in developed doctrines than in the transformation of the methods of aesthetics and the science of art. We need not here concern ourselves with an analysis of the nature of phenomenology, so difficult to understand and to define. We will

<sup>13</sup> Vgl. Panophy, E.: *Ueber das Verhaeltnis der Kunstgeschichte zur Kunsttheorie. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XVIII, 1925, S. 129ff.

<sup>14</sup> Vgl. Muensterberg, Hugo: *Philosophie der Werte*. Verlag Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig, 1908.

Kreis, Friedrich: *Ueber die Moeglichkeit einer Aesthetik vom Standpunkt der Wertphilosophie. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XIX, 1925, S. 42ff.

<sup>15</sup> Vgl., Utitz, Emil: *Die Gegenstaendlichkeit des Kunstwerkes, Philosophische Vortraege veroeffentlicht von der Kant-Gesellschaft*, No. 17. Pan-Verlag, Rolf Heyse, Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1917.

Geiger, Moritz: *Phaenomenologische Aesthetik. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XIX, 1925, S. 29ff.

simply point out that this philosophy explains the peculiar category of the aesthetic by advancing the more general doctrine that not everything that is "given" need be located in the nexus of empirical reality but that we are enabled to intuit pure phenomena. The previously mentioned problems of neo-Kantianism which arise from the inclusion of art objects in the actual world here accordingly disappear. For, in the opinion of the phenomenologists, the phenomenon of a tone, for example, may be adequately described without reference to the nature of its physical origin or of its psychological functioning. One might advance the comment that this procedure of investigating given phenomena objectively has always been followed by historians of the individual arts who are concerned with the criticism of style. When the historian of art describes the draping of a garment or the historian of music sets forth the construction of a particular symphony, he is dealing with phenomena, for the fact that the particular drapery in question, as a manifold of color surfaces or color points, belongs to the realm of the actual concerns him not at all. And the same is true as regards the nature of the feelings and associated ideas experienced by the individual in hearing a symphony. However, the aesthetics of the phenomenologists goes further than does the analytical historian of art and of music. It aims not merely to understand the style of an individual painter or of a certain specific historical period by reference, for example, to the draping of a particular garment; it seeks not merely to elucidate the structure, for example, of the third or fifth symphony of Beethoven, but it is concerned with determining the structure of a symphony as such. To be sure, it believes that one may ascertain the essence of the thing in general from a specific instance. And it cannot avoid the presupposition that the individual investigator must possess a special endowment in order to achieve such

a comprehension of essences. In the case of a number of writers, phenomenological aesthetics is carried to the point of proclaiming the existence of indemonstrable intuitions concerning the essential nature of a type of art, for example, architecture, but such works may no longer be included within the field of scientific aesthetics.

Psychology has contributed to German aesthetics a large number of experimental methods. For a long time it seemed as if one could not, by experimental methods, go beyond the traditional investigation of proportions and rhythms. Very recently, however, Schultze of Königsberg and Kroh of Tübingen have blazed new trails concerning which, unfortunately, it is impossible as yet to say anything definite inasmuch as adequate publications are lacking. New vistas are opened also by the investigations of the modern psychology of youth.<sup>16</sup> The familiar doctrine that the child is, in a definite sense, man in his early state, and that the artist has preserved much of this child nature, has been most brilliantly confirmed by the psychology of youth. We can no longer doubt that mental characteristics which, in the case of adults are, as a rule, displaced or preserved only in an impoverished state, are widely prevalent and clearly defined in the case of children. This is particularly true as regards the relation of the observing person to the visible world. Most children have visual experiences of perceptual pictures; that is to say, in their case, perception and imagination (or memory imagery) are not as sharply differentiated as among adults. Otherwise expressed, many children have experiences intermediate between imagination and sensation, and these intermediate forms are experienced as something external. A similar inten-

<sup>16</sup> Jaensch, Erich R.: *Ueber den Aufbau der Wahrnehmungswelt und ihre Struktur im Jugendalter*. Verlag Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig, 1923. *Psychologie und Aesthetik. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XIX, 1925, S. 11ff. *Ueber das Wesen der Kunst und die Kunst des Kindes (Neuer Versuch einer Grundlegung der "Aesthetik von unten")*. Verlag Benno Filser, Augsburg, in Vorbereitung.

sity of visual imagery is elsewhere to be found only in the case of the pictorial artist or the poet, or of an adult who is gifted with endowments for one of the two arts, even though not actually making contributions to it. On the basis of these recent investigations, we may emphasize with all the precision one might desire a fact which was formerly only surmised and advanced as an ingenious suggestion: the artist is a person who has preserved the characteristics of the child mind in the realm of visual experience.

Another movement in psychology which has likewise been carried over into aesthetics goes back to Wilhelm Dilthey.<sup>17</sup> As opposed to the psychology which seeks to build up consciousness out of elements, Dilthey advanced a doctrine that regards mind as a functional complex. This complex, he believed, may without difficulty be understood. In his view, every single mind, although individual, maintains a very close relation with that which is universally human. But this relation is mediated by types. One such type, according to him, is the aesthetic person. The aesthetic person and, even better, the artist, affords the proper avenue for the comprehension of art. These ideas have of late received further development.<sup>18</sup> At their basis there lies this truth: one can indeed more easily understand the nature of the particular mental fields, such as that of art or of philosophy, after one has attained a clear insight into the nature of the artistic or the philosophic person. The attempt, however, to derive the characteristic laws governing the art object from the nature of the artistic conscious-

<sup>17</sup> Dilthey, Wilhelm: *Ideen ueber eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie. Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. V, S. 133ff.* Verlag B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1924.

<sup>18</sup> Vgl. Spranger, Eduard: *Lebensformen. Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik der Persoenlichkeit.* Verlag Max Niemeyer, Halle (Saale). 2. Aufl., 1921.



ness is misguided. The latest tendency along these lines<sup>19</sup> seeks to combine life and work in the concept of *Gestalt*. Nor does this attempt appear to me entirely successful. For the meaning of *Gestalt* suffers from a serious indefiniteness. One must not confuse this concept, which we owe to the followers of the poet Stefan George, with the concept of like designation which has recently been introduced into experimental psychology.<sup>20</sup> Common to them, indeed, is the fact that both are designed to connote an inner structure which is meaningful and intelligible. But in the one case the term has been coined primarily for the purposes of the history of mind; in the other, however, for the purposes of psychological experimentation and of psychological theory. In any event, aesthetics may enter into very much more intimate relations with *Gestalt*-psychology than with the atomistic and constructive psychology of past decades.

Closely related to the attempts just mentioned is the so-called philosophy of life. For Georg Simmel<sup>21</sup> philosophy was a form of life. He also, as does the *Gestalt*-psychology of today, entered into opposition to atomistic thinking. The impression made by a work of art, he maintained, is not equivalent to a summation of the impressions produced by all of the aspects and qualities emphasized by an

<sup>19</sup> Vgl. Gundolf, Friedrich: *Goethe*. Verlag Georg Bondi, Berlin. 11. Aufl., 1922.

Bertram, Ernst: *Friedrich Nietzsche*. Verlag Georg Bondi, Berlin. 6. Aufl., 1922.

Kahler, Erich von: *Der Beruf der Wissenschaft*. Verlag Georg Bondi, Berlin, 1920.

<sup>20</sup> Vgl. Koehler, Wolfgang: *Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand*. Verlag Vieweg Sohn, Braunschweig, 1920.

Wertheimer, Max: *Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie*. Verlag der philosophischen Akademie, Erlangen, 1925.

Koffka, Kurt: *Zur Analyse der Vorstellungen und ihre Gesetze*. Verlag Quelle und Meyer, Berlin, 1912. *Beiträge zur Psychologie der Gestalt*. (Koffka Hrsg.). Bd. 1. Verlag Joh. Amb. Barth, Leipzig, 1919. *Psychologie. Lehrbuch der Philosophie, herausgegeben von Max Dessoir*. Bd. II. *Die Philosophie in ihren Einzelgebieten*, S. 497ff. Verlag Ullstein, Berlin. 1925. *Die Grundlagen der psychischen Entwicklung. Eine Einführung in die Kinderpsychologie*. Verlag Zickfeldt, Osterwieck, 1921.

<sup>21</sup> Simmel, Georg: *Lebensanschauung*. Verlag Duncker und Humblot, München. 2. Aufl., 1922.

analytical aesthetics. Its distinctive feature, much rather, consists in a thoroughly unified character which arises out of or which transcends these separate impressions. This unitary character present throughout experience and prominent also in art, is designated in Simmel's philosophy by the term *life*. "Every moment of life is life in its totality, whose constant flux—and this precisely is its unique form—possesses reality only in that wave-height to which it rises at a given moment; every immediate moment is determined by the previous course of life as a whole—it is the efflux of all previous moments and, for this reason alone, every living present is the form in which the life of the subject possesses actuality." Hence psychology can do justice neither to life nor to art. For psychological treatment always involves a certain solidification. It would be erroneous to refer to great portrait painters as good psychologists. The portrayal of the human being by Rembrandt, for example, is, according to Simmel, animated to an extreme degree, but not in a psychological sense. From these essentially negative reflections Simmel then advanced to positive conclusions. Actuality and art, he tells us, are related to each other as are two languages which seek to express the same idea. Nature and spirit, actuality and value, reveal their profound unity in the individual creation of the artist.

The problem of art has been attacked from an entirely different side by the philosophy of the "as-if." To the thinkers of this school, art appears as the capacity of peculiarly endowed persons to interpret phenomena, by virtue of their creative imagination and by means of a valuable "fiction," with greater unity and depth than other people.<sup>22</sup> This interpretation comes by way of illusion or of conscious self-deception. Thereby he who sees or hears acquires the feel-

<sup>22</sup> Volkmann, Ludwig: *Das Kunstwerk als wertvolle Fiktion. Ein Beitrag zur Aesthetik des Als-ob. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XVI, 1922, S. 69ff.

ing of a deeper comprehension of phenomena and of a satisfying enjoyment. Representatives of this fictionalism concede that such a definition does not completely exhaust the nature of the functioning or the purpose of art. But it is doubtful whether the meaning of art is thereby adequately described even as regards pure aesthetic enjoyment.

From the above survey it is not difficult to see how strongly certain tendencies of contemporary German philosophy have affected aesthetics and the philosophy of art. On their part, however, investigators of the various fields of art have now also pressed forward to philosophical considerations and have made their own contributions to the enrichment of aesthetics. It is not here pertinent to go into details. It will suffice to mention the names of Woelfflin<sup>23</sup> and Worringer,<sup>24</sup> Schmarsow<sup>25</sup> and Dvorak,<sup>26</sup> Unger,<sup>27</sup> Strich<sup>28</sup> and Walzel,<sup>29</sup> Riemann<sup>30</sup> and Mersmann.<sup>31</sup> Among the historians of formative art, as well as among the historians of literature and of music, there are now a number of investigators whose interest is likewise directed to systematic treatment. They all seek purely theoretical concepts and strictly systematic ideas. Their work has already born rich fruit and will doubtless constantly continue to

<sup>23</sup> Woelfflin, Heinrich: *Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe*. Verlag Bruckmann. 6. Aufl., 1922.

<sup>24</sup> Worringer, Wilhelm: *Abstraktion und Einfuehling*. Verlag Piper, Muenchen. 5-8. Aufl., 1919.

<sup>25</sup> Schmarsow, August: *Die reine Form in der Ornamentik aller Kuenste. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XVI, 1922; S. 491ff.; XVII, 1924, S. 129ff., 209ff., 305ff.

<sup>26</sup> Dvorak, Max: *Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei*. Verlag Oldenburg, Muenchen, 1918.

<sup>27</sup> Unger, Rudolf: *Weltanschauung und Dichtung*. Verlag Rascher, Zurich, 1917. *Literaturgeschichte als Problemgeschichte*. Verlag Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fuer Politik und Geschichte m. C. H. Berlin, 1924.

<sup>28</sup> Strich, Fritz: *Klassik und Romantik*. Verlag Meyer und Jessen, Muenchen, 2. Aufl., 1924.

<sup>29</sup> Walzel, Oskar: *Wechselseitige Erhellung der Kuenste. Philosophische Vortraege der Kant-Gesellschaft*, Nr. 15. Pan-Verlag, Rolf Heyse, Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1917.

<sup>30</sup> Riemann, Hugo: *Die Lehre von den Tonvorstellungen*. Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek. Verlag Peters, Berlin, 1914-16.

<sup>31</sup> Mersmann, Hans: *Zur Phaenomenologie der Musik. Zeitschrift fuer Aesthetik und allgemeine Kuntswissenschaft*, XIX, 1925, S. 372ff.

expand. Participating in this work are Austria,<sup>32</sup> Switzerland<sup>33</sup> and Holland<sup>34</sup>; but it is not necessary to describe their participation in detail.

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<sup>32</sup> Strzygowski, Josef: *Die Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften Vorgefuehrt am Beispiele der Forschung ueber bildende Kunst. Ein grundsatzlicher Rahmenversuch.* Kunstverlag Anton Schroll u. Co., Wien, 1923.

<sup>33</sup> Ermatinger, Emil: *Das dichterische Kunstwerk, Grundbegriffe der Urteilsbildung in der Literaturgeschichte.* Verlag Teubner, Leipzig, 2. Aufl., 1923.

<sup>34</sup> Haveloar, Just: *De symbolik der kunst.* Verlag Bohm, Haarlem, 1918.  
Berlage, H. P.: *Schoonheid in samenleving.* Verlag Brusse, Rotterdam, 1919.

Holst, R. N. Roland: *Over kunst an kunstmaan.* Verlag Meulenhoff, Amsterdam, 1925.



# THE MAIN TENDENCIES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

## I. THE MATERIALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY ADVANCED BY SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

THE materialistic conception of history is based on the fundamental doctrine that the production and exchange of goods forms the basis for every form of state, society, and law; that in each and every society the distribution of goods and the social differentiation into classes or ranks is governed by the objects and the mode of production as well as by the manner in which that which is produced is exchanged. In every social investigation, in every critical evaluation of law, state, and society, the basic consideration is the particular nature of the economic order. According to this doctrine, the legal and political systems of every people are always *causally* conditioned by the peculiar character of its economic life; this relation is one of rigid, inescapable, natural necessity. The theory may perhaps be best characterized by quoting from its creator and master, Karl Marx.<sup>2</sup> In the preface to his famous

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> Marx was born on May 5, 1818, in Trier; he died in exile, in London, March 14, 1883. In his youth an enthusiastic admirer of the Hegelian philosophy with its doctrine of the absolute primacy of the *logos* as the demi-urge of reality, he later turned into its bitter opponent. His inseparable friend, Friedrich Engels, lived from 1820 to 1895. Their most important writings are: Marx's *Das Kapital*, the first volume of which appeared in 1867, volumes two and three being literary remains published posthumously by F. Engels in 1885 and 1894 respectively; and Engels' *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (1878) of which three chapters have appeared in separate print under the title, *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft*.

work, *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, which appeared in 1859, he has portrayed his doctrine with striking significance and terseness:

"In the productive processes of society man enters into determinate and necessary relations, independent of his will—a mode of production which corresponds to a particular developmental level of his powers of material production. In its totality, this mode of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real basis from which a juristic and political superstructure arises. To it there corresponds a specific form of social consciousness. The mode of production in the sphere of material life conditions the social, political, and mental life-processes in general. It is not the consciousness of man that determines his mode of existence but, conversely, his social state that determines his consciousness. At a certain level of development the powers of material production within society come into conflict with the prevailing conditions of production, or, to state the same in juristic terms, with the property relations within which they have previously functioned. These relations are thenceforth no longer specific forms of productive power; they are transformed into chains that bind the latter. There then appears an epoch of social revolution. With the shifting of the economic basis there come more or less abrupt upheavals throughout the whole of the enormous superstructure. In considering such upheavals, the material transformations and the economic conditions of production, always to be established with scientific accuracy, must always be distinguished from the juristic, political, religious, artistic, or philosophic—in brief, the ideological—formulae under which men become conscious of this conflict and in terms of which they carry it on. One's conclusions regarding the nature of an individual should not be made to accord with the opinions which the latter forms of himself; just as little may one judge a period of social

upheaval by reference to its own consciousness. On the contrary, this consciousness must rather be explained in terms of the conflicts within the sphere of material life—in particular, the existing conflict between the powers of production and the conditions of production. A form of society never disappears before all the powers of production are developed for which it affords adequate scope; and new and higher conditions of production never arise before the material conditions of their existence have come to life within the old society itself.”<sup>3</sup>

The materialistic interpretation of history in no wise denies, as is often thought, the significance of ideas and the presence within human thought and effort of ideal purposes. Nor is it oblivious to the undeniable fact that such ideas have often been the immediate causes of historic changes in legal and political organization. However, it most emphatically denies that the pursuit of such ideal purposes is the *ultimate* cause of social changes. On the contrary, it represents ideal purposes as merely phenomenal manifestations, as mirroring specific economic conditions. According to Marx and Engels, the socialistic order of society will some day come to mankind with the same iron necessity as winter follows upon autumn; all human efforts for reform in state and society are in the last analysis causally conditioned; not the conception, or the law, of purpose but the law of causality is dominant. Freedom may not be predicated of the human will. All economic phenomena are *manifestations of nature*. Their origin and their nature are to be explained in terms of the laws of *natural science*, not those of social science. If the socialistic order of society with its collectivization, that is, socialization, of all the means of production must come with logical necessity, then all purposive action is fundamentally meaningless. Let us note the famous contention of Karl Marx: “The working

<sup>3</sup> See *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie*, sixth edition, (1920), p. LV.

class need not realize any ideals; it need only release those elements of a new society which have already formed themselves within the very midst of the crumbling bourgeoisie society." With the emergence of the new social order, wherein class distinctions disappear and property becomes collective as regards all the means of production—factories, machines, implements, and lands—the State will completely vanish and the institution wherein the propertyless classes are forcibly exploited by the capitalists will exist no more. Taking its place will be the new socialized society.

This doctrine, which we have very briefly sketched in only its salient features, is unquestionably of basic importance in two respects. On the one hand, it was the *first* doctrine to undertake a critical examination of the bases and laws of social life; through it the relation of law to the economic order and the question as to which of them is primary was illumined for the first time and in a manner which is indisputably ingenious and penetrating. On the other hand, the doctrine has a *practical* importance of incalculable magnitude. In the largest political party of the German Commonwealth as well as of Austria, it represents down to the very present the inviolable dogma which serves as the Holy Grail for all but a few of the less devoted disciples of the socialistic faith. True, Eduard Bernstein, who is scientifically the most prominent leader of present-day socialism and of the social-democratic party of Germany, sought in his intrinsically valuable works, *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie*" (1899) and *Der Revisionismus in der Sozialdemokratie*" (1909), to tone down and to develop further the doctrinal system transmitted as precious dogma to socialistic disciples. His attempts, however, encountered indignant opposition on the part of the guardians of the Grail, particularly von Mehring and Karl Kautsky, and



this, indeed, in spite of the fact that the changes proposed were not at all extreme. For many hundreds of thousands, perhaps even for millions of Germans, within and without the boundaries of the German Commonwealth, the Marxian doctrine represents the last word of wisdom, presumably the most mature conclusions ever pronounced concerning law, the State and society. They adhere to it with an almost blind faith in its dogmas. And yet it is only a creation of the imagination, though indeed a creation of magnificent proportions.

The demonstration that this Marxian doctrine does not fully develop its logical conclusions and in no wise exhibits thoroughly clarified thought represents a great and imperishable achievement which we owe to the gifted legal and political philosopher, Rudolf Stammler.<sup>4</sup> Stammler points out that Marx and Engels have nowhere given an explanation of what they meant by "economic phenomena" and by "conditions of production." There is every indication that they had in mind corporeal, spacial, tangible, natural phenomena. But this is a thoroughly untenable notion. As a matter of fact, these terms connote but legal relations; their whole being must be conceived as subject to legal regulation. Throughout all known history, regulation of the relations of men to one another has been dependent upon legal norms. The coöperation of men for the achievement of economic results is *logically* conceivable only under the presupposition of an external control. The so-called "powers of production" which Marx and Engels represent as the dynamic element in all social, legal, and political development are not at all economic but are purely *technological* phenomena, as is, for example, our modern power machin-

<sup>4</sup> Born in 1856, now a professor of law living secludedly in Wernigerode, a beautiful spot in the Harz Mountains. Stammler's comprehensive and basic works, more especially *Recht und Wirtschaft* (first edition, 1896; fifth edition, 1924) and his magnificent *Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie* (second edition, Berlin, 1923) may be most warmly recommended to all who seek a deeper insight into these matters.

ery. They become economic phenomena only when they are incorporated within some particular legal order. It is only their inclusion within the externally regulated coöperation of men that is of social interest. If, however, any legal regulation is to be undertaken, the legislator must proceed with specific ideas and teleological considerations. "The mode of regulation . . . has the *logical* priority, even though it is not necessarily the temporal antecedent. Without it the phenomena of social-economic life can not be understood. Take away the concepts of private property, of freedom of contract and of the particular legal institutions of today and not a single trace of the concepts of bourgeoisie and proletariat, of surplus value and of rate of profit will remain. . . . Economic phenomena are nothing other than uniform phenomena of groups with legal relations."<sup>5</sup> In the concept of the social existence of man, law represents the form, that is, the logically conditioning aspect, whereas the economic life represents the matter, that is, the logically conditioned element. The Marxian doctrine remains undeveloped, "for it has not logically arrived at the thought that social life is subject to law." The question whether an attempt or result is justifiable cannot be answered by reference to its history. "Error and condemnable efforts likewise arise with causal necessity. . . . Social history treats of the development of the modes of human coöperation. It is, accordingly, a history of purposes. . . . In its entirety, it is a continuous chain of human strivings."<sup>6</sup> Not the economic but the legal order may therefore lay claim to the logical, even though not to the temporal, priority. There can be no economic order without a controlling activity which logically preconditions it and makes it possible.

<sup>5</sup> Stammer, R., *Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung in the Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften* (fourth ed., Vol. 6, p. 530).

<sup>6</sup> Stammer, R., *Rechts-und Staatstheorien der Neuzeit* (second ed., 1925), p. 80.

## II. THE SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL

In his essays on contemporary sociology, Ward discusses no less than twelve distinct meanings of that many-colored and highly ambiguous collective term "sociology." Perhaps it might have been possible to discover even more. The very fact that the term has received so many different meanings renders it useless for the delimitation of a specific discipline and unsuitable as a method for legal and political philosophy. Sociology's greatest defect lies in its use of analogies drawn from natural science. It is particularly attracted to the so-called "organismic" conception of law and of the State.<sup>7</sup> The State is compared with an organism, and its organization and differentiation are described after the pattern of the human body. Toennies compares the city of mediaeval Germany, which supplied its needs from within itself and its immediate environment, with an organism. The modern city and world metropolis, on the other hand, he likens to a mechanism. In very recent times Rudolf Steiner and his anthroposophic school have advocated a three-fold differentiation of the social organism. Corresponding to the head, chest, and digestive system of the human body are the mental, the political-legal, and the economic orders within the social organism; each of these possesses a certain independence and is governed by laws of its own. This confused doctrine fails to make clear how the legal and economic orders can be administered without reliance upon the mental order. The untenability of the thesis that there are independent economic laws, free from connection with a legal system, we

<sup>7</sup> We would refer to the works of the late Otto von Giercke of Berlin—the great German historian of law; also to the various writings of the famous German national economist, Schaeffle, likewise deceased; and still further to the thoughtful and stimulating book, *Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft* (fifth ed., 1924) by the well-known sociologist, Ferdinand Toennies, of Kiel.

have already shown above. The concept "organic," as also its antithesis "mechanical," belongs exclusively to the field of natural science, as Kant has argued in his *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. The science of law, however, is a *teleological* science. Its proper method of investigation is teleological and not causal. Law and the State, as must ever again be expressly emphasized, are conscious and freely willed creations. For their interpretation, therefore, natural science can furnish at most certain illustrations, and even these must be used with great caution; never can it supply the principle for the organization of ideas.

### III. RELATIVISM IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

In recent times this movement may count a numerous following in Germany. Its main leaders are: the elder Jellinek (1830-1905) with his very stimulating book, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (third ed., 1923); Müller-Erbacher; Radbruch, of Kiel, author of *Grundlinien der Rechtsphilosophie* (1914); the well-known nationalist economist, Max Weber, now some time deceased; and Bendix. Historically, it may be traced back to the positivism of the French philosopher, Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Though exhibiting differences in matters of emphasis and of detail, these thinkers are thoroughly at one in their unqualified denial that legal and political philosophy possesses absolute validity. A weary skepticism is apparent in all their writings and theories; likewise, resignation and acceptance of a limited status. Only thorough-going relativities are recognized, more especially only subjective and historically conditioned value-judgments relating to law, the State and society. "This is a view as weak as it is inconsistent.



. . . The possibility of science depends upon the principle of unity. The latter definitely determines the synthesis of the relativities, and without a unitary synthesis we would have only a wild confusion of unmeaning accidentalities."<sup>8</sup>

This unifying principle, fundamental in every investigation of law, we will describe in the last section of our paper, where we set forth the legal and political philosophy of Stammler.

#### IV. THE MOVEMENT FOR EMANCIPATION FROM THE DOMINANCE OF LAW

This school envisages a legal system that is plastic and adaptable to the requirements of individual cases as these arise. The judge is to be bound as little as possible by compulsory legal prescriptions. Dominated by the spirit of *Treu und Glauben*, in all instances, he is to shape his decisions by reference to the requirements of the case in question. At first glance this contention is attractive. However, it cannot withstand close, critical examination. Its adoption would lead to an unparalleled legal uncertainty. In numerous legal relationships, rigid formalism is inseparable from legal security. This is apparent, for example, if we consider the law of exchange, with its rigor and its prescriptions with respect to legal forms; or, likewise, checks, and all public registers, such as that of real estate, of commerce, and of property held jointly by husband and wife. Similarly, legal security often requires strict time specifications as, for example, in the case of

<sup>8</sup> Stammler, R., *Die grundsätzlichen Richtungen der neueren Jurisprudenz*, No. 38 in *Rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen und Vorträge* (Vol. 2, p. 326).

terms of limitation and the attainment of majority. "The insistence, on the part of those who advocate emancipation from the dominance of law, that the legislator shall be prohibited from using a rigidly formulated system of law as the means for the attainment of desirable social conditions is a doctrinaire limitation without parallel. Such action would impoverish our legal condition without yielding any moral advantage."<sup>9</sup> This movement, to be sure, has not been without significant results, more especially as it is represented by the university professors, Stampe of Greifswald and Kantorowicz of Freiburg. These thinkers energetically insist that the judgments of the courts should not represent an uncritical application of, or appeal to, the so-called "ruling ideas." The content of the latter is very difficult to determine; moreover, they occasionally diverge completely from the standards of *Treu und Glauben*, and thus of that which is really valid. The thought movement now under discussion, however, exhibits its unsystematic character and its great weakness in the fact that it does not know what should be set up as the objective criteria in place of the ruling ideas. To refer the individual judge to his own "free decision" would be to create a complete vacuum; subjective inclination can not be our goal, and, indeed, is not that for which we strive. A satisfactory outlook is afforded solely by a legal and political theory which is most recent in point of time and which stands alone in being completely elaborated. To this we now turn.

<sup>9</sup> Stammer, *ibid.*, p. 382.

## V. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW AND OF THE STATE

The founder of this theory is the profound social philosopher, Rudolf Stammler, the only one in Germany, and indeed in German-speaking countries, who deserves the name of legal philosopher. Thanks to his contributions, we, for the first time since the death of Hegel, again have a philosophy of law. Joseph Kohler and von Jhering are frequently described as legal thinkers, but only inappropriately. Kohler was a general historian, and Jhering an empiricist. The fundamental conceptions of the imposing thought-structure erected by Stammler are about as follows: Legal philosophy is concerned with that which is universally valid within the field of law. But that which is thus universally valid is alone the mode of organization of our thoughts. Legal philosophy, therefore, has to do with pure *forms* of the law. By form, however, is meant that which conditions the manner in which thoughts may be organized into a unity; and this is accordingly the object of separate, independent investigation. Law is a manifestation of human *will*, and is governed throughout by purposiveness. In contrast with natural science, it is based on the teleological principle. It does not fall within the field of external phenomena. It is not an object in the spacial order; and for this reason it is likewise not subject to the causal law, the latter being simply a formal method for the organization of corporeal changes within space. Law differs fundamentally from morality and from ethics in that their commands are directed towards the purification of man's inner life whereas law seeks to regulate the external rela-

tions of men to one another. Conceptually, law connotes a will that is autocratic and in its intent inviolably valid. It lays claim to a validity that is independent of the consent of those subject to it. It itself prescribes that the citizen shall be subject to it, and it determines with sovereignty whether and under what conditions the citizen may separate himself from it by withdrawal or emigration. The claim to inviolable validity, conceptually intrinsic to law, cannot, of course, at all times be completely carried through in the sphere of every day life—consider the numerous violations of law by theft, bodily injuries, fraud, and a host of other crimes. Nevertheless, it is by this claim that law may be distinguished from so-called “rules of convention” and from social customs such as expressions of politeness. Social custom, of course, often becomes evil in character, as in the case of a social compulsion to duel. Logically, or conceptually, the validity of the rule of convention depends upon the consent of those to whom it is addressed; and the conventional society, represented for the most part by classes or other special groups, is such that those comprised therein have the liberty of withdrawing according to their pleasure. If the member of a certain feudal or semi-feudal social group in former Germany (as, for example, of the Prussian officer-group) refused a challenge to duel, he was automatically excluded from the circles of those “privileged to satisfaction”; but so far as concerns the reserve officer, at any rate, there never was any legal compulsion to participate in the “knightly” duel. Indeed, the law in Germany *universally* prohibited duelling on the part of officers. Herein is exemplified a direct clash between law and the customs of a social class. To be sure, the rule of convention often possessed, as it still continues to do, a far greater *psychological* power than the opposing regulation of the legal order; for the failure to observe the rule of convention seriously prejudiced one’s social standing,



if, indeed, it did not even lead to a boycott. This circumstance, however, in no wise affects the logical distinction between the legal system and the rules of convention.

The ideal goal of the law, that is, the *idea* of law, is the free community, an order representing that which is objectively valid, free from the turbid, purely subjective desires and feelings of pleasure characteristic of man as a volitional being. As a matter of actual fact, of course, this ideal can never be completely realized, any more than can any other idea or ideal.

“Earth’s residue to bear  
Hath sorely pressed us;  
It were not pure and fair,  
Though ’twere asbestos.”

—(*Goethe*).

But this social ideal, this concept of community, must ever be the goal of our thought and the guiding star on our earthly voyage. Upon this star we must fix our eyes as does the sailor upon the pole star gleaming in the heavens.

Justice consists in judging a particular empirical content by reference to the concept of community in such wise, and with such an orientation, that each person respects every other as a member of the social community, and, following the admonition of the great sage of Königsberg, Kant, never uses him as a means to his personal ends. Much rather must every debtor be regarded as obligated in the first instance to himself. Without the concept of will in accordance with law, there can be no permanent norms that bind the volitions of man, and therefore no universal social regulations. The latter, however, are indispensable if those activities that possess a social import are to be regulated along universally valid lines. For, conventional regulation, briefly described above, by its very nature makes itself felt only from case to case as these

arise. Herein lies the "right of law," so strongly contested by theoretical anarchism. The latter seeks to dissolve the entire legal and political order into merely loose, and always easily terminable, associations of free egoists.<sup>10</sup> Anarchism can never be applicable to all of the infinitely numerous social phenomena, for it takes into account only persons capable of entering into contracts and conducting business affairs; in the case of persons lacking such capacities—children, and individuals requiring tutelage and guardianship—it must resort to the legal compulsion which it rigorously proscribes in principle. We have here an inadequately considered and an inconsistent theory.

In the first section of our paper we referred to the exceedingly important role that was played in the history of ideas by Stammler, as the scientific conqueror of the historical materialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. In the present connection we would again offer a warning against the fatal, though popular and ever-recurring, misconception that Stammler asserts a *temporal* primacy of law over the economic order. According to him the primacy of law obtains only for *systematic, logical* investigation. And in thus contending, he is entirely in the right. As a matter of temporal fact, there was never, of course, even in the earliest times, an economic order without law, or law without an economic order. The two belong inseparably together, just as in life there is never matter without form. Law is simply the logically conditioning form of the economic order; and the economic order is the content whose eternal flux of becoming is regulated by law. It is only the organization, however, the regulating form of our social will, that is universally valid; the material itself of law, the content of social life, is in eternal flux. There are—and this is a further and important insight that we owe to Stammler—no natural rights which, in their con-

<sup>10</sup> One might refer to a work, well known though in ill repute, by Max Stirner (1806-1856) on *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*.

tent, are the same for all ages and peoples. Not a single legal dictate may lay claim to unchangeable and unconditional validity as regards its content. The objects of human desire differ, and are necessarily always involved in change. The conception of permanent natural rights is no less untenable than the doctrine, advanced by the romanticists and the historical school of legal thinkers in Germany, of a mystical, ineffable folk-mind represented as the invisible creator of law.<sup>11</sup>

Stammler's critical philosophy of law, necessarily sketched but briefly above, rests on a Kantian basis. But building beyond Kant, so far as concerns political philosophy, it erects a proud and imposingly complete thought-structure for which Kant laid not even so much as the foundation walls. Just as the work of the great "all-destroyer," Kant, will ever remain indestructible in general philosophy, so Stammler's monumental edifice will remain for legal and political philosophy a *κτῆμα εἰς αἶα*, that is, an abiding possession.

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<sup>11</sup> Leaders of this movement are: Karl Friedrich von Savigny (1779-1861) and Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846).

## TO EXIST OR NOT TO EXIST

IT IS no small degree of audacity that impels one, at this moment when the philosophical world is bordering upon ennui, to attempt to renew interest in the overworked and almost hackneyed subject of "general propositions and existence." Such affrontery must inevitably be rewarded with an impatient, "Is there nothing new under the sun?" And in this day when no one reads *Principia Mathematica*, and everyone reads *Sister Carrie*, such a response has a measure of justification. Metaphysical problems fare poorly in an age in which everything is measured in terms of "social reconstruction."

One is not surprised to find such problems characterized as "metaphysical lumber" immediately upon their presentation, and promptly relegated to the scrap heap. Indeed, were it not for the fact that science, in spite of its claims to positivism, continually finds itself face to face with such fundamental questions and is compelled willy nilly to answer them if only with an *ignorabimus*, metaphysics might disappear entirely as the worthless remnant of an outworn scholasticism.

It is fortunate that recent years have witnessed in connection with the contemplation of metaphysical problems, the development of a new factor, the importance of which it is impossible to exaggerate. I refer to the symbolic or mathematical logic, championed by such men as Russell, Whitehead, Couturat, Schroeder, and others. These men have emphasized among other things two points: (1) A large portion of the supposedly metaphysical questions are



matters for logic purely and simply. (2) Much of the Aristotelian logic is in need of immediate revision.

It is with the second of these that I shall be primarily concerned in this discussion. The precise problem is this. Here is a body of knowledge which has fittingly been called "traditional" logic suddenly subjected to the most disastrous criticism. Some of its most treasured possessions have been shown to contain nothing but a mass of inconsistencies and sophisms. Witness, for example, the following: Immediate inference has been critically examined, with the result that it has been shown to be valid only with certain very specific limitations. In view of a heretofore unexamined distinction between the relations individual-to-group, and species-to-genus, the older logic has been forced to re-examine its formal identification of the singular proposition and the universal proposition. The reduction of all propositions to the subject-attribute form has been proven impossible with regard to certain relational propositions; this limits the syllogistic logic quite definitely and calls for a new emphasis on extra-syllogistic arguments.

In what follows I shall concern myself with only one of these—immediate inference, for it is at this point that traditional logic has most severely felt the blow. With regard to this question specifically, symbolic logic has clearly demonstrated three things. In the first place conversion of an A proposition, and contraposition of an E proposition are no longer possible, and inversion is never permissible. In the second place the square of opposition needs re-interpretation. Inference from a universal to its subaltern is unwarranted, and the truth of a universal proposition does not demand the falsehood of its contrary, *i. e.*, the propositions, "All S is P," and "No S is P" may both be true at once. In the third place, and as a direct result, certain moods of the syllogism are fallacious, *viz.*, all of

those in which we draw a particular conclusion on the basis of premises both of which are universal.

The attack of symbolic logic upon this particular concept is centered about the problem of "existence." Stated as explicitly as possible, the question is this: Is it possible to deduce from an asserted universal proposition on the one hand, and an asserted particular proposition on the other, anything about the existence or non-existence of the elements of those propositions? Traditional logic has never answered this question because it has never asked it. Symbolic logic insists that the problem of immediate inference cannot possibly be answered without first definitely considering this question.

Let us determine first of all the solution which symbolic gives to this problem. Russell, who may be taken as the general exponent of the critical view, writes as follows: "General propositions are to be interpreted as not involving existence. When I say, for instance, 'All Greeks are men,' I do not want you to suppose that that implies that there are Greeks. It is to be considered emphatically as not implying that. That would have to be added as a separate proposition." On the other hand, "the contradiction of any general statement does assert existence."<sup>1</sup> It is impossible to state what is involved here without introducing the propositional-function,<sup>2</sup> for general and particular propositions reduce to propositional-functions of certain kinds. The proposition, "All S is P", reduces, for example, to "' $x$  is S implies  $x$  is P' is true for all values of  $x$ ." Thus, as far as the element, "S" is concerned, this proposition is entirely independent of existence, for it is true for all  $x$ 's, both those which are S and those which are not. If there should happen to be no  $x$ 's which are S, the proposition would still be true. Consequently the universal affirm-

<sup>1</sup> "Philosophy of Logical Atomism," *Monist*, 1918-19, p. 191.

<sup>2</sup> Russell's best treatment of this notion is to be found in his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, Chap. XV.

ative proposition does not assert existence. The universal negative. "No S is P" becomes " $x$  is S and P' is true for no values of  $x$ ." This, as can be readily seen, not only fails to assert existence, but actually denies the existence of  $x$ 's which are both S and P. Hence we may generalize our results thus far in the form of the statement, Universal propositions do not assert existence. On the other hand, particular propositions are interpreted as follows: "Some S is P" becomes " $x$  is S and P' is true for some values of  $x$ ." "Some S is not P" becomes by obversion, " $x$  is S and non-P' is true for some values of  $x$ ." The truth of particular propositions therefore depends upon the existence of the elements of the propositions. In general, then, we may say, Particular propositions do assert existence.

If I may be pardoned the momentary digression, I should like to here examine a further development of this notion which Russell makes. Out of the notion of a propositional-function as sometimes true, and consistent with his whole atomistic view which endeavors "to formulate a metaphysic upon the basis of a logic,"<sup>3</sup> he attempts to *define* existence. He says, for example, that the notion of a propositional-function which is sometimes true gives us the "fundamental meaning of the word 'existence'," and that "other meanings are either derived from this or embody mere confusion of thought."<sup>4</sup> Now any attempt to define existence tends at the outset to arouse suspicion. One feels with Aristotle that we can talk of its "aspects" but that *being* itself, because of its universality must always escape definition. The suspicion is supported when we note that "existence" is defined by Russell in terms of a propositional-function—a notion which, on the surface at least, appears to be of greater complexity than the idea of existence itself. When we recall that a propositional-function is "noth-

<sup>3</sup> *Monist*, op. cit., p. 496.

<sup>4</sup> *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, p. 164.

ing";<sup>5</sup> it seems strange that by adding the notion of "sometimes" to that which is nothing we can produce that which is in a sense "everything." It can be shown, quite conclusively, I think, that Russell's attempt involves a circular definition, for most of the notions involved in it, *viz.*, propositional-function, variable, truth, *etc.*, themselves imply existence. And so with every attempt to define existence. A definition of existence must either be of the notion "existence" or the word "existence"—but both of these are themselves instances of existence, consequently existence is given before we define it. Existence can never be defined or reduced to any simpler notion; it is given immediately just like Wittgenstein's concept of object.<sup>6</sup>

To return to our main topic, it is now clear why certain processes of immediate inference are faulty. Conversion of an A proposition is fallacious because we pass from a universal proposition to a particular, and therefore tacitly introduce the existential element. This suggests the difficulty noted by Keynes,<sup>7</sup> with regard to the partial inverse of an A proposition which gives the predicate distributed whereas it was not distributed in the original. The explanation given by Keynes must impress one as unsatisfactory. Furthermore we are now able to see how it is that contrary propositions may both be true. If there are no S's, then the two propositions, "Some S is P" and "Some S is not P" will both be false. But if they are false, their contradictions must be true, in which case the propositions "All S is P" and "No S is P" would both be true.

Let us now ask whether it is possible to reconcile the two views, that of the older logicians which maintains that immediate inference is a valid process throughout, and that of the newer critical school which maintains that it is only partly true. Is it possible, that is, to retain imme-

<sup>5</sup> *Monist*, p. 196.

<sup>6</sup> *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Prop. 4.127.

<sup>7</sup> *Formal Logic*, 4th ed., pp. 139-40.



mediate inference as a *formally* valid process by supplying it with a new interpretation? It seems to me that an affirmative answer to this question is justified. The reconciliation of the two views lies, therefore, in showing that each is a correct but one-sided approach to the problem. Symbolic logic considers the question from the side of extension; traditional logic from the point of view of intension. The conflict lies in a two-fold over-emphasis. In the first place traditional logic was not aware that its approach was intensional; as a result it introduced, consciously or unconsciously, a great deal of the extensional element. When the newer logic made its attack, its weapons were directed only against the extensional view, and immediate inference was clearly shown to be impossible from this approach. The older logic, not realizing the double approach, felt that immediate inference as a whole had been demonstrated to be false. In the second place, symbolic logic, in its eagerness to condemn, has maintained that its own point of view is the only possible one—the meaning of general-particular propositions is *exhausted* by the propositional-function. In accordance with this suggestion, the remainder of this paper will attempt to show (1) that everything involved in the extensional approach is quite in accordance with facts, but (2) that the intensional approach is also warranted in view of the fact that it may be consistently formulated.

(1) It is evident that such a proposition as "This is a man," implies that a man exists. The word "this" is a pointing word, or what Russell calls a proper name, and it can only be used when the particular which is named is present in perception. We have a generalized form of such propositions, which is indicated by "There are men." Such a proposition obviously implies the existence of men (or at least one man) as does the former. According to the same pattern, the proposition "There are good men"

implies the existence of good men. This is usually stated in the form of a propositional-function as "The propositional-function ' $x$  is a good man' is true for some values of  $x$ ."

Now take the proposition "Some men are good." For Russell this proposition is *equivalent* to the proposition, "There are good men." As a consequence his whole interpretation of general-particular propositions is determined. For if the latter is equivalent to the former, it may be looked upon as its *definition*. Since, therefore, a particular proposition is defined in terms of an existential proposition, that particular proposition itself will assert existence.

Consider further. If I assert the proposition "There are no centaurs," I evidently imply that, search where you will in perceptual experience, you will never find anything that can be called a centaur. Such a proposition implies the non-existence, or if you prefer, "denies the existence" of centaurs. In the same way the proposition "There are no two-legged centaurs" implies the non-existence of two-legged centaurs. Let this be taken as equivalent to the proposition, "No centaurs are two-legged," and we have determined the relation of an E proposition to the question of existence. The question of existence as related to A and O propositions can be determined by simply obverting the E and I propositions which we have defined.

Now this process seems to be beyond criticism. If general and particular propositions are approached thus empirically, they do have the relations to existence which are designated above. And clearly from this point of view immediate inference is not in general possible. Let us turn to the opposing point of view.

(2) Every general and every particular proposition may be looked upon as a statement of a dyadic relation of a definite and specific kind between concepts. From this

approach, the words, "all," "no," and "some" are devoid of all quantitative significance; they simply serve to designate the nature of the relation which subsists between the subject term and the predicate term. This type of proposition may therefore be symbolized by  $aRb$ , where " $a$ " and " $b$ " denote non-relational concepts or qualities, and " $R$ " designates a relational concept.

Since we are giving no content to our symbols, let us suppose, for convenience of symbolism, that " $R$ " represents the relation between the subject term and the predicate term in an E proposition. The the E proposition may be symbolized by  $aRb$ . Let the negative of  $R$  be designated by  $R'$ ; then

$$\neg(aRb) = aR'b \quad (\text{Definition})$$

Now if  $a$  has a definite relation to  $b$ , then it must also have a definite relation to the negative of  $b$  or  $b'$ . Designate this relation by " $r$ ". Then we have  $arb'$ . Call the negative of this relation  $r'$ ; then

$$\neg(arb') = ar'b' \quad (\text{Definition})$$

Let the relation  $r$  be defined by the following propositions:

- I.  $aRb = arb'$   
 II.  $aRb < ar'b'$

Since according to both approaches conversion of E is valid, we have as a result

III.  $aRb = bRa$

Now on the basis of these assumptions, and those immediately involved in the use of the implicative symbol, " $<$ ", it becomes possible to derive a number of direct relations of equivalence and implication between  $R$ ,  $R'$ ,  $r$ , and  $r'$ , together with corresponding adjustments and arrangements of  $a$ ,  $a'$ ,  $b$ , and  $b'$ . This is a formally correct process regardless of what particular content is given to the symbols. In order to show that this derivation corresponds precisely to what has been called immediate inference, we may let  $R$ ,  $r$ ,  $R'$ , and  $r'$  designate, respectively, the relations

between qualities in the E, A, I, and O propositions of traditional logic. The validity of immediate inference is shown in the following:

1. Obversion of E and A:  $a R b = a r b'$  (Prop. I).
2. Obversion of I and O:  $a R' b = a r' b'$  (Neg. of I).
3. Conversion of E:  $a R b = b R a$  (Prop. III).
4. Conversion of I:  $a R' b = b R' a$  (Neg. of III).
5. Conversion of A:  $a r b < b R' a$
- Proof:  $a R b < a r' b$  (Prop. II).
- $a r b < a R' b$  (*Modus tollens*).
- $< b R' a$  (Prop. 4).
6. Contrapos. of A:  $a r b = b' r a'$
- Proof:  $a r b' = a R b$  (Prop. I).
- $= b R a$  (Prop. III).
- $= b r a'$  (Prop. I).
- $a r b = b' r a'$  (Substituting  $b$  for  $b'$  and  $b'$  for  $b$ ).
7. Contrapos. of E:  $a R b < b' r a'$
- Proof:  $a R b < a r' b$  (Prop. II).
- $< b' r a'$  (Neg., Prop. 6).
8. Contrapos. of O:  $a r' b = b' r a'$
- Proof:  $a r b = b' r a'$  (Prop. 6).
- $a r' b = b' r a'$  (Neg., Prop. 6).
9. Inverse of A:  $a r b < a' R' b'$
- Proof:  $a R b < b' r a'$  (Prop. 7).
- $b R a <$  (Prop. III).
- $b' r a' < b R' a$  (*Modus tollens*).
- $a r b < a' R' b'$  (Sub.  $a$  for  $b'$ ,  $b$  for  $a'$ , etc.)
10. Inverse of E:  $a R b < a' r' b'$
- Proof:  $a r b < a' R' b'$  (Prop. 9)
- $a' R' b' < a r' b$  (*Modus tollens*)
- $a R b < a' r' b'$  (Sub.  $a$  for  $a'$ ,  $b$  for  $b'$ , etc.)



- |                     |                        |                                  |
|---------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 11. Contrad. A-O:   | $\neg(a r b) = a r' b$ | (Definition)                     |
| 12. Contrad. E-I:   | $\neg(a R b) = a R' b$ | (Definition)                     |
| 13. Subaltern of E: | $a R b < a r' b$       | (Prop. II).                      |
| 14. Subaltern of A: | $a r b < a R' b$       | ( <i>Modus tollens</i><br>of II) |
| Contraries:         | $a R b, a r b$         |                                  |
| Subcontraries:      | $a R' b, a r' b$       |                                  |

Since  $r$  is a transitive relation, it becomes possible to formulate the doctrine of the syllogism, as follows:

15. Mood AAA:  $(a r b)(b r c) < (a r c)$  (Principle of trans.)
16. Mood AEE:<sup>8</sup>  $(a r b)(b R c) < (a R c)$
- Proof:  $(a r b)(b r c) < (a r c)$  (Prop. 15)
- $(a r b)(b R c') < (a R c')$  (Prop. I)
- $(a r b)(b R c) < (a R c)$  (Sub.  $c'$  for  $c$ .)
17. Mood IAI:  $(a R' b)(b r c) < (a R' c)$
- Proof:  $(a r b)(b R c) < (a R c)$  (Prop. 16)
- $(a r b)(b R c) (a R' c) = O'$  (Restatement of impl.)
- $(a R' c)(a r b) < (b R' c)$  (Restatement of impl.)
- $(c R' a)(a r b) < (c R' b)$  (Prop. 4)
- $(a R' b)(b r c) < (a R' c)$  (Sub.  $a$  for  $c$ ,  $b$  for  $a$  and  $c$  for  $b$ .)
18. Mood IEO:  $(a R' b)(b R c) < (a r' c)$
- Proof:  $(a R' b)(b r c) < (a R' c)$  (Prop. 17)
- $(a R' b)(b r c) (a R c) = O'$  (Restatement of impl.)
- $(a R' b)(a R c) < (b r' c)$  (Restatement of impl.)
- $(b R' a)(a R c) < (b r' c)$  (Prop. 4)
- $(a R' b)(b R c) < (a r' c)$  (Sub.  $b$  for  $a$ , and  $a$  for  $b$ .)

Such a symbolism evidently suffices to justify the traditional interpretation of propositions from the point of view of immediate inference and the syllogism. This means

<sup>8</sup> In order to emphasize the transitivity of the relation, the premises are left in this order. Consequently to compare these with the valid moods of the first figure the premises will have to be interchanged.

simply that these notions may be reduced to certain fundamental and primitive propositions which are mutually consistent. The notion of immediate inference is therefore not entirely false, but capable of a valid interpretation.

It remains to be seen whether any definite content can be given to these symbols, which will serve to relate them to the common sense interpretation of general and particular propositions. Our failure to find such a content will not condemn the symbolism, for it may be true that the common sense interpretation is either too vague to fit into any precise symbolism, or else is internally inconsistent. What follows may be considered as an attempt to give to these symbols a content which will serve to relate them more definitely to the ordinary interpretation of general and particular propositions.

The relation "R" may be called "incompatibility" or "inconsistency." It is a relation which exists between concepts and is ultimately a matter of definition. Two concepts, *a* and *b*, are incompatible when the complete definition of *a* involves a term which is contradictory to one of those involved in the complete definition of *b*. A complete definition of a term is a statement of all of its "essential" attributes. Determination of definition is usually a matter of reference to experience; hence the notion of incompatibility is ultimately derived from and verified by what exists. But existence is no part of the *meaning* of such a notion. I can define any notion without supposing as a part of my definition that there are actual instances in perceptual experience of the defined notion. Consequently incompatibility does not involve existence. The same is true with regard to R', which may be interpreted as "compatibility." Two concepts, *a* and *b*, are compatible when they are not incompatible, i. e., when the complete definition of *a* involves no term which is contradictory to any involved in the complete definition of *b*. Compatibility is therefore

purely a matter of meanings of terms, and has only an indirect relation to existence. Consequently, such a proposition as "Some fairies have wings" may be true provided we know only what is involved in the definitions of "fairies" and "wings." It is possible, that is, to make true particular propositions which do not involve existence.

It is not so easy to give a content to the relation symbolized by " $r$ ". To interpret it as "implication" is not to be led far astray if one guards against passing over to Russell's extensional use of the word. From the intensional side, the interpretation of  $r$  again involves definition. Universal affirmative propositions, according to Joseph,<sup>9</sup> are of two types: scientific and historical judgments. Obviously, from an intensional point of view, only the former are significant for logic. In this type of proposition, a complete definition of the subject must include the predicate. Consequently, we may interpret " $arb$ " as "the definition of  $a$  includes  $b$ ." This makes every universal affirmative proposition analytic—precisely what is meant, it seems to me, by the term *scientific*. In accordance with this interpretation of  $r$ , the symbol " $r$ " will indicate its negative, i. e., the proposition " $ar'b$ " signifies that  $b$  is not included in the definition of  $a$ . Both of these notions are entirely independent of any existential implication; hence propositions which express them cannot be said to imply existence.

It will perhaps be well to interpret our three primitive propositions in the light of these notions. The first proposition says that " $a$  is incompatible with  $b$ ," is equivalent to "the definition of  $a$  involves not- $b$ ." This is evidently true, for the *definiens* could hardly include qualities which are incompatible with the *definiendum*. Proposition II, which expresses the relation of E to O, says that "the incompatibility of  $a$  and  $b$  implies that  $b$  is not included in the definition of  $a$ , but the converse is not true," i. e., if two

<sup>9</sup> *An Introduction to Logic*, p. 177.

qualities are incompatible, one cannot be included in the definition of the other, but the fact that one of two terms is not used to define the other does not imply their incompatibility. Taking the *modus tollens* we can interpret the relation of A to I: if one of two qualities is involved in the definition of the other, they must be compatible, but compatibility alone is not a sufficient warrant for assuming that one is involved in the definition of the other. Proposition III asserts simply that the relations of compatibility and incompatibility are symmetric relations, which is evidently true.

In conclusion, space forbids that I more than indicate the implications of this view as they would exhibit themselves in the theory of knowledge. A priorism is definitely repudiated. The notions of implication, incompatibility, definition, etc., have their basis ultimately in sense experience. This does not mean that one thing may imply another, or that one object may define another; it does mean, however, that all of these logical relations which refer primarily to concepts, take their origin in certain definite and specific relations which particulars may have to one another. Outside of spatial and temporal relations, probably the most fundamental of these is that of similarity or resemblance. It seems possible to develop the whole notion of implication from the empirically observed relation of similarity. This is not done after the pattern of Jevons' equational logic, but through the medium of degrees of resemblance, which again is an empirical fact. Since the laws of logic themselves are made up of such notions as implication, incompatibility and definition, this view makes even these laws referable to experience for their validity, and as a result might be called empirico-rationalism.

The outcome of the whole discussion is simply this. Profiting by its conflict with symbolic logic, the older logic is discovering the methodological value of self-criticism.



Realizing that there can be only *one* logic, and therefore that its disagreement with the newer viewpoint must be a matter merely of vagueness or ambiguity of terms, the traditional logic is attempting to justify its own existence by re-examining its subject-matter. It is discovering in this process that underneath the inaccuracy of terms there is to be found accuracy of meaning. Consequently it is re-defining many of its notions. Fortunately, in this process of self-examination, the traditional logic is beginning to appreciate the value of a precise symbolism, and is thus adopting the weapon of those who are attacking it. This promises well. In particular I have tried to show that out of the conflict has come the realization of the need for a sharper distinction between extension and intension, or, with regard to propositions, between derivation and meaning. This can be done only by formulating an intensional symbolism. Such a symbolism has been suggested above, though this makes no claim to simplicity or accuracy. At this moment I can see no reason why all of logic could not be developed from such a point of view and according to such a symbolism. If such a development can be carried out, then it will be incumbent upon someone to construct a "table of translation," by means of which the intensional logic could be transcribed into terms of the extensional. This would serve to definitely relate the problem of meaning to the problem of existence.

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## A REALIST VIEW OF ILLUSION AND ERROR

THE fundamental doctrine of modern Realism may be expressed as follows: "When we know anything, we know it as it really is"; or again "knowing is not making, but finding." We are sometimes asked, what evidence is there for this? Why this blind act of faith? The answer is simple; the doctrine is really self-evident—we see by mere reflection upon it that it must be true. This is the proper answer: but we may also point out that the contrary view—the view that knowing *is* making—turns out on examination to be unintelligible and self-contradictory. For unless we know things as they really are, there can be no argument about anything whatever; indeed there cannot be any affirmation, let alone argument: even the judgment—"knowing is making"—even this judgment cannot on its own showing be true; for the fact which it purports to assert is (on its own showing) made by him who asserts it, and when he ceases to assert it, or to think about it, it "goes out bang" as Tweedledum said.

Thus in his fundamental doctrine the Realist, it appears, is right: indeed, he is perfectly entitled to say that all philosophy—if only it understood itself—is and must be, in this fundamental sense, realistic. And this would be just as true of, say, Hume and Mill as of Reid or Dr. G. E. Moore. For Hume and Mill admit and assert the reality of sensations and images: it does not matter that those sensations and those images are fleeting: they really do occur, whether

we think about their occurrence or not: similarly the laws which govern their occurrence, their coexistence or sequence—these laws really do hold whether any philosopher thinks about them or not: and this (so far at least) is realism.

Thus the fundamental principle of realism seems unassailable. But as soon as we try to apply it to details, we are plunged into a sea of troubles. A realistic theory of perception or of the physical world is at once confronted with the problem of illusion, or (more generally) with the problem of relativity in its widest sense. A realistic theory of judgment is confronted with the problem of error, and (we might add) with the problem of belief. Finally a realistic theory of the good or of "values" seems powerless to explain the diversity of opinions upon this matter which prevail and have prevailed among mankind.

All these difficulties have of course a certain common character: the trouble is always that the nature of the subject seems to alter the object in some way. Now, of course, this fact (if fact it be) is not fatal to the fundamental basis of realism—the principle that when we know a thing we know it as it is. For unless illusion, error, and prejudice really existed, and existed whether known and thought about or not, there would obviously be no problem at all. A subjective idealist for instance cannot use the fact of error against the fundamental principle of realism. For unless that fundamental principle be true, the facts of error, like everything else, cease to be facts at all—they become mere dreams which only exist when subjective idealists are dreaming about them; and which don't even exist then, for the subjective idealist (as we saw) is not even entitled to assert that his dreams really occur, or that he is really dreaming. Thus the facts of error, for instance, cannot possibly be fatal to Realism as such, but only (at most) to mistaken applications of Realism.

But in any case those facts, together with the facts of illusion and prejudice, are there and must be dealt with somehow: it is no good to pretend that they don't exist. And there seem to be two main ways of dealing with them: first there is the dogmatic way; the realist may say firmly and flatly, "In spite of certain errors, we really do apprehend the Real as it is; in spite of illusions which sometimes occur, we really do perceive an independently existing physical world; and in spite of prejudices, which certainly exist among unenlightened people, there is an objective good or moral law." This seems a curious position to take up, though I think we could easily find examples of it. And in some ways it certainly is a strong position; the holder of it asserts that his views, or their main principles, are self-evident. "But," he will add, "the self-evident is only self-evident to people who reflect upon it; and if you are not capable of reflection, so much the worse for you." Now no doubt it is quite true that (as has been said<sup>1</sup>) the self-evident need not be evident to everybody. We do not "see" its truth unless we reflect. And it is clear that there are certain self-evident principles which cannot be proved. The law of contradiction is an instance, and so perhaps is the principle that when we know a thing we know it as it is. But surely we ought to be very careful indeed about admitting self-evident propositions: it is obvious for instance that feeble mortals like ourselves cannot for purely psychological reasons "grasp" a principle easily until we have seen its applications; again a proposition which is thought to be self-evident may in part really be so, but there may be irrelevant additions,<sup>2</sup> which have to be got rid of. In other words it really comes to this: we must be very careful about first the scope and secondly the expression of self-evident principles. And it follows that although we may think that

<sup>1</sup> I think by Mr. H. W. B. Joseph of New College.

<sup>2</sup> As apparently was the case with the doctrine of the Syllogism discovered (independently) by Hindu philosophers,



the dogmatic realists of whom we have spoken are "right in the end," yet it appears almost certain that (1) some of these supposedly self-evident propositions are of larger or narrower scope than they think—need extending or limiting; (2) others, though true, are not primary but derivative; (3) others are ill-expressed, perhaps with irrelevant additions. Thus we ought for conscience sake to be suspicious of those philosophers who constantly appeal to the self-evident in dealing with the problems of illusion, error, and prejudice.

But these problems may be dealt with in another way. This we may call the way of Neo-realism, using that name to cover the American New Realists and those who sympathize with them. "Illusory" *sensa*, we may say, are just as real and independent of minds as "normal *sensa*." When we put our stick into the proverbial pond, we see something bent: but this bent something is in no way illusory, it is a real member of that group of *sensa* compendiously called the stick. The stick simply is the whole group of the *sensa* which are commonly called appearances of it. The problem of perspective can be dealt with in a similar fashion. With regard to error, we may say that there are in the real world true propositions existing independently of our minds, and false propositions likewise. When we err, or make a false judgment, what happens is that we choose one of those existing false propositions and assert it, instead of choosing and asserting a true one. And we might take the same line with regard to the theory of "value" or of the good. All kinds of false or partly false propositions about the good subsist, we might say, independently of all minds: and some people, though not of course we ourselves, unfortunately assert and believe the false ones.

This kind of solution is at first sight a very attractive one. But on reflection we begin to wonder whether after all it doesn't raise more difficulties than it solves. The Neo-

realist theory of illusion cannot give an adequate account of change: it cannot (if conscientious) avoid saying that all perceived change is real change—in other words it cannot distinguish between what Kant called subjective and objective succession of *sensa*. If in the course of a train journey Lancashire succeeds Cheshire<sup>3</sup> in my field of vision, then (it seems) the Neo-realist is bound on his own principles to assert that Cheshire has really and objectively turned into Lancashire; and if in the course of my journey I had fallen asleep and so had ceased to perceive any *sensa* at all, then on Neo-realist principles, Lancashire must have ceased to exist while I was asleep: for all succession is *ex hypothesi* objective, and Lancashire was succeeded by blank nothing in the field of my consciousness. "Yes, in your consciousness" it may be replied "but not in reality: of course not." But the Neo-realist cannot reply in that way: for such an answer presupposes that at any rate some characteristics of our *sensa* are what they are because of their relation to us, and this is as good as surrendering the Neo-realist position. Thus the Neo-realist is caught either way: if he says that all succession is objective, he must admit that *sensa* pass out of existence when they "pass out of my ken," i. e., that they exist only when known, but if he says that some succession is subjective—would not be what it is if the character of the percipient mind were different—then again he has admitted that the nature of the percipient modifies what is perceived. And if in some cases this modification occurs, why not in all? "Apparent" successions of *sensa* do not differ *qua successions* of *sensa* from so-called "Real" or "Objective" successions. If in some cases their succession character depends upon the percipient mind, so it does in all cases: and if this be so, then not only the succession of the *sensa*, but also the *sensa* which are in the succession, must depend somehow upon

<sup>3</sup> Or the classes of *sensa* commonly so called.

the percipient mind. For we cannot separate the *sensa* from their relations, and say "the *sensa* themselves are real, but the relations are dependent upon the mind." At least this would be a very odd proceeding. And even if we said something of that kind, it would not save us. For if once you admit that the percipient mind has *some* influence upon the nature of what is perceived, where are you going to stop? You may say, the mind's influence goes thus far, but no farther: but this statement must be proved. And how shall we prove it?

The Neo-realist theory of error is likewise open to a very simple objection. Granting that true and false propositions subsist by themselves in the circumambient void, how do the true ones differ from the false ones? The answer will be, the true ones correspond with the facts, and the false ones do not. This seems satisfactory, provided that we know what "correspond" means here (e. g., Does it only mean "are true of"?) We may also ask, what exactly are those independently subsisting propositions: if they are there, whether assorted or not, how do they come to be there? But leaving that, a more serious difficulty arises: why do some misguided persons choose false propositions instead of true ones? If such false and true ones are really there at everyone's disposal, it does seem strange that anyone should choose and assert the false ones. In other words, the problem is only thrust one stage further back, but it is not solved. We began by asking "Why do people assert false propositions": and Neo-realism answers, because the false propositions are there waiting to be asserted. But the question now arises: Why then do people select false propositions? The obvious reason is, because (at the time at any rate) they think them true; because, in other words, they are in error about the real nature of those propositions. Thus we seem to be committed to an infinite regress of errors. First there is the erroneous proposition: then

there is the erroneous belief that this proposition is true—and this, on the theory before us, must be a belief in an erroneous proposition about the first proposition. Then there is a further false belief that this belief is true, and so on forever. At every step, we come up against the question “If this proposition is false, why is it believed to be true?” And we never get an answer. Thus the theory of subsistent true and false propositions does not at all explain the fact of error: and if it does not, should not so bizarre a theory be abandoned?

A similar argument would hold with regard to false propositions about the good or about “values.” If those false propositions really subsist independent of those who believe and assert them, why, we must ask, are they erroneously supposed to be true? The stubborn root of error is not so easily got rid of.

Thus the Neo-realist solution of our problem, attractive though it be, seems to break down. It gives us a weird world in which entities are painfully multiplied, a world full of strange existent sensa, and strange subsistent propositions: but the problem of illusion and the problem of error (with its two sides, error as to fact and error as to good) is not really solved at all: we have only to wait a little, and like Nature it comes running back. And on the other hand the dogmatic solution which relied on self-evidence will not do either. Thus we are left in a very uncomfortable position, convinced that the fundamental principle of Realism is true, and indeed that it cannot intelligibly be doubted: but powerless to apply that principle to the complicated facts of experience. We must try then to look afresh at those facts woefully complicated though they are.

Let us consider illusion first. People often confuse illusion with error, or speak as if they did. But the distinction is clear enough, at least *prima facie*. An error is a false *judgement* (or inference): an illusion is an unusual



*fact*, which misleads the unwary. More particularly; an illusion or, better, an illusory sensum is a sensum which is not succeeded<sup>4</sup> by the sensa which an ordinary ignorant person would naturally have expected to succeed it. It in itself is a perfectly good sensum, like any other: if we are misled by it, owing to an ignorance or inattention, so much the worse for us. Thus an illusory sensum, though it is sometimes the occasion of error, is not an error itself, and is not even necessarily connected with error. Surely nothing could be clearer than this. It is surely high time that people learned not to mix up the problem of error with the problem of illusion.

But what is the problem of illusion? Simply this: that "illusory" sensa are qualitatively similar to "normal" sensa. The face which I see in the mirror (as we say) is just like a "real" face, though its position in space is peculiar. Or, to take a rather different case of what is really the same difficulty, the colored shape at which I look really does grow smaller and less distinct in outline as the distance between it and "me" (i. e., the complex of sensa commonly called "me" or "my body") is increased. I don't merely think that it grows smaller: it really does grow smaller. And in the same way the face is really seen behind the mirror: and if (to use the language of the plain man) I press one eyeball, my visual sensa really are doubled.

Such facts, the endless facts of illusion and perspective, can only lead us to one conclusion: "illusory" and "normal" sensa must stand or fall together: if normal sensa exist unperceived, so do illusory ones too; and if illusory sensa do *not* exist unperceived, neither do normal ones either. We must choose one or other of these alternatives. Neo-realism we saw chooses the first: *all* sensa, it says, exist unperceived and independent of minds. We may admire this view for its bold and uncompromising methods: but we

<sup>4</sup> Or preceded or accompanied.

have seen that it comes to a bad end; first it multiplies entities to a terrible degree, and then, by its failure to deal with the problem of subjective and objective succession, it destroys itself. So we have to choose the second alternative: we must hold that *no* sensa exist unperceived; all sensa alike whether "normal" or "illusory" depend upon the percipient mind.

But at once a difficulty of the gravest kind confronts us. Have we not insisted that things known are independent of the knowing mind? And surely perception is a kind of knowing? Yes, certainly it is: are we then driven by our realist view of knowledge (the only possible view) to adopt the Neo-realist view of perception? Many advocates of realism, and nearly all opponents of it, seem to think that we are. But surely this is a strange mistake. Sensa are independent of minds in respect of perception. But why should they not be dependent on minds in some *other* respect? After all, knowing is not the sole activity of the mind, even if you say that it is the sole activity of the *subject*. Let us say then that sensa are dependent upon minds in respect of sentience,<sup>5</sup> though not in respect of perception; or again, let us say that minds "have" sensa, as well as perceive them. It does not follow of course that sensa are dependent *only* upon minds: very far from that; and this is where the facts of subjective and objective succession come in. Indeed, it seems quite probable that sensa are largely dependent upon a real system of bodies, extended in space, enduring and changing in time; or if this is going too far—if the use of the word "bodies" here is misleading and unwarranted—at least we can say this much: our sensa are dependent in some respects upon sentient minds, but in most respects upon a something or system of somethings, which if it is not *in* space and time, at least acts

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Dr. Stout's doctrine of immediate experience in his paper "Things and Sensations."

diversely *at* various points in space and various instants of time. Thus in some sense there is a real physical world, though by no means in the plain man's sense; and this physical world, interacting with sentient minds, produces the world of *sensa* (or of appearances) which in perception we know.

Of course it may still be said that we have merely taken cover behind a word. "Sentience," it may be objected, or "having" for that matter—these are only names for the problem. They do not help to solve it. There is obviously some excuse for this objection; especially as the conception of a "mind," to which we have assigned sentience as an attribute, is terribly vague. When we want, in our philosophising, to dispose of some inconvenient entity, we call it mental or spiritual, and put it into the mind; if not into the individual mind, then into some super-individual mind, which is invented or discovered for that purpose; and this seems to satisfy most people. Let us try, then, to state our result in a more agnostic and less question-begging form. What are the indubitable facts of this matter? Simply these: *sensa* are independent of the percipient mind (since perception is a kind of knowing) and yet we cannot without contradiction suppose that they exist in the absence of percipients. It follows from this that *sensa* are (partially) dependent upon something *S*, which is present where the percipient mind is present, and absent where it is absent. This *S* may be a "part" of the "mental structure" of the percipient though not his percipient "part"; on the other hand it may not; all we know is that *S* somehow or other is intimately connected with the percipient mind. We must add one word of warning. We are *not* entitled to hold that *S* is the nervous system, as some rash people think. For what we commonly call the nervous system is nothing but a collection of *sensa*: and these *sensa*, like any others, are dependent upon *S* for their existence.

No one would pretend for a moment that the above account was satisfactory. Still there seems to be no glaring contradictions in it. But perhaps it may serve as an example to show that a theory of perception can be framed which is faithful to the fundamental principle of Realism (as any feasible theory must be) and yet does not come into obvious conflict with the observed facts, nor destroy itself, as Neo-realism does.

The problem of illusion is puzzling enough, but it is as nothing compared with the problem of error. The problem is, why do people make false judgements instead of true ones—since they are intelligent beings? We have seen before that this problem cannot be used to destroy the basic principle that when we know anything we know it as it is; for all arguments, arguments about error just as much as others, presupposes that principle, and so do all statements. Still, the problem remains: why do people make false judgments; or (if you will) how are false judgments possible? The plain man would probably answer, why shouldn't they be possible? Could anyone expect anything else? But the plain man, if he said that, would not have seen the difficulty. Obviously it is this: if some judgments are false, why should not all be so? And yet all cannot be so; else, what are we arguing about? Now if all judgments are alike in kind *qua* judgments, the difficulty does seem insoluble. For either all so-called false judgments must really be true, or all so-called true judgments must really be false: and either alternative is absurd.

But of course we must never dream of admitting that true judgments and false judgments are alike in kind. They are expressed in the same verbal form, of course, that of the proposition. But we must not be deceived by words. If I say, "The sun is larger than the earth," that is a proposition: and if I say, "The earth is larger than the sun," that is a proposition, too. The two statements are, verb-



ally, of the same form: and more than that, the entities to which the statements refer are the very same perfectly real entities, namely the sun, the earth, and a system of spatial relations: in the one statement they are combined or arranged in one way, in the other statement, in a different way, but still (we may reasonably say) they are the same entities in both cases. But in spite of these points of similarity or identity, there is a vast difference between the two judgments; a difference in the *state of mind* of him who judges. That is the crucial point. In fact the man who says, "The earth is larger than the sun" is not really *judging* at all; or if we like, he is not *thinking*. What is he doing then? What is his state of mind, since clearly he is in *some* state of mind? Perhaps we may best describe it in the words of the late Prof. Cook-Wilson: the man does not judge or think that A is B; he is only *under the impression that* A is B. It may be said, this is a foolish answer, for it only gives us one word instead of another. Of course, words explain nothing by themselves: nevertheless the verbal difference here signifies a most important difference in the facts—a difference which many people never seem to notice, obvious though it be.

The difference is simply this, that man has a two-fold nature. He is both a psycho-physiological organism, and a rational or intelligent being. This fact, however exactly we express it, is well-known to everybody except a few psychologists: indeed it is almost notorious. Of course, it will not "explain" error—nothing will do that—but it may help us to see exactly what error is. For how, after all, would we account for any particular error made by a particular person? Clearly, in terms of psychological laws, so far as these are known to us. We should say that Mr. A's false belief was due to association, or again to his desires, or his character and upbringing. And we believe that with sufficient knowledge of psychological laws in general, and of

particular psychical facts, we could account for all the false beliefs that ever were held. To account for false beliefs in terms of repressed "wishes" is one of the chief aims of the psycho-analyst; and whatever we may think of his methods or his terminology, we must at least admit that such research into the origin of false beliefs is part of the proper business of psychology.

But although a false belief, a "being under an impression" may be thus accounted for psychologically, a *judgment* as such cannot. For a judgment, in the proper sense of the word, is an operation of intelligence or reason, and this power or principle (whatever we call it) falls quite outside the scope of psychology. To borrow Professor Alexander's term, reason "emerges" out of, or in, the psycho-physiological organism (or again "supervenes upon it") but it cannot be explained in terms of that organism. No doubt, if certain psycho-physical conditions be not present, reason cannot operate at all: it cannot (as we commonly think) operate in a worm, or in a man who is sound asleep. But once it does begin to operate, its operation is not determined by psychological laws in any way whatever. Its movement is determined by the nature of the facts before it, whatever those facts be (of course they may be psychical facts, as we call them). It analyses and synthesises those facts—that is the operation which we call judgment; and the objective connection of one fact with another (including those facts which we call universals) determines its movement in inference. Reason then is determined in its operations by the objective nature of the facts before it: and is *not* determined by the nature of the mind in or through which it operates.

The operations of Reason (or whatever we call it) constitute knowledge, that is, the knowing of facts. Belief on the other hand is as such psychologically determined by the particular nature of the believing mind. But all beliefs of

course are not erroneous, in the ordinary meaning of the word belief. Many are highly probable, and there are few which do not contain (as we say) "some element of truth." Thus we must express our conclusion rather differently.

We might perhaps make a distinction between pure knowledge and pure belief. Pure knowledge would be a state of mind which was in every respect rationally determined, i. e., determined by the nature of the objective facts: while pure belief would be a state of mind which was in any respect psychologically determined—i. e., determined only by the nature and experience of the believing mind. Our ordinary condition is somewhere between these two extremes. And hence, idealist logicians can plausibly say that all our judgments are more or less infected with error. And we may perhaps accept this wider and looser use of the term judgment,<sup>6</sup> though strictly speaking judgment as an operation of reason, cannot possibly err. We may even accept the doctrine of degrees of truth, if we understand exactly what it means: and in order to do so, we might well restate it somewhat as follows: All our ordinary statements and opinions are in part rationally or objectively determined, by the nature of the facts; and in part psychologically determined, by the nature of our minds. And one statement (or opinion) A is more true than another B, when A is to a greater extent or in more respects rationally determined than B.

But if all our opinions are of this half-and-half consistency, how do we know that they are so? And how do we know which elements are true and which false? This question is fatal to the idealist who says that *all* our opinions are more or less false. For if he is right, of course this opinion likewise, the opinion that all our opinions are more or less false, is itself more or less false, and so cannot stand. In other words, there are some facts, however few, about

<sup>6</sup> Opinion might be better. And we cannot in any case admit that *all* judgments are partially false.

which we don't merely have opinions, but which we *know*. In other words, we must come back at last to the position of the people whom we called Dogmatic Realists, and say that some propositions are self-evident. Only we must reflect very carefully upon propositions supposed to be self-evident: we must assure ourselves by reflection that those propositions really are rational propositions, and that our consent to them is determined not by our desires or our past experience or a pain in our tooth or by anything psychological, but purely by the nature of the propositions themselves, or rather of the facts thereby expressed. There is no other royal road by which we may infallibly escape error. For after all we are not wholly or only rational beings; we are also (unfortunately) psycho-physiological organisms, subject to the laws of the natural world.

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## CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS

PHILOSOPHIE DER SYMBOLISCHEN FORMEN. Bd. II, DAS MYTHISCHE DENKEN.  
By Ernst Cassirer. (Pp. xvi, 320). Bruno Cassirer Verlag, Berlin, 1925.

In his essay on Einstein's theory of relativity (1921) Cassirer defines the task of systematic philosophy as the apprehension of the system "of symbolic forms, the application of which produces the concept of an ordered reality, and by virtue of which subject and object, ego and world are separated and opposed to each other in definite form, and it must refer each individual in this totality to its fixed place. If we assume this problem solved, then the rights would be assured and the limits fixed, of each of the particular forms of the concept and of knowledge as well as the general forms of the theoretical, ethical, aesthetic and religious understanding of the world." The symbolic forms, then, are the systems of symbols by which man objectifies and understands his world. One such system of symbols is that of the mathematical and physical sciences which Cassirer has analyzed in *Substance and Function*. From this limited and technical, although central field, Cassirer has formed the idea of a universal Philosophy of Symbolic Forms which shall trace the function of symbolism through all branches of human culture. The first volume of this new work, published in 1923, dealt with language, while in the present volume the subject is myth; a third volume, on the philosophy of science, is still to be published. In general the two volumes carry out the point of view of the *Erkenntnisproblem* and *Substance and Function*; their standpoint is that of critical idealism. In the earlier works Cassirer dealt with the logic of the most abstract branches of knowledge, primarily mathematics and physics, while he now applies his critical method to the more primitive and universal strata of thought which are embodied in Language and Myth, especially in the language and myths of primitive man. His method remains the critical method, that is to say, it presupposes a mass of empirical material, which has been collected by empirical researchers in the fields of language and myth. In the case of the present work it is the material supplied, for example, by such works as Frazer's *Golden Bough*, which Cassirer makes it his problem to analyze. He makes no attempt to construct the material *a priori* or to force it into the artificial mold of a dialectical scheme; indeed, one might rather wish that he had been able to systematize his material more sharply and definitely. He follows the given contours of his subject-matter although always demand-

ing of it answers to questions formulated from his epistemological standpoint.

His problem is primarily to trace the "logical" motives, the "ideas" which are involved in mythology, more exactly to come to grasp the *form of the mythical consciousness* which manifests itself in the whole system of the world of mythology. For the mythical consciousness has its logical and phenomenological structure quite as much as has the scientific. Cassirer's method is thus equally opposed to the metaphysical interpretation of myth of Schelling, which viewed the development of myth as the actual process by which God comes to self-consciousness, and to the merely psychological interpretation offered by Wundt, which would explain myth primarily in terms of the mechanistic association of ideas. Consciousness is in all its manifestations an active and creative power which has its own structure or form, and it is this latter which the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms seeks to understand. Cassirer thus seeks to apply the "transcendental method" of Kant to a field which seems at first sight merely given over to chaos and irrationality and to show that it too has its categories and principles.

This problem determines the plan of Cassirer's book. After a preliminary discourse on the idea of a philosophy of mythology, the general features of the mythical consciousness of objectivity are described. The basic antithesis of myth is that of sacred and profane: the extraordinary, mysterious and divine on the one side and the everyday routine experiences on the other. It is this distinction which is lacking to modern science, which would seem to be the dividing line between the two. Space, time and number as they are conceived in myth are next considered. Space and time are, of course, not conceived in myth as abstractly homogeneous systems of reference, but as concretely differentiated wholes. Each direction of space has its mythical and magical meaning, while as Cassirer shows in detail each of the religions has its characteristic view of time. The Hindu seeks to escape from time, the Chinese with their ancestor-worship seek stability and perpetuity in time, the Jews and Persians with their prophetic and ethical religions are directed towards the future, while in the Greek consciousness the present comes to its rights. Time is by no means a mere abstract fourth dimension of space in the mythical and religious consciousness; its parts are qualified by a different value and significance according to the basic attitude of the system of myth involved. Number, the great instrument of science, appears in myth not as a mere abstract scale of quantity, but each number has its distinct and frequently magical individuality. After discussing the structure of the spatio-temporal world in the mythical consciousness, Cassirer portrays the discovery of subjective reality, the discovery of the ego, i. e., its separation from the primitive matrix of a universally animated and living nature. Totemism and the personal gods play a very important part in this process.

It is not in accordance with Cassirer's method to draw up, after the fashion of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, a definite list of categories or principles either for science or for myth. His interest is not in a clear-cut logical system of categories but rather in tracing certain pervasive atti-

tudes through the cultural material at hand. The categories of the mythical consciousness are for the most part the same as those of the scientific consciousness, time, space, causality, object, etc., but they appear in a special modality, as Cassirer calls it, in a peculiar shading and nuance of meaning, which is wholly different from their meaning in science. The scientific consciousness is above all characterized by the fact that in it there is a separation made between the essential and the unessential, between reality and appearance. In the world of myth all appearances tend to stand on one plane. The word and its meaning, the image and the thing, the dream and the reality, for example, are fundamentally identical. The nuances of meaning and value which are so significant in distinguishing degrees of objectivity for the scientific consciousness are lacking to the mythical view. Dream and waking perception are not distinguished and primitive ideas of immortality arise from a mere failure to distinguish between the appearances of the dead in the thoughts, dreams and feelings of those still living from the actual existence of the dead. The magical power of the word and of the picture or image, which have been observed in so many systems of myth, are based on the fact that for the mythical consciousness the word *is* the thing, the image *is* the man. In general, Cassirer finds mythical consciousness to be characterized by a lack of all those critical distinctions which have been acquired so laboriously by civilized man. All things blend together and are entangled in a network of magical relations, which are however only relations for us, while for primitive man they are substantial identities. The absurdity of the naive symbolic interpretation of myths, the notion that primitive man endeavored to communicate abstract truths with myths as mere metaphors is made clear, since the very notion of symbolism, which implies a clear distinction between symbol and symbolized is precisely what is lacking from the mythical consciousness. In fact, mythical consciousness seems to be characterized negatively by an absence of distinctions. The notion which underlies the more naive understanding of the concept of "primitive animism" would seem to be that the savage has a clear idea of his own mind and personality which he reads into external nature, whereas in reality the most primitive state appears to be a vague apprehension of the universe as a whole, which we would call living, of which the individual is a part. Primitive man has no clear idea of himself as a conscious being, he has even, as Cassirer brings out with reference to totemism, no clear idea of the human species as distinguished from the various forms of animal and even plant life. He is merged in a whole of feeling in which distinctions gradually appear. It is in fact through the development of ideas of creative and personal gods that man comes to possess a concept of personality to apply to himself. It is thus by a development of the immanent dialectic of myth itself that man comes to emerge from the organic continuum of nature.

Cassirer has penetrated into all phases of the mythical consciousness and his work shows throughout that masterly scholarship and understanding of the human spirit which we have learned to expect from him. His failure to go into the psycho-analytic theories of myth-symbolism is

no doubt the expression of a well-founded value-judgment. He has given us in this work something of what Hegel intended in his *Phenomenology of Mind*, an insight into the process by which man raises himself to the level of science. Unlike Hegel, however, he bases his account on a wealth of concrete material which was unknown a century ago. One question arises, however: Is there really any such thing as the mythical consciousness? No doubt there are certain traits common to the primitive way of looking at things the world over. Cassirer would grant that there is and should be expected no rigid identity; the form or structure of mythical consciousness is as such fluid and plastic. It may nevertheless be asked whether the mythical consciousness is not imply the scientific, ethical and aesthetic consciousness at an undeveloped stage. Kant recognized but three fundamental modes of consciousness: Knowledge, Will and Feeling, and this clearly leaves no place for what is called the "religious consciousness." Would it not seem that the mythical consciousness would have to be resolved into an undifferentiated complex of all three modes of consciousness? In other words, the mythical consciousness seems to be inherently imperfect, inherently destined to pass beyond itself in so far as it gains clarity. Cassirer recognizes in fact, in his last chapter, entitled *Die Dialektik des mythischen Bewusstseins*, that the mythico-religious consciousness perpetually strives to free itself from symbolism, in other words, to destroy itself in its very essence. Myth strives to become clear and consistent, but it can only do so by ceasing to be itself. The essential feature of myth appears to be its dim and confused apprehension of things, its failure to recognize the distinctions which are so deeply incorporated in our modern culture and language that they seem self-evident to us. The very material which Cassirer has presented shows that the essence of myth is nothing positive; it is rather simply a confused and unclear way of looking at things. The "mythical consciousness" therefore appears to be a **level** rather than a **kind** of consciousness.

This distinction, however, would not essentially affect Cassirer's account. The necessity for a treatment of these deeper-lying strata of thought from the standpoint of critical idealism is obvious. As long as critical idealism confined itself to the "logical foundations of the exact sciences" the field of primitive thought was given over to psychology. The genetic point of view was ruled out of philosophy. Where the forms of thought came from had nothing to do with their validity and was of no concern to the Theory of Knowledge. Cassirer is seemingly the first of the critical idealists to endeavor to follow thought back to its primitive beginnings in language and myth. He shows that there is a method of studying myth from its own point of view, in its immanent structure and meaning rather than in its appearance to a psychological observer. From this point of view Cassirer's exposition has a distinct value which is independent of whether we accept his general epistemological system.

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# THE MONIST

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## GENERAL PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

IT IS well known how greatly general speculative philosophy has renewed its activity in France during the last years of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, through the work of Henri Bergson, on the one hand, and of Octave Hamelin, on the other. But whatever boldness modern thought may display in its constructive efforts, it can no longer be solely and completely dogmatic. Whether to establish the foundations of a new synthesis, or to discuss its validity, modern thought must always start from a critical theory of knowledge. Such a theory is found in Bergsonism. This is an exceedingly attractive and strong doctrine, closely akin to pragmatism. Through rigorous analysis, perception and concept are set forth as intended less to make us grasp reality than to guide and favor action, and are subordinated to a kind of direct union with objects through intuition and sympathy. There was likewise a theory of knowledge in the great presentation of universal deduction, that we owe to Hamelin. In this case the theory of knowledge is of such central importance that it is blended with the development of the doctrine itself. Thought, consubstantial with reality, appears as an absolute, and leaves nothing outside of itself that could without contradiction furnish the conditions and elements of existence. It seems that the efforts of French philosophy have been concentrated during these past eight years around this problem of knowledge and have scarcely gone beyond it. But, on the other hand, it

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Gertrude C. Bussey.

is clear that a problem of this kind includes all others: it would not be difficult to extract a metaphysics latent in the great doctrines of the time, even when the writers themselves forbear to formulate one. There is no doubt but that some of these theories tend more to idealism, others to realism; that some constitute at least virtually a monism, while others constitute rather a dualism or pluralism.

What, before the war, was called the "new philosophy," i. e., the philosophy of M. Bergson, has not produced an original work of importance since 1918, even though its influence is noticeable upon practically all the thinkers of this period. The whole philosophical public is, furthermore, awaiting the new work which the author of *l'Evolution créatrice* is preparing. But at least he has collected in one volume under the title *l'Energie spirituelle*,<sup>2</sup> some of his earlier articles, and these gain a new value simply from being brought together. On the subject of the relation of the physical and the mental, in particular, this volume contains some refinements which are essential for an understanding of the question; it includes also the famous, epoch-making article on psycho-physical parallelism, and, in addition, some more limited and more strictly psychological studies on dreams, on intellectual effort, on false recognition and even on "metaphysics." Its interest is, then, of the first order. Furthermore, the great intellectual commotion aroused everywhere by the theories of Einstein, and the overthrow of the idea of time which seems to result therefrom, could not leave indifferent one who had founded all his metaphysics on the essential reality of duration as a reality lived through. Accordingly, in his short volume on *Durée et Simultanéité*,<sup>3</sup> M. Bergson has tried, by a minute and precise analysis of the new conceptions in physics, to prove that the different times which one at-

<sup>2</sup> Alcan, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> Alcan, 1922.

tempts to conceive are only "measures of time," or "auxiliary times," intercalated by the mind of the physicist between the starting point of the calculation, which is real time, and the point of arrival, which is similarly real time; but in the latter only is there real succession, the latter alone is a duration.

Under the name of intuition, M. Bergson acknowledges a mode of knowing distinct from the abstract knowledge by categories. It permits us to grasp reality immediately. With a different and more traditional terminology, a somewhat analogous conclusion is finally reached on the whole by thinkers who remain attached to positive religious dogma. These thinkers, with M. Maurice Blondel, claim to delineate a form of intelligence which, superior to abstract understanding, models itself upon things by virtue of a kind of natural affinity, and penetrates them more exactly than does positive science which always parcels out and impoverishes the real. This form of intelligence, conceived as it seems in the fashion of Emile Boutroux, corresponds to what is termed "common sense," or "soundness of mind," or "experience of life," closely akin to the Pascalian penetration or keenness of mind.<sup>4</sup>

The traditional religious doctrines, furthermore, are being set forth in our time, if not with originality, at least with an imperious confidence which they seem to have lost in preceding generations; but they more often inspire literary writers or the authors of polemics than philosophers proper. Thomism seems to be acquiring a renewal of influence, not only upon historians, like M. Gilson, but also in connection with dogmatic speculation. In violent reaction against Bergsonism, which has served in its time as a support for some modernists, there is often an appeal from this quarter to scholastic intellectualism. However, if there is a French Catholic philosophy, it has to be sought

<sup>4</sup> *Le Procès de l'intelligence*, Bloud, 1922.

in the works of those thinkers who are somewhat suspected by the scrupulously orthodox, a Le Roy, a Blondel, a Laberthonnière. In the main, the study of this movement belongs at least as much to the history of the literary and particularly of the political ideas of the time, as to the history of philosophy.

It is very interesting to observe how frequently philosophers proper turn away from the traditional problems of philosophy, such as the question of God and the soul, and in a certain sense avoid them. The questions which they prefer to raise are in some sort the preambles to these problems, and, as we have said above, the most original efforts of the time are concentrated upon the theory of knowledge and the theory of science.

Strict positivism still has its representatives, chiefly among the workers in the special sciences. However, M. Goblot in his *Systèmes des sciences*, adheres in general to positivism and declares that there is no philosophical knowledge distinct from scientific knowledge. M. Cresson,<sup>5</sup> for his part, tries to establish once more the claim that metaphysical problems do not permit arguments nor valid proofs. They comprise, in his opinion, the realm not so much of the unknowable as of the unverifiable. It is not denied, furthermore, that these problems may legitimately be raised, but it is maintained that the choice between the different possible solutions can rest only upon the temperament of the different thinkers. M. J. de Gaultier<sup>6</sup> comes to the same conclusion. For him the universe is in its essence only disorder and blind will to live. Both art and science express only the esthetic moods of the men who have invented them and can have only a dramatic value. One should therefore abandon the attempt to derive rules of life from either.

<sup>5</sup> *l'Invérifiable*, 1920.

<sup>6</sup> *La Sensibilité Métaphysique*, 1923.



Considering rather the results of the different positive sciences, and the conceptions of the world suggested by them, M. Rosny, in an erudite volume,<sup>7</sup> has used all his powers once more to establish pluralism. He believes that from mechanics and physics through chemistry and biology, although the mind tends to unify phenomena, the latter present in themselves an irreducible variety and mobility. The laws or types which we define express only averages; the order is only approximate or apparent, and is entirely statistical in character. The intrinsic and basic disorder eludes us by virtue alone of the law of large numbers and of the scale on which we consider phenomena.

The complementary aspect of the same idea is brought to light by M. Emile Meyerson in his profound and learned book on *l'Explication dans les sciences*.<sup>8</sup> Science always aims to reach the real and explain it; but to explain is always to reduce phenomena step by step to one other, making differences and novelty disappear as if they were only apparent, and tends finally to identify them. This fact accounts for the privileged position of the mechanistic conceptions in which all diversity seems to arise from the different position in space of elements which are identical in nature and unchangeable in themselves. But nature and experience lend themselves only imperfectly to this attempt at unification; at long intervals, brute facts appear which are heterogeneous and irreducible to each other, "irrational." Such is, in particular, the principle of the degradation of energy, and philosophical analysis forces us to recognize others, if only the existence of change and of the sensible qualities. Thus there is in turn reciprocal agreement and resistance between nature and unifying reason: such is the spectacle that the universe of M. Meyerson presents to us. Further than this the author refrains from

<sup>7</sup> *Les Sciences et le Pluralisme*, Alcan, 1922.

<sup>8</sup> Payot, 1921.

deducing the metaphysical consequences of his studies in epistemology.

This conception of the struggle between the world which is the source of diversity and the mind which tends always toward unity and assimilation, recalls the conclusions of the already old thesis of M. André Lalande, *La Dissolution opposée à l'évolution*, conclusions which their author has not restated in any new work that has appeared in the period with which we are concerned, but which, sustained by the great authority of his teaching, exercise at the present time an incontestable influence on the philosophic youth of France.

Finally, M. Leon Brunschvicg, in his large and comprehensive enquiry into *La Causalité physique et l'expérience*,<sup>9</sup> as well as in an important study in *l'Orientation du rationalisme*,<sup>10</sup> has defined with deepest erudition what he believes will be the only one possible task of philosophy in the future. This particular task of philosophy is, according to M. Brunschvicg, to make the mind conscious of itself by retracing its own steps and its successive creations through the stages of its secular life, in science first, in mathematics and physics, then in the moral life, and in civilization at large. Basing his study on the most extensive knowledge of the history of the sciences, Brunschvicg derives from it a conception of the relation of experience and reason which is both precise and flexible. As far as the mind goes back into its past history, and analyzes its elementary operations, it never encounters brute data where external reality can be grasped as it is in itself; everywhere it finds itself face to face with itself, i. e., with processes through which, in its inexhaustible fecundity and its unforeseeable ingenuity, it has succeeded in making nature intelligible and in mastering it. But, on the other hand, at every moment of scientific evolution, it is only through the shock

<sup>9</sup> Alcan, 1922.

<sup>10</sup> *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, July, 1920.

of experience that mind has unfolded new resources, and has modified, adapted, reformed, or, at long intervals, upset its earlier constructions. Thus, whether we are concerned with mathematics or physics, experience and reason always make their appearance as inseparable, constituting correlative terms—the one inconceivable without the other. We never encounter anything except ideas, facts, or objects, already worked over and interpreted by the mind, and theories or laws modelled upon the lines of experience. This is a conception of science which may seem quite close to that of the critical idealism of the Kantian variety, with this essential reservation, that for M. Brunschvicg, reason can never be considered as a collection of fixed and unchangeable forms imposing themselves *a priori* upon phenomena; what are called categories, laws, or rational principles are themselves, in the long run, the results of the collaboration of experience and mind, and always remain subject to modification according to the exigencies of this indefinite adaptation, and of this assimilation of one to the other. Finally, if it were necessary to state what reason, or mind, is for M. Brunschvicg, one would define it doubtless as an activity, pure, original, and free, which is no more subordinated to the nature of a supposedly external object, than to the supposed nature of a subject; for the latter, as soon as it is conceived as given once for all, becomes by that very fact object in its turn.

Evolution, incessant and creative, in the life of the universe, according to M. Bergson; evolution in the theories of science, and in the different disciplines of moral life; evolution in reason itself,<sup>11</sup> the instrument of both: such seem to be the conclusions in which the majority of present day thinkers agree. And it might seem that they agree

<sup>11</sup> M. Meyerson who, for a long time, seemed to hold that reason was unchangeable in its principles, and in the demands by which it is manifested, has apparently been converted by Einstein to the idea of a possible transformation of reason. (*La déduction relativistic*, Payot, 1924.)

in some measure with the conclusions of scientific positivism, with the conclusions, for example, of biology, and of contemporary sociology. Indeed, one thinker who belongs to a period anterior in date, but whose inspiration and works are being revived at this time by the faithful enthusiasm of a group of disciples—the obscure and profound Jules Lagneau—seems to bring to the fore the idea of spiritual freedom. This freedom even in rational activity conquers by doubting and at each instant goes beyond its own demonstration and proof. But the distance nevertheless remains great—wide enough to provide place for the whole of true philosophy between empiricism, naive objectivism, or an uncritical positivism, and the profound conviction, which animates all of modern French philosophy, of the ever-present creative activity of mind and of its universal immanence.<sup>12</sup>

And perhaps it is permissible to believe that from this point of view there is still possible a genuinely philosophical interpretation of the world, wherein one will rediscover, over and above the necessary negations, the positive traits which would define a reason whose spontaneity and freedom would not exclude its determinateness and dialectic continuity, in accordance with the eternal conditions of the possible and of the logically necessary and in accord-

<sup>12</sup> This is, in fact, the main inspiration of a remarkable *Introduction à la Philosophie* (Alcan, 1925), which has just revealed a young thinker, M. René Le Senne. Taking his departure from the dialectic of Hamelin, and from relation and categories as expressing the metaphysical conditions of all experience and of all thought, which are but one, he believes that he can discover in contingency and freedom the creative principle which should allow us to go beyond the domains of abstract necessity, and to construct a *concrete idealism*. Over and above metaphysics and science, reason should be able to strive through religion, morality, and art, toward an indefinitely increasing approximation, to the purely individual act which is essentially invention, life, and thought in one.

There are also efforts toward the highest philosophy, and attempts, more or less under the influence of Hamelin, at constructive dialectic, manifested in the work of M. Lavelle, *La Dialectique du monde sensible*, and in that of M. Nabert, *l'Expérience intérieure de la liberté*. On the other hand, M. Rougier has felt obliged to denounce *Les Paralogismes du Rationalisme*; but in so doing he has given perhaps a rather narrow and arbitrary interpretation of rationalism.



ance with the demands of intelligibility: "in the beginning was the Word."

If such are the character and directions of general philosophical speculation in France, we shall not be surprised to find them not only in the universities, where ideas are worked out, but in the classes in philosophy, which are unique in our secondary education, and through which these ideas are disseminated and contribute to the formation of all cultured minds. No state doctrine is imposed upon these classes; freedom of teaching is complete. It is just for this reason that the diverse tendencies of our own times are represented there, and combine, in a thousand ways, particularly the spiritualism of Bergson, the sociologism of Durkheim, and idealism of the Hamelin variety. Evidence of this may be found in text-books, those of M. Malapert, Abel Rey, Challaye, Thomas, l'Abbé Baudin—among which a special place must be given to the excellent *Psychologie* by M. D. Roustan, in which Bergson's influence is dominant.

D. PARODI.

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## LOGIC AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SCIENCES<sup>1</sup>

IT is commonly said that the French are a nation of logicians. Is that the reason why France has produced few treatises on logic, while there are many such in England, a land where citizens enjoy the reputation of carrying into daily life more intuition and feeling than inclination to reason upon their conduct? There is often a kind of compensation between theory and practice. It is not the men most gifted in business who have written the best books on economics, and the converse is no less true. However in the last few years, there has been a revival of activity in the field of logic. This is due, it seems, to the influence of two men: Louis Couturat, who died in 1914 as a result of an automobile accident incurred in the course of mobilization, and whose remarkable works are therefore anterior to the period with which we are here concerned;<sup>2</sup> and M. Edmond Goblot, Professor at the University of Lyons, whose *Traité de Logique*<sup>3</sup> is the most important and most widely read book in this field published since the war. Although this book shows a thorough knowledge and a fairly extensive use of the ideas put into circulation by Couturat, it is conceived in an entirely different spirit. M. Goblot has shaped his ideas through contact with the ex-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Gertrude C. Bussey.

<sup>2</sup> Louis Couturat was forty-seven years old when he died. It will be remembered that logistic (following the method of Bertrand Russell) and the logic of language (particularly the logic of artificial languages) were his two favorite fields of study. Both writers, furthermore, are related to Leibniz whom Couturat had first studied in his masterly book, *La Logique de Leibniz* (1901).

<sup>3</sup> Armand Colin, 1918.

perimental sciences. His recent *Logique* is in many respects the sequel and development of an already old study on *La classification des sciences*<sup>4</sup> which had begun as early as 1898 to win him recognition. He there set himself the problem of which his new book has just given a solution, debatable to be sure, but forceful: how can reasoning be at once both rigorous and fertile? If the conclusion is necessary, it is already contained in the premises, and we have tautology; if reasoning can carry thought forward, create something new, there must have been in it something unforeseeable and contingent. The solution is derived, according to M. Goblot, from the distinction between the operations which one decides to perform and the precise rules according to which one carries out each of these operations; the rules are rigorous, but the operations are acts, quite comparable to physical movements which one chooses at pleasure to make or not to make. One observes their conclusion as one observes the effect produced by a manipulation. The rules of logic guarantee their validity, but the initiative of the reasoner is what constitutes their fertility.<sup>5</sup>

Moreover, the *Traité de Logique* of M. Goblot is not limited to this ruling idea. It reviews all the traditional questions, passing rather hastily over many points, but on the other hand treating profoundly and in detail questions in which the author is particularly interested: the theory of hypothetical judgments and inferences, to which he reduces many of the forms usually regarded as categorical; teleological reasoning, by which is demonstrated the relations of finality, relations which, in his opinion, can be given a perfectly scientific and positive meaning; the logic

<sup>4</sup> Published by Alcan; the present form of other ideas expressed in this book may be found in a recent book by the same author, *Le Système des Sciences*, Armand Colin, 1922.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. also on this question, A. Roux: *La Raisonement par récurrence; la nécessité et la nouveauté en mathématiques*, in *Revue Philosophique*, January, 1925.

of judgments of value; and, finally, the relations between logic and the rationalism of which he is a vigorous and determined partisan.

This book is today in the hands of all students. But the *Logique* of M. Rabier,<sup>6</sup> which has been frequently reprinted and which was inspired by the teaching of Lachelier at the *Ecole Normale*, and the *Manuel de Logique* of Liard<sup>7</sup> in which much less space is given to general and formal logic than to methodology, are still much used. Moreover, all the manuals of philosophy (rendered numerous by the organization of French secondary teaching and of the baccalaureate) contain a section devoted to logic. It is impossible to cite them all: the manual richest in treatment of questions of logic is that of M. Rey,<sup>8</sup> professor at the Sorbonne; the latest is the book of M. Challaye,<sup>9</sup> professor at the Lycée Condorcet, which is very lucid and well adapted for its purpose.

Classical and even mediaeval logic have been represented by an important work by M. Maritain, professor in the Faculté Catholique of Paris.<sup>10</sup> In it, the author expounds, in modern form but with rigorous fidelity to the principles of St. Thomas Aquinas, the doctrine of the concept, of the proposition, and of the syllogism. He develops in an interesting way and with the aid of the most recent works, the ruling ideas of his master, but he is severely orthodox in his opposition to any position contrary to that of the latter, for example, to logicistic and the logic of relations, which he considers as "destructive of a sane philosophy of reasoning."

France, furthermore, has never looked with favor upon symbolic logic. Our mathematicians, after the manner of

<sup>6</sup> Hachette, 1886, 8th ed., 1924.

<sup>7</sup> Masson, 1884, 10th ed., 1922.

<sup>8</sup> *Leçons de philosophie*, Vol. 2: *Logique, Morale et Philosophie générale*. Revised in accordance with the new programs of the baccalaureate. Rieder, 1925.

<sup>9</sup> *Philosophie scientifique et philosophie morale*, Nathan, 1923.

<sup>10</sup> *Petite Logique (Logica minor) ou Logique formelle*, Tequi, 1923.



Poincaré, attach only slight importance to it, and the philosophers are only mildly interested in this technique which they, in general, criticize as being enclosed within itself, without giving evidence of any appreciable fertility in useful applications to other sciences. However, *La structure des théories deductives*,<sup>11</sup> by M. Rougier, the *Maitre de conférences* at the University of Besancon, constitutes an interesting attempt to reform classical logic through reliance upon the works of Mm. Peano, Padoa, and Russell. But the work is not limited to this attempt. The formulae of a mathematical nature take only a secondary place. M. Rougier is in the main a disciple of M. Goblot to whom the book is dedicated. It is true that he disagrees with his former master on the question of which we have just now spoken, that of the novelty of the conclusion. On this point he maintains a doctrine more in harmony with intellectualistic traditions, and more favorable to an idealistic logic which transcends action. Nevertheless, in his ideas on deduction, on the unity of the different forms of reasoning, on "*l'économie des théories deductives*," there remains a direct kinship in spirit between this book and the *Traité de Logique*. In many respects it appears as the free development of the earlier work, a development which takes advantage of the logical researches of mathematicians, but which received its original orientation from elsewhere.<sup>12</sup>

Mention might also be made of the *Lecons de Logique formelle* by M. Luquet,<sup>13</sup> a text-book of studies of the same kind, but one which exhibits even greater freedom in regard to the logistic already formulated. M. Luquet is professor at the Lycée Rollin, and is already well known through his *Essai d'une Logique systématique et simplifiée*,

<sup>11</sup> Alcan, 1921.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. also, on logic and mathematics, A. Reymond: *Sur une définition des ordinaux transfinis*, in *Revue de métaphysique*, May, 1919; J. Richard: *Considérations sur la logique et les ensembles*, *ibid.*, July, 1920; Hadamard: *Les principes du calcul des probabilités*, *ibid.*, July, 1922; Bénézé: *Qu'est-ce qu'un système de reference?* *Ibid.*, July, 1925.

<sup>13</sup> Alcan, 1925.

which had attracted the attention of specialists twelve years ago. His earlier work was based upon the classical logic, but his new book is in harmony neither with that nor with logistic; notations, principles, demonstrations, practically everything is his own. Although the work in its general aspect is predominantly algorithmic, it makes numerous appeals to intuition, and thereby sets itself in opposition to the ideal purity aimed at in the *Principia Mathematica*.

Within the field of symbolic logic—or at least within a field adjacent thereto—one may mention, finally, a remarkable little work by Jean Nicod, which shows—in contrast to the work just mentioned—an extreme care for the rigorous criticism of postulates, and for the precise distinction between ideas: *Le problème logique de l'induction*.<sup>14</sup> The author, who died in 1924 at the age of thirty-one, was an excellent logistician who had supplemented his studies in France by several years of study at Cambridge, under the direction of Bertrand Russell. The vigorous work just mentioned, though debatable on many questions, is none the less one of the books which one must have read in order to speak on this problem today. It occasions a high opinion of its author, and a keen regret for his premature death.

We should also connect with logic, at least for an important part of their content, several of the numerous works on linguistics which have appeared during these last years: *Le langage et la pensée*<sup>15</sup> by M. H. Delacroix, and *Le langage*,<sup>16</sup> by M. Vendryès, both writers being professors at the Sorbonne, the one of psychology, and the other of the science of language; and especially, *La pensée et la*

<sup>14</sup> Alcan, 1924. Jean Nicod has also published *La Géométrie dans le monde sensible* (*Revue de métaphysique*, 1924), a very unusual and penetrating logical analysis of perception. (Preface by Mr. Bertrand Russell). He is also the author of an interesting discussion of *La Logique*, by M. Goblot, *ibid.*, May, 1919; of a study on *Les relations de valeur et les relations de sens en logique formelle*, *ibid.*, October, 1924, and of several English articles in British reviews.

<sup>15</sup> Alcan, 1924.

<sup>16</sup> *La renaissance du livre*, 1921.

*langue*,<sup>17</sup> by M. Ferdinand Brunot, Dean of the Faculté des Lettres at the University of Paris. The latter work exhibits the great originality of substituting for the old analysis of language, made according to morphological or syntactical forms, a new arrangement, in which the author rather brings together under one head all the verbal forms answering to the same feeling, the same intention, or the same logical function, e. g., determination or indetermination, exclusion, addition, cause, consequence, opposition, possibility, necessity, hypothesis. Experience has already shown that even in teaching grammar to children, this method of approach, from thought to its verbal expression, has evoked a livelier interest than did the former method.

Another aspect of this logical study of language is to be seen in the voluminous work of philosophical semantics which was begun twenty-five years ago, and carried out under the supervision of *la Société française de philosophie*, the last part of which (U-Z) appeared in 1922. Each of the technical terms of philosophy is there analyzed, its diverse meanings are distinguished, its equivocations, and the sophisms which result from them, are pointed out, unusual uses or abuses of terms are discussed. All the conclusions upon which the members and correspondents of the society have been able to reach an agreement are incorporated in the main text; but numerous observations in the form of notes contain, over the signatures and upon the responsibility of their respective authors, divergent opinions that could not find place in the article, or accessory remarks that it has seemed useful to preserve à propos of the meaning of the words and the discussions connected with them.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Masson, 1922.

<sup>18</sup> *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, *Bulletin de la Société Française de philosophie*, 1902-1922, and *Supplement*, July and October, 1923. Part of these numbers are at present out of print, but a new edition, revised and enlarged in two volumes, is announced by Félix Alcan to appear in July, 1926.

But the field of logic wherein the French have been pre-eminently active is that of epistemology, understood in the sense which we give to the word, and which is not quite the same as that which it has in English-speaking countries, i. e., the study of the method and structure of the positive sciences. In this domain, I should not hesitate to analyze, first of all, the very remarkable book of M. Brunschvicg, *l'Expérience humaine et la causalité physique*<sup>19</sup> if it were not that it goes far beyond our field of study in two directions: on the one hand, this work is conceived on an essentially historical plan, and, on the other, it carries its conclusions to the most ultimate problems of the philosophy of mind, and of its relation to nature. A very profound analysis of this book will be found, however, in the preceding paper, devoted to general philosophy and to theories of knowledge.<sup>20</sup>

On the other hand, we are in the very center of French epistemology with the two works of M. Emile Meyerson, *l'Explication dans les sciences*,<sup>21</sup> and *La déduction relativiste*.<sup>22</sup> There are few works on science which are so much read and discussed by the younger generation of philosophers. They are the natural sequel of *Identité et Réalité*, which for a long time has assured the reputation of its author, and they develop the same ideas by commenting upon them or applying them. *L'Explication dans les sciences* is a freer and more popular exposition of the subject; to explain is to show that what appears new is reducible to something that existed before; that which seems different in appearance is for reason reducible into like elements. Hence the increasing use of mathematics in the sciences, for all calculation presupposes the repetition of identical units.<sup>23</sup> But this truth leads to a conclusion which

<sup>19</sup> Alcan, 1922.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. above article by M. Parodi, p. 359.

<sup>21</sup> 2 vols., Payot, 1921.

<sup>22</sup> Payot, 1925.

<sup>23</sup> In *L'Explication dans les sciences*, Vol. 2, Ch. XVII, there may be found a remarkable account of the development of these ideas.



M. Meyerson has himself named "the epistemological paradox." On the one hand, science is realistic, in so far as it involves prevision and the power of acting upon things; on the other hand, it tends to annihilate everything through explanation, for nothing exists but differences, and if everything were identical nothing would be. It was precisely to escape this consequence that Hegel, renouncing classical logic, wished to banish mathematics from the philosophy of nature and to explain everything by his concrete universal. Thus the name of Hegel is the one which appears most often in the work of M. Meyerson, who is at the same time both his friend and his opponent—his opponent considered as a physicist, his friend considered as a critic of the philosophical consequences which result from explanation through homogeneity. *La déduction relativiste* is an application of the same principles to the theory of Einstein. The author has not here attempted to give a popularization of the theory but to trace its psychology. He has collected the assertions or the characteristic expressions of the principal relativists: Einstein, Eddington, Langevin, Weyl, etc., and tries to show that the great motive of their work, as well as the great factor in their success, is to be found in their progress towards a complete assimilation of phenomena—a progress so considerable that some become afraid of the complete identity which they foresee, and react against the vertigo of universal dissolution.

With these ideas one may compare *Le mensonge du monde*,<sup>24</sup> by M. Paulhan, who, however, considers the subject in its psychological and metaphysical rather than in its logical aspects. He also is one of those who have perceived this character (strange at first) of scientific thought. But he does not make of it the backbone of epistemology as do the authors of whom I have already spoken.

<sup>24</sup> Alcan, 1921.

The same thing may be said of another work of M. Rougier, whom we have already mentioned. It is a very interesting and well informed collection of articles on scientific philosophy, which bears the title *En marge de Curie, de Carnot, et d'Einstein*.<sup>25</sup> The principle of the degradation of energy and the principle discovered by Curie (that effects are always as symmetrical as, or more symmetrical than, the causes) are presented as two remarkable forms of the tendency of phenomena to become uniform spontaneously. Strictly speaking, these laws are not interpreted in the same way by everyone. M. Meyerson sees in these leveling principles an irrational character, because they are a blow to the principle of conservation. Others, on the contrary, have tried to show that they are in essential conformity with reason, inasmuch as they tend in the direction of identity.<sup>26</sup> But this very discussion may give a fair hint of what are at present the themes debated in the logic of the sciences.

It is too late now to return to the relativist movement of Einstein which passionately interested the French public from 1921 to 1923, but which seems today to have been cast somewhat into the shadow by other preoccupations. There remain, however, as witnesses to this movement not only numerous reviews<sup>27</sup> and a whole library of popularizations, but also some very original reflections by M. Bergson himself, in *Durée et Simultanéité*.<sup>28</sup> These last have occasioned many discussions to which the author has replied in the addenda to the second edition. Public opinion has remained uncertain concerning the solution which he proposed, and it does not appear that the verdict will be given for a long time.

<sup>25</sup> Chiron, 1921.

<sup>26</sup> *L'Épistémologie de M. Meyerson et sa portée philosophique*, in *Revue Philosophique*, March, 1922; *La déduction relativiste et l'assimilation*, in *Revue Philosophique*, March, 1926.

<sup>27</sup> Particularly, *Bulletin de la Société de philosophie*, July, 1922; *Revue philosophique*, same date.

<sup>28</sup> Alcan, 1922. 2nd ed., 1923.

On the other hand, problems which concern the nature, method and co-ordination of the sciences are always the subject of numerous publications. Mention has already been made of *Le système des sciences* by M. Goblot. A short while before his death, M. Pierre Boutroux wrote a little masterpiece, *L'idéal scientifique des mathématiciens*,<sup>29</sup> which summarizes and completes his large work on *Les principes de l'analyse*.<sup>30</sup> In the same collection have appeared *L'espace et le temps*,<sup>31</sup> by M. Emile Borel, professor at the Sorbonne, and *l'Unité de la science*,<sup>32</sup> by M. Leclerc du Sablon, formerly dean of the Faculté des sciences at Toulouse. M. Rey has published a new and greatly enlarged edition of his thesis: *La théorie de la physique chez les physiciens contemporains*.<sup>33</sup> *La méthode générale des sciences pures et appliquées*<sup>34</sup> by M. Lamouche, a naval engineer, is an important work animated by a markedly instrumentalist spirit. The author aims to maintain throughout a direct contact between the most general ideas and their technical applications, and believes that only minds capable of grasping and comprehending this double aspect of ideas, combine in themselves the necessary conditions for speaking with competence about them. The book is a little long, but substantial and instructive. Personal talent, imagination, originality are, on the other hand, the dominant traits exhibited by the book of M. Rueff, *Des sciences physiques aux sciences morales*,<sup>35</sup> in which the author analyzes the use of mathematics in the physical sciences in order to show how its use may be extended to the moral sciences and particularly to economics. Finally

<sup>29</sup> Alcan, 1920 (New scientific collection).

<sup>30</sup> 2 vols., Hermann, 1914 and 1919.

<sup>31</sup> Alcan, 1922 (New scientific collection).

<sup>32</sup> Alcan, 1919.

<sup>33</sup> Alcan, 1923.

<sup>34</sup> Gauthier Villars, 1924.

<sup>35</sup> Alcan, 1922.

numerous articles on methodology have found a place in our principal philosophical reviews.<sup>36</sup>

A serious disadvantage of asking a specialist to summarize the movements in the field of his science is that he is forced either to be incomplete or to speak of his own works. Entrusted for the past twenty years with the work in logic and methodology at the Sorbonne, the author of the present article has had there as students a large number of the young professors who are at present teaching in the "classes of philosophy"<sup>37</sup> at the Lycées and colleges. He believes, therefore, that it will not be out of order to indicate what have been the dominant ideas of his own teaching.

Their origin lies in a reaction against the Spencerian interpretation of the positive sciences, which was still dominant at the beginning of this century, and which despite all that has been said against Spencer, still has great weight in the minds of many scholars. However, if one reflects upon it with a critical mind, one perceives clearly the insufficiency of "differentiation" to represent even the physical order with its spontaneous tendency toward uniform distribution of energy, still more its inadequacy to the moral, aesthetic, and religious orders, where there is manifested throughout an "involution," a progress toward identity. It is necessary, then, to recognize two opposing currents in the world, the one vital, the other manifested both above and below the biological level, in degradation of energy on the one hand, and in the constitution of

<sup>36</sup> Among the articles may be cited particularly, Dorolle: *La Valeur des conclusions par l'absurde*, in *Revue philosophique*, Sept., 1918; Halbwachs: *L'expérimentation statistique et les probabilités*, *ibid.*, Nov., 1923; Déat: *La démonstration par l'absurde en psychologie et en morale*, *ibid.*, Jan., 1924; Lacombe: *L'interprétation des faits matériels dans la méthode de Durkheim*, *ibid.*, May, 1925; Winter: *Les axiomes de la physique différentielle*, in *Revue de métaphysique*, Jan., 1924; Dupréel: *Convention et raison*, *ibid.*, July, 1925. See also *La Revue de synthèse historique*, directed by M. Henri Berr, as published by La Renaissance du Livre. We mentioned above, in connection with formal logic, various other reviews concerned with mathematical method.

<sup>37</sup> In France elementary instruction in philosophy is given to all students who carry on their secondary studies, even if they do not go to the universities.



human values on the other. Between these there is a parallelism from which important consequences can be deduced.<sup>38</sup> Many of these concern only remotely the subject of this article; but, among others, may be found the incontestable proof that logic is a normative science, not in the sense that it can conclude from ascertained facts to bounden duties, but in the sense that it moves entirely in the normative realm of obligations, and that the most fundamental position of logical thought, " $p$  is  $q$ ," means that one has not the right to deny  $q$  when one has affirmed  $p$ . It is hardly necessary to point out the agreement of this thesis with the one which regards the concept as logically posterior to the judgment of which it is an abstraction, or a result. But it is in my opinion, the only way to give a reasonable answer to the question of the principle and basis of induction set forth hitherto in such an ambiguous way.<sup>39</sup>

From this point of view, logic is plainly distinguished from psychology on the one hand and from symbolic logic on the other.<sup>40</sup> The latter must not be considered as the substance, but as the auxiliary of reasoning, with a role comparable to that which may be played in the aesthetics of music, by the notation on the staff, or by the symbolic theory of harmony. A *purely formal logic* does not even exist. Not only must the algorithms be handled like things, furnishing no results except on this condition—in this M. Goblot seems to me to be quite right—but they do not assume a logical character unless they cease being a simple assemblage and are interpreted as proof of the true and false. It is by catachresis that one speaks of the "formal truth" of a proposition, in order to say that it followed necessarily from certain hypotheses; what is true is the assertion that it *does* follow from these hypotheses, and

<sup>38</sup> Cf. *Le Parallélisme formel des sciences normatives*, Report of the Congress of Bologna, 1911; *Revue de métaphysique*, July, 1911.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. *Revue des Cours et Conférences*, Feb. 15 and 29, 1924.

<sup>40</sup> *Sur les rapports de la Logique et de la Psychologie*, in *Scientia*, 1915, Williams and Norgate.

this truth is no less "material" and "ascertained" than the cubical form of a salt crystal.

This, naturally, does not preclude our recognizing that symbolic logic has rendered immense service in analyzing judgment and reasoning. It has brought into relief the distinction between the existential and the non-existential; and the invalidity (or more exactly the incompleteness) of reasoning which moves from the universal to the particular. It has generalized the useful notion of a universe of discourse. It has shown the independence of principles formerly confused; the importance and extent of correct operations which are not reducible to the classic types; the real complexity of some of these; the generality of the conclusions based on the formal properties of various relations. All these results may be incorporated into formal logic, taken in its broadest sense. Formal logic should also develop the different properties included under the term intension, subjective and objective; intension, optative, complete, implicit, eminent. It should similarly analyze in a more exact and complete fashion the extension and quantity of propositions. When all these distinctions are correctly made, many prejudices and pretended principles and equivocations seem to disappear, such as that which states that extension is in inverse relation to intension, or the futile classic discussion as to whether the true point of view of logic is that of intension or extension.

These foundations assured, there can then be demonstrated, I think, an important distinction which is too often misunderstood or improperly expressed, that between the operations of reasoning (a syllogism, a transformation of an equation, a substitution of a constant for a variable) and the conduct or general structure of reason, which can I think, be reduced, at least tentatively, to four types: the hypothetical—deductive; the inductive or experimental; the reconstructive, of which the principal application is in

history, but which is also of great judicial interest; the polemic, of which a good example may be found in the *Nouveaux Essais* by Leibniz, or the *Philosophy of Hamilton*, by J. S. Mill, and to which are related problems as characteristic as the burden of proof. I would not present this list as definitely complete, but it seems essential to set forth this general methodology and to distinguish it clearly both from the logic of operations, and from the "special methodology" (the methodology of each particular science) which forms its field of application.<sup>41</sup>

Further, if logic is really normative, it ought to eventuate in a precise conception of the true and the false, as well as of related ideas such as certainty and error. I say "eventuate in," for the method of normative sciences seems to me to proceed by induction, like the natural sciences, with the changes implied by the difference between the experience of a sensible fact and that of the judgment of appreciation. Nothing would seem to me more inadmissible than the old pretention of dogmatism and even of certain forms of criticism that one grasps the fundamental laws of the mind by an immediate act of reflection; but it is no less true that, in this case as well as in others, in proportion as an inductive science develops, its outcome should tend to be transformed into a possible principle.

Does this method authorize us at this time to give any answer to the question, "What is truth?" It seems to me that that is true which any mind feels the obligation of recognizing in the absence of seduction or of constraint, provided only that this mind has reached the stage of cultural development necessary to understand the meaning of the proposition, concerning the truth or the falsity of which the

<sup>41</sup> All these logical "conducts" have been treated in courses taught in the past years, but only one has been published: *Les théories logiques de l'induction et de l'expérimentation*, in *Revue des Cours et Conférences*, December, 1922, February, 1924.

question is raised.<sup>42</sup> This gradual agreement of minds among themselves, of which the analysis of the sciences furnishes a continual illustration, is the most easily discernible aspect of a triple assimilation that gives a more complete answer to the question: viz., assimilation of minds to each other, assimilation of things to each other, assimilation of things to minds.

This triple assimilation is the great motive of what is commonly called the necessity of reason, or "rational truths." It has become impossible to admit that the *a priori* forms of space and time, the principle of causality or that of continuity have remained invariable in the historical movement of thought. Some forms of reason which earlier epochs have not recognized appear as possible and convincing. Reason as it is constituted at each moment is transformed to a certain degree. But is not this to fall into scepticism, to put feeling above reason? No, because throughout its transformation reason exhibits a vector, a definite direction which can be characterized in an unchanging fashion as supremacy of identity over difference. This constitutes the fundamental logical value (even though it may not, as yet, be wholly conscious) and appears as the essential norm of Constitutive Reason. Constitutive Reason is active, but cannot be apprehended in its pure state. Constituted Reason at each epoch may express itself in formulae, but this is because it is incorporated in a matter furnished by experience. It includes: *first*, acquired truths, categories hallowed by use, values held in common; *second*, rules of thought, i. e., of effective logical procedure, having authority in discussion; *third*, rules of conduct which it is sufficient merely to mention, since our subject is not concerned with practical reason; and, finally, even rules of aesthetic judgment, which are just beginning

<sup>42</sup> Cf. for a detailed exposition of this theory, H. Lelesz: *La conception de la Vérité*, published by *La vie universitaire*, 1921.



to be worked out.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, in what constitutes the very soul of logic, one finds (as one should if rationalism is *true*) the same spiritual function that gives birth to the other normative sciences, and that constitutes the *a priori* factor of their observable parallelism.

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. the lessons entitled *Raison constituante et raison constituée*, in *Revue des Cours et conférences*, April 15 and 30, 1925 (publisher, Boivin) and *Lettre à M. Brunschwig*, in *Bulletin de la Société de Philosophie*, July, 1921 (Publisher, Armand Colin).

## PRINCIPAL CURRENTS OF ETHICAL THOUGHT<sup>1</sup>

IT is impossible to speak of the flux of ethical conceptions in France during the last six years without a preliminary reference to the lessons of the war. For so great a catastrophe, if it does not strike a direct blow at speculative thought, at any rate compels a reconsideration of the problems representing the very life of society itself. The special problems revived or created by the war, however, demand a separate investigation devoted solely to them, and this task we have attempted elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> We may therefore be excused from here touching upon them. Moreover, during the last seven years life has resumed its normal course, the new problems have been brought into connection with the old, and the great currents of French thought are reappearing in ethics as well as in the other disciplines.

Three great ethical currents may be distinguished: the sociological current, properly so-called, represented by the school of Durkheim and of M. Lévy-Bruhl; the opposition thereto, which, starting from a positivism that is not of Durkheim, issues in a rationalism, that is often radical, but

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> *Quelques réflexions sur les idées morales après la guerre*, in *La Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1921. Questions discussed: 1. Legitimate defense and non-resistance. 2. Force and law. 3. Religious ethics and secular ethics. 4. Rationalism and sociology. 5. The difficult wisdom.

We also take for granted a knowledge of the main currents of French ethical thought prior to 1914. An account of them may be found in a chapter, "The Moral Problem," of a book by M. D. Parodi on *La philosophie contemporaine en France*, Alcan, 1919; a new edition has appeared, with an elaboration first in *La Revue Philosophique*, Nov.-Dec., 1925.

exclusively secular; and, finally, the current of religious ethics which is opposed to both the sociological school and the purely secular rationalism. In addition to these three great currents, there are some suggestive attempts to maintain, in ethical thought, intuitive or irrational tendencies. Moreover, legal and political doctrines are themselves throughout permeated with the same antagonistic influences.

# I. ETHICS AND SOCIOLOGY

The most important work in the field of ethics offered by the sociological school up to the last few weeks is M. Lévy-Bruhl's book, *La morale et la science des moeurs*, published in 1903. Here we find stated the creed of this school. Durkheim himself had treated these questions in only a fragmentary manner in his *Division du travail social* and in his note on *La détermination du fait moral*.<sup>3</sup> The course in ethics which he offered in the Sorbonne had until just recently remained unpublished. But it has now appeared under the title *l'Education morale*.<sup>4</sup> This is indeed a strong and admirable book, in every particular exhibiting the hand of the departed master. It creates a profound impression as much by its logical rigor as by the singularly gripping, even imperious, tone of some of its pages.

The thought of Durkheim is clear. He wishes, as he says, beginning with the very first of his lectures, to develop a secular system of morals, that is, one that is purely rationalistic. He starts with a postulate which he expresses thus: "There is nothing in the realm of the real that need be regarded as radically opposed to human reason." But it is important that we clearly understand this

<sup>3</sup> *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, sessions of Feb. 11 and Mar. 22, 1906.

<sup>4</sup> Alcan, 1925. Brought out by Paul Fauconnet, *Maitre de conférences* at the Sorbonne.

rationalism. On the one hand, it is unalterably opposed to mysticism, according to which there is at the basis of things something unintelligible, "I know not what principle of darkness, forever refractory to reason." But Durkheim is equally disinclined to a rationalism that is "too easy," and too simple, and does not take into sufficient account the complexity of things. It is between these two "abysses" that the child must be led and doubtless also the adult.

Moral education, according to Durkheim, is all the more necessary in our age because of the fact that we are passing through a period of grave crisis; "we are living in one of those revolutionary and critical epochs in which the authority of traditional discipline, always enfeebled in such periods, may easily give way to the spirit of anarchy." We recognize here an idea that goes back to Saint-Simon and Comte. We can see how it comes that Durkheim insists on the necessity of a spirit of "discipline" as the first essential of morality. The second principle, likewise to be found in the thought of the positivist, consists for the founder of the existing sociological school of France in "the attachment to social groups," among which, when we are dealing with the child, is the school. In the preface to his *Division du travail social*, Durkheim had already insisted upon the importance of professional groups as a means of introducing the individual to society. In treating of education, he emphasizes the similar role of the school. The family is too much dominated by sentiment; humanity is too vast and too remote; the Fatherland which "enjoys a real priority over all the others" cannot accomplish its humanizing function unless the school arouses a love for it. One can thus understand the "supreme importance of the function which falls to the school in shaping the moral life of the country."



By means of this stern discipline and of this attachment to social groups, Durkheim seeks to maintain in social life an imperative rule which has been described as a revival, in a different form, of the categorical imperative of the Kantian ethics. Instead of conscience, it is society that commands; or rather, the requirements of society and those of conscience are identical. This does not mean that Durkheim demands absolute conformity to laws and customs. The third element in morality, according to him, is the "autonomy of the will," and here again the author of *l'Education morale* is in accord with the author of the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Rationalism, far from being contradictory to individualism, presupposes it. Society includes not only forces of tradition but also forces of regeneration and progress, and it is for this reason that the educator cannot be content merely to expound "the traditional morality of our fathers." "It does not suffice to conserve the past; it is necessary to pave the way for the future."

Such are the ruling ideas of this work *l'Education morale*. One need not look beyond it to gain a knowledge of the ethical theories of the French sociological school. For this edifice Durkheim expected to furnish a rigorously empirical foundation. For him, as for M. Lévy-Bruhl, the type of ethics just described is truly scientific—indeed, it alone is scientific. The posthumous work of the master of the Sorbonne brings dire destruction upon theoretical and abstract systems of ethics; these, to him, seemed antiquated. A system of ethics must be concrete and this concrete authority, though transcending the individual, is the authority of society: "what is necessary is to place the child in contact with things, with concrete and living realities in respect to which abstract terms express only the most general characteristics. Thus we show what the thing really is. And thus moral education acquires a real hold."

Taking their inspiration from the master and placing special emphasis on certain aspects of his doctrine, his followers have attempted to revive several of the most important questions of traditional ethics. Thus, M. Paul Fauconnet has reattacked the problem of responsibility<sup>5</sup> which M. Lévy-Bruhl had previously treated in a classic manner. At the present time the idea of responsibility is commonly associated with those of liberty and of individual merit or guilt. But the latter, says M. Fauconnet, are entirely modern conceptions, representing a departure from and an abandonment of primitive responsibility. In primitive cultures, responsibility is collective and does not, as in modern times, relate exclusively to individuals. The function of pain is not so much to punish the guilty as to restore order in the social group shaken by the misdeed. It follows that sociological ethics, in the minds of its exponents, undermines neither the idea of responsibility nor that of duty, though it justifies these conceptions in its own way. And the same holds of the idea of contract, even if one believes with M. Georges Davy, that its origin is to be found in the institution of "potlatch."<sup>6</sup>

The necessity is already being felt of supplementing these particular studies with a general science of moral facts—a science for which another disciple of Durkheim, M. Albert Bayet, has suggested the name "ethology."<sup>7</sup> M. Bayet, however, more radical than his master, advocates the elimination of every normative tendency as distinctly contrary, in his view, to the spirit of scientific research. He seeks to limit himself exclusively to the study of facts, whatever their complexity and difficulty of comprehension. "When ethology shall have come into existence, the practical applications will doubtless appear of themselves." The moral fact concerns the distinction of good and evil in the

<sup>5</sup> *La responsabilité*, a sociological study by Paul Fauconnet, Alcan, 1920.

<sup>6</sup> G. Davy: *La foi jurée*, Alcan, 1922.

<sup>7</sup> Albert Bayet: *La science des faits moraux*, Alcan, 1925.

field of social phenomena, requirements, languages, laws, customs and literatures. To establish facts through a search for laws which, as in every science, is free from any but an exclusively scientific interest—such is the task which M. Bayet assigns to the sociologist. He has himself exemplified what he requires in a comprehensive study on suicide.<sup>8</sup>

Sociologists, even those of the school of Durkheim, are not equally convinced that moral ends may be determined by exclusively scientific methods. M. Bouglé is unquestionably persuaded that the scientific study of ends considered as facts is the prime necessity; "but," he queries, "to arrive at a knowledge of these ends, can and ought one henceforth limit one's procedure to that of scientific investigation? That is another question." And, like Durkheim, M. Bouglé asserts that the reasoning of the moralist who forms and co-ordinates value judgments "is something more peculiarly rich and flexible than the reasoning employed by the scholar when he is engaged in demonstration and verification, and occupies himself with the intentionally delimited field of positive science."<sup>9</sup>

## II. POSITIVE ETHICS, MORAL RATIONALISM, ETHICS AND BERGSONISM

The recent works of the sociological school, then, leave standing those criticisms which had been directed, from a strictly ethical and normative point of view, against the very principles maintained in these works. It is, indeed, necessary to examine moral facts objectively and empirically, but from such an examination one must not deduce rules of conduct. Durkheim's *l'Education morale* does

<sup>8</sup> *Le suicide et la morale*, Alcan, 1922.

<sup>9</sup> *Leçons de sociologie sur l'évolution des valeurs*, pp. 239 and 242, Colin, 1922.

not enable us any more than does the *La morale et la science des mœurs* to understand why we ought to acquire the spirit of discipline and of attachment to social groups upon which the author lays so much stress. No more can one derive from facts an obligation to realize the "normal" type. We indeed understand very well, in reading M. Fauconnet, how the idea of responsibility is transformed in the process of becoming individualized. But ought we to regard this development to individual responsibility with favor, or ought we, on the contrary, to resist it, striving to revive the collective responsibility of primitive society? Is "simple morality" which condemns suicide preferable to the "differentiated morality" which sometimes condones it? Such are questions for which purely sociological studies have no answer.

Nor has there been any weakening in the current of resistance to the methods of the school of Durkheim. Some moralists, while carrying on their investigations in a strictly empirical spirit, warn against confusing positive and positivistic no less than social and sociological. M. Gustave Belot, in re-editing his *Etudes de morale positive*,<sup>10</sup> has pointed out that we must take into consideration not merely the actual society that impinges upon man but also the will of society that urges man on to the realization of a type of society ever more conformable to the moral ideal represented by the most developed consciences of the time. In other words, just as there is, superior to the purely physiological ego, the ego which tends to realize the idea that it has formed of the moral person, so "superior to the society which makes man and to which Comte and his epigones have been fond of ascribing the genesis of man's superior qualities, there is the society which man makes according to a certain slowly elaborated conception of the human ideal." Thus the idea of the end, and of the volun-

<sup>10</sup> New edition in two volumes, with a second preface and two new studies: *Règle et motif* and *La valeur morale de la science*, Alcan.



tary end, deliberately chosen as that which most conforms to man's moral nature, reappears in ethics. It is this that M. Belot has in mind when he asserts that we are concerned not with the discovery of an already existing will but with the creation of a will, being assured from the outset that the rule imposed by the reflective conscience rediscovers and justifies the social instinct as the supreme moral motive. This distinction between the rule and the motive, according to M. Belot, satisfactorily removes numerous theoretical difficulties.

But why does the reflective conscience confirm the social interest? Why does man desire the existence of moral ends? To this question there is as yet no very clear reply. Hence M. Parodi still finds an "element of arbitrariness and of ultimate irrationalism" in the teaching of M. Belot.<sup>11</sup> M. Parodi, as well as M. Paul Lapie, seeks the reply in a "moral rationalism" integrated within rationalism as a whole. There are not two forms of reason, one theoretical and another practical, which might be conceived as diverse; there is but a single reason which builds up both science and ethics, employing the same methods in both fields. Moral ends are established by reason and are obligatory as scientific truths, inasmuch as "all recognized truth contains an obligation." One can no more logically escape from the obligation of conforming his conduct to a rule recognized as rational than one can escape the necessity of drawing conclusions from a rational demonstration. In brief, the determination of the good has its ultimate basis in reason, "the same reason which constructs mathematical and theoretical knowledge."<sup>12</sup> "Reason," writes M. Lapie in the same vein, "is practical as well as theoretical. It is

<sup>11</sup> *La philosophie contemporaine en France*, p. 361, Alcan, 1919.

<sup>12</sup> *Le rationalisme moral*, pp. 475-480. Address at the *Congress International de philosophie* held in Paris in 1921. M. Parodi has also published a new edition of his work, *Le problème moral et la pensée contemporaine*, Alcan, 1921.

alike a spring of action and a torch of intellect."<sup>13</sup>

With respect to these matters there is no essential difference between M. Parodi and M. Belot, except that the latter supplements the rational conception just described with a sociological content defining concrete duties. But this moral rationalism, in turn, has encountered adversaries. M. Felix Pecaue has pronounced it very "narrow."<sup>14</sup> Formal universality seems to this anti-Kantian "a thing extremely empty, empty to the point of nothingness," "complete ennui." He demands moral realities that have more body, such as sympathy or sociability. To this M. Parodi has replied that moral rationalism can no more dispense with affective state than can intellectual rationalism with experience, but that reason must order the former as well as the latter; in any case, rational ethics is "in the same position as science."<sup>15</sup> We here notice a well marked contrast between two "spiritual families."

This antithesis becomes still more apparent when we pass from these more or less rigorous rationalists to those who, like M. Alfred Loisy, do not expect to find in reason the justification of moral facts. The difference relates not to the content but to the justification of duty. In entire agreement with M. Parodi, M. Belot and Durkheim, M. Loisy believes that moral life is possible only within society, so that it is the latter which is the source of duty. In a spirit very similar to Durkheim, M. Loisy goes even so far as to say that the moralist cannot create morality; he can only discover it. Solidarity is a duty because it is first of all a fact. But after having thus disengaged morality from all metaphysical connections, Loisy directs all of his

<sup>13</sup> *Revue pédagogique*, Oct., 1925, p. 250. M. Paul Lapie is Rector of the *Académie de Paris*.

<sup>14</sup> M. Parodi, M. Belot and M. Pecaue are inspectors general of public instruction.

<sup>15</sup> Discussion that followed M. Parodi's address at the *Congress International de philosophie*. Cf. also, *Morale et Science* (lectures delivered at the Sorbonne), Paris, Nathan, 1923.

energy against the rationalists.<sup>16</sup> Morality, for the Professor of the History of Religions at the College de France, is not rational, but is "mystical." It is "human" but it is also "religious." Let it be realized that morality is not a science; "morality is a spirit, the social instinct developed into the spirit of justice and of devotion." Let it be realized that it has nothing to do with any positive religion but with an always living faith which communicates itself not by demonstration but by a sort of "spiritual contagion" and which enables us to labor "for the realization of a single, holy, universal and abiding humanity, a veritable church of the spirit."

One can perhaps understand that such a doctrine is capable of arousing an ardor that is truly contagious, but one can also understand the criticisms of the rationalists. It is all very well, reply the latter, to exalt faith, but who will guarantee for us its authority if it will not submit itself to reason. "No," writes M. Lapie, "neither the intuition of the ideal nor the anticipation of its realization is foreign to reason; neither is an item of knowledge superior to intellectual knowledge. Let us reclaim for reason the entire domain of which M. Loisy has wished to dispossess it."<sup>17</sup> What remains true is that one must not think of rationalism in too narrow and circumscribed a way. And one comes to the distinction made by Durkheim.

What follows when one rejects every rational criterion is clearly shown by the example of those who are consistently irrationalistic. For M. Jules de Gaultier, who is a representative of this tendency, rationalism is absurd; it is but an "official philosophy" which sets itself in opposition to true philosophy. For him, reality is at the bottom blind and aimless. Every doctrine, when closely regarded, is but

<sup>16</sup> *La morale humaine*, Nourry, 1923. M. Loisy is Professor in the *College de France*.

<sup>17</sup> *Revue pédagogique*, Oct., 1925. See also an article by Mme. J. Jacob, *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1924, No. 3.

"an impassioned expression of an emotion" and these emotions eternally clash. No recourse remains therefore but that of observing this scene without attempting to change it; the emotion should become an object of observation.<sup>18</sup> The abandonment of ethics in favor of aesthetics—of an aesthetics which may lay no more claim upon truth than may ethics—this, indeed, is the inevitable outcome of irrationalism.

The adversaries of irrationalism, however, are not all in agreement with one another. Between pure rationalists represented, among others, by M. Parodi and M. Lapie, and the pure irrationalists who are led to deny the existence of moral rules, as does M. Jules de Gaultier, there is an intermediary group that allies itself with pragmatism. One would call it Bergsonian if M. Bergson had himself directly treated moral problems. But the work upon which we know that the author of *l'Evolution créatrice* is engaged has not yet seen the light of day. Meanwhile there are disciples, who, inspired by his doctrine, have supplied the omission of their master. M. Pradines denounces the "moral error" of rationalism; in the latter he sees only "an allurements of nothingness." Then he attempts to establish a morality of action designed as an essential part of his "philosophy of action." Reason appears only as "a method whose fruits are the moral precepts."<sup>19</sup> M. Joseph Wilbois, on the other hand, has made an extremely original and suggestive attempt at a Bergsonian ethics that seeks likewise to preserve the results that may henceforth be acquired by the sociological school. For M. Wilbois duty is based neither on rational principles nor on empirical data. It is a primary reality which is at once impossible and useless to prove. But it can be identified. It is characterized by two features, endeavor and generosity, as one can see in the

<sup>18</sup> J. de Gaultier: *La sensibilité métaphysique*, edition of *le Siecle*, 1923.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *l'Erreur morale* and *Principes de toute philosophie de l'action*, Alcan. M. Pradines is Professor in the University of Strasbourg.



case of the individual as well as of humanity. Creative evolution becomes creative progress and this progress, although free and unpredictable, realizes itself through sociological determinism. Moral effort, the human equivalent of the *élan vital*, creates institutions and then leaves them behind in a perpetual striving for moral invention. "A morality that grows without ceasing is basically involved in an ultimate definition of man."

The rationalists have not failed to reproach this ethics, along with all purely pragmatic doctrines, with "subjectivism." Pragmatists, as we know, throw back the criticism and accuse rationalism of itself being subjective. When the issue is thus formulated, the debate is fruitless. But that which, in the eyes of most of the pragmatists, saves them from the accusation of arbitrariness, is the fact that, beyond the individual and the purely human reason, they conceive another truth, a transcendent truth, which is the absolutely religious truth. We are thus carried to another plane and the debate acquires a new breadth.

### III. ETHICS AND RELIGION

M. Bouglé discussed the theories of M. Wilbois before the *Société française de philosophie*. In characterizing them, he contended that M. Wilbois supports on two columns of such different styles as intuitionistic pragmatism and sociological determinism, a "Catholic capital." The author of *Devoir et durée* did not defend himself. "The hand of the transcendent," he writes, "forms and upholds us, cradles us, chastises us, and pierces us in order to free us. . . . When a virtue grows it becomes religious; development transforms an ordinary duty into a supernatural

duty; God appears in the midst of our moral upheavals."<sup>20</sup>

Thus there reappears at the heart of moral problems the question as to the relation of morality and religion. Here French thought assumes a unique position. While not in general separating the one from the other, and while still accustomed to find in religions the justification or culmination of moral precepts, most of the thinkers of whom we have just spoken as positivists or rationalists undertake to sever morality from religion as completely, or even more so, than from metaphysics. They profess what Ferdinand Buisson calls "the secular faith." Even the thinkers who recognize the great social importance of religions and are distrustful of abstract rationalism, as, for example, M. Alfred Loisy, wish to institute a purely human morality.

At the same time this is not the only tendency. There are, as we are coming to see, a number of philosophers who wish to maintain close bonds between morality and religion. But these philosophers, in turn, do not all put the problem in the same way. We may distinguish two fairly demarcated tendencies. On the one hand, there are those who, maintaining an alliance with pragmatism or Bergsonism, conceive transcendence as necessary for immanence. They hold that religious or supernatural truth conditions or envelops human nature which therein alone finds its culmination. It has often been noticed that some of the most eminent disciples of M. Bergson, such as M. Edouard LeRoy and M. J. Wilbois, give the doctrine of *l'Evolution créatrice* a religious crown, and that the master, without appropriating the latter, nevertheless does not disavow it. Another thinker of similar tendencies, a philosopher of "action," M. Maurice Blondel, also comes to conclusions that are distinctly Catholic in character. This is not the

<sup>20</sup> M. J. Wilbois: *Devoir et durée*, Alcan, 1912. Cf. a discussion of this book before the *Société française de philosophie*, in the *Bulletin* of this society, 1914, No. 1. M. Wilbois has founded an *Ecole d'humanités contemporaines*, designed to train leaders for the direction of affairs.

place to study the specifically philosophical and metaphysical aspects of his view. In the field of ethics, this tendency toward Catholic thought has produced a vigorous moralist who died prematurely, namely, Paul Bureau. His book on *La crise morale des temps nouveaux* published twenty years ago was followed by a great work on *l'Indiscipline des mœurs*.<sup>21</sup> Bureau holds himself more closely to LePlay than to Comte. In common with the rationalists, he criticizes purely sociological theories of morality; but, in distinction from the rationalists, he affirms that there can be no basis for morality apart from a belief in a personal God, the only being "qualified to . . . induce the obedience of an intelligent and free being who would have no reason to submit himself to a force devoid of personality." Paul Bureau was particularly inclined to plumb to the depths of the question of sexual morality which seemed to him of prime importance for the future of society. In this he resembled another thinker whose tendencies are otherwise very different, being thoroughly permeated by the spirit of Bergson, Georges Sorel, the philosopher of syndicalism, who died in 1922. "I am persuaded," writes the author of *Reflexions sur la violence*, "that the world will become more just only in the measure that it becomes more chaste."

Besides these Bergsonian or mystical Catholics, there are others who accuse the former of compromising Catholic dogmas through interpretations that are singularly divergent from doctrinal truth. Modernism has been condemned by Pious X and a number of works by Bergsonian Catholics have been put on the Index. In reaction against this tendency, there are thinkers who advocate a return to the scholastic philosophy. Best known among them is M. Jacques Maritain. As characteristic of this neo-scholasticism in the field of ethics, we would mention at least two

<sup>21</sup> Bloud et Gay, 1923. With reference to Paul Bureau see the first of the *Cahiers de la nouvelle journée*, organ of this tendency of Catholic thought, Bloud et Gay, 1924.

works: a new edition of Mgr. Deploige's book, *Le conflit de la morale et de la sociologie*<sup>22</sup> and a more recent work by M. R. P. Gillet entitled *La morale et les morales*, which is a collection of lectures first given in Buenos-Aires in a course on Catholic culture.<sup>23</sup> These two works furnish a particularly spirited criticism of biological, psychological and sociological ethics. They seek to show that there can be no true ethics without a theological basis. After discussing in particular the distinction made by M. Belot between the rule and the motive, M. R. P. Gillet endeavors to demonstrate that the supreme rule of human conduct is the divine reason. He argues that the supreme motive of moral action is the divine reality, the final goal toward which we tend, alike in our spontaneous activity and in our free volitions, so that in heaven "the motive meets the demands of the rule." This theology, thus, is rational and objective without thereby neglecting the spontaneous impulse of human nature which propels man towards God.

Obviously we here reach a limit where all controversy becomes impossible. For we have to do with an act of faith in the supernatural and with revelation, the keystone of religious faith which the secular thinkers are unwilling to acknowledge. This is not to say, however, that these thinkers are completely satisfied with secular rationalism in the form in which it at first sight seems opposed to religious thought. They attempt to perfect it. M. Jean Devolvé accuses it of being too abstract and of failing to touch the heart. The conditions under which a secular morality may be efficacious, he thinks, involve a utilization of a religious sentiment, but of one that is very broad; precisely because

<sup>22</sup> Third edition, 1923, *Nouvelle librairie nationale*. Mgr. Deploige is President of the *Institut supérieur de philosophie* at the Catholic University of Louvain.

<sup>23</sup> Edition of *La revue des jeunes*, 1925. M. R. P. Gillet, as well as M. Maritain, is Professor in the *Institut catholique de Paris*. Paul Bureau belonged to the same institution.



it is too vague it meets with reproach at the hands of rigorous spirits.<sup>24</sup>

The debate has not remained an affair of philosophers. It is carried on beyond the circle of thinkers; it has entered the turbulent domain of politics where the religious question, because of the role which the Roman church has always played in France, continues in the forefront of attention. The Catholic politicians wage a vigorous campaign against the secular school and against educational neutrality, in which they see only deception. The secular publicists reply not only with dogmatic justifications but also with references to the fruits of the secular school—it furnished the great majority of the heroes of the war.<sup>25</sup> We can here but mention these polemics which are sometimes very sharp; but it is necessary to know of them in order to judge of the commotion which such doctrinal controversies can arouse when they affect vital interests.<sup>26</sup>

We would add, furthermore, that, except in these political struggles, the minds of all the religious faiths and of all the philosophical schools are very happily united in the common pursuit of moral tasks and of theoretical enlightenment. *La ligue française d'éducation morale*, *l'Union de libres penseurs et de libres croyants pour la culture morale*, and *l'Union pour la vérité* (formerly *Union pour l'action morale*) bring together Catholics, Protestants, Jews, rationalists, and thinkers without any religious belief in a spirit of co-operation, confidence and mutual esteem. Within these organizations we find an equal respect for all sincere beliefs; even profound metaphysical differences are

<sup>24</sup> *Rationalisme et tradition*, Alcan, 1911. M. Delvolvé, Professor in the University of Toulouse, has applied his ideas in a small book on ethics designed for children: *La morale à Nelly*, Paris, Nathan.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Albert Bayet: *La morale laïque*, Rieder, 1925; also Georges Weill: *Histoire de l'idée laïque en France au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Alcan, 1925.

<sup>26</sup> One may find an account of the religious question in France from the Catholic point of view by M. Georges Goyau and from the secular point of view by the present author in *L'Europäische revue*, Sept., 1925. Cf. also our work, presenting in collaboration a debate, *Sur la paix religieuse*, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1923.

not repressed. Only the Catholic irreconcilables have a tendency to hold aloof from these philosophical and ethical societies, restricting their efforts to specifically Catholic activities. This irreconcilability varies with the times; at the present moment it is ordered, if not by the sovereign pontiff, at least by the high dignitaries of the church.

#### IV. ETHICS, LAW AND POLITICS

Our survey of the main thought currents would be inadequate if it restricted itself to individual morality. The same tendencies, sometimes contradictory, reappear when we turn to the relations of the individual to society, as these are manifest in law and politics.

Here likewise the sociological and the individualistic or rationalistic schools are ranged against each other. But the conflict in this case exhibits unique characteristics. Why ought we to obey the juridical law, the social counterpart of the moral law? To this question M. Duguit, appealing to the authority of August Comte, replies by rejecting every metaphysical element of a subjective sort and falling back solely upon the rule of objective law, the expression of social solidarity.<sup>27</sup> But though invoking sociology, the dean of Bordeaux rejects the hypothesis of a collective consciousness. Along with Tarde, he finds reality only in individuals, governing and governed. If legal relations are to be obeyed, this, according to him, is because they impose themselves as facts without whose acceptance society is impossible. But we clearly see the problem which continually arises from the juridical as well as from the moral point of view—the problem of judgments of value. Why ought we to submit to a fact? Why

<sup>27</sup> The works of M. Duguit are well known to jurists and to sociologists. The master of Bordeaux is giving definite form to his doctrine in a monumental work, *Traité du droit constitutionnel*, which began to appear in 1921.

should we obey the "regulation of law" of Duguit any more than the "collective consciousness" of Durkheim? This is a question to which no reply is possible without a kind of idealism which goes beyond a pure sociological and juridical realism.

This is the criticism of M. Duguit raised by the partisans of individual rights who rejuvenate the ancient theory of natural rights by adapting it to the modern outlook. M. Hauriou, the most eminent representative, after Saleilles, of this school, does not deny that there are social rights that are objective and prior to the rights of individuals. His theory of the institution is in this respect one of the masterpieces of present-day juridical sociology. But for M. Hauriou social rights are limited by the imprescriptible rights of the individual moral person; for the moral and religious destiny of the latter transcends society. Objectivity, according to M. Hauriou, is transcendent. The Dean of Toulouse in this respect espouses a sort of Platonic and religious idealism,<sup>28</sup> and we are always carried back to the profound and ultimate roots of doctrines, which are metaphysical beliefs.

With reference to these two extreme theses of realism and idealism in the field of law, paralleling a similar situation in the field of ethics, the orthodox sociological school has believed itself able to effect a synthesis and a reconciliation. In a substantial little book on *Droit, l'idéalisme et l'expérience*,<sup>29</sup> M. Georges Davy, a disciple of Durkheim, seeks to maintain that sociology alone can resolve the contradictions into which the antithetical doctrines fall.<sup>30</sup> He

<sup>28</sup> "Intelligence has been forced to develop by adapting itself to the intelligible realities of the external world, to the *idées-forces*, the messengers of God. . . . In these ideas and in God who is their center, the moral order and the principles of natural law have an objective existence." Summary of *Droit constitutionnel*, 1923, p. 46.

<sup>29</sup> Alcan, 1922. The same author has since published a *Sociologie Politique*, Delagrave, 1924. M. Davy is Dean of the Faculty of Letters in Dijon.

<sup>30</sup> *Revue philosophique*, Nov.-Dec., 1925. With reference to the relations of law and sociology see also an excellent study by M. J. Aillet in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, July and Sept., 1923.

holds that assertions of an objective import and the prescriptions of juridical idealism have a common center in the requirements of the collective consciousness. But there always remains, as M. Parodi has retorted, the necessity of explaining "how collective representations can be formed and can acquire a constraining authority . . . ; and furthermore, once critical reflection has arisen and an individual can no longer content himself with establishing the existence of collective representations, how and on what rational basis one may justify the latter." Thus, there reappear the questions already put to sociological ethics. We move in a circle.

The reflections of the jurists relate not alone to general theories of law. They attack also the more concrete questions of private and of public law. This is best exemplified by the very animated critique of the idea of national sovereignty and of the very notion of law, the traditional bases of the democratic regime in France. M. Duguit, in particular, has sharply attacked the Roman conception of sovereignty developed by royalty and likewise adopted by the Revolution which transferred it from the king to the people.<sup>31</sup> M. Hauriou, without definitely rejecting it, as has M. Duguit, has shown that it ought to be limited by the individualistic principle in accordance with the viewpoint which we have just described. Along with the idea of sovereignty, that of law is no less energetically proclaimed to be "decadent." On the part of a number of jurists, parliament is no longer considered to be the sole source of legislation. Just as the League of Nations tends to develop an international law superior to the laws of nations, so the powers of parliament tend to be curtailed to a certain extent from within, by economic and social groups which develop "professional laws" and by judicial administration

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Duguit: *Les transformations du droit public*, Colin, 1923, and *Le droit social, le droit individuel et la transformation de l'état*, Alcan, 3rd ed., 1922.



which tends in "its juridical constructions" more and more to emancipate itself from the letter of the law. "We no longer have to choose between the rigorist and the liberalist interpretations of the written law; it is in the great book of life that we must read."<sup>32</sup>

We thus come to the threshold of grave political questions which have been throwing the European democracies into confusion, particularly since the war. The crisis of parliamentarianism, the crisis of authority, the crisis of law and the crisis of contract are but varieties of one and the same phenomenon to which we may give the generic name "the crisis of democracy." We cannot here enter upon it but one can at least realize its moral character. Without doubt institutions cannot be eternal. Our parliamentary regime, the outcome of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, ought to be brought into harmony with the new economic, political and moral needs which could not be foreseen by the contemporaries of Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau, or even by the theorists of the nineteenth century. But if one evokes "life" and its changes uncritically, one succumbs, in political as in moral philosophy, to "mobilism" and to an arbitrariness no less dangerous than an abstract and immutable dogmatism. To diminish the powers of parliament for the aggrandizement of particular groups or of the judiciary will involve national life in serious difficulties and will destroy the very foundations of a democratic regime. M. Gaston Morin is well aware of the danger inasmuch as he demands a reform of the intellectual training of the judge—in his belief the most important of reforms. Though not unmindful of this necessity, let us realize that there is something of even greater importance, namely, the reformation of the intellectual and moral outlook of the legislator and of the citizen. For in

<sup>32</sup> Cf. G. Morin: *La decadence de l'autorité de la loi*, in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, April-June, 1925; also the discussion of this contention before the *Société française de philosophie* in its session of Dec. 27, 1924.

spite of the diversities which exist and of which the magistrate ought to take cognizance, there is need, in the last analysis, of a social bond which is expressed in the law. It is indeed the law which should express whatever there may be that is constant and rational in the consciousness of an epoch.

Thus we have throughout found in ethics, law and politics, the same preoccupations, the same problems, the same tendencies, the same antagonistic solutions. It is at bottom the eternal problem of the one and the many in which one must hold both ends of the chain. The types of minds range themselves according to their leanings, the rationalists favoring the universal rule whereas minds in love with the concrete place the emphasis upon diversity, multiplicity and relativity. We can dispense with neither of the two tendencies, but they are more or less fitting according to the epoch. We live in an age of crisis where particular events are in the focus of attention.<sup>33</sup> It is clear, however, that a normal order will not be re-established if, transcending these diversities, there is not recovered the sentiment for general law which, however, should not have the rigidity characteristic of it in the past. Laborious search for scientific information as complete as possible—pursued, without any other aim than that of truth, by the special paths of all the various disciplines—and the judgment of the upright man, the citizen, the legislator, the judge, on the one hand illumined by this work yet on the other exercising upon it his critical reflection; this, it would seem, is the best means of bringing together the rigor of the scientific spirit and the need of an ideal for conscience. Such is the path that must be taken if one would form or strengthen a common and developing idea of what is rational and just by the collaboration of all who are com-

<sup>33</sup> We have undertaken to develop this in a chapter of our book, *La démocratie et l'après guerre*, Paris, Rivière, 1923, and in a more recent study, *La crise actuelle de l'autorité* in *Grande revue*, Aug., 1925.

petent in matters of ethics. These, it would seem, are the conclusions in which ethical speculation in France today eventuates.

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## AESTHETICS

AESTHETICS being a comparatively new science among philosophers, it is not unnatural to find it tinged with other forms of knowledge already explored. Each country, each school of thinkers, marks it with its own particular stamp. Therefore, while Benedetto Croce in Italy and the earlier German aestheticians turn to its metaphysical side, while in Great Britain, we find with Ruskin mainly ethical cares, in France there is a tendency to emphasize the psychological factors in aesthetics. We are chiefly concerned with the representation of the universe as seen through our own individual minds; the latter being, when all is said and done, the only representation which we can be quite sure of, after all.

Among French philosophers we can only trace M. Jules de Gaultier who condescended to clothe aesthetics in the dignified garb of metaphysics.<sup>1</sup>

Unlike, however, Benedetto Croce, who assigns to the aesthetic activity the first momentum historically in human

<sup>1</sup> Jules de Gaultier: *La sensibilité métaphysique*, Editions du Siècle, Paris, 1925.

thinking and the lowest among disinterested activities in the scale of metaphysical values, Jules de Gaultier considers that the aesthetic activity is, on the contrary, the most developed in the evolution of the mind which ascends from the primitive Messianic point of view to the spectacular point of view. The "*sensibilité messianique*" is the one which contemplates the universe with the aim of changing it. All tendency to progress whether it be religious or moral perfection or be it the Bergsonian "*élan vital*," all search for an external or future end belong to the hope of a Messiah. The "*sensibilité spectaculaire*" contemplates the universe for the sole pleasure of contemplating it.

This theory which was first obscurely expressed in a different way by Nietzsche was not followed out to its conclusion by the German philosopher. Nietzsche forgets the world as representation in his enthusiasm for the world as action, and he falls back into the "Messianic fallacy" by expecting (in precisely the same way as do the moral thinkers whom he criticizes) some immoral Messiah who will perfect the world in beauty.

M. Jules de Gaultier, who is more Nietzschean than Nietzsche (I mean the earlier Nietzsche of the "Origins of Greek Tragedy") and who is logical, works out his thesis in the following manner: The first symptoms of a "*sensibilité spectaculaire*" manifest themselves in biology with the change of sensation into perception. This "*sensibilité spectaculaire*" plays an important, though often unconscious part in human life in the form of curiosity, and attains its perfection in aesthetic activity. Science is far from being disinterested. Quoting Hobbes': "Knowledge is power" and Comte's: "Every science aims at foresight," Jules de Gaultier concludes that the desire to know is a form of the will to power. Science belongs therefore, at first, to the "*sensibilité messianique*," searching, as it does, the final end outside itself; i. e., an end where, owing to



some universal convergence, all phenomena would merge into an identity, whether this identity be the Eleatic One, the Platonic τὸ ἀγαθόν, or the Hegelian Absolute. Science has failed in this enterprise, because of the resistance of the Real. It appears, then, that modifying its primitive conception of identity, according to which science considered itself as a means of reducing the diverse to unity, it has later used this conception as a means of uniting between themselves the different forms of diversity and of creating out of these forms perceptible objects. After an infinite development, these objects have become no longer degrees towards the attainment of an end, i. e., Bradleyan degrees of reality, but objects the contemplation of which constitutes an end in itself.

Existence, according to M. de Gaultier, is conditioned by knowledge, but knowledge itself is conditioned by relation. Relation must needs exclude all finalism, in which it would be abolished. This argument brings Jules de Gaultier to the position, somewhat paradoxical at first sight, that in the sphere of relation, which is also that of the whole of reality, there is no place for truth. For nothing is true, except when considered from an objective and sole end. Truth presupposes Messianism and belongs to the sphere of philosophical folklore. It must therefore in the sphere of relation give its place to Beauty. Knowledge which is the condition of existence is also its sole justification. It appears, finally, that in the evolution of the different forms of the "*sensibilité messianique*" towards the forms of the "*sensibilité spectaculaire*," existence frees itself from dependence upon truth and becomes subservient to the hegemony of the beautiful, which alone mirrors the real.

M. Jules de Gaultier is the first philosopher since Kant and after Croce to give to aesthetics its metaphysical import, but unlike the two former thinkers, he allots to this

science the chief place, and his conclusion reduces practically the whole of the theory of knowledge to an aesthetic activity.

Among those—and they are very few in France—who have approached aesthetics from a moral point of view, we must mention M. Lalo.<sup>2</sup> After a very exhaustive and critical survey of the different solutions of the problem, and an impartial statement of its historical side, M. Lalo points out the impossibility of adopting an absolute scale of values. He admits, however, a differentiation between the “normal value” (i. e., the moral principles of the man-in-the-street) and the “ideal value” or the morality which it is not always desirable to realize. In all questions of value, it is the “normal value” which remains fundamental and is the only one capable of being objectified. The ideal value is its hypothetical transposition and can be more or less verified by time, space and humanity. M. Lalo argues further that that which is morally bad in itself may be morally good on the whole, and he enforces his attitude by Aristotle’s cathartic theory of art. An immoral work of art may be finally moral by the very fact of its immorality, i. e., of the purgation of undesirable passions; which, of course, lands the whole problem in a kind of universal relativism.

It is difficult, says M. Lalo, to conciliate the beautiful and the good in one indivisible unity; this would be too simple and too abstract for life. It is also difficult to maintain them in a badly regulated duality, which is anarchical. Their harmony must be solidarity and organization. He therefore seeks the answer to the problem in the double notion of synthesis and relativity. Wherever there is synthesis, the whole acquires a value which its elements do not possess. If the whole reacts on its parts or vice versa—as would a cell in an organism—these two values clash,

<sup>2</sup> Lalo: *L'art et la morale*, Alcan, Paris, 1922.

though the one cannot exist without the other, and though they form a whole. The only sin in spirit, in M. Lalo's eyes, is that of being incomplete.

Though M. Lalo insists, so it seems to us, too much on the social side of art,<sup>3</sup> he remains well in the vein of French thought. Even in *l'Art et la Morale*, and especially more so in his other works on aesthetics,<sup>4</sup> he approaches aesthetic questions chiefly from a psychologist's point of view. He discerns five main classes among the functions of art in life:

Firstly, an escape from practical reality (Type Flaubert).

Secondly, a cathartic activity of immunization—by liberation—against the tension of external and tyrannical aspiration (Type Goethe).

Thirdly, a purely technical activity which leads to the theory of "art for art's sake" (Type Goncourt, Théophile Gautier, Oscar Wilde).

Fourthly, an activity of embellishment of a vulgar reality and of the author's own vulgarity (Type Jean-Jacques Rousseau).

Fifthly, a more humble activity of reinforcement of simple reality (Type Stendhal, Van Dyck, Mozart).

This classification, though very ingenious, appears to us, nevertheless, somewhat arbitrary and often overlapping. For instance, there is much more in Oscar Wilde than a purely technical activity, and Van Dyck seems to have been far more refined in his art than in his private mode of living.

M. Lalo's two treatises on aesthetics, already mentioned, contain an exhaustive and impartial survey of the different problems for a beginner. Of the same type but of a more ambitious character is the treatise by M. Alain.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Lalo: *L'art et la vie sociale*.

<sup>4</sup> *Notions d'esthétique*, Alcan, Paris, 1925; *Esthétique*, Vuibert, Paris, 1925.

<sup>5</sup> *Système des Beaux-Arts*, Nouvelle Revue Française, 1920.

Though it imparts nothing entirely new, we find therein a systematized review of technical theories of art. The history of French aesthetics has been set forth in a satisfactory way by M. Mustoxidi.<sup>6</sup>

The psychological field is far from being exhausted. Among the most interesting publications is, no doubt, the chapter by M. H. Delacroix on *Le Sentiment Esthétique*.<sup>7</sup> He examines the doctrine that play is the origin of all art. Though he does not deny the analogy between these two activities, he argues that the new factor which the aesthetic activity adds to the faculty of play, it might as well add to a more serious faculty. He defines the work of art as a profound psychological moment in life. At the beginning of every aesthetic sentiment there is a sensorial element, but the task of intellectualizing the imagination and the dream is none the less important. Not unlike the former thinkers whose theories we have stated, M. Delacroix holds that the aesthetic activity is that faculty which discovers new relations between us and the sensations and among the different sensations, as independent of the particular quality of the sensations themselves. There is therefore at the basis of all the arts an intellectual activity which is the same as that which leads to the constitution of language.

The aesthetic sentiments, though individual, bear, according to M. Delacroix, a character of universality. In the pure emotions the artist detects the structure and the plan of evolution. These sentiments are the most delicate and the most profound reaction of the soul towards the universe. He claims, therefore, that all human interests are represented in art. But he thinks that the same aim is achieved by the contemplation of nature as by a work of art.

Such is also the opinion of M. A. Dauzat.<sup>8</sup> After hav-

<sup>6</sup> *Histoire de l'Esthétique française (1700-1900)*, Champion, 1920.

<sup>7</sup> In Georges Dumas's, *Traité de Psychologie*, Alcan, Paris, 1924.

<sup>8</sup> *Le sentiment de la nature et son expression esthétique*, Alcan, Paris, 1914.



ing analyzed the impressions which the contemplation of nature produces in certain individuals, he proceeds to examine the influence of surroundings on works of art. He concludes, however, with M. Paulhan,<sup>9</sup> that it is mostly when love of nature has been denied its free outlet, that it reveals itself, as it is always a repressed tendency which creates the artistic attitude.

This brings us to a very modern part of the literature on the subject. It is not surprising to find that the Freudian doctrine has influenced in many ways contemporary aesthetic theories in France as much as—or perhaps a little less than—in other countries. Even M. Lalo seems to tend in this direction in his more recent books. We have not found, however, in this Freudian aspect of the aesthetic activity anything new which was not already stated in the old Aristotelian theory of the purgation of passions.

Doctor Hesnard<sup>10</sup> argues that a work arises in the mind of the artist through an unconscious process which can be compared with that of the dream. The artist puts in his work many tendencies of which he finds an ideal realization or liberation. He searches for the sublime means of expressing all his aspirations. Psychoanalysis will discover in his work all the intimate sentiments of the author with the whole of his affective history and the whole of his personal life, including his reminiscences of childhood and youth.

Charles Baudouin<sup>11</sup> gives us many examples to illustrate the Freudian doctrine of art. Every state which engrosses the mind tends in one way or another to secure external expression, for it is a concentrated energy which wishes to diffuse itself. He goes on, showing how, for Victor Hugo, for instance, hallucination by compromise, which in his case is the source of symbolical poetry, is the normal

<sup>9</sup> *L'Esthétique du paysage*, 1912.

<sup>10</sup> *L'Inconscient*.

<sup>11</sup> *Suggestion et Auto-Suggestion*.

method of discharge; and how Goethe by writing Werther freed himself from a suicidal impulse.

On the pathological side of the subject we must mention Doctor Vinchon's *L'art et la folie* (Stock, Paris, 1924), and an earlier book by Marcel Réja, *L'art chez les fous* (Mercure de France, 1914). Though the examples they give of art (literature, painting, music) as created by inmates of an asylum are interesting in themselves, they throw but little light on the main problems. Marcel Réja, basing himself on the examples in his book, concludes that art seems to be the manifestation of the obscure consciousness of the individual. It expresses, with the satisfaction which every activity finds in its own expression, the actual state of mental acquisition. The work of art is a kind of concrete scheme in which the individual takes pleasure in synthesizing acquired notions without having recourse to the logical and rational process of abstraction.

If anything, the poems and pictures created by lunatics and systematically collected by Marcel Réja would go to prove the theory of the French aestheticians, as against Benedetto Croce, that a real work of art is constituted of intellectual elements as well as sensual.

Our review would be incomplete if we did not say a few words of the artists who have written about their own activities. Their theories may not be philosophical, but as a confession they throw some light on the subject. They are important in a country like France, where new literary schools are created every year, new manifestos written, new poetical programmes proclaimed, and where artistic life is bubbling over with new fashions.

Among the earlier writers, a curious theory of "eurythmic harmonization" of the individual with conflicting causes, has been put forward by Rémy de Gourmont.<sup>12</sup> Though it remains in the tradition of the Aristotelian

<sup>12</sup> *Le problème du style*, Mercure de France; *Esthétique de la langue française*, Mercure de France.

καθαροῖς and the Freudian "libido," Rémy de Gourmont's theory is more subtle, as it is based on a hedonic search for "attunement" with the surroundings and the universe and the desire for immortality, which is reminiscent of the Platonic doctrine in the Banquet. This theory has been followed to its logical conclusion by the author's brother, Jean de Gourmont, who tells us a very illuminating anecdote on the subject: "I once suggested to Rémy," he writes, "the possibility of a fire in his library. He answered that he would rather die than see his notes and manuscripts disappear. Transposition of the instinct of generation, perhaps. But in this there is especially the human conception of the idea of eternity. This realization of oneself in a work of art which will last longer than one's life, is, in fact, the negation of religious faith and its transposition into an individual eternity."<sup>13</sup>

The desire for immortality as a factor in creative work is also emphasized in M. Paul Valéry's *Eupalinos*, an imitation of a Platonic dialogue, which takes place in the underworld between the ghost of Socrates and that of Phaedrus.<sup>14</sup> "Nothing beautiful," says M. Paul Valéry through Socrates' mouth, "can be separate from life, and life is that which dies." It is most ironical and somewhat pathetic to hear two immaterial ghosts discussing the necessity for material bodies and forms as these alone can radiate and perceive beauty. For there exist no details in the execution of a work. The reality of a discourse, according to Paul Valéry, lies more in that which appears accidental to the profane, i. e., in the coloring and in the tone of a voice, in the way things are expressed rather than in the things expressed. Here again we see that the sphere of relations is of paramount importance for aesthetic perceptions.

The crux, however, of M. Valéry's theory is in its aesthe-

<sup>13</sup> Jean de Gourmont: *Souvenirs sur Rémy*, Champion, Paris, 1924.

<sup>14</sup> Paul Valéry: *Eupalinos ou l'Architecte*, Nouvelle Revue Française, Paris, 1923.

tic formulation, too often overlooked by those who approach the question as metaphysicians and psychologists. Paul Valéry insists that art is mainly choice—a fact often forgotten—and that as such it is tyrannical. Real beauty, he says, is as rare as is, among men, the man capable of making an effort against himself, i. e., to chose a definite self and to impose it upon all his other selves. It is urgent that *that which shall be* should satisfy, with all the force of its novelty, the reasonable requirements of *that which was*.

After a somewhat arbitrary distinction between natural and artificial objects—arbitrary, because M. Valéry, basing it as he does on two different kinds of order, forgets that order is altogether an anthropomorphic conception—Paul Valéry's theory of choice (among the infinite subject-matters for aesthetic creation) culminates in the following argument:

If the universe is the effect of an act, and the act itself the effect of a Being and of a need, of a thought, of a science and of a power of that Being, it is by an act alone that one can join again the great aim and propose to oneself the imitation of him who has made all things. This is the most natural way of putting oneself in the very place of God. And out of all acts the most complete is that of constructing. A work demands love, meditation, obedience to one's most beautiful thought, invention of laws by one's soul. It arises from the most intimate part of one's life, and yet it is not identical with oneself. One would be to that work—if it could but think—a God. Just as God created out of chaos, the artist creates out of the chaotic elements which surround him, and he starts where God has stopped.

Thus, by putting aesthetics at the highest summit of spiritual evolution, Paul Valéry comes, though by different means, in a totally different manner, and on an alto-



gether different plan, to a conclusion which has several points of analogy with that of Jules de Gaultier.

Among the ultra-modern manifestos on art, we must quote Marinetti's cry of battle: "An automobile in full speed is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace or the Venus de Milo." Exaggerated as it may seem, it nevertheless marks a new aesthetic interest. Until now, all civilizations have centered around two main ideas: the infinite, in the East, based perhaps on the contemplation of the desert, which brought forth mystical ecstasy, monotheistic religions, pantheistic thinking and a general disorder in creative work, where, as can be seen in Hindu temples, the mass, reminiscent of infinity, is overadorned and overdressed with rich details; the finite, in the West, based on the contemplation of trees which suggest individuality, human gods and beautiful forms. But whether oriental or occidental, the aesthetic ideal has always been an ideal of repose, of immobility.

"Est-elle en marbre ou non, la Vénus de Milo?

Je hais le mouvement qui déplace les lignes."

Such was the credo of beauty of a former French poet. Now the futurists have introduced for the first time the idea of movement as a subject-matter for aesthetic contemplation, and this opens up new vistas of possibilities.

Following closely in the steps of the futurists are the surrealists, chiefly represented by Philippe Soupault, Joseph Delteil and Robert Desnos. Their ideals also are speed and shortness, with special stress laid upon impulsive expression.

No masterpiece, nothing of great artistic value has so far been created in any of these modern schools.<sup>15</sup> This, of course, is not a fair criticism, for (as is witnessed in the

<sup>15</sup> We must except M. Marinetti's works. However, his better writings like *Le Roi Bombance*, *Poupées électriques*, etc., have not been written according to futurist canons.

history of art) hardly any masterpiece has ever been achieved by the same minds who have invented a new aesthetic language. The sonata form was known a century before Beethoven and Mozart brought this musical language to perfection. It seems as if the whole creative power is exhausted by the invention.

However, for better or for worse, the futurists and the surrealists are children of that century of speed where conditions of life leave little time for contemplation. The value of their aesthetic ideal can be determined alone by time.

MARYSE CHOISY.

## HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

### I. METHODS

THE generation of professors who held the highest positions in French universities in 1914 had succeeded in bringing about the long-expected conciliation between the historical mind and the philosophical mind. Already such men as Renouvier and Boutroux had proved that an aptitude for original thinking, instead of excluding, rather evoked, an interest in what other philosophers had thought. Bergson entered with complete sympathy into the philosophical attitudes of Plotinus and Berkeley. Hamelin combined a most robust originality with an exceptionally keen understanding of Aristotle, as well as of the great classical systems; Durkheim, different as was his mind, agreed with him in the belief that a thinker must speculate not apart from, or against, but in the trend of those who came before. Both of these thinkers, like A. Comte, were of the opinion that "one can destroy only to replace." L. Lévy-Bruhl had given an example of the *analytical* intelligence through which a system is taken to pieces in such a way as to show the origin of its various elements (*La philosophie d'A. Comte*). V. Delbos had offered well-known examples of a *synthetical* effort, following the development of a system step by step, in the case both of a single, powerful thinker (*La philosophie pratique de Kant*) and of a succession of thinkers (*Le problème moral dans la philosophie*

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Germaine and Louis Landré.

*de Spinoza et dans l'histoire du Spinozisme*). Lévy-Bruhl and Delbos remain the unchallenged masters in the teaching of the history of philosophy in France.

The war brought heavy losses within the ranks of the younger generation. It delayed the publication of many studies. Through a decision of the Minister of Public Instruction, war veterans were allowed to present one thesis instead of two for the Doctor's degree; hence a decrease in production. But it seems impossible to say that contemporary events have had any influence on the methods followed in the history of philosophy; on the other hand, we shall find that they have left their mark upon philosophical inquiry.

The adepts of analytical formulae, such for instance as that of R. Berthelot, are many; none, however, has been able to handle this method with the dexterity and the lucidity of Lévy-Bruhl. The synthetic formula has inspired several studies of very great value. Those of L. Brunschvicg on Spinoza and Pascal, that of L. Robin on *La pensée grecque* (Renaissance du Livre, 1923), that of X. Léon on Fichte (*Fichte et son temps*, vol. 2, 1924, Colin), the notes added by P. Tisserand to the works of Maine de Biran (Alcan) will mark an age. The rich monographs of R. Lenoir belong to the same group of studies (*Condillac*, Alcan, 1924; in *Revue Philosophique*: Cl. Bernard, Jan., 1919; *M. de Biran*, Nov., 1924; *Saint-Simon*, Sept., 1925).

Neo-criticism is still progressing. The Hellenism of L. Robin follows and completes that of Hamelin. The analyst of the *Sciences Sociales dans l'Encyclopédie* (Alcan), R. Hubert, believes that he can justify, by the exigencies of reason in its evolution, the description of the phases of reason set forth by sociological empiricism (*Le sens du réel*, Alcan, 1925). A similar point of view throughout pervades the *Evolution de l'humanité* of Henri Berr, who, as the editor of the *Revue de Synthèse Historique*, has proved



to be the most philosophical of historians. This collection of a hundred volumes is not merely a series of studies of all the civilizations of the world; it aims to follow step by step the formation of mind.

E. Durkheim (died in 1917) with his friends and disciples—was he not the only French contemporary thinker who founded a school?—inaugurated new methods even in the history of philosophy. He himself had produced commentaries on Aristotle, on Hobbes, on Comte; he had studied Montesquieu, Rousseau, Condorcet; after beginning a *Histoire du socialisme*, he traced the history of the family and the history of pedagogy. All of his far-reaching works are too little known outside of France. The sociological method, in its desire to build on an historical basis the science of social facts, has given stimulus to numerous works on the history of philosophy; it suggested that the progressive formation of our categories should be sought in the evolution of the various societies. Lévy-Bruhl at once applied this method to an analysis of the primitive mind, mystic and pre-logical, incommensurable with the positive mind (*Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, 1910; *La mentalité primitive*, Alcan, 1922). The science of man, about which the eighteenth century dreamed prematurely, henceforth requires a comparative knowledge of mentalities. More strictly faithful to Durkheim's inspiration, M. Mauss upholds the principles of *l'Année sociologique*, which reappeared in 1925 (Paris, Alcan).

Studies of a very diverse character have been published under the influence of the sociological school. The leader of the school has studied penal evolution, suicide, etc. G. Davy starts on the history of law (*La foi jurée; Le droit, l'idéalisme et l'expérience*, Alcan, 1922; *Des clans aux empires*, in collaboration with A. Moret, Renaissance du Livre). M. David, killed in action in 1914, had introduced

this research by investigating Greek thought as a whole and not merely that of philosophers; he is followed by L. Gernet, who gives the archaic value of such words as ὕβρις and τυμή. M. Granet analyzes in a similar way the rural institutions of primitive China, then the feudal period of pre-imperial China (*Fêtes et chansons anciennes de la Chine*, Leroux, 1919; *La polygamie sororale*, *ibid.*, 1920; *Danses et légendes de la Chine ancienne*, Alcan, 1926.) R. Lenoir, whose monographs on French thinkers we have mentioned, analyzes the potlatch (*Revue Philosophique*, March, 1924). He devotes to the history of technique the same attention given to it by Espinas and Sorel.

Perhaps we may be permitted to supplement this list of references with a mention of our own work. We are concerned with the philosophical vocabulary of both the Chinese and the Sanskrit languages. We apply to the comparative history of ideas in the three synchronic and parallel civilizations—Occident, India, China—the method that has proved so fruitful in sociology. A positive science of the mind, in our opinion, is possible only through the comparison of the various human mentalities. For if problems and solutions have meaning only for the society that conceived them, the parallels between convictions or, if one prefers, prejudices inherent in each intellectual tradition, is the main field of philosophical concern. (P. Masson-Oursel, *La philosophie comparée*, Alcan, 1923; *Comparative Philosophy*, London, Kegan Paul, 1926).

## II. THE SUBJECTS

Recent political events have, unfortunately, not strengthened in France the desire to understand the German soul. Most of the works published by students of German civilization after 1914, were begun or may have been begun

before the war. Such is the case with *Hebbel*, by L. Brun; *La fortune intellectuelle de Herder en France*, by H. Tronchon; and *Fr. Th. Vischer*, by O. Hesnard. The penetrating studies of H. Delacroix on mysticism have aroused, so far as the tendency in Germany is concerned, only the work of Ed. Vansteenbergh on *Nicolas y Cusa* (Lille, Lefebvre-Ducrocq, 1920) and *Autour de la Docte ignorance* (Münster, Aschendorff, 1920). More useful than ever as an intellectual link is the zeal shown by such men as Benrubi and Groethuysen to reveal modern German thought to France, and, conversely, the thought of France to Germany. German philosophy has been reviewed by E. Bréhier in a short *Histoire* which is valuable for its succinctness and precision (Payot, 1921). The University of Strasbourg henceforth has a task of considerable importance, that of supplying information on Central Europe to the French mind. Its School of Protestant Theology has had the merit of publishing H. Strohl's book on *l'Évolution religieuse de Luther jusqu'en 1515, puis jusqu'en 1520*; and the *Cahiers* of the *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses* will be useful in reminding the French public of the solidarity between dogmas or cults and philosophical notions.

Research is attracted more than before 1919 by the Slavonic mentality. The works of Léger have been fruitful. The Parisian Institute of Slavonic Studies, as well as French foundations established in Czecho-Slovakia and Poland are at once the outcome and the consecration of interesting intellectual relations. On the other hand, the Revolution has isolated Russia. During this time Tolstoi's prestige decreased in France, where literary people felt a growing admiration for Dostoievsky. The powerful criticism of Chestov has produced a deep impression among us: we have been unable to forget his masterful portrayal of the personality of our Pascal (*La nuit de Gethsemani*,

Grasset, 1923). Suarès has been leading us toward a better understanding of Chestov. May the latter infuse in us his supreme sense of the vitality which abstract problems seem to acquire in ardent personalities!

Before the war, the history of Anglo-Saxon philosophy subsequent to Mill and Spencer was unknown not only to the general public, but also to the philosophers. Boutroux met some eminent Englishmen at congresses; and Bergson was fully conscious of his affinities with W. James, as was the latter of his debt to Renouvier. But the knowledge of English and American thought remained elementary. Three "agrégés" have modified this state of affairs. G. Marcel revealed Josiah Royce to the public (*Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 1918). J. Wahl analyzed the *Philosophies pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique* (Alcan, 1920) with a penetration of mind that was all the keener since he started from a very solid knowledge of the whole history of philosophy, especially of German thought. Em. Leroux examined the *Pragmatisme Américain et anglais* (*Ibid.*, 1923), with the aim of reaching speculative conclusions. In him the historian has not killed the philosopher, and his understanding of systems has not suffered, but has considerably gained, from his attitude. Beside these essential works, we should mention the *Mystiques et réalistes anglo-saxons* (Colin, 1918) and *Autour d'Emerson* (Bossard, 1924) by R. Michaud. The collaboration of Legouis and Cazamian gave us a masterful *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* in which the history of thought is not neglected. We cannot omit two interesting theses by D. Saurat: *La pensée de Milton* and *Blake et Milton* (Bordeaux, Université, 1920).

The field of the philosophical systems explored by modern investigation has widened considerably. The Middle Ages have ceased to be ignored by the State schools. Thanks to the fruitful activity of Et. Gilson, M. de Wulf



is no more the only French-speaking philosopher to whom scholastic argumentations are not unknown; the understanding of Saint Thomas Aquinas is no more the exclusive privilege of the Catholic institutes. France cannot yet compare her series of monographs, collections of texts or critical studies with the productions of the school of Baeumker. Yet a general plan is being formulated both for exploring the Middle Ages and for studying what has survived to the present day of the thought of those times (Gilson: *Le Thomisme*, Strasbourg, 1920; *Etudes de philosophie médiévale*, ibid., 1921; *Saint Bonaventure*, 1922; *La philosophie au Moyen Age*, Payot, 1922). The works of Durantel on Saint Thomas (Alcan, 1918) and of Landry on Duns Scotus (Alcan), and the theses of Carton on Roger Bacon (*La synthèse doctrinale de Roger Bacon; l'Expérience mystique et l'expérience physique de Roger Bacon*, Vrin, 1924) bear the stamp of a new discipline. A criticism of scholastic rationalism, resting on a considerable number of documents, has been attempted along very independent lines by L. Rougier (*La scolastique et le Thomisme*, Gauthier-Villars, 1925). The philosophical interest of theological problems becomes obvious at last, even to lay thought: the influence of Delacroix is felt. *La doctrine de la grace chez Arnauld* and the *Saint-Cyran* by J. Laporte (Presses Universitaires de France, 1922) have been received with favor; as to the *Saint Jean de la Croix* by J. Baruzi (Alcan, 1924), it is a worthy step in the study of mystical experience.<sup>2</sup>

At the same time, patristic thought has become a part of the history of philosophy. While de Faye continues his work on Origen, G. Bardy studies the *De Principiis* of this author (Lille, Desclée, 1923) and examines *Paul de Samo-*

<sup>2</sup> A collection of Greek and Latin philosophers of the Middle Ages, as well as a Latin collection of the Middle Ages and Renaissance are planned by the *Association Guillaume Budé*, under the auspices of which there have just been published translations of Plotinus, by Em. Bréhier, and of Lucritius, by Ernout and Robin, (Société Les Belles Lettres).

sate (Bruges, Ste. Catherine, 1923). The outskirts of Christian dogmatism are explored: Em. Bréhier undertakes a translation of the *Ennéades* (Belles-Lettres, 1924) and R. Arnou gathers material on the *Désir de Dieu chez Plotin* (Alcan, 1921). L. Francois gives us the real personality of *Dion Chrysostome, Cynique et Stoicien* (Delagrave, 1921); F. Préchac devotes himself to the study of the *De Clementia* (Belles-Lettres, 1921); B. Latzarus treats the *Idées religieuses de Plutarque* (Leroux, 1920). L. Rougier has studied *Celse, or Le conflit de la civilisation antique et du christianisme primitif* (Siècle, 1925). C. Toussaint determines the relations between *l'Hellénisme et l'apôtre Paul* (H. Jouve, 1921). Works of even greater originality appear: *Yahya ben Adi*, an Arabic Christian philosopher of the tenth century, by A. Périer (Gabalda et Geuthner, 1920); the *de Deo* by Eznik de Kolb (Imprimerie Nationale, 1921), translated from the Armenian, and the *Commentaire de Diodore de Tarse sur les Psaumes* (Firmin-Didot, 1924) by L. Mariès. A masterful work, in its line, has been produced: the double story of P. Alfaric, treating both Manicheism and Saint Augustine, its enemy. For the first time a thorough study in the field of Orientalism gives a new interpretation of one of the main thinkers of the Occident; for the first time a religious movement which upset the ancient world from Spain to China is considered with perfect objectivity through an analysis of its sources (*l'Evolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin* (Nourry, 1918); *Les écritures manichéennes* (Ibid., 1918).<sup>8</sup>

Finally, Oriental thought is definitely brought within the scope of our history of philosophy. Even before the war, one felt, and now no one can doubt, that our civiliza-

<sup>8</sup> The Renaissance, which is a thoroughly European fact, has inspired some research work. Let us mention: *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie, 1494-1517* (Champion, 1916) by A. Renadel; *La pensée italienne au XVI. siècle et le courant libertin* (Champion, 1917) and a small thesis on Bruno (*ibid.*) by Charbonnel; *Un humaniste italianisant, Papire*

tion is Eurasiatic and not strictly Mediterranean. Orient and Occident are two terms of a very relative value, according to the periods to which they refer; both can be understood only within the same total order, which, through centers distinct but not unconnected, has been spreading for three hundred years from the extreme Orient to the extreme Occident. The Semitic population, whether in a group as in Babylon, or scattered as after the Dispersion of Israel, or victorious as in Islam, has always been a connecting link between the various parts of this continent. In this respect, the text-books published by R. Kreglinger (Lamertin, Brussels) on the history of the various religions, Ed. Montet's pamphlet on the *Histoire de la Bible* (Payot, 1924), the *Koran* of Dr. J. C. Mardrus (Fasquelle, 1925) and the *Penseurs de l'Islam* by Carra de Vaux (Geuthner) are contributions to the history of philosophy. The *Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie musulmane* (Leroux, 1923) by L. Gauthier may be of some use, but how much more the works of Massignon! His *Passion d'al Halladj*, and even more his *Lexique technique de la mystique musulmane* (Geuthner, 1922) are master works.

Had it only its "hundred philosophies" to offer us, China would be a mine of original and varied speculations. But it possesses even more than that. This is attested by the works of Father L. Wiegier. These are lacking in critical sense, but not in material (*Histoire des croyances religieuses et des opinions philosophiques en Chine*, Hien-hien, 1917 and Challamel, Paris; *Les pères du système taoïste; Le canon taoïste*, *ibid.*) The brief but very original *Religion des Chinois*, by M. Granet (Gauthier-Villars, 1922) shows Masson, 1564-1611 (*ibid.*, 1924) by P. Rouzy; *Jean Bodin*, by R. Chauviré (*ibid.* and La Fleche, 1914); *Erasmus* by J. B. Pineau (Presses Universitaires de France, 1923); *La Renaissance du stoïcisme au XVI. siècle* (Champion, 1914) by Léontine Zanta. P. Villey has pursued his researches on Montaigne (*Revue Philosophique*, May, 1926). Campanella has found a worthy historian in L. Blanchet (Alcan, 1920), and G. Bruno, in the young Egyptian philosopher, Namer.

on what basis this thought was established. We should not forget that the originator of contemporary Sinology, Ed. Chavannes, had received a philosophical training and that, allured by the ideas of China, he devoted himself to the study of it. He inspired his successors with an ardent curiosity. As to India, it offers to the historian of philosophy a more abundant and richer field than any other civilization. The very few fruitful researches of Sylvain Lévi and of his collaborators and disciples, after those of Bur-nouf, Bergaigne and that other historian of philosophy, Auguste Barth, have considerably advanced the true history of philosophy, the comparative study of human thought. Students of Sanskrit or Tibetan, Sinologues, discoverers of languages spoken or written in Central Asia centuries ago, are little by little revealing this Buddhist canon in which so much philosophy is embodied. The *Journal Asiatique*, the *Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient*, the *T'oung pao*, contain about as much history of philosophy as the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*. The Buddhist studies of the Belgian, Louis de la Vallée-Poussin almost all deal with the history of thought. The *Histoire des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, by P. Oltramare, of Geneva (Musée Guimet, Paris) is the work of a philosopher. The *Sutra des causes et des effets* (Geuthner), translated by P. Pelliot, is of no less interest to critical reflection than David Hume's *Treatise*. The study by the French Swiss, P. Demiéville, of the Chinese versions of the *Milindapanha* (*Bulletin* mentioned above, Jan., 1924) adds to the history of logic as well as to that of dogmas. Supplementing the monographs or partial histories is the synthetic effort of P. Masson-Oursel in his *Esquisse d'une histoire de la philosophie indienne* (Geuthner, 1923).

Credit for this enrichment of the history of philosophy should be given mostly to our master, Professor Lévy-Bruhl, who encouraged the co-operation between philo-



sophical criticism and such disciplines as linguistics (as represented by Meillet and Vendryès) and ethnography (as represented by Rivet and Mauss). The *Revue Philosophique*, since passing from the direction of Ribot to that of Lévy-Bruhl, reflects this broadening of philosophical curiosity.

### III. THE RESULTS

The new spirit discernible in philosophical historiography in France may be summed up as follows: an indefinite extension of the field of study and, as a consequence, a renewing of the subjects.

Europeocentrism and "europeomorphism" no longer have meaning; we may not *a fortiori* limit ourselves to about ten systems, Greek, English, French, German, as the amplitude of human thought. It would be a mistake to suppose that our notions have simply been increased. A knowledge of the intermediary phases hitherto neglected—end of Antiquity, Middle Ages, Renaissance, Contemporary Period—and a better documentation on the peoples interposed between the principal civilizations will serve not only to decrease our ignorance but also to throw a new light on the very doctrines which we believe we knew best. Thus Aristotle's logic seems transformed when we compare it with that of Dharmakirti, which does not deal with concepts. Our judgment on Scholasticism is modified when we learn that it is not only a European fact but an event of greater generality. The discoveries of Miguel Asin Palacios, a student of Arabic, oblige us to modify our exegesis of the Divine Comedy and our interpretation of Pascal's wager. In no field can a part be understood, that is, assigned its exact place in history, except by reference to its relations to a greater whole. It is impossible to offer a satisfactory interpretation of any system except in connection with the comparative history of human thought.

In so far as these leading ideas are prevalent, synthetic views are useful, provided one realizes their provisional character. The general *History of philosophy*, soon to be published by Em. Bréhier (Alcan) will meet a need. Important discoveries are to be expected, if research ceases to be left to the chaotic initiatives of individuals. A general organization of intellectual work that may be of great value to the history of philosophy is being prepared at the *Centre de Synthèse*, organized in the latter part of 1925 by Henri Berr, 2 rue Montpensier, Palais Royal, Paris. The recent commemorations of Pascal, Biran, Kant, Saint-Simon and Renan have not been fruitless, since they have brought out the different ways in which successive generations have understood systems too often considered as soaring in eternity. Every human thought has been lived; it becomes accessible to those alone who can again give it life. If such men as Gustave Cohen, Gilson, Koyré and Blanchet modify our understanding of Cartesianism,<sup>4</sup> it is by replacing it in its environment, in connection with its antecedents. And it is not otherwise that Dupréel tries to formulate a new interpretation of the Socratic philosophy (*La légende socratique et les sources de Platon*, Sand, Brussels, 1922). It is also in life, but in life as it is revealed by clinical experimentation and psychiatric practice, that F. Morel, inspired by Freudianism, illuminatingly places the obscure and subtle dogmatism of the pseudo-Denys by psycho-analytical methods (*l'Introversion mystique*, Geneva, 1918). To derive from philosophical systems all the teaching they contain it is not enough to re-

<sup>4</sup> G. Cohen: *Les écrivains français en Hollande dans la première moitié du XVII. siècle*, Champion, 1920; Et. Gilson: *La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie*; *Index scolastico-cartésien*, Alcan, 1913; A. Koyré: *Essai sur l'idée de Dieu et les preuves de son existence chez Descartes*, Leroux, 1922; L. Blanchet: *Les antécédents historique du "Je pense, donc je suis,"* Alcan, 1920. The *Histoire de la philosophie*, by R. Lote, following upon the *Histoire des sciences biologiques*, by M. Caullery, in the *Histoire des sciences en France*, allows the public at large to place the principal French thinkers in the field of general history. (*Histoire de la nation française*, by G. Hanotaux, vol. 15, Plon-Nourrit, 1924.)

vive them; one must be able to live them, to use them for judging other types. Thus pursued, the history of philosophy achieves its purpose, which is to advance the criticism of thought.

PARIS, FRANCE.

PAUL MASSON-OURSSEL.

## PSYCHOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

IN the following pages, we intend not so much to make a complete review of the results achieved by psychology in French-speaking countries since 1914, as to indicate the principal currents of psychological thought which characterize the works published during that period.

As we are not concerned here with questions connected with pedagogy (child psychology or vocational guidance) nor with religious or esthetic psychology, we may group our remarks under four principal heads: general psychology, abnormal psychology, physiological and animal psychology, and problems closely connected with psychology.

### GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY

Just as we can reach biology through anatomy, physiology or embryology, so we can also distinguish three main currents, at present, in general psychology: the *structural*, the *functional* and the *genetic* tendencies. If it is interesting to make such distinctions it is because one definitely feels that the psychologists who adopt one or the other of these orientations have very different views as to what constitutes explanation in psychology. It is certain that the psychology written in French during these last years has remained faithful to the general ideal of contemporary psychology, i. e., the ideal of being a positive, autonomous

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Marthe Sturm, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.



science, distinct especially from general philosophy. In this respect Th. Ribot's influence remains a living one. But it seems that the meaning of this rally cry has notably changed during these last years and that psychological methods have become more flexible. For Ribot, probably, the independence of psychology from metaphysics meant the progressive reduction of psychological to physiological phenomena. At least, the well-known principle of psycho-physical parallelism would not have aroused so many discussions if it had not been considered as a weapon in the hands of physiologists. During the last few years, on the other hand, there has been a stronger and stronger tendency towards the complete autonomy of psychology, and the theory of parallelism now seems to be interpreted by every one in the manner some time ago set forth by Flournoy, whose work on this subject has just been republished.<sup>2</sup> Flournoy declared psycho-physical parallelism an easy way to avoid discussion about mind and body and to permit the collaboration of physiologists and psychologists without confusion of their respective fields. Indeed, the principle of parallelism offers to both groups of scientists guarantees and freedom of action: if it establishes a parallelism, it also denies any identification or causal connexion as regards the two series, psychical and physiological. But even though the contemporary psychologists writing in French agree in considering psychology a positive science, they, however, by no means accept the same underlying metaphysics. In spite of their implicit systems of philosophy, which are further divergent than ever, they agree to use, as the only possible method of psychology, observation and experimentation, to the exclusion of any kind of ontology. From this point of view Dumas' conclusion, in his *Traité*

<sup>2</sup> Th. Flournoy, *Metaphysique et Psychologie*, 2nd edition, preface by H. Hoeffding, Geneva and Paris, 1919.

*de Psychologie*,<sup>3</sup> is most interesting. He shows how different are the philosophical tendencies of his contributors and insists on the consequently greater value of their agreement on purely psychological problems. Such being the case it is easy to understand why some of the authors tend preferably towards structural analysis, others towards functional analysis and a third group towards genetic investigation. It is because of their underlying philosophies. Some do not expect any interpretation except in terms of the human mind itself, while others count on some more or less distant physiological explanation.

During the last ten years the leader in structural psychology has been H. Delacroix. M. Delacroix plays a very interesting part in the psychology of French-speaking countries. He has attempted to maintain the integrity of the realm of psychology against the encroachments of physiology on the one hand and of sociology on the other. That is the reason why his method is one of structural analysis. It is the favorite method of rationalism: to explain the human mind by reference to itself and to distrust any kind of "mental chemistry" that would seek the origin of mind in something other than itself. Therefore M. Delacroix remains wisely on his guard against all genetic formulations. These ordinarily tend either to explain psychological facts in infra-psychical, i. e., physiological, terms, or to trace them back to supra-individual, i. e., to sociological, phenomena.

We are here not concerned with religious psychology. But *La religion et la foi*<sup>4</sup> is a highly significant book from the viewpoint of method. Against genetic methods M. Delacroix raises three kinds of objections. In the first place, the concept of evolution is obscure. Secondly, the

<sup>3</sup> *Traité de Psychologie*, 2 vol., Alcan, 1924. G. Dumas, with the collaboration of Barât, G. Belot, Ch. Blondel, Bourdon, Chaslin, Claparede, Dagnan, Davy, Delacroix, Dugas, P. Janet, Lalande, Langlois, Lapicque, Mayer, I. Meyerson, Pieron, Poyer, Rabaud, Revault d'Allonnes, Rey, Tournay, Wallon.

<sup>4</sup> H. Delacroix, *La religion et la foi*. Alcan, 1922.

primitive stages, even if we could reach them, do not afford more information than the more evolved stages for they exhibit a reality already made and not a genesis. Thirdly, the permanent conditions of the possibility of a phenomenon give us better information concerning it than any genetic hypothesis, for this latter is pseudo-explanation. Against the sociological theories, Delacroix asserts the existence of a human mind anterior and superior to society, or at least of an individual infra-structure that makes possible the blossoming of social phenomena.

These principles have since been applied by M. Delacroix to the problem of the relation between language and thought.<sup>5</sup> The result represents a masterly analysis of this difficult question. Against the almost purely sociological tendency of French-speaking linguists (they are influenced by the school of de Saussure) Delacroix shows the indispensable relation between linguistics and psychology. Language is indeed a social product, but its functional conditions, its affective roots, and above all its rationality can only be understood through psychology. This rationality is especially emphasized by M. Delacroix, but without exaggeration, for, he says, "language oscillates between chaos and a cosmos."

Thus Delacroix gives us a new viewpoint regarding language. Psychologists have for a long time considered language as a pure nomenclature, as if things were simply designated by words, and as if, psychologically, words were nothing but auditory or motor images, or the like, in consciousness. Nothing is more superficial than this conception. Language is thought. Every thought process consists in the handling of symbols; and language is a necessary stage in the elaboration of these symbols. A word is not simply a label. It is a sound, bearer of a meaning and susceptible of grammatical treatment. This means

<sup>5</sup> H. Delacroix, *Le langage et la pensée*. Alcan, 1924.

also that a word is very difficult to isolate. It is not a unit. It constitutes the limit of an intellectual process of separation and identification. As to the sentence, it is not a simple sum; it is a whole made of reciprocal relations. Language, therefore, presupposes thought. Just as religion is the rational organization of affective data so is language the rationalization of chaotic phonal matter.

M. Delacroix, verifies his assertions by studying the acquisition of language by children and the loss of this function in aphasia. But his genetic analysis remains descriptive. Against the physiologists, he strongly argues that the verbal sign is not a conditioned reflex. Indeed, at first, signs adhere to objects. In order that they may really become "signs," the mind must sever them from the objects, must place them in a network of symbols, in that system of relations between symbols which constitutes the very stuff of reason.

In Dumas' *Traité*, Delacroix gives a complete analysis of intellectual functions, the wealth and subtlety of which are such as to forbid our summarizing it in so short a paper as this, but the general content of which fits entirely into the main lines of the sketch we have just drawn.

Another leader in psychological analysis is Paulhan. With the exception of a book which we shall review later, he has published since 1918 only three studies, *Le psychisme inconscient*,<sup>6</sup> *La sensibilité, l'intelligence, et la volonté dans tous les faits psychologiques*,<sup>7</sup> and *Le présentisme*.<sup>8</sup> In his study of the unconscious, Paulhan continues his researches in the systematization of tendencies. Tendencies and our coming to consciousness of them are essential parts of psychic life, according to Paulhan. Consciousness, it is true, exercises an influence as a cognitive element. But psychic processes maintain the same nature and func-

<sup>6</sup> *Journal de Psychologie*, XVIII.

<sup>7</sup> *Revue Philosophique*, 1920.

<sup>8</sup> *Journal de Psychologie*.



tioning whether or not they are conscious. The theory of "presentism" set forth in the third mentioned paper, points out the exaggerated predominance in the mind of the present state, whatever it may be—sensation, emotion, or new idea. This preponderance is due to the insufficient or delayed control of former tendencies. Hence certain "presentist" characters, such as impulsivity, etc.

This idea of Paulhan's leads us to mention, in the field of the analysis of characters, the work of F. Mentre, particularly his book, *Espèces et variétés d'intelligence, Éléments de noologie*.<sup>9</sup> By the term "noölogy" the author means the science of individual types. Binet, Paulhan and others had already raised the problem, but Mentre suggests new classifications; these have already been criticized just as Mentre criticized his predecessors. A. Delmas and M. Boll have also discussed the subject in their book on "Human Personality."<sup>10</sup>

If we now pass from the field of structural to that of functional psychology, we shall find an entirely different source of inspiration. The most remarkable works in this second field are undoubtedly the studies of Claparede on *l'Intelligence*,<sup>11</sup> and on *la Volonté*,<sup>12</sup> and those of Larguier des Bancelles on *l'Emotion et l'Instinct*.<sup>13</sup> Claparede is a pure empiricist. Few psychologists are so completely free from philosophical concerns, whether these are rationalistic or "empiristic" in the epistemological sense of the word. Sometimes he is anti-intellectualistic, when facts seem to lead him in that direction; at other times he is anti-mechanistic to the extent of seeming to tend towards finalism. The truth is that he grasps phenomena not as a theorist but as a physician. He sees phenomena as moving things, interwoven in their vital context and functioning; wherever a

<sup>9</sup> Bonard Paris, 1920.

<sup>10</sup> *La personnalité Humaine*, Flammarion.

<sup>11</sup> *Scientia*, 1917.

<sup>12</sup> *Congrès philosophique de Naples*.

<sup>13</sup> *Introduction à la psychologie, L'émotion et l'instinct*, Payot, 1921.

structural analysis seems to him impossible or simply difficult, he begins to give a purely functional description of psychological data. Furthermore, he is convinced that applications, if not the leaven of any science, are at least the criterion of a conception's fruitfulness. That is why his analyses are always written in a language most apt to describe the process in terms of action and of movement.

His paper on intelligence is from this last viewpoint a perfect model of a short sketch. In it he repeatedly emphasizes the vagueness of our present structural knowledge and thus he raises a great number of problems that are most of the time unconsciously veiled. He supplants structural knowledge with a functional synthesis as simple as it is charming.

Intelligence, says Claparede, responds to a need. "The particular need that arouses intelligence is the need of adaptation which arises whenever the individual is not adapted to environmental circumstances." There are two kinds of behavior that ordinarily adapt the individual to his environment: i. e., *instinct* or the system of hereditary mechanisms, and *habit*, the system of acquired associations. But when instincts fail and habits do not work, there is but one other recourse, trial and error. The method of trial and error, observable in the lowest forms of animal life (Jennings) can itself be divided into two stages which together constitute intelligence. Trial and error is either purely empirical, i. e., the steps taken are determined by a pseudo-choice made according to external circumstances; or it is systematic, i. e., the choice is determined by the consciousness of relations. Hence we have empirical intelligence and intelligence proper. But how does the readjustment which constitutes intelligence pass from purely empirical trials to systematized attempts? Here Claparede's analysis becomes most fruitful because of the problem it suggests. Three periods can be noticed in any intellec-

tual act.<sup>14</sup> First there is a *question*, i. e., the maladjustment becomes conscious; then an *hypothesis*, or the imagination of a solution; thirdly, *control* or verification. These three operations are easy enough to describe in functional terms, but what is their mechanism? By what kind of mechanism does the particular state of consciousness which constitutes the question start and direct the search for a solution? How do hypotheses arise and follow one another? What is the nature of that process of rejection and acceptance which constitutes the control? Without ignoring the value of the fine German works on *Denkpsychologie*, Claparede emphasizes the fact that in these matters we know nothing; we possess static and structural analysis but we do not understand the dynamism of the functioning.

In an article on the will, as yet unpublished, Claparede makes similar statements. He distinguishes will from intentional act as he previously distinguished intelligence from instinct. Just as intelligence arises when instincts do not work so will makes its appearance when two intentions conflict.

These contentions have been criticized. Spearman accuses Claparede of defining intelligence "by reference to experimentation," the way in which it appears in children between six and nine years of age. But it is a strength to be able to consider things with enough freshness of mind to forget classical descriptions and to find a language which shows the gaps in our knowledge. It is to this method of procedure that Claparede owes the production of a few very searching pages on *la loi de prise de conscience*.<sup>15</sup> Observing that children are more quickly aware of differences than of similarities (though they generalize automatically all the time), he shows how it is maladaptation that creates consciousness, and from this observation

<sup>14</sup> Pillsbury expressed similar ideas in 1910.

<sup>15</sup> *La conscience de la ressemblance et de la difference chez l'enfant*, Arch. de Psychol., XVII, 1919.

he draws a criticism of habitual ways of speaking, ways that are static and not functional.

The recent works of J. Languier des Bancelles, and particularly his fine *Introduction to Psychology*, have a similar orientation. Languier considers functional description better for an introductory study, but he thinks that there should be a constant alternation between structural and functional psychology. Such a rhythm, he believes, cannot be anything but useful to the improvement of science.

For James, and particularly for McDougall, emotion is but a concomitant, or an affective aspect, of instinct. Languier, through a very precise and fine analysis, arrives at the opinion that emotion, while necessarily and closely linked with instinct, is not its affective counterpart but its failure. In other words, it is when instinct fails that emotion appears; when instinct tends toward useful reaction, emotion is only harmful. Anger is not an adaptive reaction, a counterpart of the fighting instinct; it is a "brief madness" arising from the failure of that instinct. Instincts are, indeed, adaptive, but only in a general way, without anticipation of all possible cases. It is therefore not strange that they often fail. But, says Languier, there remains the problem of determining why, in the case of certain individuals called "emotional," instincts miscarry more than in the case of others. There is also the problem of understanding the mechanism of emotion. Why does the failure of a given instinct take a certain form rather than some other? To such questions Languier awaits the answer from psychology.

There is but a step between functional and genetic psychology, and most psychologists cannot be univocally classified. This is particularly true in the case of Pierre Janet whose recent works indicate an extremely interesting combination of functional psychology and genetic construction.



A synthesis of these new conceptions of Janet may be found in Dumas' *Traité*<sup>16</sup> and in three lectures delivered in London.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the *Méditations psychologique* (of which we shall speak again when we come to abnormal psychology) are full of allusions to the new ideas of Janet on the hierarchy of tendencies, or the different stages of development. These ideas, if we are well informed, will soon lead to some general study of the question. The works of Janet prior to 1914 are too well known to need mention here. Let us simply indicate the most recent orientation of this versatile and fruitful scholar.

The present method of Janet is that of the behavioristic psychology, but of a behaviorism which integrates all the phenomena of consciousness under the head of particular acts. Let us, for example, take the case of memory. Memory, says Janet, is an *account*, i. e., a certain mode of speech relating to an event; it represents the event more or less correctly and was constructed at the time when the other actions called forth by the event were performed.<sup>18</sup>

From the point of view of the old school of psychology, this is an unbearable paradox, since in order to narrate one should recall. But one nevertheless sees how interesting Janet's theory is. By making memory a mode of behavior and not a faculty, such a definition emphasizes precisely all that which, in a recollection, is arbitrarily constructed and not given; such a theory explains also why the classification and ordering of memories are so slow in the case of children, and depend so much on action, particularly on social behavior. This single instance at once shows Janet's present mode of analysis. Janet agrees with Baldwin on the point that most psychological operations

<sup>16</sup> *La tension psychologique et ses oscillations, Traité de psychologie*, Vol. I, p. 919-952.

<sup>17</sup> Brit. Journ. of Psych. (Medic. Sect.), Vol. I, Part 1, 3 and 4, and Vol. II, Part 1 (1920, 1921, 1924).

<sup>18</sup> Pierre Janet, *Les Souvenirs irréels*, Archives de Psychologie, XIX, 1924, p. 14.

are internalized social actions: "We repeat with respect to ourselves modes of behavior which have first been constructed with reference to others."<sup>19</sup> Memory, belief, reflection, logical principles are but accounts, promises of action, discussions, ethical rules, etc., internalized, through repetition within and for ourselves. From this viewpoint language seems to Janet to constitute the fundamental phenomenon of human psychology: man is a talking animal who talks his actions and acts his words. And, if in truth memory is an internalized narration, reflection, an internalized discussion, and belief, a promise, etc., one can see how the genesis of these fundamental operations would not have been possible without speech.

But these new views of Janet do not remain isolated and fragmentary. They have enabled him to construct, particularly in his courses at the Collège de France,<sup>20</sup> a doctrine that relates to the hierarchy of tendencies and constitutes a general genetic theory of the stages of mental development. The guiding idea is an attempt to classify psychological operations by their degree of difficulty, taking as a criterion their order of appearance. In brief, the important stages are the following: reflex stage; social stage characterized by the appearance of imitation; the elementary intellectual stage, marked by the emergence of the perception of relations, and therefore of language, and, along with language, of primitive memory conceived as a narration; the assertive period or stage of belief; the period of reflection (which is an inner discussion leading to the summation or synthesis of beliefs); the ergatic stage, marked by the appearance of the possibility of work (i. e., work assigned by oneself); the rational stage, and finally the experimental one.

Now—and it is here that the new ideas of Janet recur to his former conceptions, with reference to the dynamism

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>20</sup> See the summaries in *l'Annuaire des Cours du Collège de France*.

of mind—the establishing of these stages is guided by an extremely interesting principle which marks the point of union between pathological and genetic psychology. Each of the stages corresponds to one of the successive strata of mental structure, or, stated more exactly, to one of the successive degrees of psychological tension. This tension may vary. The variations of level are linked with states of depression and excitation, fatigue, age, emotions, etc. But it must be particularly noted that every mental disease is marked by a regression in the hierarchy of tendencies and is thus characterized by a certain level beyond which the mind seems unable to pass. Yet these oscillations of level are not sufficient to characterize a psychological tension: it is necessary to add what Janet calls the variation of the activation degree of the tendency. A tendency may be in a latent stage. It may bring forth a desire, an effort, or a complete action, or give birth to the “derivation” called emotion. Moreover, between a latent state and complete action, the tendency may lead to an interior thought process, a kind of reaction of the subject himself to his own actions, happily compared by Janet to the proprioceptive reflexes of Sherrington. It is the interference of the oscillations of the degree of activation with the oscillations of the mental level that produces the general oscillations of psychological tension.

Among other genetic attempts mention must be made of Ph. Chaslin's works concerning the genesis of mathematical concepts. Everybody knows that the Italian psychologist Rignano has followed Mach in an interesting conception of reasoning considered as a “mental experience.” This work was of great interest to the psychiatrist Chaslin whose very rich clinical experience led him to study the pathology and psychology of reasoning. He left a posthumous study on mathematical reasoning, a few abstracts of which have been published in different reviews.

To be mentioned also is a little book by M. Cresson on *Les réactions intellectuelles élémentaires*.<sup>21</sup> The author attempts to trace the diverse forms of reasoning to a sort of unconscious analogical reasoning that is constantly manifest in perception, recollection, etc.

Works on educational psychology, which are to be discussed elsewhere, naturally contain also several new ideas in the field of genetic psychology.

But the great innovation in genetic studies is the appeal made to sociology in explanations of the higher psychological functions. In this regard Baldwin is a forerunner. He has not had as great an influence as he should have had, except on the psychology of Janet. The most important influence came from sociologists themselves, principally from M. Levy-Bruhl. Durkheim, as is well known, considered religion, ethical feelings, personality, logical reasoning, etc., as products of social life conceived as independent of individual consciousness, as external and superior to it. It is also known how M. Levy-Bruhl attempted to verify these doctrines in the field of logic, through the study of the judgments and categories peculiar to primitive mentality. These works have deeply impressed the psychologists writing in French and have directed towards sociological explanations at least two of them: Ch. Blondel and G. Dumas.

Ch. Blondel, as he has himself said in an article in the *Journal de Psychologie*, has been influenced by both Levy-Bruhl and Bergson. The former led him to distrust individualistic explanations; the latter taught him the part played by language and therefore by social life in the very structure of intelligence. Thus, since 1914 (as appears by reference to a book to which we shall later refer, *La Conscience morbide*), Blondel has distinguished two elements within the human mind, the purely psychological

<sup>21</sup> Alcan, 1922.



and the social. The former comprises all that the mind is unable to integrate either into collective sentiments or into the verbal and conceptual forms due to society. It is, then, the inexpressible: on one hand, the unconscious motor activity and, on the other, the mass of elusive feelings, somatic sensations, etc., which in normal life are completely suppressed or, as Blondel says, *décantés* in favor of whatever can be socialized or conceptualized. The genesis of the higher psychic functions brings us back, says Blondel, to the history of the socialization of the mind.

It is in Dumas' *Traité* that the most categorical pages of Blondel on this subject are to be found.<sup>22</sup> In a study of the will Blondel begins with a sharp and witty criticism, often exaggerated but always suggestive, of the introspected experiences in the realm of the will. He praises James for having most clearly seen the *sui generis* character of the will, but he insists even more strongly than this author upon the mysterious and unexplainable element in the "fiat" if one remains on a purely individualistic plane. Hence his conclusion: the "fiat" is less a decision than a manifestation of obedience—obedience of the individual to the group imperatives.

An analysis of personality leads Blondel to similar conclusions. Without society, personality would be reduced to the consciousness of body, to coenesthesia. But, strange to say, this very intimate ego, which is our most individual possession, is also the least personal thing we know. The continual introspection of an Amiel leads only to the realization of the strange and the disquieting. "The personality that loses itself in the depth of the ego finds itself again only at its surface." It is in plunging into the society of men that we rediscover ourselves. The social ego which at first appears to be most external is thus our real self. Personality is social in character. This paradox is reflected

<sup>22</sup> Chapters on *Les volitions* and *La personnalité*, *Traité*, Vol. II.

also in theories: the psychological theories that have limited themselves to the individual alone have always ended by considering the ego an inexplicable datum. Sociology alone permits us to get a glimpse of its genesis.

From a different point of view G. Dumas himself comes to similar ideas. With A. Comte he considers mind as a compound of physiological and social elements. It is true that Dumas places himself on ground that is in this respect privileged. He is concerned with the expression of emotions. The fine works of Dumas on this subject are well known. They go back beyond 1914. But in his *Traité* Dumas has renewed the exposition and has been able to show how empty are certain psychological theories that appeal to fanciful constructions where physiology and social psychology are sufficient for an exhaustive analysis of the facts.

These genetic attempts inspired by sociology have from one side or another aroused a rather strong opposition. We have already spoken of the position of Delacroix. In the field of ethical and religious feelings, G. Belot has, in Dumas' *Traité*, defended a similar conception, maintaining the psychological and individual nature of these feelings. But it is especially in the realm of thinking that the debate becomes more heated. Not to speak of philosophers who see in "sociologism" a sort of neo-pragmatism that weakens the value of rational principles, psychologists themselves have some difficulty in admitting that all of logic may be the work of society. Touching this subject, I. Meyerson published, in *L'année psychologique*, a very interesting critical study of the "Primitive Mentality" by Levy-Bruhl.

According to I. Meyerson, it is not necessary to invoke a kind of non-rational causality in explanation of the phenomena collected by M. Levy-Bruhl under the name of "mystical causality." We need merely recognize that prim-

itive man, as is only natural, has not yet come to believe in the regularity of the laws of nature, and that he looks upon nature as a vast system where everything is related to everything and kept in an instable balance. Such being the case a rational principle of conservation is sufficient to explain the fact that primitive man clings to traditions and customs which we judge, and which he also sometimes judges, queer and incomprehensible. It is simply that primitive man maintains scrupulously the existing modes of action, for fear the world might collapse, i. e., for fear the slightest change might bring forth some kind of unexpected and dangerous result. The apparently non-rational element would thus be explained by a very rational principle of conservation. Here let us mention also that M. Paulhan, whose talent as an analyst is well known, has written a book on social transformation of feelings, a book which provides a balance between sociology and psychology.<sup>23</sup> Without disregarding the individual nature of feelings, Paulhan studies their socialization and the spiritualization which follows from it. The analysis of sexual feelings is particularly well done.

In the field of social psychology, to which many contemporary scholars have been led through their genetic interests, mention must be made of studies on language, the place of which is to be found half way between psychology and sociology. M. Bally has continued his fine studies on stylistic. These inspired G. Vaucher to write a thesis on affective language and judgments of value.<sup>24</sup> The *Journal de Psychologie* has devoted to the psychology of language an important brochure with contributions from Meillet, Bally, Vendryès, Bloch, Sechehaye, and others.

<sup>23</sup> *Les transformations sociales des sentiments*. Flammarion, 1920.

<sup>24</sup> *Le langage affectif et les jugements de valeur*. Alcan, 1925.

i  
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

Particularly in France, because of the masterly works of Th. Ribot, it would not have been possible before the war to separate abnormal psychology from general psychology. Even now quite a few general systems of psychology lead to abnormal psychology and vice versa. This is particularly true in the case of the work of P. Janet and Ch. Blondel. Nevertheless on the whole one may say that abnormal psychology, because of the difficulty of the questions raised and the relations of their solutions to medical and physiological problems, has become in some measure an autonomous science. At any rate the time is past when one could, as Ribot did, devote a lifetime to the study of pathological methods without oneself meeting a single patient. But this does not mean, of course, that Ribot's work as an initiator has not been necessary and most fruitful.

The present status of abnormal psychology in French-speaking countries has been very clearly set forth by Dumas in two of the longest chapters of the *Traité*. These papers sanction in particular the official victory of the ideas of Babinski—ideas already old—insofar as hysteria is conceived as simple suggestion. It is true that not all the authors have accepted these ideas with equal conviction. In French Switzerland, Claparede and H. Flournoy, while not maintaining the classical conception in its entirety and while acknowledging with Babinski that the explanation of hysteria is to be found more in psychology than in physiology, nevertheless assert the authenticity of some disputed facts. Pierre Janet also refuses to define hysteria in terms of suggestion alone and continues in his last works to defend an original conception of it. In his earlier doctrines, this conception represents an explanation of hyste-



ria by reference to automatism. According to his later conception (behaviorism), automatism is itself quasi-action, or action of low tension; in such action the whole personality does not collaborate and the result is that impulse is stronger than reflection. As regards the hierarchy of tendencies or the stages of mental development, hysterical behavior is to be located at the stage of belief and may not be placed on the level of reflection, or the compensatory synthesis of beliefs.

Janet's latest works on abnormal psychology are *Les Médications psychologiques*<sup>25</sup> and *Médecine psychologique*.<sup>26</sup> In these books Janet presents a very complete history and a critique of the different systems of psychotherapy and gives a full and extremely rich account of the procedures based on the idea of psychological force and its economy, and on the fundamental idea of tension oscillations. He is thus led in each case to establish a kind of "budget for the mind."

One of the most striking novelties in abnormal psychology is the notion of morbid consciousness due to M. Blondel. Such is the title of a book published in 1914. As already noted, the idea has been the starting point of a movement in general psychology inspired by sociology. Since Claude Bernard, most psychiatrists and even most pathologists in every field have started with the idea that the pathological and the normal are identical in nature and that a simple difference of degree distinguishes disease from normal oscillations. In contrast hereto Blondel states that the morbid consciousness is a psychic reality *sui generis*, irreducible to normal ways of feeling or thinking—a reality that must be studied in itself and for itself. Here is an attitude similar to the one taken by M. Levy-Bruhl with regard to primitive mentality. Morbid consciousness is, in fact, characterized by certain paradoxes: motor, affec-

<sup>25</sup> 3 vol., Alcan, 1919.

<sup>26</sup> Flammarion, 1923.

tive, logic paradoxes. The last mentioned of these is particularly interesting; the patient's thought swarms with contradictions, irrepressible and inexpressible concepts queerly linked with a word taken from the current language but given an entirely different meaning.

Such a consciousness, says Blondel, is not a normal consciousness distorted. It is a unique consciousness different from ours and therefore incapable of conceptualization and of socialization. It is due, according to Blondel, more particularly to the patient's richness in somatic sensations and feelings. With the normal being, these sensations, being inexpressible, are "decanted" through the socialization of thought, for thought maintains and expresses only what is common to all. With the patient the elements being more abundant and different from ours, cannot be "decanted." Hence his non-socialized and consequently strange consciousness is an inexpressible consciousness, ill adapted to ordinary speech. Hence the contradictions. For to the patient words have a different meaning. He feels differently and experiences a resistance due to common language and common consciousness.

This conception of the purely psychological, placed in opposition to the social, offers some analogy with certain conceptions of psychoanalysis. "Decanted" realities are not without similarity to suppressed realities. The split between the psychological and the social reminds one of the opposition which Bleuler thinks characteristic of the schizophrenic between autistic and socialized thinking. Nevertheless, exemplifying a not uncommon paradox in the history of ideas, Blondel is a merciless enemy of psychoanalysis. His book on the subject is a biting and harsh criticism of Freudian theories.<sup>27</sup> Here a few words would be in place concerning the influence of psychoanalysis on

<sup>27</sup> *La psychanalyse*. Alcan, 1924.

the development of abnormal psychology in French-speaking countries since 1914.

The novel tendency during that period has been an increasing interest in psychoanalysis on the part of French-speaking psychologists. If religious psychology were to have a place within the limits of this paper, it would be necessary to mention first of all Th. Flournoy, the genial and fruitful psychologist of Geneva, whose works previous to 1914 were an anticipation of the useful results of psychoanalysis. In a paper on *Une mystique moderne*, published in 1915, he made a remarkable and very searching application of the Freudian methods.<sup>28</sup> Flournoy's influence has been and remains great in French Switzerland, and all French Swiss psychoanalysts are his disciples.

To state things briefly and without reference to the historical evolution of the doctrine, it might be said that among French-speaking psychologists we may distinguish three attitudes toward psychoanalysis.

Some are openly hostile. Without referring to the authors, unfortunately still numerous, who criticize it without being well informed, we may say that the most intelligent criticisms have been made by Blondel (*loc. cit.*), Chaslin<sup>29</sup> and Ombredanne.<sup>30</sup> Others, without of course accepting all of the Freudian ideas, are strong advocates of the psychoanalytic methods. Several among this number have made valuable contributions to the subject. We would mention in France, the works of Hesnard, Laforgue, d'Allendy, Borel, Robin, Minkowski; in Switzerland, works by H. Flournoy, R. de Saussure (among whose publications there is an excellent book on the general doctrine of psychoanalysis<sup>31</sup>), Odier, Christin, Baudouin; in Belgium, the contributions of Varendonck. These writers have in-

<sup>28</sup> *Arch. de Psychol.*, XV.

<sup>29</sup> *Journ. de Psychol.*, 1923.

<sup>30</sup> *Rev. Philos.*, 1922.

<sup>31</sup> *La méthode psychanalytique*. Payot, 1922.

augurated a yearbook of psychoanalysis, an interesting volume of which has already been published. It contains a complete bibliography of psychoanalytical works written in French during the last few years.<sup>32</sup> Finally, a third group assumes an attitude of sympathy and critical reserve, and tries to point out what of the material presented by psychoanalysts is fruitful and what must be ascribed to the spirit of systematization. In Switzerland, Claparede, Bovet and Larguier des Bancelles have published several studies replete with suggestions. In France, Dumas has devoted some very interesting pages of his *Traité* to Freudianism, and put in a particularly clear light the psychiatric usefulness of the concept of suppression. In a similar spirit, H. Claude, with his students at Sainte Anne, is making a number of different investigations of schizophrenia.

A propos of psychoanalysis we would mention an interesting book by Varendonck, *Evolution des facultés conscientes*.<sup>33</sup> This represents a psychology of intelligence studied from a dynamic and affective point of view inspired by Freudianism.

But with such a rapid review of the work of Janet, of Blondel and of those inspired by psychoanalysis we have not exhausted the studies of French-speaking authors in the field of abnormal psychology. To be mentioned also are the books of Logre and Devaux on *Les anxieux*<sup>34</sup> and of Dupré on *La pathologie de l'émotivité et de l'imagination*<sup>35</sup> an already mentioned book by Delmas and Boll, and the work of M. de Fleury on *Les états dépressifs et la neurasthénie*,<sup>36</sup> the studies of Hartenberg on *Les psychonevroses anxieuses*; works by Laignel-Lavastine, Revault d'Allonnes, Mourgue, etc., etc.

<sup>32</sup> *L'évolution psychiatrique*. Payot, 1925.

<sup>33</sup> Alcan, 1921.

<sup>34</sup> Masson, 1917.

<sup>35</sup> Payot, 1925.

<sup>36</sup> Alcan, 1924.



## PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Long ago we should have mentioned the names of H. Pieron and E. Rabaud. But even though Pieron's works may at any time delve into general or abnormal psychology, they nevertheless stand by themselves, because the strictly physiological and experimental methods of their author have obliged him to cling to special problems.

We mention first a general work by Pieron on *Le cerveau et la pensée*.<sup>37</sup> It is a well-informed, clear, and up-to-date review of psycho-physiological problems, particularly of questions of cerebral localization which have been so deeply changed by observations on wounded soldiers during the war. This book contains also a complete study of the physiological problem of aphasia and several new features such as an interesting physiological schema similar to that of Claparede. Pieron has also published in the *Année psychologique* (which he directs since Binet's death), in the *Journal de Psychologie*, and in various French biological Bulletins a great number of papers and notes on psycho-physiological questions. Three of these studies must be mentioned. First, an *Essai d'analyse expérimentale du temps de latence sensorielle*.<sup>38</sup> In this study Pieron takes as a working hypotheses the idea that "the decrease in the time of releasing peripherally a sensorial nervous influx through a physical stimulus of increasing intensity must, since it is capable of determining to a great extent the general aspect of the phenomenon, result in decreasing the reaction time considered in relation to the increasing intensity of excitation." Then in a paper published in 1922<sup>39</sup> on new researches in the analysis of the time of sensorial latency Pieron succeeds in confirming this

<sup>37</sup> Alcan, 1923.

<sup>38</sup> *Journ. de Psychol.*, 1920.

<sup>39</sup> *Année Psychol.*, Vol. XX.

hypothesis and discovers a general law relating to the decrease of reaction time. Turning to the second of the studies above referred to we would call attention to a short but important note: *Du rôle des reflexes localisateurs dans les perception spatiales*,<sup>40</sup> in which Pieron supports the interesting idea of nativism in respect to reflexes. Nativist theories, according to Pieron, must be rejected as regards the associative level of knowledge, since the associative reactions of spatial perception, for instance, are acquired only by an empirical process of trial and error. But certain congenital reactions of localization show that localization is also made through a "*prise de connaissance*" of spatial reflexes, and this allows the partial reintroduction of nativistic theories under a new form. The third of Pieron's studies alluded to above is presented in an important paper entitled *Les problèmes psychologiques de la perception du temps*.<sup>41</sup> Here Pieron expresses a great number of useful suggestions concerning the difficult question at issue. Attention should be called also to another research by Pieron on the memory of digits and forms,<sup>42</sup> and to works by Madame Pieron on various tests of aptitude, on sensorial transfer, etc.

In this same field M. Foucault and B. Bourdon have made valuable contributions, the former on sensations and perceptions, the latter on exercise, fatigue, rest, persistency of acquired habits, etc. The question of psychological heredity has been excellently treated by Poyer.<sup>43</sup>

M. Wallon has contributed an interesting study on motor reactions in emotions.<sup>44</sup> His two chapters in Dumas' *Traité* on the biological conditions of consciousness and on the subconscious life are full of useful ideas. His book on *L'Enfant turbulent* contains also much in the nature of

<sup>40</sup> *Journ. de Psychol.*, 1921.

<sup>41</sup> *Année psychol.*, XXIV.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, XXII.

<sup>43</sup> Alcan, 1921.

<sup>44</sup> *Année psychol.*, XXII.

physiological psychology. Lastly, mention must be made of a forceful study by Wintrebert in *Le mouvement sans nerfs*.<sup>45</sup>

To physiological psychology belongs animal psychology. Pieron, who himself made a great number of researches in this field (particularly on memory curves of mollusks) has given a good summary of it in Dumas' *Traité*. Moreover, E. Rabaud has made several interesting contributions to this subject as well as to pure biology. Rabaud's orientation is towards integral mechanism. No one more than he attacks anthropomorphism, finalism, vitalism under any form. No one is a more enthusiastic believer in the continuity between the purely physiological and the intellectual, through the steps of reflex and instinct. His work on instinct tends to show that instinct is far from being infallible and immutable, as too many seem to think. Instinct is but a collection of reflexes that work mechanically, right or wrong according to circumstances.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, the reflex or instinctive mechanism is not merely dependent on external stimuli but is influenced by other factors such as internal secretions. From this point of view Rabaud studied the maternal affection of mice. Giard had explained this instinct through the advantage and well being which the mother derives from it. Rabaud, after criticizing this theory in detail, shows that a female is attracted by the young of another female when she reaches the middle period of her pregnancy. This attraction according to Rabaud depends on internal secretions of the ovary itself.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> *Journ. de psychol.*, 1921.

<sup>46</sup> *Journ. de psychol.*, 1921. See also *Bull. Biol.*, 1918 and 1919, where Rabaud shows that a certain caterpillar lives underground simply because it flees from light. The so-called simulation of death belongs to the category of immobilization reflexes, the mechanism of which has been studied by Rabaud.

<sup>47</sup> In the field of animal psychology mention must be made of the fine researches of Ferton on the life of bees and wasps. These correct many a hasty judgment due to Fabre. We refer also to A. Forel's work, *Le monde social des fourmis* (1921), a very important summary of a life-long observation of the customs of ants.

We thus come to the most striking novelty in the field of physiological psychology during these last years: endocrinology. The researches of Gley, Mayer, Laignel Lavastine, Claude, and Athias have indicated the great number of relations between internal secretions and reflexes, instinct, character, emotions, etc. Dumas gives a good general account of the question in the second volume of his *Traité*.

### PROBLEMS RELATED TO PSYCHOLOGY

It would be difficult to close this rapid review of psychological works written in French without indicating the implicit or explicit psychology found in the works of important authors on logic and epistemology.

In the field of logic we must speak of the *Traité de Logique* by Goblot.<sup>48</sup> It contains a theory of reasoning that is of interest to the psychologist. The syllogism, according to Goblot, represents only a part of deductive reasoning. Deduction consists essentially of a mental construction, similar to what Mach and Rignano call a "mental experiment." Thus, mathematical reasoning consists of spatial or numerical constructions, the rules of which are not rules of logic but the propositions previously accepted. The part played by the syllogism is only to permit the application of these rules to new constructions which are therefore the essence of reasoning. This theory is psychologically very interesting and converges with the teachings of the German *Denkpsychologie*.

In epistemology, the names of Brunschvicg and Meyerson must be mentioned. In *L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique*,<sup>49</sup> by the former, is to be found a genetic psychology of the notions of cause and of object. As we have elsewhere endeavored to show,<sup>50</sup> it may be compared

<sup>48</sup> Colin, 1918.

<sup>49</sup> Alcan, 1922.

<sup>50</sup> *Journ. de psychol.*, XXI.



with Baldwin's system of genetic logic. Although M. Brunschvicg is a pure epistemologist, the reading of his pages is indispensable to anyone who would again take up Ribot's researches on the evolution of general ideas. It is much the same with M. E. Meyerson's works, *De l'explication dans les sciences* and *la deduction relativiste*. Meyerson's central idea is that the notion of cause belongs with that of logical identification and may thus be contrasted with the notion of law. Such a theory presupposes a psychology of perception, as indeed is explicitly stated by Meyerson himself: to perceive is to identify. But while Brunschvicg believes in the plasticity of reason, in genetic transformations of the categories, theories which open the door for a genetic psychology,<sup>51</sup> M. Meyerson is a "fixist" and thinks that always and everywhere, with animal or primitive man, with children or civilized people, perception is a rational process and reason is invariable, both being essentially an identification of diverse elements.

Bergson has published only two new books since 1914, *L'énergie spirituelle*, a collection of previously published studies, and *Durée et simultanéité* in which he is led by Einstein's physical theories to reconsider his conception of time.

Among other epistemological works touching psychology we would call attention to a fine book by J. Paliard, *Intuition and reflexion*, which presents some highly interesting ideas on the relations of life and consciousness. Worthy of mention is, finally, the attempt of P. Masson-Oursel (*La philosophie comparée*) to find some parallelism between European philosophy and Chinese and Hindu thought. A chapter devoted to a comparison of psychologies gives valuable information for history of psychology.

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<sup>51</sup> Brunschvicg in this respect agrees with A. Lalande whose fine methodological preface to Dumas' *Traité* must be mentioned.

## SOCIOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

IN ORDER to form a precise and accurate idea of the contemporary sociological movement in France, it is necessary to know its source, or, more exactly, its sources. One school undoubtedly demands attention as much for the rigor of its scientific method as for the abundance of its production and for its incontestable influence in and out of the sociological domain: it is the school of Durkheim. But in believing, as one might be tempted to do, that this school alone represents all of French sociology, or all that counts in French sociology, one would not only commit an injustice but one would also place himself in an unsatisfactory viewpoint in regard to understanding the true nature of the Durkheimian sociology, which is at once in conflict with itself and is at the same time continuing. There is indeed some diversity in our contemporary sociological movement, because there was some diversity yesterday, and because the movement constantly scatters in the different directions—often, moreover, as we shall see, less and less different—which the nineteenth century has marked out for it. The nineteenth century we say. In fact one may well mention, and it is right to mention, the names of some great precursors, from Aristotle, formulating his famous definition of man as a political animal, to Montesquieu, deducing his concept of social law, and Condorcet, that of the future and of progress. It is none the less true that sociology is a thing of the nineteenth cen-

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Frances Noble.

ture—a century of history and of experience, of progress and of relativity—and that it is, also, essentially a thing of France. Tracing, in 1900 in the *Revue Bleue*, the course of sociology in France in the nineteenth century, Durkheim could justly write: "To determine the part which belongs to France in the progress that sociology has made during the nineteenth century, is to give, in large measure, the history of this science, for it is among us and during the course of this century that sociology was born, and it has remained a science essentially French."

It is, then, the nineteenth century, and especially the nineteenth century in France, that has defined and opened all the directions which we today still find in the science which concerns us. If we would retain only that which is essential and that which throws light on present conditions, we would say that these directions are four in number. Around them, and with a varying importance, all the other movements center; among them, moreover, there is more than one common trait and more than one instance of borrowing, as well as a number of mutual reactions which are often profitable. At first there were two directions. They were very different and were more independent of each other than doubtless was wise. On the one hand, we find that which dominates the entire movement and proceeds from Saint-Simon and from Auguste Comte to Durkheim; on the other hand, that which, under the names of social reform and, still more, of social science, goes from LePlay to Paul Bureau, passing by way of Henri de Tourville and Demolins. Finally, two last directions: one, starting from the Englishman Spencer, then defined, rendered precise, and enlarged by Espinas, contributes notably to the formation of the Durkheimian sociology, even while subsequently existing side by side with it and distinct from it in the form of a modified organicism; the other, brilliantly represented by Gabriel Tarde, pro-

vides, according to Tarde, not so much a new, positive route across the sociological field as a concentration point and guiding idea for the attack which individualism, whether metaphysical or psychological, ceaselessly directs against sociology. The latter will be accused—almost always excessively, but not always without reason or usefulness—of considering of no importance the initiative and rights of individual conscience and reason. From this viewpoint, which, is so to speak, negative, the sociology of Tarde, which has remained, in one sense, without a future, because there is no sociological school which bears his name, ceaselessly regains life and actuality. It is truly around the individual, whom Tarde would make at once the author of all progress and the single real sociological factor, that there is today being ceaselessly waged the great battle between partisans and opponents of sociology. And that is natural enough. In spite of its queer etymology, has not sociology among us truly taken for its object, not so much the strictly historical and limited knowledge of societies, as the larger, more philosophical and more human knowledge of the individual in his environment and his social order, and the determination of what he, as an individual, does or does not owe to that environment?

But in order that such knowledge may be possible and may have an effective newness, it is necessary that a definite reality be assigned to the environment whose influence on the individual one wishes to maintain. It is exactly because such knowledge will be founded on this reality—which is, moreover, quite concrete and not at all metaphysical—and because it will proceed from this reality to the individual—we say will proceed to the individual, not will proceed systematically to deny him—for these reasons the knowledge will be sociological. Three of the schools named by us, despite all their differences of opinion and methods, agree in thus understanding it. The fourth does



not believe in the existence of sociology proper. LePlay and Paul Bureau proceed to the individual only from what they believe to be his essential social environment, the working-class family.<sup>2</sup> Very similar is the view of Espinas. In contradiction to Spencer, he affirms the reality of the collective consciousness, giving as the essential and natural type thereof the family and the nation. These are, for him, simply individualities that are more extensive than individuals in the ordinary sense, whereas the latter, in turn, are only societies that are more restricted than the groups commonly so designated. Of a kindred view and much more forceful is Durkheim, whose struggle in favor of the concrete and specific reality of society and of the collective consciousness is a matter of common knowledge.

The agreement between the different schools, and the persistence from the founders down to the very present of that capital notion of a specific social reality, on which sociologists continue to count, is one of the most characteristic traits of their science. They today like to pay homage to a precursor who is too much and unjustly forgotten, and to whom several important works and essential preoccupations of the present hour have just given a lively actuality: Saint-Simon. In his previously quoted article in the *Revue Bleue*, Durkheim did not fail to assign to Saint-Simon a fine, prominent place or to pay him the homage that had been denied him by Auguste Comte. Later, in 1915, in a chapter on sociology written for a volume devoted to French science and presented at the International Exposition in San Francisco, he repeated the same homage. "Saint-Simon," he wrote, "was the first to declare that human societies are realities, certainly of a unique sort, different from those that one finds in the rest

<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that despite their anathemas against the Durkheimian notion of a collective consciousness, sometimes deliberately misrepresented, it is indeed in the study of groupings and not in the study of the individual that this school begins.

of nature, but subject to the same determinism."<sup>3</sup> Finally, in a course on Saint-Simon, a course of which the *Revue Philosophique* has just published several sections (May-June, 1925), he brought to the public eye the following significant passage by Saint-Simon: "Society is far from being a simple agglomeration of living beings whose actions have no other cause than the decisions of individual wills, no other result than brief and unimportant accidents; society is, on the contrary, a highly organized machine, all the parts of which contribute in independent ways to the functioning of the whole. The grouping of men constitutes an actual unit."<sup>4</sup> And M. Maxime Leroy, who, along with Messieurs Bouglé and Halévy, is one of those who are today doing the most to rehabilitate Saint-Simon, also emphasizes his original and significant conception of the social being which one must not, as he wisely remarks, lower to the vulgar level of a simple organism.<sup>5</sup>

Speaking of the sociological and politico-social attempts of Saint-Simon and of Auguste Comte, Durkheim has written of these two men, who have also been described as Messiahs: "It is in reason alone, that is to say in science, that the means of bringing about the moral reorganization of the country were sought. It is from this intellectual effervescence that there resulted simultaneously Saint-Simonism, Fourierism, Comteanism, and sociology."<sup>6</sup> Thus we find Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, with their idea of a distinct social reality, the object of a distinct social science, as objective as the other sciences, at the beginning of a positive and rationalistic sociology which, after an eclipse of a good quarter-century, rose again with Espinas and came into flower with Durkheim and his school.

<sup>3</sup> *La Science Française*, 1915, Vol. I, p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> *Revue Philosophique*, 1925, p. 331.

<sup>5</sup> Max. Leroy, *Henri de Saint-Simon*, 1924, p. 319. See also Bouglé, *L'Œuvre d'Henri de Saint-Simon—Textes Choisis*, 1925, and *La Nouvelle Edition de la Doctrine de Saint-Simon*, by Bouglé and Halévy, 1924.

<sup>6</sup> *Revue Bleue*, 1900, p. 612.

But during this actual eclipse of the tradition of Saint-Simon and Comte, preoccupations with social science and social reorganization analogous to theirs in point of departure, although very different in results and in the doctrines to which they led, arose in the work of one who was also a thinker, an ingenious man, an enthusiast, and who was also destined to found a school: Frederic LePlay. His name and method, even if not his doctrine, must be mentioned if one would today understand Paul Bureau, just as Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte must be considered if one would understand the work of Durkheim. There is in LePlay—and, unfortunately, it is doubtless this that is best known about him—a moral and religious doctrine of individual reform and of paternalism which is far from having had the success and influence that its author expected. But it should be recognized that he also inaugurated, and that he even began by practicing objectively and independent of all doctrine, a distinctive method which can be dissociated from his specific teachings. In fact, it has been so dissociated by his dissenting disciples, founders of the *Science Sociale*. This is an instrument of method, as opposed to the *Réforme Sociale*, which is an organ of doctrine. LePlay's method has exactly two eminently sociological peculiarities. It declares social facts worthy of scientific observation just the same as natural facts, and it focuses this observation at the outset on a reality that is collective and not individual; namely, on the working-class family. It is for the purpose of dissociating the method from the doctrine, of making it precise, of ridding it of the inadequate mathematical considerations of family budgets, of extending it, according to LePlay's own indications, from the particularistic monography of the family to the comprehensive study of society with its physical and social conditions of existence, that Henry de Tourville and Demolins have worked. And this transformation of LePlay's

method, wrought by these founders of social science, terminates today, as in its last, most precise and scientific conclusion, in the sociology of Paul Bureau.<sup>7</sup> This stands face to face with Durkheim's sociology. It makes pretensions of also being an objective science, but of being wise enough likewise to make a place for liberty. The recently deceased author codified this in a book called *Introduction à la méthode sociologique*. This work appeared in 1923 as the manifesto of the new school of social science.

A bit earlier, J. Wilbois, a rather liberal member of the same school, began the publication of an introduction to sociology in the *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale* for 1920 (pp. 471-494). But the work of P. Bureau remains much the most important and most characteristic work of this tendency. We have said that he built upon an expansion of the method of LePlay. As long ago as 1855, the latter had perceived the inadequacy of the method of family monography when the family was studied simply through its budget. "A number of details," said he, "escape this financial analysis of human life." It was in order to meet this inadequacy that he had added to his first monographic framework two rather indeterminate rubrics. One of these came at the beginning and was entitled "Preliminary Observations." This was designed to contain a description of the place where the family lives, of the organization of the work in which it is engaged, of its mode of existence, of its traditions, etc. The other rubric, entitled "Diverse Elements of the Social Constitution," also served to enlarge the analysis. There remained the step of definitely leaving the family in order to comprehend social life. LePlay felt the necessity of so doing and made the attempt in dealing with England. But it was Henri de Tourville who undertook methodically to co-ordinate in a

<sup>7</sup> Cf. on this movement Pierre Meline, *LePlay: l'oeuvre de science*, Paris, Bloud, 1912; *Le travail sociologique*, *ibid.*, 1909. Also *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée*, I. Paul Bureau le sociologue, Paris, Bloud, 1924, p. 65-127.



*general nomenclature* the different orders of social facts and also to define the setting of the study of societies in the narrow sense of the word, and of all the "social repercussions" of laws observed there.

This retrospect was necessary for an understanding of the exact sociological method of P. Bureau. The latter, indeed, absorbed this tradition and then passed beyond it. First he absorbed it. "I will," declared he, "borrow considerably from the nomenclature of social facts elaborated almost forty years ago by Henri de Tourville in dealing with the works of LePlay, though I will make important simplifications and changes such as have been shown necessary by experience. Just as it stands, this brief questionnaire is, according to me, a valuable instrument of analysis, and doubtless this will soon be realized if students will consent to follow LePlay's recommendation to study the working-class family. I am aware that this method seems to some discredited and antiquated. Nevertheless the analysis of wisely chosen samples remains the favorite and most certain method in all empirical sciences. . . . As has long been said, the working-class family, that is to say the family which draws its means of subsistence largely from the manual labor of its head or of its members, furnishes an excellent introduction to the general study of society as a whole. Since the organization of private life occupies such an important place in the general economy of society, no better avenue could be found to the interior of society itself; and the choice of a working-class family is likewise justified by the fact that, alike because of its work and because of its means of existence, this family, more than any other, is under the influence of determining elements of the group under observation. By virtue of their intellectual culture or material resources, families in moderate or good circumstances can raise themselves above the action of these elements. The working-class family is

more the prisoner of circumstance, and by reference to it one can best perceive the action of the environment. Moreover, to recommend the monographic method is not to say that the completion of a single monograph is sufficient. On the contrary, it is advantageous to renew observation on a different family and to check by a new test the results of the first study. All that can be said is that the scrupulous analysis of a well-chosen sample, better than any other procedure, permits the penetration of those mysterious fastnesses of psychological life where the social life of a people is developed and organized.”<sup>s</sup>

Thus, as one sees, knowledge of the family retains its privilege as the key to the knowledge of society; and this two-fold knowledge can be obtained through the use of a nomenclature which is no other than that of Henri de Tourville—a nomenclature which Bureau describes and on which he comments in a long and interesting chapter.

But let us note how he goes beyond his masters and what seemed to him their geographical materialism, in order that, without renouncing science, he might establish a “sociology of liberty,” as he has himself baptized it. It was the study, classic in the circles of science, of the fjords of Norway and of the social type which their material configuration is thought necessarily to produce that led him to abandon the determinism of his school. “As my study progressed,” says he, “I felt a triple affirmation arising in me with irresistible force. If, said I to myself, a powerful fairy gave me the ability to change these granite mountains into beds of oil or of copper, or into good arable land, it is certain that the social structure of all Norway would be profoundly modified. But if, on the other hand, without changing anything in the geographical configuration, a chemist should tomorrow discover the means of using this granite in combinations capable of engendering force

<sup>s</sup> P. Bureau, *Introduction à la Science sociale*, p. 185.

and heat, what would not be the extent of social transformations arising from the modification of economic technique? In some decades Norway would be covered with workshops and factories, and would become one of the principal manufacturing regions of Europe. Finally, if, without modifying either the geographic structure or the technique of work, a lay mission composed of the masters of French rationalism, came to flood with conferences, pamphlets, tracts and propaganda this peasant population so firmly entrenched in the somber Lutheran dogma of sin and salvation, if this mission succeeded in convincing these pious peasants—that all their beliefs are only mirage and illusion—is it not certain also that the social structure of Norway in the fjord region would be profoundly modified? The austere life led by these peasants, in the inexpressible isolation of their “gaard,” would appear to them intolerable the day their religious doctrines were abandoned.”<sup>9</sup> The first two of these affirmations fit very naturally, as one sees, into the deterministic frame of social science, but the third demands the insertion of the possibilities and exigencies of liberty. “Under the impulsion of new evidence,” proclaims our author, “I acquire the power to abandon my first positions.” Under the name of sociological materialism, he rejects alike the liberal economy, the scientific socialism of Marx, the sociologism of Durkheim, and social science itself. The material circumstances of place, of work, and of system of property, which constituted for his masters the three determining factors, appear to him only situations that arouse or conditions that permit the phenomena, not causes that necessarily produce and suffice to explain them. But what then becomes of social science? That is the question which arose and which he asked himself but which he did not succeed in answering in clear and satisfactory fashion: “According as I held it necessary

<sup>9</sup> *Introd. à la meth. Soc.*, p. 16f.

to assume liberty, was it not necessary to give up the idea of constituting a science of social phenomena?" He decided that this was not the case, saying especially that one must hold fast the two ends of the chain of determinism—liberty, even though unable to perceive the intermediate links.<sup>10</sup> In any case he claimed for representations, especially those of morality and religion, a causal efficacy analogous to that of scientific factors proper.

We may now note a significant fact which shows that we are nearing the crucial problem. Through the claim just mentioned Bureau rejoins that Durkheimian sociology in which he wishes to see only a materialistic determinism. Even before the appearance of Durkheim's book on religion, which certainly marks this author's evolution toward idealism, I pointed out how the ideal factors (beliefs and representations) join in his thought with the material factors (morphology and institutions) to constitute the notion of collective reality and to explain human progress. And with a Bouglé, for example, sociological orientation tends to take this specific form. It is not by chance that in the Durkheimian heritage, he selects especially the notion of value—a conception that indeed acquires increasing importance—and that he devotes to the evolution of this notion a clear and brilliant little book which represents a balance-sheet of contemporary sociology.<sup>11</sup> Though appearing to us as objective and impersonal precisely because they are collective, judgments of value nevertheless express only preferences, that is, to say brusquely, sentiments. And if a common bent imposes on us values that it has created or has generally accepted, this is not by the tyranny of a law of servitude, but by the charm inherent in a superior ideal: "Its authority," writes Bouglé, "is far from being something exterior to spiritual life, which could only command offensively; it springs from the heart of the peo-

<sup>10</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 149.

<sup>11</sup> *Leçons de sociologie sur l'évolution des valeurs*, 1922.



ple. From which it follows that to invite man to respect society, is not to ask him to bow before a sort of huge animal, but before a great flame which mounts toward heaven and which is kept ever burning by souls united in common interest."<sup>12</sup>

The analysis of economic value, moreover, seems to show us, despite classic prejudices, that it is itself a function of desire and of idea: "To measure (economic) values it is not sufficient to compute the work embodied in them. Neither does it suffice to represent them as the result of a relation between two almost mechanical forces: supply and demand. In its functioning, the law of supply and demand itself assumes a certain condition which marks the limits imposed by the moral ideal on economic appetites. There are, moreover, other needs than material needs, other interests than individual interests; by diverse systems of attractions and influences, and in directions unexpected by the economist, collectivity orientates the desires of individuals. In so far one may contend that economic values are themselves matters of opinion, it being well understood that the opinion of which one speaks is not at all anything that can be avoided or an arbitrary fantasy. It is the sum total of ideas and feelings which in a given country and time impress themselves upon collective customs, and give rise to judgments of imperative values, representing ideals that are themselves in harmony with the structure of society. Values thus conceived are the essential objects of sociology."<sup>13</sup>

The same viewpoint is emphasized still more by Bouglé in a course of lectures on, or rather against, materialism in sociology.<sup>14</sup> Durkheim's sociology, he shows, contains more psychology than is generally supposed. Despite interpretations which try to reveal other tendencies, the true

<sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>13</sup> Bouglé, *loc. cit.*, p. 110f.

<sup>14</sup> *Science, morale et education*, Paris, 1925, 3e série, p. 141f.

social reality is for Durkheim mental and sentimental. He does not make the collective consciousness dependent upon social morphology alone; and he admits a logic of development of beliefs. And Bouglé adds on his own account: "In order that societies may continue to exist, judgments of value must be imposed on the consciences of individuals to the end that their efforts may be made to converge. Societies would doubtless crumble into dust if there were nothing but material interests to unite men. But forces of sentiment are always at work. It is they that constitute the veritable substance of society. . . . If it be true that such is the tendency of our sociological teaching, I believe that we can all say that we are far from racial determinism, from geographical determinism, and from economic determinism. We maintain that an ideal is a necessary force. We maintain that this force itself is subject to the influence of social transformations. But especially do we point out that it is necessary to the maintenance of the life of societies." The same sort of idealism pervades the sociological conception of law which I have myself more than once sketched when criticizing the principal theoretical conceptions of contemporary jurists.<sup>15</sup>

Certain sociologists have attached an extraordinary importance to an exclusively psychological analysis of collective mentality with its unique characteristics and laws. They indeed do not cease to claim an absolute specificity of this analysis in relation to that of pure individual psychology, yet they consider it necessary to present the collective mentality in its entirety, and disengaged from correspondences of detail among its various traits and the particular or local causes of its formation in definite social organizations. This is the plan of two universally known books in which Levy-Bruhl achieves the veritable resurrection of the collective mentality of primitive man, full of life

<sup>15</sup> G. Davy, *Le Droit, l'Idéalisme, et l'Experience*, Paris, Alcan, 1922; *Éléments de sociologie politique*, Paris, Delafranc, 1923.

and local color.<sup>16</sup> It is the most received of the books of which we would here speak. It carries as its title a singular expression, *la mentalité primitive*, thus symbolizing the psychic identity found among regional and racial diversities. That primitive mentality is governed by a law of participation rather than of contradiction, and thus confuses classes and beings as it confounds actions and causes; that it is mystic, impenetrable to experience, indifferent to apparent causes that it believes ineffective, confident only in invisible causes, magico-mystic in character; in a word, that it is pre-logical and pre-scientific—this is all matter that it is scarcely necessary to repeat, so well known is Levy-Bruhl's book, and so often re-edited and translated. Its contents, moreover, have recently been popularized by a pamphlet from the pen of a psychologist who is himself interested in sociology, M. Blondel.

M. Faucounet's essay on responsibility is much more orthodox in its Durkheimianism.<sup>17</sup> It presents responsibility as an objective institution. It indeed contends that responsibility cannot be deduced, as is ordinarily believed, either from the requirements of a metaphysics which exhibits the free individual, or from those of morality which present him as a being full of failings before the bar of his conscience. Nevertheless it shows that responsibility expresses an imperious and entirely ideal need of the collective consciousness. All offenses against the values which the collective consciousness holds dear must be immediately effaced and compensated by a reaction *sui generis*. This at first strikes blindly and vaguely whomever, whatever, and wherever it can, just to be striking; finally it corrects its aim, directing itself to a given point where there is at last discovered an individual declared to be the responsible cause of the evil. While it lends itself to interpretation

<sup>16</sup> *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, Paris, Alcan; *La mentalité primitive*, Paris, Alcan, 1923.

<sup>17</sup> *La responsabilité*, Paris, Alcan, 1921.

and comprehension at first only in its objective aspects, and outside of the domain that metaphysicians and psychologists explore, the need that there be responsibility, an effacement of crime, nevertheless remains a trait of primitive mentality, a phenomenon of the collective mind.

Should one not, in a sense, say the same of another need felt in common by so many archaic civilizations—the need to translate all their activity and solidarity, as well as their group antagonisms, into the form of a ritualistic exchange of loans and gifts? With our custom of free gifts this has nothing in common except the name. For according to the ancient custom it is as obligatory to receive as to give; and an act of return must be with ceremony and with the desire to outdo and to overwhelm. This curious juristic-economic-ritualistic custom, comprising almost the whole group of traits found in the social life of societies at the totemic stage of evolution, where the potlatch is one of the most characteristic manifestations, has during these last years opened an entirely new and a fertile field of sociological investigation.<sup>18</sup> The conclusion of M. Mauss' study, referred to in the footnote, brings out the significance and the multiple importance of this kind of studies. They clarify on many matters far removed from the origins of law on which they cast immediate light. In these institutions, still entirely objective, it is indeed the psychology of the human living group in its concrete fullness that is presented to us. Let us turn to M. Mauss' own words. Though doubtless a little long, the citation is too important and too characteristic of this new point of view either to omit or to abridge. "We have, then, more than themes, more than the elements of institutions, more than complex institutions, more even than systems of institutions, differ-

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Mauss, *Année Sociologique*, Vols. XI and XIIff; and, in the first number which has just appeared (1925) of the new series of *l'Année sociologique*, an important study on the gift, an archaic form of exchange. See also Georges Davy, *La Foi Furée*, Paris, Alcan, 1922; and Lenoir, *Sur le Potlatch*, *Revue Philosophique*, 1924.



entiated, for example, into religion, law, economics, etc. . . . we have entireties, whole social systems whose functionings we have tried to describe. We have seen societies in the dynamic state of physiology. We have not studied them as if they were fixed in a static state or as if they were dead, and even less have we decomposed and dissected them into rules of law, into myths, into values, and into prices. It is in considering the thing as a whole that we have been able to perceive that which is essential, the movement of the whole, the living aspect, the fugitive moment when society or men acquire an affective consciousness of themselves and of their situation face to face with one another. This concrete observation of social life affords means of finding new facts which we are now only beginning to see faintly. Nothing, in our opinion, is more urgent or more fruitful than this study of social facts as a whole. It has a double advantage. There is first an advantage of generality: the facts of general functioning have the possibility of being more universal than the diverse institutions or various phases of these institutions, for the latter are always more or less accidentally tinged with local color. But above all there is the advantage of reality. One thus comes to see the social phenomena themselves, in the concrete, as they are. In societies one grasps more than ideas or rules, one grasps men, groups, and their actions. . . . Historians feel and rightly decry that sociologists are too abstract and that they are too prone to sunder the diverse elements of societies from one another. We must do as the former do, and observe what is given. But what is given is Rouen, Athens, the middle-class Frenchman, the Melanesian of such and such an island, and not prayer or law in itself. After having been a little too divisive and abstract, sociologists must force themselves to reconstruct the whole. Thus they will find fertile fields of study. They will also find means of satisfying the psycholo-

gists. These latter are keenly conscious of their privilege, and the psychopathologists especially have the certainty of studying the concrete. All study or should study the actions of beings as a whole and not divided into faculties. We must imitate them. The study of the concrete as a whole is possible, and is even more captivating and significant in sociology. We observe the complete and complex reactions of numerically defined quantities of men, of complete and complex human beings. We also describe the nature of their organisms and of their minds, while likewise portraying the actions of the mass and the psychoses which correspond thereto: feelings, ideas, volitions of the crowd or of organized societies and their sub-groups. We also watch bodies and the reactions of bodies, of which ideas and feelings are ordinarily the interpretations and more rarely the motives. The principle and the end of sociology is to view the group as a whole and its behavior as a totality."<sup>19</sup>

If it is thus among the complexities of collective life, among practices, usages and obligations included within it, that there first clearly appears the action of the individual in relation to himself and to others, and the feeling of value which he attributes to himself or which he makes others attribute to him, it is not surprising that sociology is more and more introducing its point of view and explanatory method into the domains of psychology and of law. Will it dissipate all the difficulties in these fields? Will it lead to an integral, scientific explanation by the radical elimination of that which is individual and contingent? Less and less would we dare to affirm it. And, in a chapter written more than ten years ago (in 1914; the book itself appeared much later) for Dumas' *Traité de psychologie*, a chapter for which I, not at all to my surprise, have been charged with intransigence, I already concluded with

<sup>19</sup> *Année sociologique*, new series, I, p. 181f.

this declaration, full, one will agree, of reserve: "Sociology shows psychology how the soul of society is reflected in that of the individual, how it there inscribes the rules of thought as well as of action, how it instills the sentiment of ideal values which make human life differ, by virtue of intellectuality and morality, from simple animal life where knowledge is based on experience. And now what original form does this feeling take in each individual consciousness, and in what unique manner does each individual exercise the superior faculties which social influences develop in him? This is a question which psychology must raise. Sociology gives it over to psychology, without denying in any way that there is such a question, but asking only that it be settled for the benefit of individual originality only after sociological explanation shall have been exhausted, and with the condition that sociological explanation be always permitted to function in reducing the part assigned to the individual."<sup>20</sup> Some attempts at sociological explanation in psychology may be found in several chapters of Dumas' *Traité*, chapters devoted to will and personality and written by the alert and colorful pen of M. Blondel; also in a recent book on memory, more than one thesis of which will awaken resistance, but which is full of substance.<sup>21</sup>

To set forth the position and the ambitions of the sociologist in the domain of law would require a special chapter. Let us note simply this question: May not the fundamental categories of private or of public law, of contract and sovereignty, for example, or the very notion of law in general, far from representing either the changeless principles of natural law, or artificial constructions as in the contractualism of J. J. Rousseau or the neo-contractualism of Léon Bourgeois, or organic products as in the evolutionism and organicism of Spencer, really represent progressive acqui-

<sup>20</sup> G. Dumas, *Traité de Psychologie*, II, p. 808f.

<sup>21</sup> M. Holbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris, Alcan, 1921.

sitions of civilization, superior products and at the same time expressions of collective life and of society's work upon itself, work in which, moreover, one cannot see why the individual should not lend his collaboration, as when the reasoned art of codification comes to graft itself onto the spontaneity of custom? It is a fact that one obtains singular clarity concerning the origins and nature of juridical notions when one gives up the attempt to explain them as the image of reason or of human instinct in general, and considers them as objectively existing institutions that are formed, unformed, and transformed in the course of the history of societies and under the action of assignable causes. One can then seek to illumine by the light of history and of experience problems which have continued to remain after and in spite of much dialectical debate. This is what we have ourselves sought to do for the notion of contract and of obligation, and for that of sovereignty, as well as for that of the mutual relationship between national sovereignty and individual liberty on the one hand, and national sovereignty and international solidarity on the other.<sup>22</sup>

This brief review is not at all exhaustive. It has had as its especial purpose the characterization of several essential tendencies. To give an idea of contemporary sociological activity in France, some facts remain to be mentioned. We would refer, in the first place, to the reappearance of the *Année sociologique* in its two-fold form of a periodical with original studies and reviews and of a collection of works. The first number has just appeared with the important essay, already noted, by M. Mauss. The second number will follow shortly. In the collection of works there is announced an account by M. Granet, a student of Chinese sociology, of the dances and legends of

<sup>22</sup> Cf. G. Davy, *La foi jurée, étude sociologique du problème du contrat* Paris, Alcan; *Elements de sociologie: sociologie politique*; Paris, Delafranc; also A. Moret et G. Davy, *Des claus aux Empires*, Paris, Renaissance du livre.



ancient China. The works, above mentioned, by M. Levy-Bruhl, by M. Halbwachs, and by myself form a part of the same collection. We must likewise refer to the assembling in book form of scattered articles by Durkheim and the publication of his unedited courses, of which we have no desire to present the work which is out-of-date but wish to exhibit the living spirit and the influence.<sup>23</sup> There must also be noted the publication of certain more or less unfinished works affording an impression of some promising sociologists lost during the war. In the foremost rank here is the very fine study by Robert Hertz on expiation and sin,<sup>24</sup> published, as were the unedited works of Durkheim, by the faithful efforts of M. Mauss. The *in memoriam* placed at the head of the first number of the new series of the *Année sociologique* will give an idea of all the unfinished work which was tragically interrupted and of which only a small part can be published. Besides the Durkheimian movement in the strict sense of the term the important collection which, under the general head *L'évolution de l'humanité*, and under the supervision of M. Berr, director of the *Revue de synthèse historique*, presents a history and an interpretation of the progress of civilization, and the Library of the Institute of Comparative Law of Lyons, an important collection of publications directed by Professor Lambert, give evidence of a sociological spirit in the large sense. The *Revue internationale de sociologie* continues to appear, as in the past, with a very friendly spirit; its enthusiasm for organization is continually waning, as is evident in the last book published by its director,

<sup>23</sup> Durkheim: *Sociologie et psychologie*, with a preface by C. Bouglé, Paris, Alcan, 1924. *Education et sociologie*, with an introduction by P. Fauconnet, Paris, Alcan, 1922. *L'Education morale*, with a note by P. Fauconnet, Paris, Alcan, 1925. Finally one will find in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* and in the *Revue philosophique* some of Durkheim's lectures extracted after his death from his courses on morality, on the family, and on the history of doctrines (socialism and Saint-Simonism).

<sup>24</sup> Robert Hertz, *Le péché et l'expiation dans les sociétés primitives*; taken in part from the *Revue de l'histoire des religions*. Paris, Leroux, 1922.

René Worms, who has just died.<sup>25</sup> We would call attention also to an important series of very suggestive articles published in recent years by M. R. Lenoir in the *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale* and the *Revue de Synthèse Historique*; they relate to the history of positive ideas and to current sociological questions. Let us note in closing that sociology has won a place for itself not only among the public, even among non-specialists, but also in programs of instruction.<sup>26</sup> It has become obligatory in the programs of study for the *Licence* and the programs of primary normal schools, and even facultative matter for the Baccalauréat.

GEORGES DAVY.

DIJON, FRANCE.

<sup>25</sup> René Worms, *La sociologie, sa nature, son contenu, ses attaches*. Paris, Giard, 1926.

<sup>26</sup> Whence the appearance of manuals of sociology: Hesse and Gleyze (Paris, Alcan); Déat (Paris, Alcan); René Hubert (Paris, Delalain); Sourian (Paris, Nathan); G. Davy (Paris, Delagrave).

## PEDAGOGICAL TENDENCIES<sup>1</sup>

IT is difficult to characterize in general terms the pedagogical tendencies current among French-speaking peoples within recent years, for this movement is notably different in France from what it is in French Switzerland and in Belgium.

France, in truth, appears to be much more conservative and traditionalistic than her small neighbors. She fears innovations in the domain of pedagogy. Her entire school system, strongly centralized, lends itself but poorly to experimentation, and her educational problem appears to be dominated by considerations of politics. It is in their political bearings, unfortunately, that she still envisages most of the pedagogical questions, such, for example, as the question of the "école unique" (single type school), with reference to which Switzerland has long since reached an affirmative decision.

In France, ecclesiastical considerations likewise factor in obscuring and complicating a number of the pedagogical issues. Whereas, in Switzerland, the principle of the lay school is admitted by all and no one would venture to question it, in France, lay teaching is still an object of lively attack from the side of the parties of the right.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, the war has aroused in France a renewed interest in pedagogy. The moment the war closed there appeared a work written by a number of combatants who assumed the name, "Les Compagnons."<sup>3</sup> They demand

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Edward L. Schaub.

<sup>2</sup> Bouglé: *l'Educateur laïque*, Paris, 1921.

<sup>3</sup> Les Compagnons: *l'Université nouvelle*, Paris, 1918.

that educational institutions shall create a new spirit. They hope that France may witness a reversal in the order of values, as a result of which politics will pass to the second place and education to the first. "It is the individual Frenchman who must be reformed. It is his inner being, his course of life and morals, that must be changed. One must penetrate to the depths of his heart. . . . For this reason we turn to childhood. It is in the child that we place our faith." The authors from whom we have just quoted develop a complete program for all the stages of education; they seek a genuine systematization of the teaching personnel.

As early as 1916 M. Herriot proclaimed the necessity of rejuvenating the educational system, "of modifying it along lines at once more democratic and more conformable to the needs of France."

A considerable body of writers and of works have struck the same note. M. Ferd. Buisson and Mme. Kergomard, the deans of French pedagogy, insist on the "new duties" which actual events impose on the educator. More especially, they insist, one must show the children the benefits of the League of Nations. C. Bouglé shows that democracy requires of citizens the development of their reason to the end that they may be able to control the acts of those whom they elect to office. Melle. M. Dugard (*La culture et la vie, problèmes de demain*, 1918) holds that "what is most lacking in the contemporary world is men capable of improving the social structure"; "in its eagerness for the mastery of things mankind neglects certain essential values." It is necessary above all, she contends, that "studies shall be made to serve the ends of culture"; egoism must be uprooted, love of justice implanted.

Most of these proposals, however, are not novel. But one hears them proclaimed with more force than ever. Yet up to the present they have all remained mere words; they



have not yet passed to the sphere of action. *Agir!* Such is the title of a work by M. Herriot.<sup>4</sup>

In Belgium, on the other hand, under the influence of the movement inaugurated by Dr. Decroly, and in French Switzerland, thanks to the influence exercised by the *Institut J. J. Rousseau* (a school of educational science founded in 1912), the pedagogical spirit may almost be said to have been made over, and many improvements have come in educational practice.

But we cannot here enter upon the details of school questions. It is our task to indicate some of the more important publications of recent years in the fields of pedagogy and of child psychology.

### GENERAL PEDAGOGY

A new and important pedagogical outlook is developed in the posthumous works of Durkheim. This writer connected pedagogy with his social theory. For him education is primarily a social matter. Indeed, the ideal to which it is subordinate and the end to which it should set itself vary with each society and depend upon the social structure. "Education is a socialization of the young generation." Morality and language are essentially social in character. Education must develop the will in such wise that the individual will subordinate himself to the exigencies of the group. According to Durkheim, therefore, if one would impart to the child the rudiments of morality, one must inculcate in him "the spirit of discipline" and arouse in him "an attachment to social groups." The ob-

<sup>4</sup> We would cite also the work of J. Wilbois, *La nouvelle éducation française* (Paris, 1922), which suggests a complete reformation of methods and programs. This reformation, Wilbois believes, should be founded upon the science of the child; that is, upon pedagogical experimentation.

jective of school discipline is to develop morality within the class. Its function is "to serve as a stepping-stone from the emotional morality of the family to the more severe morality of civil life." Thus, discipline is not merely a simple process designed to maintain order in the classroom. Furthermore, obedience is truly moral only if it expresses an inner sentiment of respect for the rule imposed. And this rule, in turn, is truly a rule only if it appears to the child as impersonal, as not dependent upon the good pleasure of the teacher. Respect for discipline, then, ought not to be aroused through fear of the teacher himself; the latter must develop in the mind of the child respect for the rule which he himself reverences.

It is the role of the school to awaken that social loyalty for which there is so dire a need, especially among the French who are inclined to rebel against the group spirit. The milieu of the school, as well as certain studies, notably history, are particularly adapted to engender in children interest in a social group at once wider and more impersonal than that to which they have previously been accustomed.

As thus appears, the pedagogy of Durkheim is derived from his sociological conceptions. Once these are admitted, one must recognize that the pedagogical edifice which he has erected is not lacking in magnificence. Nevertheless one cannot fail to see that many of his theories are quite artificial. In his entire work rhetoric too often assumes the place which ought to be occupied by observation and experience. The facts regarding the social and moral development of the child are still very obscure; Durkheim writes as if they were all definitely known.

Without doubt the social environment exercises a considerable influence on the development of the child, as well as on the formation of the moral ideas which serve as social norms. But does it follow that in educating a child one

must subordinate him to the ends set by the group? Not at all, for to act morally is very often to act *against* the opinion of the group. And thus it is with entire justice that G. Belot says: "Between society and the self of reflective thought, the accord is neither immediate nor constant. Though the human animal is inferior to the social man, society is often less advanced than the rational man. So far is society from being by its nature creative of reason and of the ideal, that it constantly ranges tradition against the will for progress and against the intellectual conquests of the individual; it ranges intolerance against the free play of thought."<sup>5</sup>

J. Delvolvé, Professor at Montpellier, has also devoted some attention to moral education.<sup>6</sup> He has circulated a questionnaire relating to the moral character of school children. Up to the present, however, the results of this investigation have not been published. M. Delvolvé emphasizes the social factors of moral education in the schools. He develops a number of ideas on "educational technique" that are original but not always very clear. The technique to which he refers is of a rational character and must not be confused with educational practice. It has for its aim the justification and the interpretation of the latter. It is concerned with "the development of the child under the influences of education."

For a considerable period of years and with untiring patience, Adolphe Ferrière, of Geneva, Director of the International Bureau of New Schools, has kept adding to his publications in behalf of a reformation in our school systems under the inspiration of the methods practiced in the "new schools."<sup>7</sup> "Among the deep-lying causes of the

<sup>5</sup> From G. Belot's contribution to a co-operative volume, *Les problèmes pratiques de la pédagogie morale positive*, Paris.

<sup>6</sup> *La technique éducative*, Paris, 1922.

<sup>7</sup> Ad. Ferrière: *l'Ecole nouvelle et le bureau international des écoles nouvelles*, Lausanne, 1919; *l'Education dans la famille*, Neuchatel, 1921; *Transformons l'école*, Basel, 1920; *l'Autonomie des écoliers*, Neuchatel, 1921; *l'Ecole active*, Geneva, 1922.

war and of the prevailing marasmus," he says, "there is one that has perhaps hitherto not been sufficiently noticed. In all the countries of Europe, the school strives to train the child to passive obedience. It has done nothing to develop the critical spirit. It has never sought to promote co-operation. It is easy to see where this patient and long-continued training is bound to lead peoples." Ferrière therefore pleads for a school that shall teach the children initiative, self-mastery, and that shall develop the social sense. All of this is to be found in the "active school." The active school is a school based on needs, on interests. "To make the pupil act one must put him into such situations that he will experience a need for doing the thing that is expected of him."<sup>8</sup> Ferrière often insists on the bio-genetic law, and, along with Stanley Hall, he holds that educators ought to take it into more account.

M. Roger Cousinet, a school inspector in France, himself a notable advocate of the principles of the new education and of self-government, seeks to eliminate all constraint in matters of discipline and of instruction. The teacher, he believes, must efface himself as much as possible and thus allow the child to act freely. "He should give children the utmost liberty," says M. Cousinet, "no longer subjecting them to constraint of any sort or imposing upon them any manner of action, any specific mode of learning, or any definitely assigned things to learn. He should observe them. Placing the child in the environment of reality where he is altogether free to move under the surveillance of our attentive eyes, let us observe how he conducts himself, how he attacks this reality in order to make it his."<sup>9</sup>

In a work on *Pédagogie française* (1920), M. Paul Lapie, at the present time Rector of the University of Paris, maintains that an essential feature of this pedagogy

<sup>8</sup> Ed. Claparède: *Psychologie de l'école active, Interméd. des Educateurs*, Dec., 1923.

<sup>9</sup> *La pédagogie moderne*, l'Education, 1921.



is liberalism, that is to say, a tendency against authority and pressure. M. Ch. Chabot, Professor of Pedagogy in Lyon (recently deceased), seeks in a small book to vindicate "the right of the child" (Paris, 1922). For him it is the family which is and which ought to remain the natural environment of the child.

Ed. Claparède advocates "a school made to measure," that is to say, a school which takes account of individual differences. Ought one not to have for the diverse forms of mentality a respect at least equal to that one has for the different shapes of feet, when one gives to them shoes "made to measure?"<sup>10</sup>

In an amusing and spirited brochure, *Le pédagogue n'aime pas les enfants* (Lausanne, 1917), H. Roorda, Professor in Lausanne, ridicules "the absurdities of our methods of teaching." A Belgian, Jean Haesaert, vigorously criticizes the school as unadapted to present conditions.<sup>11</sup>

Melle. Hamaide has given an interesting exposition of the system of Dr. Decroly in Brussels;<sup>12</sup> and Em. Duvillard, of Geneva, has sketched the prevailing tendencies in primary education.<sup>13</sup>

One of the real tasks of moral education is to develop the international spirit and the spirit of solidarity. The Third International Congress of Moral Education held in Geneva in 1922 gave especial attention to these problems.<sup>14</sup> Much attention is at the present time being devoted also to the modification of the manuals of history and of reading books with a view to eliminating everything that might needlessly arouse hatred between nations.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Ed. Claparède: *l'Ecole sur mesure*, Lausanne, 1920.

<sup>11</sup> *Didactique mineure*, Brussels, 1924.

<sup>12</sup> *La méthode Decroly*, Neuchâtel and Paris, 1922.

<sup>13</sup> *Les tendances actuelles de l'enseignement primaire*, Neuchâtel and Paris, 1921.

<sup>14</sup> Investigations presented to this congress: *Education et Solidarité*, and *l'Esprit international et l'enseignement de l'histoire*, 2 vols., Neuchâtel and Paris, 1923.

<sup>15</sup> Carnegie Foundation for Peace, *Enquête sur les livres scolaires d'après guerre*, Paris, 1923.

## CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL PEDAGOGY

It is a singular fact that these disciplines are less cultivated in France, the country of Alfred Binet, the gifted originator of intelligence tests, than in Belgium and in French Switzerland. As a matter of fact, it is in Geneva that there was founded, in 1912, the *Institut J. J. Rousseau* which is especially devoted to researches in this field and endeavors to orient future educators in psychological and pedagogical methods. The director of this institute, Professor Pierre Bovet, published in 1917, an authoritative study of the fighting instinct. This study was based in part on an investigation which indicated that among most children from nine to twelve years of age fighting is a form of play, and that this play involves an instinct. But this fighting instinct is repressed by social life. It canalizes itself, or it assumes complications or deviations; it becomes sublimated, and Bovet has shown the role of education in the sublimation whereby moral virtues acquire the victory and the instinct is thus rendered harmless.

P. Bovet has also written a very striking essay on the nature and the genesis of the religious sentiment of the child. For Bovet it is neither sexual nor conjugal love, but filial love that is the prototype of divine love. This hypothesis rests on a mass of observations cited by the author.<sup>16</sup>

Ed. Claparède published, in 1916, a new edition of his *Psychologie de l'enfant*. Along with an exposition of psychological methods this book furnishes a glimpse of the mental development of the child. The author puts into prominence the phenomenon of play, modifying the theory

<sup>16</sup> P. Bovet: *l'Instinct combatif*, 1921 (also translated into English); *Le sentiment religieux chez l'enfant*, Neuchâtel, 1925.

of K. Groos so as to take into account the facts of compensation and of origin, which, no less truly than the considerations advanced by Groos, come to expression in play. He defines the function of play in the following manner: "It is in satisfying present needs that play equips for the future." He maintains that the educator can find in play a valuable ally, for play is a liberator of energy; it is in play that the child gives himself in his entirety.

The *Institut Rousseau* has pursued various lines of investigation. A part of its activity has been devoted to the study of mental tests. We would cite here the works of Melle. Descoeurdes, notably her book on *Developpement de l'enfant de deux à sept ans* (Neuchatel, 1921). This development the author has traced through the use of various tests. Melle. Descoeurdes had, in 1916, published an admirable work on *l'Education des enfants anormaux*. M. Claparède has brought out a small volume presenting an introduction to the technique of tests, *Comment diagnostiquer les aptitudes chez les écoliers* (1924).

Among the most remarkable works coming from the *Institut Rousseau* belong the researches of Jean Piaget on the development of the intelligence of the child. Piaget has shown that the mind of the child differs from that of the adult not simply quantitatively but more especially qualitatively. The thought of the child is not like that of the adult. It resembles the incoherent thought of the dream. And Piaget contends that the thought of a child is intermediary between the "autism" and the logic of the adult. His works include also a mass of observations that should be read in the original.<sup>17</sup>

The *Institut Rousseau* created, in 1917, a bureau of vocational guidance, one of the first in Europe. One of its founders, J. Fontgène, published a work covering the

<sup>17</sup> J. Piaget: *Le langage et la pensée de l'enfant*, and *le jugement et le raisonnement chez l'enfant*, 2 vols., Neuchatel, 1923-24; *La pensée symbolique et la pensée de l'enfant*, in *Archiv de psychologie*, XVIII, 1923.

whole of this field and showing its importance for education. The most recent creation of this institute (1926) is the International Bureau of Education, which is to serve as a general clearing-house for all educational and psychological information and enquiries.

In Paris, the experimental tradition of Binet is carried on by an independent society for the study of the child. Subsequently to 1917 the organization has called itself *Société Alfred Binet*. Its animating spirits are Doctor Simon, the collaborator of Binet, and M. Vaney, the director of the primary school where Binet pursued his investigations. Simon has just inaugurated a series of books on experimental pedagogy by a work devoted to studies of writing, reading and spelling. Experimental pedagogy represents progress in pedagogical practice; but it ought not to be separated from such practice.

Another collection, *Bibliothèque du Psychologie de l'enfant et de Pédagogie*, has just been launched by the publisher Alcan. Its first two volumes are devoted, the one to *l'Imitation chez l'enfant* (by P. Guillaume, 1925) and the other to *Enfants turbulents* (by H. Wallon, 1925).

In Montpellier, Marcel Foucault has edited a manual entitled *Observations et expériences de Psychologie scolaire* (1923) and, in Brussels, T. Jonckheere has published a small book on *La pédagogie expérimentale au jardin d'enfant* (1924). These works are designed to encourage teachers to observe and to take note of the acts and the behavior of their pupils.

Let us add that the use of tests, hitherto much neglected in France, is in that country now beginning to have its experts. Among these we would mention M. Duthil of Nancy, and M. and Mme. Pieron of Paris. Publications by them may be found in *l'Année pédagogique* for 1924.

ED. CLAPAREDE.

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## METAPSYCHICS AND PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

THERE has been considerable discussion concerning the term *metapsychics* on account of its prefix *meta* which suggests that it means “*after* the psychical” and that, too, in the derogatory sense of something beyond psychology, outside the pale of science. When Charles Richet invented this term—guided by analogy with the term “*metaphysics*”—his only intention was to give a name to the new science of the unknown forces of intelligence. It was to avoid premature judgment as to the nature of these forces that he chose a term which leaves to the future the task of replacing “*meta*” (beyond) with exact knowledge. In fruitless discussion of a term, we must not lose sight of the reality which the term designates. Let us understand by *metapsychics* the study of phenomena of human origin whose attributes go beyond those powers which the officially taught science of today ascribes to the human being. Let us understand that it is also the study of all such other supernormal phenomena, if such there be, as would be caused by forces of intelligence acting from another plane of life upon our own. This definition makes it clear that *metapsychics* sets itself the task of studying phenomena which are not as yet universally accepted as subject matter of science and, thereby, of bringing them within the field of science.

The special atmosphere in which this branch of science came to birth still keeps it in the anomalous position of

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French by Nina Winans.

having the very actuality of the phenomena it studies contested. If one were to inquire today of the greater number of scientists whether there is such a thing as a science of metapsychics, there is no doubt in my mind but that the reply would be in the negative. In the fields of chemistry, of physics, of biology, one would, ordinarily, carefully refrain from uttering an opinion about the existence of any phenomenon produced by the mere exercise of the mind. As regards the metapsychical, one abandons reasonable logic with scarcely any hesitation; one is ready to believe in his right to judge without taking the trouble to observe the facts of nature—it is a sentiment which decides. A question of fact is transformed into a matter of belief.

This unusual situation in metapsychics is due to two causes which I point out without dwelling upon them: first, *its subject-matter*, which runs the gamut of the unusual and almost miraculous aspects of the human psycho-dynamism in paranormal operation; secondly, *the intellectual attitude of most of its investigators* who introduce elements of the mystical and fantastic into the study of phenomena, thereby removing them from the field of strict observation and of methodically carried-out experiment.

It would be unprofitable to undertake here to convince the reader of the actuality of the contested phenomena. I shall content myself with the assertion that during the short era of the *scientific* cultivation of metapsychics, all savants who have been willing to base their judgment of them upon personal experience have become as certain of the actuality of metapsychical facts as of the phenomena within their own special fields of science. During the sixteen years of my strictly experimental study of man's power of supernormal knowledge, I have put certain scientific persons in a position to verify this power through their own personal observation; up to the present time there has not been a single one of them who did not finally conclude

by asking: "How can it be that phenomena, which so frequently occur, which are so readily verifiable, and which are of so great scientific import, have not long since been investigated in the psychological laboratories with a view to their explanation?" The science of metapsychics, like any other science, should be estimated by observation of the facts. To remain in the midst of the conflict of beliefs—scientific, philosophical, religious, etc.—in the face of the special manifestations of the human psycho-dynamism, which are producible and verifiable at will, is not to make a proper use of one's reason.

What are the phenomena which constitute the subject-matter of metapsychics? There is a tendency to distinguish two types of phenomena: the *subjective* and the *objective*, according to some students, or the *psychological* and the *physical*, according to others. Inasmuch as all metapsychical phenomena are at once subjective, objective, psychological and physical, this distinction is without adequate foundation. It is more reasonable to distinguish two groups of phenomena: those having to do with *the capacity of supernormal knowledge*, and others having to do with *the human being's paranormal control over matter* (telekinesis, teleplasty). It should be understood that the supernormal is not to be—as it sometimes is—confused with the supernatural, but that it is qualitatively superior to the normal: the exceptional ranking in value above the usual.

To speak of a *scientific* study of these phenomena is to have in mind the setting up of experiments which, so far as possible, vary their conditions, psychological, physiological and physical. Scientific study requires that the phenomena under investigation be such as can be produced and repeated again and again. This requirement is met by the fact that there are persons, more or less numerous, who permanently possess the power to produce the several

classes of phenomena. Very rare are those who exhibit the paranormal control over matter. Very common, however, are the mythomanes or the impostors who imitate them. In France, it has been the case, by a sort of fatality, that whenever at the instigation of metapsychists scientific persons have met to confirm the facts of supernormal human actions, they have been shown this class of phenomena—phenomena which are rare, but imitable and often fraudulent, and difficult to attest because of the conditions which surround their production. The balance of results pointing in this direction appears, in the opinion prevailing in the scientific world, to suggest that these phenomena are to be regarded as more probably feats of conjuring than of psycho-physiology. Hence, among the scientific elect, the lack of interest in a science whose field, and the importance of whose sound portion, they ignore.

While those who exhibit paranormal control over matter are rare, the subjects who are endowed with the powers of supernormal knowledge are numerous—numerous and very dissimilar as to the sorts of reality they are capable of perceiving. In general they display the power to apprehend distant realities under conditions where the best intelligence equipped with the best of senses would have known nothing, time and space not restricting their perception. In practice, however, the range of supernormal perception varies with different subjects, and this variation divides them into groups according to their special sensitivities—none of them detects all sorts of realities, but each is capable of perceiving only the one or the other, or perhaps several, from among the manifold sorts.

A very large number of them are limited to the detection of expanses of water or subterranean streams of water; only some of them are equally sensitive to veins of coal, of metals, of petroleum, subterranean caves, etc. Others, such as Bert Reese, Ossowiecki, Ludwig Kahn, dis-



close what is contained in a sealed box, what is written in a sealed envelope or what was written on paper that has been burned, etc. Others, touching an object, can reconstruct in thought its surroundings, the beings and things which at various times have formed the environment of the object. Others show a special faculty in the way of supernormal understanding of man, i. e., his individual traits—emotional, intellectual, bodily—and the general trend and episodes of his life.

I mention these specializations and there are many others. They are not the product of the subject's volition nor of his surroundings; they are determined by the crypt-aesthetic range of each subject.

All the special forms of supernormal knowledge have a bearing upon the study of a human being's capacity for knowledge transcending the known senses. But there is one form whose importance I cannot too much emphasize, viz., that in which the special object of supernormal knowledge is *man*. By his psychic organism, indeed, man is a being who intensely and widely influences the cryptaesthetic organism which is in harmony with his radiations. This is a field of research in which the psychologist can enter upon an experimental study of the intercommunication of minds and of the physical mechanism which underlies the amazing complexity of its manifestations.

How far has the science of metapsychics progressed? It has been in existence for about a century. But the real workers in the field are very few; and they have devoted to it not the principal part of their labors, but their leisure. All branches of science, in respect of their progress, are mutually dependent; the growth of the one furthers the development of the others. The metapsychists have not found in the classical psychology, and still less in the physiology and physics of their time, concepts which could serve for the explanation, even a superficial explanation, of the

observed phenomena. They have been, they still are, constrained, before advancing in the study of conditions which determine their phenomena, to make new contributions to psychology. Today they must bring about further progress in physics and physiology if they wish to end the era of a fruitless accumulation of facts continually recurring under the same conditions.

The small amount of time devoted to research and the difficulty of an unaided investigation, in an entirely new field, explain why the past century, as regards progress, has the appearance of a laborious beginning.

The accomplishment of the metapsychists has been two-fold: they have classified their phenomena and they have begun, experimentally, an explanatory investigation into certain of these phenomena.

What, at the present time, is accomplished in the way of explaining the metapsychical? To give a fair idea of this within the limits of a few pages is a task from which I recoil. This young science already offers a wealth of newly acquired knowledge. A partial account would put it in a false light. Since, after all, I have been requested to present in this article the point of view of French metapsychics, I prefer simply to tell the reader who seeks an introduction to the subject, that useful sources of information may be found in three books, recently published, which represent—so far as France is concerned—the scope of the cleared ground. I cite these books in the order of their publication, apologizing for the inclusion of one of my own works: *Traité de Metapsychique*,<sup>2</sup> by Charles Richet: a survey of the historical development of metapsychical science down to 1921; a presentation and classification of the phenomena; *La connaissance supranormale*,<sup>3</sup> by Dr. E.

<sup>2</sup> Paris, Alcan, 1922; Eng. trans.: *Thirty Years of Psychical Research*, New York, The Macmillan Co.

<sup>3</sup> Paris, Alcan, 1923; Eng. trans.: *Supernormal Faculties in Man*, London, Methuen & Co., New York, Dutton & Co.

Osty: an experimental study of the power of supernormal knowledge in cases where the object of this knowledge is man: *Ectoplasmie et clairvoyance*,<sup>4</sup> by Dr. G. Geley: an account of experiments upon man's supernormal control over matter, and of experiments on supernormal knowledge.

Inasmuch as my words are intended for philosophical readers, I make haste to indicate how philosophy will be affected by metapsychics when this science shall have attained to the universal recognition which cannot be long delayed. The best way of doing this briefly will be, I think, to show how far certain metapsychical phenomena, selected from among those readily verifiable, *extend* the human being beyond the confines to which he is limited by the classical psychology, i. e., by the psychology that is taught officially. With this end in view, I shall consider that aspect of the rich phenomenology of supernormal knowledge which is most enlightening: viz., that in which the object of supernormal apprehension is man. And to simplify matters, I shall select three types of phenomena, endeavoring through them to convey some notion of what philosophers may expect from this new branch of science.

One of these phenomena is fundamental in the "supernormal knowledge ("metagnomie") of a human object":<sup>5</sup> *the transference of thought from mind to mind*. Theoretically, it is this phenomenon whose possibility is most easily admitted since the discovery of electro-magnetic rays and of radium. One readily compares the unknown dynamic power of thought with this known radiation; and one admits an analogy between the influence of one brain upon another brain and the influence of a source of radiation upon a receiving apparatus. Nevertheless, if one's curios-

<sup>4</sup> Paris, Alcan, 1924. Eng. trans. in preparation.

<sup>5</sup> "Metagnomie" (from *μετα*, *beyond*, and *γνώμη*, *knowledge*) is a term originated by E. Boirac to denote the power of cognizing a reality which lies beyond the range of cognition under so-called normal conditions.

ity impels him to investigate the extent of experimental knowledge of the subject, he will discover that the most reputable treatises on psychology regard this phenomenon as non-existent inasmuch as they say nothing of it, and that the periodicals of psychology and of related sciences mention it very rarely and then as an exceptional, and even an uncertain, phenomenon.

Now the transmission of thought from one psychic organism to another can be brought about very easily and in a remarkable number of cases when one works with subjects who are gifted with the power of revealing personal characteristics, presenting to them in succession different personalities selected at random. Two psychic organisms are then joined functionally, so to speak, through their subconscious minds without the participation of the so-called conscious levels of thought. When the psychic couple has been established in a sufficiently close harmony, as frequently happens, the co-operation of mind with mind is brought to its full realization and the result shows itself in "metagnomic" (supernormal) information about the personality "given objectively."

When, knowing how to produce at will this direct communication of thought between two psychic organisms, one would push one's inquiry further and investigate the process involved in this subconscious co-operation between minds and the range of its possibilities, one soon recognizes that one is dealing here not with a "reading of thought" on the part of the percipient and a "mental suggestion" on the part of the perceived, but with an *active* co-operation in which each of the two psychic organisms plays a part, with the result that there is transferred into the conscious mental representation of the metagnomic subject the knowledge which exists potentially, actually, or in memory, in the person who is the object of this supernormal knowledge ("metagnomie").



If by well-devised experiments one carries one's investigation further into the conditions under which such functional union between psychic organisms occurs, one finds that this intermental co-operation, so readily called forth when detector and detected are in the presence of each other, also occurs, though with less effect, regardless of the distance by which they are separated. It is to experimentation along this line that one may look for the explanation of the cases of spontaneous telepathy so frequently reported.

There is sufficient experimental evidence to establish the fact that this intermental co-operation between two psychic organisms, in contact with or at a distance from one another, can extend itself to a larger number of psychic organisms. In subconscious collaboration, a group of persons is capable of elaborating knowledge and ideas which are not the product of any single one of the group but of all. What happens is as if a sort of collective psychic organism with a momentary purpose suddenly precipitated itself. Ignorance of this psychological possibility has led practitioners of spiritism to believe that they were in communication with a more than human intellect when through automatic writing, ouija, table-rapping, etc., there is obtained information not traceable to any single individual present.

So far has experimentation investigated the *spatial* extension of the human psychic organism in intermental relations. When it essays the investigation of the *temporal* extension, it brings the investigator into the presence of a dizzy spectacle. For here is what it shows.

The collaboration of minds at a distance from each other is most frequently obtained by putting into the hands of a "metagnomic" subject an object owned or touched by a distant person. If, however, instead of giving the subject an object belonging to a person distant in space, one gives him

an object which belonged to a person distant in time—i. e., a person who has been dead for a longer or shorter time—one elicits in the “metagnomic” subject knowledge of the life, or of episodes in the life, of that departed individual.

Obviously I am speaking only of well authenticated cases in which no living psychic organism, however remote in space, could through any possible intermental communication, be the source of the subject’s information. I am speaking only of the case where no living person knows or can know the nature of the subject’s “metagnomic” revelations.

Thus, facts which can be indefinitely multiplied, by pure experimentation, yield the certainty that *man leaves behind him after his death in some place, other than in the mind of the living, the story of his life.*

Does, then, the “metagnomic” subject derive information from the dead, through an intermental co-operation, in the same way that he might obtain it from the living? Does he, by a momentary participation in a universal inclusive psychic organism discover the story of a life? Or does he obtain the information elsewhere, and where? And in any case, how? Thus there is presented to experimental research, with every hope that it will eventuate in substantial explanations, in certainties, the problem of man’s fundamental nature and destiny which humanity, ever since it has been capable of so much thinking, has vainly sought to solve by purely subjective reflections.

And now let us consider that other phenomenon, the culminating manifestation of human thought, the actuality of which my sixteen years of practical investigations enable me to assert without fear that I shall ever be found in error: *The foreknowledge of the future of the human individual.* Conclusions regarding this subject may be summed up as follows: the metagnomic subject’s power of supernormal knowledge of a living human personality is

not confined to the already actualized portion of his life; it knows *his future*.

This is effected through collaboration between the mind of a subject and the mind of the person in question.

What results is as if each of us possessed a latent level of thought which knows his own future, whence the metagnomic subjects derive their information through a co-operation, active on both sides, of mind with mind.

This bimental functioning is not possible to all psychic couples. The production of pure premonition seems, to all appearances, to depend upon the subject's sensitiveness being in accord with the special constitution of the psychic plane which furnishes the transcendental knowledge.

I shall not dwell upon the transformation of human knowledge which may result from future work which shall make known the factors that underlie so remarkable a phenomenon. I merely ask philosophers to contemplate the revolution in our conceptions of man, of life, of the universe, which will ensue when official science simply accepts "foreknowledge of the future of the human individual."

To give a clear, indisputable, conclusive proof of the actuality of this phenomenon will make it certain that *knowledge precedes in time the reality known*, and therefore that there is good reason to abandon the belief that matter is the creator of thought.

To prove that it is *through the co-operation of mind with mind that the metagnomic subject is informed of our individual futures*, is at the same time to show that the transcendence of consciousness which that phenomenon everywhere discloses is not, in each of us, the product of the brain alone, an organ whose mechanism could not react to future vibrations of things not yet actual.

Philosophy is primarily the persistent effort, progressing step by step with science, to explain life, and particularly that most reflective form of individual life: man.

About human nature are centered all the great problems called metaphysical and held to be insoluble experimentally: determinism, free will, materialism, spiritualism, deism, etc., with all of their corollaries.

To the extent to which science has pushed into the unknown, to that extent is metaphysics, which not long since was almost the whole of philosophy, reduced. Under the experimental constraint of metapsychics we shall see metaphysics shrink, perhaps disappear. A new world of the mind will be revealed to a humanity which today is incredulous, which tomorrow will be astonished and perplexed.

M. Bergson has turned to instinct for the secret of the relation between universal consciousness and the successive forms of matter. From this standpoint his genius has derived all that the position could yield: splendid speculations reared on slender and uncertain foundations.

If some day man succeeds in solving his own riddle and in assuring himself that there exists the infinite intelligence which we suppose is through its will directing all that is, it will be—I am certain—only by methodical study, progressive experimental investigation of the supreme manifestations of thought: those manifestations in which the human individual is observed extending himself in space and time to other thinking individuals, and, perhaps, becoming one with them in a universal psychic organism.

DR. EUGENE OSTY.

PARIS, FRANCE.



## IN THE EYES OF YOUTH

IT IS one of the charms of the profession of the college teacher that he is in daily contact with the freshness and beauty of youth. The completion of the second decade of our human life is a period filled with splendid anticipation and swift adventure and with a vital experimentation in things humane that is characteristic of no other period. Physically the form of maturity is attained, and the fullness of that image in which men have dreamed and fashioned their gods; and although the body is as yet smooth and the flesh unengraved with the symbols of the developed character, there is still a subtlety and zest in the very richness of the promises with which quick emotions and facile thoughts overwrite the clear countenance. It is the period when the young man is trying out his muscles, the maiden her charms, and the vital saps are at flood. In the cheek there is the flush of health; the eye gleams with curiosity and eager intelligence; and in every play of sympathetic expression there is transparent a flow of fantasy. For the teacher with twenty or thirty such youths before him, all caught in the glow of a new wonder, there is exhilaration and there is rejuvenation: the Councils of Olympus offer no nobler spectacle; he drinks at the Fountain of Youth.

If your bookish sort of man be asked into what golden morning of things human he would soonest walk, he will answer—so the chance falls—with those eager Periclean boys making a festival of learning nigh to Socrates, or again in the Florence of guilds and pomps, with silvery-tongued Lauras and Beatrices, with Sandros and Raffael-

los blazoning the city with immortal images. And yet, I, here in Nebraska, caught in the jaws of mechanical modernity, have many a classroom moment when I question me if youth can ever have been more beautiful with life than here and now, and whether indeed we may not unsuspectingly be upon the brink of a Renaissance as flown with joy as any in the past. When I see the bannerets in their eyes, when the voices of their thought fall like cymbals sounding the onslaught and I know that as one they are assailing the citadels of hope, then I can believe them capable of everything fair and fine—these students of mine, who are receiving the future into their hands. The Re-birth is come, I say; blessed be the profession bequeathed of Socrates.

To be sure, as with every birth, the moment is one of peril. After the hard, drab winter of the cocoon the butterfly must poise for a time, preening and testing his wings, before he can give himself to the glory of the first sun-glinting flight. That moment of the preening wings is fraught with deadly peril; the new life is utterly helpless before every foe, captive to every chance; and between creation and destruction lies no more than a breath of wind. Men's lives are like that in the first twenties, and men's civilizations in those times when the forms that have housed their pasts are breaking.

But there is another kind of moment, sitting in the classroom before these same youths. It comes imperceptibly, like an inadvertent shift of focus, and it changes the entire aspect harshly and strangely. I have sometimes amused myself, beside a rill or a pool, with the involuntary fashion in which the eye is caught first by the rippling reflections of the surface waters, then by the pebbled mosaic of the bed beneath—first superficial dazzle, then a fragment of clear penetration, then dazzle again. In our relations with one another perception varies in a similar fashion, depth and surface changingly.

Sometimes I think it is from them, sometimes from myself that the change comes. At all events, where the moment before I had looked into responsive intelligent faces, and beyond the faces into brimful human minds, now, of a sudden, I find myself aware of a kind of grotesquely repeated design. The faces fade into irregular ovals, patterned with a geometrical regularity in the space before me, and on each oval the features assume the character of subordinate elements of design: repeated pairs of eyes, enlarged and spot-like, mouths transformed into over-emphasized lines—something, indeed, very simple, yet uncomfortably recognizable as the hieroglyph of the human countenance. The bony structure becomes prominent, and what one sees in skulls is made unpremeditatedly present in these faces. It is as if one were introduced into a congregation of mummied men, to hold converse with dead forms.

It is in moments such as this that I am led to question most earnestly what it is that constitutes human beauty. The skull which gives the foundation of our features men unitedly describe as grinning and grisly, a thing to be put out of sight and thought. It is true that it has been used by some peoples—mainly primitives—as a motive of decorative art; but it is always in that domain of art which we term the grotesque. And if one pause to reflect, everywhere in the grotesque appear forms of the human face—eyes and mouths, mouths and eyes in unthinkable variation employed to excite the ribaldries of mankind. If the features of man are by nature noble why do they so readily lend themselves to forms terrifying or humiliatingly amusing? What, indeed, would be the verdict, on this issue, of star-form beings from another planet sent hither to survey terrestrial types? or of intricate angels descended from a fourth dimension, judging our simpler measures? Even within our own range there are certain analogies that suggest our unconscious self-disparagement. “Du bist wie

eine blume,"—when we liken the maiden to a flower are we not confessing her relative imperfection? And I have sometimes wondered whether the forms which we find repulsive and monstrous, the geometrical spider, the sinuous serpent, might not win unexpected awards from stellar juries.

We are tolerably familiar with the human form (though far less intimately so than our cavalier moments assume), and we take it for granted that we understand the nature of which this form is the living expression. Does not this fact explain our self-approbation? Are not familiarity and understanding the real core of our acclamation of human beauty? The gods of the Thracians are blue-eyed and red-haired; those of the Ethiopians snub-nosed and swart; Australian Blackfellows ridicule the hatchet faces of Caucasians, and African Negroes paint the devil white. These are clues to the sources of our admirations; they may be also partial explanations of that oddity in our disposition which causes us to mask our goblins and bogies with the features of men.

As one walks down a city street, it is shocking what consistency of ugliness one encounters. It is not merely that the activities of men and the abodes which circumscribe these activities are ugly: material life has this cast to it, and we can accept it, as necessary. It is not merely that the men and women themselves parade misshapeness, and exaggerate it with the clown's padding and fool's motley of our clothes. But most of all the shock comes—if one is alert to it—from their human faces. They seem to rejoice in affronting one with every variety of disproportion: beetle brows, owl eyes, falcon noses, bull-dog jaws—for our very terms of description we are driven to all the types of animal grotesqueness; and beyond these there is the whole range of the distortions found in man alone which makes the art of the cartoonist easy. I have wondered



somewhiles at the odd zest shown by men of so many races and times for transfixing in masks the leers and grimaces, snarls and guffaws, which characterize our unloveliest moments; and at the same time I recall bits of archaeological treasure-trove which are uncertainly described as being perhaps humorous in intent, or perhaps as meant to be portrait images: so near are we by nature to a born laughing-stock. The image of God? Walk down your city street and you will encounter in passing the bizarre deities of all pantheons.

Nor is the spectacle helped by the enchantments of distance. From the crest of the Woolworth the New York streets are for all the world like the trails of an insect colony, motor and street cars moving along like parades of beetles and men like streams of skurrying ants threading to and fro their beaten paths and tortuous tunnels. The metropolis itself is no better than an ant nest, as mechanical and as meaningless. Indeed, the effect of the elevator in a skyscraper is precisely what Alice encountered in Wonderland, with her unexpected fluctuations of dimension—save only that Alice beheld her world with the more unprejudiced eyes. For we, being human, magnify the works of man, and in some inverted way get the notion that in them are to be found the values for which we live.

Not infrequently I find a brown-faced Oriental in the classroom before me; and I experience a kind of patriotic cringe as I reflect upon what must be the impressions on such a one of our Caucasian physiognomy, in person and in thing. I remember our own blank contempt for foreign types; our childish amusement over the unfamiliar mold of their visages; or again I recall the shudder of Europe when it first described the hideousness of the Huns. Against this is the Mongol's detestation of the cruel gray eye of the blond man, or the Chinaman's nausea at the smell of him. There is some grim handicap which our humanity suffers

in the mere fact of its physical presentation; and when I have reached this stage in my reflections I become very humble before my classroom, and very grateful that in the generosity of their souls these boys and girls can endure to sit face to face for an hour's stretch with such an object as myself.

I am back in my classroom with a new angle to my problem. Here they are before me—beautiful human youths, and yet with a questionable, relative beauty. Is it their smooth faces and fresh color that makes them fair? The pretty girl yonder, who is face-conscious, ceases by that very fact to be pretty; and I recall my own uneasy sense of the futility of the work of that ever-present school of color-dabblers who give us only the surface charms of youth upon their canvases and call their productions art—how curiously empty it is as compared with the achievements of genuine portraitists, whose delight—did you ever think of it?—is in the features of maturity. No, it is not in their physical bloom that the beauty of my youths lies; nor, I believe, is it even in their moment of life, full of romance and love-making, of generosity, friendliness, clean ambition, high spirits, although all of these are admirable. Rather it is in something subtler and deeper, more intimately and lastingly humane, of which the hour of youth is but the promise of embodiment.

Metaphysically (and that is, as I understand, actually) the quality which makes youth so splendidly appealing is that it is the age when for the first time we look open-eyed at life—in its full form and dimension and bearing. The greater portion of our earlier years is taken up with acquiring familiarity with our mode of incarnation. The infant awakening into the world is a bundle of appetites, mainly discarnate and unrelated. Then comes the enchanting hour of discovery: these toes, actually mine! wriggling when I will!—this detachable tooth, which I prove mine by the cav-

ity and cherish as a pocket charm—hair that tangles and curls and cowlicks and pulls, mine, too. “Oh, mother,” cried a little one of six summers, “such a wonderful dream! I dreamed that I had a beautiful face!” Throughout the growing years the bodily education continues, for there is enough to learn, what with remindful aches, and new inches, and weights, and sizes of garments to be remembered. The boy is everlastingly feeling his muscles and comparing them and trying them out, and the girl is full of the fantasies of doll-clothes; and what with running and riding and sports and frolics the years are one continuous flare of bodily initiation. But when one is grown up, this physical preoccupation begins to fade, and the eyes are opened to new realms of conquest.

The young man and the young woman are still full of the lust and vigor of the body, but it is now become an instrumental thing, not a self-engrossment. Its powers are an agency through which are to be accomplished whatever of those myriad emprises, of which youth dreams itself hero, fate shall make real; and the hour is one of vivid selection, not yet of the career in the making, but of choice of career. Youth is so full of possibility! That is its beauty, that its truth. It is as if during childhood one had gone carefree and helter-skelter through a garden in which no path were a lost path; and now, suddenly, at the gate of maturity, were disclosed the multiform routings of one's lifetime; and one of these must be chosen. No such decisions are to be made again: marriage, profession, habitation, beliefs even—all of these are being determined, and the fashion of a life is being forecast. Youth is rich, rich, not for its fair physique, but for its superb chances.

Often I realize this, as I sit in my classroom and look into their eyes. Shall I command or plead? Shall I show them the way or give them over to chance fates? If my wisdom were but sufficient . . . yet who can pretend to

such wisdom, when the whole world is spread out before them? I shall ask them to open their eyes to the one vista that is mine; beyond that they are discoverers.

Of course, I know, and they know, in a general way what must be the pattern of their futures. Mortal possibilities are varied, but they are not limitless; and I suppose that it is this element of restriction which gives to the activities of maturity the character of work. Work implies restriction and self-denial, and a certain hard confinement of one's life within some pit of matter; work bends body and mind to the shapes of local enterprises, and work habituates body and mind to rigid little routines; the tailor's stoop, the smith's thews, the ploughboy's walk, the seaman's roll, are all but minor examples of those tyrannies of the taskmaster which are even more manifest in the malproportions which the lifework, whatever it may be, inflicts upon the mind. It is as if Nature, with a sardonic fancy, were determined to misshape into mountebanks all those of us who are permitted to swink and sweat (to use the picturesque old phrase) through our years of maturity. And I wish it to be understood that I do not refer here chiefly to those incidental malformations which attemper the physique to forms of manual labor—the deformities that so offended patrician Greeks; probably the most generalized and freest career that we have is that of the man of all work, the digger and delver, while the most intensely specialized life is one caught—in waking hours and in dream—in the meshes of huge and inescapable enterprises. Indeed, as I gaze curiously at the twinkling windows of these great combs of buildings which hive our professionals and mind-workers, and reflect that in each hot little box of an office is being steamed and contorted into rigid shapes what once promised to be a free human mind, I cannot but wonder if this sort of confinement is not more deadly than that of the underground miner after physical matter, who but becomes



owl-eyed to the light of day; or yet if our industrial civilization is not more truly bent upon punishment of the soul than was ever the ascetic cell of the monastic age upon punishment of the body.

Of course, this is not the aspect of the life-work that appears to the youth. For him what lies before is a challenging opportunity to try out his powers, to pit himself man against man, mind against mind, and more than all to measure his human prowess with the problem which the dark material of unfashioned Nature shall set for him: whether muscle or wit be the agent, whether politics, business, or the mechanics of life be the medium, he is full of anticipation and the will to dare, and ready to wager every power that he possesses against the threat of slavery. In his heart of hearts he intends that Nature shall become not his prison but his habitation, and he proposes to ride, not to be ridden by, his life-work. In the broad, he is justified, too; for however aware we must become of the serfdom of this man or that to the habits and interests which his toils have exacted, looking at our human achievement in the whole, we men have right to feel some exultation in the degree to which collectively we have subjected our brute Earth. Our works have not risen above nor passed beyond her, and we know that we have built nothing which she will not reclaim with inevitable sands and seas; but for our moment—our brief million years, if it be that—we have at least farmed and canaled and mined and walled her formless body, and made her to yield the sustenance not only of dust-born bodes but of spiritual arts. Youth is instinct with this triumph of our manhood; and it is in this, that for youth, lies the beauty of the work of maturity.

Truth is, one should liken maturity to a new growing period, in the bodily, restricted mode. Maturity, not old age, is our real second childhood. Just as in the upspringing years we are engrossed with the fantastic changes of

our material flesh and blood, every enterprise more or less an appetite, so in maturity we are engrossed with the material bricks of our Earth-built habitations and the material objects of our Earth-bound thoughts. We are building a new and larger body, physical like the organic, geometric in the true sense of being Earth-measured, mechanical even where it finds expression in idea, business-like everywhere. Not merely things, and their ways, but also men, and their ways, form the substance of this material habitat which is the shell of our mature lives, and which dangerously threatens to become the tomb of our souls. There are, I believe, children who grow so rapidly and distortedly that they become monstrous, organically over-fed, and out of human proportion. So also, in mature years, men become overfed with business and its undertakings, or with politics when politics gets the better of the man, or with any work which converts a soul into a routine. In every avenue monstrosity threatens, and as the issues of life are more complex than those of childhood, so the chance is happier if a man emerge from the pressures of his maturity without malformation.

We like to talk of the years that lie between majority and retirement as if they were life. We tell the youngster, not that he is living, but that he is preparing for life; and to the old man we talk pleasantly, as to one honorably interred, of a life well spent or a life-work done. We seem to refuse the fullness of vital being to the first and the last years of our sentient bodies; though I often wonder if this is not mainly due to the busy-body, elbows-out traits of that period in which we collect the world's rents and sign its cheques and conduct most of its conversations. Actually, the small boy with his indulgent grin at the grown-up, the respectful juveniles to whom I do so much superfluous talking, the old man meditative in retirement, actually are not these as living and profitable and human as myself, or

others of my years? Our words are a polite assent; but our proclaimed theories deny it.

For my part, I should not divide the life of man into sequentially graded ages, logically gliding into one another, but into pupal and metamorphic periods like those of insects; into periods of incubation and transformation, generalizations and particularizations of form. The baby is generalized, and childhood particularizes him into a man; the youth is generalized, and maturity particularizes him into a worker: childhood is an incubational period, with youth its metamorphosis, just as the infant is the metamorphosis of the embryo; may it not be also that old age is the metamorphosis of the worker for whom maturity is the pupal period, as childhood is the pupal period for winged youth? Certainly, there are striking analogies between youth and age,—as the crescence and senescence of the moon are analogous.

For one thing, neither youth nor age lives in its present (as childhood and maturity both do). Time for youth is future time; life is in anticipation, hope, design. Time for age is past time, and memory and reflection are its fuels and its illuminations. They are both periods of comparison and perspective, whether in prospect or retrospect; and they are both periods of choice and of judgment, and therefore of freedom. Yes, maturity is the second childhood, age a second youth; and like youth, age may be beautiful.

It is, of course, beauty in another dimension. The blank hieroglyph of humanity into which the physical features of youth so readily fade is less obtrusive because less simple. Something has transpired to alter the significance of lines and spaces; toil and thought have written their texts, and the countenance is become a palimpsest of past wills and emotions. The countenance of the old man or woman is an image, not of decorative but of symbolic art; and if it be beautiful it is for its meaning. The fascination which

ancient sculptors found in the depiction of the beautiful soul of Socrates behind his Silenus mask exists in some degree for every beautiful old person: the charm is in a dimension which has wrought more powerfully than Nature herself, and has defied her decays.

So far as physical charm is concerned the acme is reached when man is first full grown, after the gangling and scrawniness and awkwardness of the growing age is passed. Thereafter, the years are but slow attritions, Nature scarring and furrowing what in sport she had made fair. But that very spirit which in youth had suddenly wakened to something more than the physical, which had viewed life in prospect and thrown down the gauge, that, if it survive, gives to age a new complexion and it gives a new tone to the whole human image; and if it be beautiful, it is because the man has conquered Nature's witherings, because he has not only done his work, but has outdone it.

The attainment of this fullness of age has in it something of contradiction. The presence of the baffled body is a fact no one can gloss over: its powers are decrepit; its senses are blunted; it shivers and cringes and calls for warmth as its fires subside; and if its form be mimicked and fixed, as in carved wood or molded clay, it becomes unlovely and forbidding. Toothless, rheumatic, blear, and gray, Nature strives to teach us our places, to portray us self-detestable; and the body is helpless. But the soul of man can defy her, and the spirit of man has defied her in the greatest of its proclamations. For the grayed beard is our token of sagacity and of the venerable; the Father of the Gods is imaged as a bearded father; and of him who reveals the wisdom of life it is written: "And his head and his hair were as white wool, white as snow; and his eyes were as a flame of fire; and his feet like unto burnished brass, as if it had been refined in a furnace; and his voice as the voice of many waters." This is the image, not of



a Greek Apollo, but of one tried in the crucible of the flesh, and emerged therefrom in a spiritual body. One sees sparks of this fire, now and again, in the wise and tender eyes of the old, and it is the most spiritual thing one sees upon this Earth; and one hears, now and again, in their voices a music as of the waters of many living streams, and it is the truest attestation of the beauty of life which one hears upon this Earth.

There is a passage in the Iliad which seems to me to compress in its half dozen verses the essence both of the contradiction that is in age and of its affinity for youth. It is where the old men who had ceased from battle because of their years (though they were yet stout orators), sat upon a tower of Troy overlooking the field—like grasshoppers upon the limb of a tree (so writes the satirist), and their voices woman-thin. And when Helen, the bane of their city, passed in the splendor of her youthful flesh, they addressed to one another winged words—

*Ou nemesis Troas kai euknemidas Achaious . . .*

"Blame be to none if Trojans and battle-gear'd Greeks endure peril for such a woman: like she is to a deathless goddess!" The glamor that was Helen and the glory that was Greece are somehow compressed once for all in this fragment of eternal wisdom, piped in failing tones from the worn old bodies.

A thousand and more years after Troy, Longinus was thinking back to Homer. And he likened the poet of the Iliad to swift, impetuous youth, battle-cry, charge and echo caught in one irresistible onslaught. But the Homer of the Odyssey he drew in an image that is yet more significant, for he conceived him now to be an old man whose imagination was rich with all the splendors of a setting sun, playing upon the foam-flecked shallows and pools and runlets of the varied coasts of life, when Ocean is depart-

ing, with the outflow of his vast and mysterious tide. Such is the beauty of the evening of life, where the field of the years has been well fought through, and physical flesh and physical Nature have been denied their triumph.

Like youth, old age is likely to be generous in its judgments and friendly in its dispositions; it is tolerant and kindly and sympathetic—provided, of course, that it is a successful, and not a broken old age. These virtues come from its understanding of life, from that empirical wisdom which has immemorially made of the gerontes, the Elders, the natural counsellors of mankind. They come also, from the fact that age, more than does another period, has succeeded in freeing itself from the prejudices of passion and desire; and that its judgments have, therefore, not only the weight of experience to uphold them, but also the finer quality of impersonality. The old are true judges, for they alone are true freemen: the very point which Plato quotes the aged Sophocles as making. Flesh is after all a kind of miasma of appetite, and there is liberation and sanity in the wearing away of its distempers. Age, therefore, complete in experience and retrospective in understanding, seems somehow a fulfillment of all that is normally humane.

Indeed, I have sometimes wondered whether, if all men were to arrive undefeated and healthy at the full round of their three score and ten, we should ever have anticipated more of life; whether such a cycle of years would not seem a perfect thing in itself, as a flower may be perfect; and a natural prelude to death. With such a certainty we should have no need of Gods or Saviours; Fates only would suffice; and life would be as admirably definite as the demonstration of a theorem, as satisfying as a flawless play. This is not so; death has many preludes, and men cling to their Gods. But at least it gives pause to thought that occasionally we see the round of a man's years given the quality of rounded art.

But when I give the matter second thought, it takes on a different air, and age begins to assume the guise of an apocalypse of things metaphysical; like youth it is an opening up rather than a closing down of the portals of reality. That very fact of which I have spoken, that the successfully old man has quieted and tamed the flesh, that he has constructed a home for himself out of the meager measures which Nature has assigned to him, this indicates something more than flesh or physics as the core of his energies; and it indicates also that this something is not acquiescent in our world, but hostile and self-assertive. It is what we call the spirit of man, which somehow gains its fullest form only by outliving the worst which physical ugliness can do to us; and which, in age, may appear at the last beautiful in spite of all indignities. This is no thing found in fulfillment, no natural fruition, no mellow-ripe of autumnal life; it is rather a flame burning after carnage, spectral as seen from the field, but unconsumed. When it vanishes we speak of death; but actually we cannot think of it as gone, any more than I can actually think away the intelligences of the youths before me in the classroom when, for the moment, their faces fade into expressionless hieroglyphs. Old age completes the circle of man's possible adventures with the clay of his body and the clay of Earth, but the possibilities of his spirit are comprised within no such bounds—as no beauty proclaims more than does the beauty of an old person.

Is it not odd that the word Death should mean more to us than does the word decay? We look with a certain uncomfortable curiosity, perchance distress, upon the denuded bones of our physical frames, and we use skull and femurs to symbolize death; but death is more than the dust and ashes; like Birth and Youth, Death is a proper name, and the being it names is a keeper of portals. This, at any rate, is the image men have made.

Clearly it is the experience of dying, not corpses and interments, that men personify; and (flout it in the face of the materialists) it is in this experience that lies the core of our fascination with life. One need not hark back to the paradox of Socrates, that the philosopher's truest living is a mode of dying; nor to that of Jesus, that whoso loseth his life, for the spirit's sake, shall save it; nor yet to what I have already said of the character of the triumphant old people; for this truth attaches to every guise of death, and is proclaimed by all our codes of honor and by all our idolatries of heroism. There is something game in knowing how to die right; and there are decencies connected with it, and mysteries. Pain, as we know, is often the breaker of its seals; and perhaps the pain is in part clew to our trepidations; but neither pain nor decay can give us the full account of what we expect of death. At the least death must come as a moment of life; and though it be the last moment it is still in some mode a crowning moment. When the eyes glaze and the breath ceases an invisible Something is revealed: of that we are intuitively convinced.

Is it perchance that the moment of death is actually a moment of metamorphosis, as so many of the children of men have strangely believed? There is little in the nature of things to contradict such a supposition; there is enough to support it, if the ocular be not demanded. For of course, eyes of the flesh see but flesh; as I, in my bizarre moments, see the schematized faces of my class-room; it is only the mind, looking into and speaking with physically invisible intelligences, that can see such a possibility as that of which I speak. Yet to the mind it is a simple thing; for it is the mind's own mode of fullest life that is bespoken. Growth of the slow, incremental kind is known to us only in the physical world; change of continuous sort is known only there. But in the mental world we are wholly familiar with transformation and re-embodiment: these indeed are



what thinking is, and through these are born all works of genius—those creative achievements which make men most of all godlike. And if life be radically such a series of metamorphoses as I have described: childhood transforming into youth, youth into maturity, maturity into age; and if the net form of these be, as I have described, embodiment succeeded by disembodiment, progressive liberations from physical flesh and from physical nature—if this be a fair description, can there be any marvel in deeming that at the last, with the earthly casts flung aside, the spirit that has conquered these may not take unto itself still freer forms? Those for whom thought is oxidation, and intelligence conditioned reflexes, and their own words but their own breaths, they will laugh at the notion—but the mystery of a life that created the sudden glory of laughter is their sufficient answer.

If I were asked what it might be like, the Resurrection, the reply seems to me to be simple. Dreams, at times, resurrect our past lives with terrible vividness. But when they do so most effectively, I have observed, it is in an allegorical, a symbolic mode. The dream comes with an image which is not a memory, but an embodied meaning, though the embodiment be phantasmagoria. There is something in it more penetrating than even are the tense moments of waking experience; the loves and terrors are as vivid, and the understandings are vastly more so. It is as if one were suddenly and actually reborn, a moment of life lifted up into new being, transfigured and transubstantiated. For one whose metaphysical conviction is, as is mine, that the whole physical world is of the stuff that dreams are made of, that it is a symbolic thing, or nought at all, it is but as the order of Nature that the spirit which has found itself so amazingly in the midst of the phantasms of sense, might even more readily and purely find itself in ultra-terrestrial dimensions. We live on this Earth, we live in astronomical

space, but a very little of our time; most of our lives are spent in realms of intangible emotion and invisible thought; there is where our realities abide, even as now the reality which I am addressing is nothing visible nor tangible, but is an intelligence, out of metered time and space, in which I more firmly believe than in any physical thing. Is it unthinkable, then, that when the hour comes that I should turn elsewhere, when the hieroglyph is gone, the phantasm vanished, is it unthinkable that the spirit should still live on in its accustomed forms? All turns on this duplex word Death: when we think of death for others, we think of the corpse, the blank; but when we think of our own death, it is as of an adventure, perhaps not unfamiliar in kind, that we think.

I come back to my class-room. There they are—forty clear-eyed, blooming youngsters. The future is in their hands; not mine to give them, but theirs by divine right. Is it a future of material cities, and blustering business, and warping bodies, and corpses—or is it the future of the Spirit of Man, kingly over physical stuffs? I look **beyond** the surface dazzle, into the illumined depths of their souls, and the light that I see there is a creative light.

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# INFINITY AND THE INFINITESIMAL

(Continued)

## PART TWO

### I

CONNECTED so closely with, as in many respects to be indistinguishable from, the problem of the infinite, is the problem of its apparent opposite, the infinitesimal. Passing from one to the other appears outwardly to be taking a gigantic leap, since the former concept is of the infinitely large, whereas the latter is of the infinitely little. Here, however, as in some other departments of mathematical philosophy, that which first impresses us as being unnecessarily difficult if not impossible is soon discovered to be a feat alike necessary to perform and fairly easy. In accuracy, indeed, most of the features of these two problems which are customarily separated are identical. We discover at once, if we but stop to analyze our discourse, that we can not profitably speak about the one concept without speaking at the same time about the other.

Since this is a conclusion which we think can not with consistency be avoided, it is somewhat surprising to find that there are many writers today who hold a contrary opinion. The infinitely great, they maintain, is a legitimate concept; nay more, it is indispensable to the science of modern mathematics.<sup>51</sup> The infinitely little, on the other hand, is an unnecessary concept, and, although once erro-

<sup>51</sup> For example: "Greek mathematicians usually shunned this notion of the infinite, but with it modern mathematicians completely revolutionized the science." F. Cajori, *A History of Mathematics*, 1919, p. 160.

neously thought to be necessary, is now seen to be negative and even ridiculous.<sup>52</sup> The infinitesimal is no longer a conspicuous point of mathematical dissension; since the time of Weierstrass it has been abandoned. It is difficult, however, to understand how a problem which once estranged but latterly has effected a reconciliation between mathematicians, is itself to be reconciled with their positive doctrine of the infinite.

No arguments that we can muster more effectively destroy the concept of an infinitesimal quantity than those employed by Mr. Russell, whose contempt for the infinitely little is matched only by his respect for the infinitely great. The continued division of a quantity, he writes,<sup>53</sup> gives us always finite quantities. In the end the quantity will not be infinitesimal simply because there is no end. This argument to us appears irrefragable. But when Mr. Russell reasons thus he leaves out of reckoning his positive theory of the infinite. In order to make this clear, let us for argument's sake assume that the theory of the positive infinite, against which we argued in the preceding section, is valid. It is admitted, then, that there can be a number which comes after (is greater than) all the finite numbers—and that something can come after an endless series.<sup>54</sup> Now it will be remembered that the infinitesimalists (whom we shall examine a little later) maintained that a finite quantity infinitely divided became actually infinitesimal (*i. e.*, less than any finite quantity, yet not equal to 0), and upon this ground they fought their losing battle. Bearing now in mind our postulated validity of the "completed" infinite, it would appear that their defeat was merely a chronological accident. Had they lived and written later by two and

<sup>52</sup> Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, pp. 82-4: ". . . at last Weierstrass discovered that the infinitesimal was not needed at all . . . thus there was no longer any need to suppose that there was such a thing." Cf. also Hobson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 41.

<sup>53</sup> *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 135.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 178, 181.



one-half centuries, they might have sharpened their pens with the arguments of Dedekind and Cantor, and proved their point to the satisfaction of, at any rate, those mathematicians of the present day who regard the Cantorian doctrine as unquestionable. For the latter have openly admitted that a number *can* come after (that is, be greater than) any member of an increasing endless series, and thus the chief obstacle to the acceptance of the infinitesimal is already banished. For the converse of the operation which yields Aleph-zero and its peers to the infinitists will yield the infinitesimals to those who desire them. An "infinite number" is a number which comes after the endless series of finite positive integers; so, we maintain, an infinitesimal is a number which comes after the endless series of decreasing fractions less than 1. If something can come after the endless series in the one case, something can come after the endless series in the other.

The contradiction in Mr. Russell's work stands clearly exposed when the passages in question are placed together. In the book<sup>55</sup> they are separated by forty-six pages of text—an interval amply sufficient for one of Mr. Russell's whimsical agility to raise enough paradoxical dust to conceal their mutual repugnance:

*Loc. cit.*, p. 135: "Suppose we halve a given distance, and then halve the half, and so on. . . . This infinite divisibility seems at first sight to imply that there are infinitesimal distances, *i. e.*, distances so small that any finite fraction of an inch would be greater. This, however, is an error. The continued bisection of our distance, though it gives us continually smaller distances, gives us always *finite* distances. . . . 'But,' it may be said, '*in the end the distance will grow infinitesimal.*' No, because *there is no end.* (Italics ours.) Thus infinite divisibility of distances, does not imply that there are distances so small that any finite distance would be larger."

*Ibid.*, p. 181: "The first infinite number is, in fact, beyond the whole of an unending series. 'But,' it will be said, 'there cannot

<sup>55</sup> *Our Knowledge of the External World*, pp. 135, 181.

be anything beyond the whole of an unending series.' This we may point out is the very principle upon which Zeno relies in the arguments of the Race-course and the Achilles. Take the Race-course: there is the moment when the runner still has half his distance to run, then the moment when he still has an eighth, and so in a strictly unending series. Beyond the whole of this series is the moment when he reaches the goal. *Thus there certainly can be something beyond the whole of an unending series.*" (Italics ours.)

It is a pity for mathematical logic that Mr. Russell can not establish communication between his cerebral hemispheres with respect to these quantities that can and can not come after unending series. Let him import some of his excellent reasoning upon the infinitesimal into his treatment of the infinite, or carry his bad reasoning upon the infinite into his treatment of the infinitesimal, accept the despised and rejected entity, and be consistent at any rate. Mr. Russell, we fear, has been saved from the infinitesimal by Weierstrass only to be betrayed to the infinite by Cantor. "Infinite numbers" appear necessary to Mr. Russell; since the work of the Berlin School, the infinitesimal has fallen into the disrepute it clearly deserved. But had this been otherwise, and the infinitesimal seemed necessary to Mr. Russell, in how blithe a manner would he chide them of antiquity whom the problem troubled. "It is here," he would say,<sup>56</sup> "that the positive theory of the infinite comes in and makes all straight. For when  $x$  has the relation  $R$  to  $a, b, c, \dots$  (when  $a, b, c, \dots$  are finite numbers) and  $R$  is the relation which  $a, b, c, \dots$  have to  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \dots$  (when  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \dots$  are transfinite numbers),  $x$  is said to be infinitesimal." This definition would, we think, have delighted the hearts of the infinitesimalists. In what way it is less valid than the definition of an "infinite" or "transfinite" number, escapes us, based as it is on a logic too fine, and, above all, we fear, too supple. Aleph-zero is said to be an "infinite number"; its reciprocal ( $1/\text{Aleph-zero}$ ).

<sup>56</sup> *Opus Hypotheticum*, pp.  $1/\infty - \infty$ .

we should think, is an infinitesimal number. As Aleph-zero is reached by the First Principle of Generation, just so, we submit, is the infinitesimal reached by the First Principle of Degeneration.

## II

That what once was necessary is now useless, and what important now trivial, is itself an interesting commentary on the somewhat flexible modes of a science famed for the unchangeableness of its fashions. That, in addition, the same object of thought, within a single era of history, can be both mathematically useless and logically indispensable—this is surely enough to pique our interest, and even to arouse our suspicions.

The disfavor into which the infinitesimal latterly has fallen may be a silent indication that its metaphysical elder brother, the Infinite, is not so popular as it was in those naive days when natural philosophers courted its fascinating cousins, Fluxions and Increments. It seems more likely, however, that our altered attitude toward the infinitesimal has been occasioned, in part at least, by the development of modern physics; that the theory of quanta as developed within the last twenty years has been influential in bringing our reaction to a climax. For, as we have seen, infinity is a concept not lacking in favor. In so far as it is used to lend magnificence to the notion of magnitude, it has suffered very little at the hands of those who have ridiculed it. Astronomical research, in other words, as yet offers no direct evidence of the emptiness of this term (except with respect to certain astrophysical problems mentioned later) corresponding with that furnished by atomic analysis regarding the physical unreality of its converse. Physics hence may have left this extremely significant mark on mod-

ern philosophy. At the same time, such facts may be nothing but coincidence, so we shall not dwell on them for the present. But a circumstance of extreme relevance to our problem, from the standpoint both of logic and mathematics, is that infinity thrives lustily whilst the infinitesimal grievously languishes. The fundamental question immediately suggesting itself, therefore, is the following: How do mathematicians justify logically the waning popularity of infinitesimals in the light of their own asseverations that the infinite is incontrovertibly proved?

But first it may be well to ask what infinitesimals are, or (to speak more accurately) what they are supposed to be; for opinions on this matter differ widely.

"There are great difficulties in trying to determine what infinitesimals are: at one time they are treated like finite numbers, and at another time, like zeros."<sup>57</sup> "Some interpreted them as quantities which were entirely null," remarks Voss of the contradictory statements of earlier writers, "others mystically pictured them as magnitudes which, although smaller than any other imaginable magnitude whatever, yet contained in all cases the germ capable of producing a finite quantity."<sup>58</sup> Leibniz himself, to whom the concept is chiefly attributable, though in some particulars he was indebted to Pascal, wavered between treating infinitesimals as zeros, as real quantities, and as pure fictions. "When he considered these quantities in their origin," Bledsoe has observed of the quandary into which the father of the calculus wandered, "and looked at the little geometrical lines which their symbols represented, he thought they must be real quantities; but since these quantities might be infinitely less than the imagination of man could conceive . . . he was inclined to believe that they must be veritable zeros. But, not being able to reconcile

<sup>57</sup> P. E. B. Jourdain, *The Nature of Mathematics*, 1910, p. 70.

<sup>58</sup> A. Voss, *Ueber das Wesen der Mathematik*, 1913, p. 47, cited by E. Rignano, *The Psychology of Reasoning*, 1923, p. 173.



these opposite views or to rest in either, he sometimes effected a sort of compromise, and considered his infinitely small quantities as merely analytical fictions."<sup>59</sup> The Marquis de l'Hôpital, a celebrated follower of Leibniz, sought to escape by a method more definite in appearance, indeed, but not otherwise less confusing in its application than the tortured evasions of his eminent German master. "We demand," the Marquis desperately demanded, "that we can take indifferently, the one for the other, two quantities which differ from each other only by an infinitely[!] small quantity, or (which is the same thing) that a quantity which is augmented or diminished by another quantity infinitely[!!] less than itself, can be considered as remaining the same."<sup>60</sup> Newton, about the same time in England, was wrestling himself with this grand problem. "Quantities, and the ratios of quantities," said he, "that during any finite time approach nearer than any given difference, are ultimately equal."<sup>61</sup> The influence of this last statement by Newton, though rejected by several writers soon afterwards, was, as might be expected, enormous. Despite the flat verbal contradiction in this lemma, it was overlooked by many of his contemporaries and followers who were not in the least dismayed, apparently, by seeing "ultimately" written out where "the end of eternity" would have appalled them. As a consequence, the self-refuting statement that the process of dividing a finite quantity will "ulti-

<sup>59</sup> A. T. Bledsoe, *The Philosophy of Mathematics*, Philadelphia, 1874, p. 145. Compare, however, upon this difficult question, Vaihinger's statement that Leibniz ultimately rested in the belief that the infinitesimal was but a *modus dicendi*. *The Philosophy of "As If"*, trans. by C. K. Ogden, 1924, Pt. II, Sec. 22.

<sup>60</sup> The Marquis de l'Hôpital, *Analyse des Infiniments Petits*, 1696, p. 3.

<sup>61</sup> Sir Isaac Newton, *Principia*, Bk. I, Sec. I, lemma I. The above is Robins' translation. It is instructive to note that Jurin's varies somewhat from Robins' version. *Fiunt ultimo aequales* are Newton's own words, and would appear to mean just one thing, *viz.*, *do become ultimately equal*. Yet there is nothing like a dead language for embalming logical quibbles. Fortunately for us today, few writers are bilingually minded, though this circumstance, in another sense, is to be regretted: posterity might credit us with sanity if it could be found that our metaphysical differences rested, at least in part, on etymological misunderstandings.

mately" reduce it to zero, soon became not merely a mathematical tenet of faith among Newton's disciples, but a self-evident principle which was speedily incorporated as such in otherwise reputable treatises on the science of quantity and proportion. Indeed, during many succeeding decades numerous technical works on higher mathematics, accepting Newton's dictum as revealed wisdom, failed both to smooth out its logical discrepancies and to suggest how such a theorem should be mathematically interpreted by those using it. A hundred and fifty years later the doctrine was being reflected, without in the meantime having been retouched by deliberation, in a famous English treatise on the calculus. "A difficulty . . . connected with the notion of a limit," we find there written without apology, "appears to embarrass many students of this subject—namely, a suspicion that the methods employed are only approximate. . . . In such a case he [the sceptical student] must examine the demonstrations, and if he can find no flaw in them, he must allow that results *absolutely true and free from all approximation* can be legitimately derived by the doctrine of limits."<sup>62</sup> And this doctrine, despite assailants whose mathematical learning gave them the right to speak as authoritatively as any of its defenders, and who believed in addition that common sense had a legitimate bearing on their science, survived and prospered exceedingly. Although such eminent thinkers as D'Alembert, Cauchy, Duhamel, Euler, Lagrange, Maclaurin, and Robins, either openly repudiated the doctrine or else seriously restricted its implications, it was frequently accepted as an axiom.

It is small wonder, then, that in the presence of endless arguments and counter-arguments and rejoinders, as to the nature and value of infinitesimals, Berkeley should have concluded that the Church was not the mother of all error.

<sup>62</sup> Todhunter's *Differential Calculus*, 1855, cited by Bledsoe, *op. cit.*

If his summary of the open disagreement he found amongst the most learned mathematicians of his day reflects but little honor on the ecclesiastical dogmas he subscribed to, it sheds the gravest discredit on the science. Thanks to the intervention of a Bishop some of the more overt symptoms of mathematical hysteria were allayed. Even today, however, there is some justification for his strictures; their immediate cause is, it is true, somewhat altered, since the present attitude toward infinitesimals is generally contemptuous. But disagreement amongst mathematicians, on several fundamental features of their science, renders them at least partially subject to his criticism. Well known as it is, we can not therefore forbear quoting a significant portion of his reply to Jurin.

“Believe me, sir,” retorted Berkeley to Jurin, who had assailed his criticism of Newton’s doctrine, “Believe me, sir, I had long and maturely considered the principles of the modern analysis before I ventured to publish my thoughts in the *Analyst*. And, since the publication thereof, I have freely conversed with mathematicians of all ranks, and some of the ablest professors, as well as made it my business to be informed of the opinions of others, being very desirous to hear what could be said towards clearing my difficulties or answering my objections. But though you are not afraid or ashamed to represent the analysts as very clear and uniform in their conception of these matters, yet I do solemnly affirm (and several of themselves know it to be true) that I found no harmony or agreement among them, but the reverse thereof, the greatest dissension and even contrariety of opinion, employed to explain what after all seemed inexplicable. Some fly to proportions between nothings. Some reject quantities because infinitesimal. Others allow only finite quantities, and reject them because inconsiderable. . . . As many men, so many minds; each differing from one another, and all from

Sir Isaac Newton. Some plead inaccurate expressions in the great author, whereby they would draw him to speak their sense; not considering that if he meant as they do, he could not want words to express his meaning. Others are magisterial and positive, say they are satisfied, and that is all; not considering that we, who deny Sir Isaac Newton's authority, shall not submit to that of his disciples. . . . All of which I mention . . . that the unprejudiced inquirer after truth may see it is not without foundation that I call on the celebrated mathematicians of the present age to clear up these obscure analytics, and concur in giving to the public some consistent and intelligible account of their great master, which, if they do not, I believe the world will take it for granted they can not."<sup>63</sup>

Contempt so deliciously urbane as this was almost certain to ruffle the waters. And, in fact, it did so at once, by way of drawing Robins deeper into a controversy he had already entered with Jurin when he had criticized Berkeley's *Analyst*. Robins' part in the discussion which now followed is somewhat baffling, in that with Berkeley he denied the literal validity of the infinitesimal postulate of Newton. His animus toward the "ingenious Bishop," it would almost appear, was merely stronger than his reverence for Newton.<sup>64</sup> For his tortured defence of Newton, as Bledsoe has sensibly remarked on this point, is really an interpretation giving the lie to his master. "The views of Mr. Robins," writes Bledsoe, "respecting the method of limits, appear perfectly just as far as they go; yet nothing could be more ineffectual than his attempts to deduce these views from the *Principia*." Elsewhere Robins' para-

<sup>63</sup> G. Berkeley, *A Defence of Free-Thinking in Mathematics*, XLIII-XLIV.

<sup>64</sup> For a fuller discussion of Robins' part in the controversy, as well as for an excellent historical survey of the whole problem, see Florian Cajori's *A History of the Conceptions of Limits and Fluxions in Great Britain, from Newton to Woodhouse*, 1919. Regarding the particular point of Robins' interpretation of Newton, see especially p. 110 therein, which conforms with Bledsoe's remarks above quoted.



doxical feat is duly examined, and Bledsoe sums up, with a pointed query, the curious attitude of this opponent of Berkeley, to wit: "Newton himself, as we have seen, expressly asserts that 'the parallelograms will in *all* parts coincide with the curvilinear figure.' But Mr. Robins, in his explanation, says they will *not* coincide. . . . Now is this to interpret, or simply to contradict, Sir Isaac Newton? No one could possibly entertain a doubt respecting the meaning of Mr. Robins. If Newton had meant unequal, could he not have said so just as well as Mr. Robins?"<sup>65</sup> Now, antiquated as the foregoing arguments appear today, in the light of our assurance that the infinitesimal is devoid of existence (and but a few of the historic battles over this point have been mentioned), nevertheless it is salutary to remind ourselves that a matter as mathematically fundamental as the infinitesimal was once thought to be, could have furnished occasion for anything but agreement. In truth, the situation is even worse than we have presented it: not only are two eras in conflict, but some writers manage to contradict themselves without any posthumous assistance. Hans Vaihinger is one of

<sup>65</sup> Bledsoe, *op. cit.*, p. 193. De Morgan (*Philosophical Magazine*, 4 S., Vol. IV, 1852, p. 328) contended that Newton, in his *Tractatus de Quadratura Curvarum* (which, as an appendix to the *Opticks*, appeared in 1704 between the first and second editions of the *Principia*) clearly renounced the infinitesimal. It may be argued that Newton's warning therein—"The very smallest errors in mathematical matters are not to be neglected" (*Errores quam minimi in rebus mathematicis non sunt contemnendi*)—justifies De Morgan's contention. Yet Newton, only a little further on in the same work, remarks that the "analysis may nevertheless be performed in any kind of figures, whether finite or infinitely small, which are imagined similar to the evanescent figures" (*Peragi tamen potest Analysis in figuris quibuscumque seu finitis seu infinite parvis quae figuris evanescentibus finguntur similes.*) And in the face of this, Cajori, justly we think, maintains that "If what he [Newton] used in 1704 is not the infinitely little, it is so closely related thereto that it can not be called either a finite magnitude or an absolute zero" (*op. cit.*, p. 35).

De Morgan's mathematical genius was undoubtedly great, but his mathematical attainments on more than one occasion seriously crowded his logical talents. For us, at any rate, it is difficult to make logical consistency of the attitude of one who is "fixed in the faith of the *subjective reality of infinitesimal quantity*"; but who "do[es] not believe in *objectively realized infinitesimals*" nor an "infinite number," and who, believing in the experiential basis of mathematical concepts, retrospectively patted Newton on the back for inaugurating what we considered was a purification of the elder mathematician's methods.

these. And therefore, although we have no desire to detract from either the validity of the "as if" approach, or the merits of this German as a thinker who, in developing his fictional doctrine, has made a brilliant contribution to modern philosophy, we must mention unfavorably a questionable use of this principle by that writer. Vaihinger maintains that the infinitesimal, like the infinite, is a fiction. And, although freely admitting it to be such, he also urges the fruitfulness of this fiction. Unfortunately, by allowing the fiction a place in his general doctrine, he casts serious discredit upon it, involving himself in the same tangle of words that cripples the reason of all those writers who do not repudiate such fictions at the outset. He contradicts himself, in fact, on adjacent pages. We shall quote the passages in question; and the reader may then determine for himself whether our strictures are an injustice to the author. The first passage occurs on page 242:

"In strict logic, as we have already remarked, we could never subsume the curved under the straight line. All the laws of rectilinear figures hold only for such, and rectilinear figures remain rectilinear, *even if we increase the number of their angles to infinity.*" (Italics ours.)

The second passage occurs on page 243:

"We saw above that the equation of an arc with the side of a polygon was false, and that this could only be nullified by thinking of both elements as diminished *ad infinitum*, when the error disappeared." (Italics ours.)

We ourselves, as we have said, can make nothing of these two statements but the plainest and the flattest contradiction. In one case, infinity turns the trick; in the other, it fails to. What, then, is the answer to the problem? The answer, as we have more than once suggested, is simply that a writer, no matter how brilliant a dialectician, is nearly powerless to pen two consecutive paragraphs

that shall not give rise to just such a contradiction, if the word *infinite* or *infinitesimal* appears in either of them. And it is for this reason, which appears cogent, that we belabor these two terms and those using either, in any of their works, with the least seriousness. For the fiction is not fruitful: it is sterile. Indeed, it is worse than sterile: it is poisonous. It is sterile in its applied, poisonous in its logical consequences. If it does not, as we have just watched it do, poison two adjacent pages of philosophical writing, the havoc it works is delayed merely—as we have already seen in the passages by Mr. Russell who, with greater skill, managed to keep his antithetic conclusions further separated.

In other words, whilst calling infinity and the infinitesimal fictions, Vaihinger, intent upon justifying the geometer's subsumption of curvilinear under rectilinear figures, overlooks the uselessness of his apparatus. We find that the subsumption is necessary; but the fiction of the infinitesimal is neither necessary to mensuration nor logically justified. For what actually is done in determining the area of a circle from the area of an inscribed polygon, is merely this: we first make a fiction called a polygon; we next make another fiction called a circle; and though the two fictions by definition are incommensurable, we now make a third fiction that they are *not* so. And it is this third fiction, *This polygon is this circle*, that mediates between the two original fictions and permits our taking the one for the other. More than this never is done, nor is there reason to believe that more than this ever can be done, in the comparison of the areas of such surfaces. The fiction of the infinitesimal is not only useless for actual measurement, but is destructive of the very logic that would justify it.

Will a rectilinear figure, given a regularly increasing number of sides, finally coincide with a curvilinear figure?

Or will it not? The answer would seem to be important. For if the coincidence be not exact, and the two figures fall short of agreement, albeit by as little as we choose to have them, the basis of the calculus is approximation and our variable can never attain its limit. In the past, as we have seen, some asserted that this limit could "ultimately" be attained; some, never; whilst still others of equal mathematical eminence, unable to rest in either conclusion, essayed the precarious task of straddling two horses that galloped in opposite directions. Vaihinger, as we have shown, is one of the latter *redivivus*. "Disputes are multiplied," Hume cynically concluded two centuries ago, "as if everything was uncertain; and these are managed with the greatest warmth, as if everything was certain." Although Hume's scorn was not directed explicitly at contemporary mathematical thinkers, it bore on their disagreement; and it held, as we now see, no small measure of prophetic significance.<sup>66</sup>

As we have seen, but as we may be pardoned for repeating since our survey of the infinitesimal herewith terminates, the figment has been generally abandoned. And for mathematicians' final if tardy renunciation of a spectre which was too much for even a Bishop, some measure of logical gratitude is in order.. It is nevertheless no part of

<sup>66</sup> A graphic presentation of the absurdity of the fiction under discussion might helpfully be pictured as follows: Each time that the sides of the polygon are to be doubled, let the diameter of the circle be likewise doubled; the actual linear discrepancy between the chord and the arc of the second figure will thus be the same as that between the chord and arc of the first figure. Since it is agreed by all that the *size* of a geometrical figure has no bearing on the accuracy of our deductions, we are at once presented with a picture concerning what is wrong with it any reader is privileged to answer. Whether we actually describe a new circle each time the sides of the inscribed polygon are doubled, or picture this new figure in imagination, this linear discrepancy remains constant; for we are just as competent to double the diameter of the circle as to double the sides of the polygon. And this, we submit, is an argument against both the practical and theoretical use here of the infinitesimal: if the linear discrepancy was one inch to begin with, the discrepancy will each time have that same magnitude—irrespective of whether the enlarged circle is empirically given or whether, as we have the right to demand, its defined increase is put in a one-one relation with the defined increase of the sides of the inscribed polygon. Should the reader like to pile Pelion on Ossa he may, moreover, try the experiment not of doubling but of *tripling* the diameter of his



impertinence to point again to the delay of its burial; to remember the logomachy which attended its passing; and finally to wrest from this pitiful effort of mathematicians, who endeavored to blow life into a logical cadaver, the lesson which is offered by that picture.

### III

The notion of an infinite magnitude, as we have earlier said, is counter to every datum of experience; and experience, as we now wish to indicate while entering upon the psychological genesis of our problem, is the sole channel through which such a concept is imported. Here at once there lies the potentiality of a contradiction—and one that has given great trouble to those who would either explain or understand it. If our concepts are formed from nothing but what is given in experience, how, it will be pointedly inquired, did we get the concept of infinity? On this point, serious misapprehension of the sensationalist's argument is so common, that we may be pardoned for briefly developing the reasons for our belief that this troublesome contradiction is an apparent one only.

What, then (suppose it to be asked in return), is meant by a concept of infinity? It will be answered, our notion of *neverendingness*, of eternity, of so on indefinitely without limit. But have we ever had any single experience of circle each time that the sides of his polygon are doubled—in which event, of course, the longer he proceeds with his exercise the greater will be his reward in the linear discrepancy between two lines that are said to be “ultimately” equal.

Indeed, it is pertinent to inquire once and for all time why, if the notion of the infinite be so exceedingly useful that with it (in the words of Florian Cajori) “modern mathematicians have completely revolutionized the science,” the quadrature of the circle—that *bête noir* of the geometer—has been finally and formally abandoned, even by those infinitists who themselves should effect it. Their ready despair does not speak favorably for the value of their treasured symbol; though we may be thankful that the plain absurdity of their position, in giving up the ghost of this problem, makes manifest to all the world the vacuity of that mental process by which they have gained sure possession of this barren what-not.

such a nature? The answer, quite obviously, is in the negative. "Today" has no meaning except as it is bounded by yesterday and tomorrow. An inch is a linear measure only because it is itself a limited extension. And the same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of a foot, a mile, or a light-year; a ton of coal, a sheet of paper, or a century. Whatever unit we select wherewith to determine duration, extent, or repetition, is a unit which has both a starting-point and a finishing.

Even mentioning so evident a fact may appear to call for apology. Its psychological bearing on the concept of infinity is so insistent, however, that we must ask the reader to extend his courtesy in the face of an apparent insult to his intelligence. Every unit, we therefore repeat, is limited. Experience thus seems to controvert at every step the concept of something unending. How, then, did the concept originate? It originated, we doubt not, nor can we discern any possible way of avoiding the conclusion, in those experiences which are limited in themselves, but the succession of which very naturally has fathered a vague notion of the interminable. Every object, that is to say, clearly terminates. But by what are these objects severally terminated? Surely by nothing but other objects which succeed them. Walking-sticks end where street pavements begin, under some circumstances; under other circumstances they may end merely with the adjacent atmosphere. But as regularly as they are found to end at all, their termination marks the beginning of some other object, or the inauguration of a novel sensory stimulus. It is therefore true that experience gives us no data which, in one respect or another, are not completed. But it is no less true—indeed, it is a corollary of this principle—that *completion is but another name for succession*. And it is this discovery which we are constantly making, if seldom

remarking in plain language, which is the sole basis of our so-called concept of the infinite.<sup>66a</sup>

The old saying, What can happen once can happen twice, and what can happen twice can happen thrice, is a happy expression of our meaning. In familiar speech, it indicates all that can legitimately be attributed to a word which, if interpreted otherwise than as a process of succession or repetition, is an altogether meaningless vocable. Whilst we clearly need a descriptive term for that serial process which might not inaptly be designated the *function of contiguous occurrences*—and here infinity does almost seem relevant—there is a very serious danger in assigning such a word even to the *process*; for its connotation, unfortunately, is at once boldly transferred, and that without the least license, to the *product*. Thanks to this transfer of meaning from the act of performing to the performance, we have been rewarded with such short-sighted statements as that there must be an infinitely great number since we could go on enumerating for ever; or that since we could visually take as many light-year strides into space as we pleased (at least apparently), space itself must be in-

<sup>66a</sup> That a second-rate American poet should exceed Cambridge mathematicians in logical rigor is a circumstance less amazing than we once might have thought it. The last person a logician commonly respects is a poet. Yet an argument, if rigorous, can hardly be deemed vitiated by its origin. If, besides being harmonious with the conclusions of the greatest thinkers of all ages, it includes a searching psychological analysis of the manner by which men delude themselves on infinity, such an argument and analysis bear repetition. Therefore, with less shame than should be felt by our antagonists when called to account by a versifier, we shall offer them the following pregnant utterance: "I may be permitted to say that I *cannot* conceive Infinity, and am convinced that no human being can. A mind not thoroughly self-conscious, not accustomed to the introspective analysis of its own operations, will, it is true, often deceive itself by supposing that it *has* entertained the conception of which we speak. In the effort to entertain it, we proceed step beyond step, we fancy point still beyond point; and so long as we *continue the effort*, it may be said, in fact, that we are tending to the formation of the idea designed. . . . But it is in the act of discontinuing the endeavor—of fulfilling (as we think) the idea—of putting the finishing stroke (we suppose) to the conception—that we overthrow at once the whole fabric of our fancy by resting upon some one ultimate, and, therefore, definite point. This fact, however, we fail to perceive, on account of the absolute coincidence, in time, between the settling down upon the ultimate point and the act of cessation in thinking." Edgar Allan Poe, *Works*, 1859, Vol. II, pp. 130-1.

finitely extended. Such confusion of thought is astonishingly frequent. We therefore feel justified in insisting that there are the strongest possible reasons for ostracizing the word "infinity" altogether—at any rate, from every department of thought save theology, to serve the ends of which it seems peculiarly fitted.

WINTHROP PARKHURST.  
W. J. KINGSLAND, JR.

(To be continued.)



# THE MONIST

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## INFLUENCE AND REFERENCE: A BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS<sup>1</sup>

ALTHOUGH we are often told—quite recently for example by Mr. Joad in a little book of popular appeal<sup>2</sup>—that the problem of the relationship between mind and matter may be regarded as insoluble, tentative solutions will probably be offered for a good many years to come. Mr. Joad includes in this problem, “the way in which they interact,” which raises the prior question whether they do interact; and he qualifies his opinion that the problem is insoluble by inserting the words “for all practical purposes.”

The odd thing is that, in one sense of these words, the problem may be regarded as solved every day and hour of our waking life. As a practical problem, in this sense of the expression, *Solvitur ambulando*. What we call mind and what we call matter are somehow interrelated in such wise that very complex sets of events run their course in ways which we can describe with passable accuracy. But this is not the sense in which Mr. Joad uses the qualifying expression. He says: “As the discovery of the whole truth about everything is highly improbable, and is, in any case, an extremely remote contingency, the problem of the relationship between mind and matter may, for all practical

<sup>1</sup> We are especially glad to print this article from Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan. After a long and distinguished career as scholar and administrator, his work still retains the freshness and vigor of youth; and his conception of emergent evolution is at the focus of contemporary discussion of the philosophy of biology. Prof. Lloyd Morgan was one of the earliest contributors to *The Monist*, articles from his pen having appeared in Volume I.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> C. E. M. Joad, *Matter and Mind*, p. 7.

purposes, be regarded as insoluble." On these terms is any problem soluble so long as the solution of all problems remains a remote contingency?

One is tempted to wonder whether the problem of the relationship between time and space, no less than that between mind and matter, may not, on like grounds, be regarded as insoluble. Here, too, much depends on what we mean by time and space. Here, too, they are somehow related in such wise that complex sets of events, which imply both, run their course in ways which may be described with much accuracy. But are they, in some sense, causally related? If so is the causal influence one-sided—say on the part of time which "acts into space"—or is it reciprocal? If the relation be not causal, how does anything get itself done? Some may say—and I am one of them—that, given spatial and temporal relations *only*, nothing could ever get itself done. In terms of spatio-temporal relationship, and no other, the problem presented by change—or technically some mode of "acceleration"—in the course of events, is an insoluble problem. But that such changing change in the course of events does happen is undeniable. It sets a problem which, whether it has yet been solved or not, seems to impose on philosophy a demand for fresh endeavor to solve it.

There must therefore—if time and space, though perhaps necessary are not sufficient—be some other relationship, say that of mind and matter which may, or may not, be causally related. In any case we have to seek the natural home of causal relatedness somewhere—if not in space or time then in matter, or in mind, or in the relation of one to the other. Thus we get back, with some added complexity, to the world-problem perhaps basally expressible for empirical treatment in terms of space-time and mind-matter. On these terms it may or may not be soluble. In attempting here to rediscuss, very briefly, fun-

damental questions of perennial complexity and perplexity, I beg leave to approach in my own way a tentative suggestion of the lines along which a solution may perhaps be reached.

One who seeks to write intelligibly on philosophical problems in which the intelligent layman is interested, is faced again and again by an old dilemma. He says to himself, with Lord Balfour, "I require a word to express a concept which is vital to the doctrines I am preaching. Where am I to get it? If there is no such word in ordinary use I must either invent a new word, or I must modify the familiar meaning of an old word. There are objections to both courses; yet one of them must be taken."

If one elect so far to follow the latter course as to modify the meanings of some of the words that are current among those who discuss the problems with which we are concerned, the trouble is that many of them have already been modified in such manner as to render them suitable to express concepts that are vital to the doctrines which others preach—doctrines to which one is perhaps unable to subscribe. What is one to do? No course seems preferable to that of stating in what sense one uses this or that word and, without presuming to dictate to others such usage, to beg that it be taken in this sense and in no other sense. And if one draw in for technical use some word of common speech which therein has diverse meanings in differing contexts, one must render clear what is to be its special meaning in this specialized context.

Clearly the salient words are "mind" and "matter." I do not, however, attempt at the outset to emphasize any special usage of either of them. This only needs saying. I take a material body to be a cluster of natural events which go together under spatial, temporal, and physical relations, within or intrinsic to that body. Where the body is an integral entity, such as an atom, a molecule, a crystal,

an organism, I speak of the events as its *stuff* whereof the several items go together in *substantial unity*. Any two such bodies have likewise extrinsic relations in virtue of which they are connected in some wise—often in such wise as to form items of stuff in an integral entity of higher order. Such are atoms in the molecule.

Similarly, I take a mind to be a cluster of natural events which go together in substantial unity to constitute an integral entity, in us of a very high order, subject to certain modes of relatedness which are distinctively mental in that broad sense in which “mental” may be contrasted with “physical.” We must allow also for extrinsic relations of the mental order, in this sense of the word “mental”—relations not only *within* this or that, but also *between* this and that. It may be that the same cluster of natural events has intrinsic relatedness both physical and mental; and that the extrinsic relatedness between this cluster and that is both mental and physical. This must, for the present, suffice to indicate what I mean when I speak of matter and mind.

To the words “reference” and “influence,” I shall attach specially modified meanings. Reference, as I use the word, is distinctively mental. Influence is no less distinctively physical. Influences from Mars may reach the retina of my eye and initiate complex chains of biochemical events with their intrinsic modes of influence in my body. Reference on my part, when I see Mars as an object of vision, is an extrinsic relation of the mental order. Mars, *qua* object of vision, is, for me, mental—not, for me, non-mental, whether this mean physical or “neutral.” There would be no reference to an object on my part if I were not in some sense a mind in some way connected with a material body. This usage of the words “influence” and “reference” enables me to give expression to concepts that are “vital to the doctrines I am preaching.” Of course, objections may



be raised *in limine*. It may be said that the restriction of the word "influence" to what I call physical influence not only robs the word—in the case of Mars for example—of its old astrological meaning harking back to the days of mythological interpretation, but precludes one from speaking of the influence of Newton's or Darwin's thought on the thought of today; nay more, precludes one from speaking of the extrinsic influence of a mind on another mind. That is so. All I ask is that those who care to read what follows should be at the pains to understand what I mean whenever I use the word. It will always stand for physical influence in a sense which I hope may be comprehensible. Similarly with "reference." What I mean by the word is typically illustrated by reference on the part of some mind to some thing which is *objective* under such reference, and which as such, is mental. This use of the word "objective" is vital to the doctrines I am preaching. All that I can say, then, at present is: *Nota bene*.

Thus, in the usage I seek to make clear, that which is typically objective is one term in the relatedness which I speak of as reference; and the referential relation is to be for us here and now distinctively mental in contradistinction from physical. This seems to render the expression "physical object," or "material object," a contradiction in terms, where the qualifying adjective is incompatible with the noun it qualifies. We must remember, however, that very many of the current expressions of common speech are elliptical. Two foci are comprised within one figure of speech. When I speak of a physical object what I mean is an object of mental reference with which may be correlated a thing, if by thing we mean a self-contained group of physical events. Here again is a concept vital to the doctrines that I preach. The correlation of that which is mentally objective under reference with that which is the source of physical influence on the body, as a thing or sys-

tem of physical events, lies near to the very heart of our problem.

Now if, under what we speak of as sensory perception, a physical system of events (which for the present we accept under acknowledgement) is correlated with an objective world to which there is reference, spatio-temporal relatedness seems to be common to both. Without committing Mr. Broad to doctrines which he would deem heretical, we have to distinguish, with him, what he speaks of as "geometrical" shape or size from "sensible" form. We have, too, to consider in what manner geometrical distance is correlated with the sensible distance of a perceived object of reference. Is, then, geometrical shape, size, and distance to be regarded as physical? It has for so long been customary to regard extension as typically physical that the answer most people will give is: "Of course it is. Shape and size are quite distinctively physical properties. They are contributory to the physical character of a thing as *res extensa*."

Let us, however, distinguish. Perhaps all may agree that whenever there is a system of physical influence there is a spatio-temporal "frame" which, *qua* spatial, is dealt with in terms of extension. But, in an universe of discourse which purports to be philosophical, it is permissible so to use the word "physical" as always to imply some mode of physical *influence*. I beg leave so to use it. I beg leave also to restrict the words "cause" and "effect" in such wise as to be applicable only within a system of physical influence where some change in the current change in the course of events betokens such influence. On this understanding all physical relatedness is causal; and any effect is interpretable in terms of physical influence. And on this understanding I should not say of any two sets of events which are correlated that the one set is either the cause or the effect of the other set.

This implies that the word "correlation" is here used in a somewhat restricted sense. There is for each one of us severally an objective world to which there is cognitive reference on his part. This is the objective world of naive perception. There is also for each one of us severally a physical system of some sort—let us say that which we accept in such form as has been developed in the interpretative schema of scientific thought. If we call this the physical universe, there is need for correlating the objective worlds of naive perception—your world and mine respectively—with the physical universe as known to science.

The trouble is that the word "perception" may not be used—is seldom used—by writers on logic in the restricted sense I intend by qualifying it by "naive." It is taken to include some measure of *interpretation* and is therefore in that measure reflective. Furthermore, it may be said that one cannot speak of an objective *world* that is private to the individual and nowise public. The stress here is on distinctively human perception—which stands at a higher level than naive perception. I cannot here discuss the valid distinction, at this higher level, between public and private which is the outcome of reflective analysis. It must suffice to lay emphasis on the need for correlation of what I call the objective world of naive perception—that of a child of twenty months and that which still is ours in our unsophisticated moments—with the physical universe which is the outcome of reflective thought and bulks large in the sophisticated atmosphere of logic.

Take now the word "interaction." It may be said that by common consent it has already undergone such modification in current philosophical discourse that it means the action of matter on mind, that of mind on matter, one, or other, or both. One must take it or leave it in this specially restricted sense. One may accept or reject the cardinal feature of the concept so named; but one must not apply

the name to some other concept. Clearly on these terms, taken literally, one must not speak of the interaction of physical bodies or systems on each other; nor of the interaction of mind on mind. Some other word, or words, should be used. It seems, too, that this use of the word "interaction" renders it questionable whether we should even speak of the "action" of one physical body on another.

It is, however, pretty obvious that a physicist who enters the philosophical arena is not likely to acquiesce if any such restriction be imposed on the word "action." Nay more he may, on his part, impose a quite different restriction. He may say: All action, in our sense of the word, is within a system of physical influence. And if we use the word "interaction" it means reciprocal action which implies mutual influence of one physical body or system on another. He may, perhaps, add that, in his province of inquiry, he finds no shred of evidence on which the notion of interaction of mind on matter or of matter on mind may be based.

If such an opinion should be expressed, there seems an obvious and ready reply. It may be said: "Apart from your conscious apprehension of physical events, thousands and tens of thousands of the instances of action, in your sense, with which physicists deal in their laboratories, are subject to guidance on the part of highly trained minds. If there be no interaction in our sense there can be neither apprehension nor guidance."

Consider, then, the concept to which the word "guidance" gives expression. Few are likely to deny the validity of the concept, or the appropriateness of the word in some sense, if its meaning be rendered quite clear. Few would raise any serious objection to its restriction in such wise as to imply a factor which is distinctively mental. On these terms we should not say that a planet is "guided" in its orbital course; nor should we say that molecules or



atoms are "guided" to their stations in crystalline structure. We should use some other word. But we may say that the homing flight of the pigeon not improbably exemplifies guidance; and we may assuredly say that the experimental procedure of the physicist is subject throughout to conscious guidance.

Now whenever we have occasion to infer such conscious guidance as few would care to deny, it seems always to imply prospective reference to a state of affairs which may, if all go well, be attained. And since action is contributory to its attainment, we speak in elliptical fashion of the guidance of action. But action for us is distinctively physical, whereas such prospective reference as seems essential to guidance is distinctively mental. No less distinctively mental, for us, is the objective field wherein guidance obtains. Can one adduce an instance of conscious guidance in which prospective reference within an objective field is absent? No doubt the objective field may be correlated with a system of physical events—the existence of which we acknowledge. Whether, and if so in what sense, we should then speak of the objective field as "representative" of the correlated physical system opens up a further question. The nearer question is this: If action obtains within a system of physical influence; and if guidance obtains within a field of reference; how are we to interpret the current and familiar expression "guidance of action"? If guidance be distinctively mental; and if action be distinctively physical; does this expression necessarily imply interaction of mind and matter? I submit that it need not do so if this expression, like so many others in common parlance, be elliptical. There may be two stories of the natural events, all of which are both physical and mental—not some of them physical and others mental. This has been the belief of philosophers of admitted distinction. The one story may be told in terms of action under influence; the other story may be

told in terms of guidance under reference. One gives a physical interpretation of the course of events; the other gives a mental interpretation in terms of reference. One deals with material things; the other deals with their objective correlates. Both interpretations may be such as to withstand the brunt of criticism. Hence the elliptical expression "guidance of action" (which is a bit of the one and a bit of the other) may well be good enough for common parlance, and yet not good enough for analytic thought where the twin foci are distinguished.

When, therefore, we speak elliptically of guidance of action under conscious reference to an end in view, the change of direction in the course of events—which is what can be observed—may always be subject to the physicist's rubric that all action is determined within a system of influence. If this be so, it does not necessarily entail acceptance of interaction of mind on matter. To say that all guidance presupposes conscious reference (which the physicist is not concerned to deny) does not justify the assertion that if there be no "interaction" there can be no such guidance. It may, however, still be roundly asserted that, apart from "interaction," there can be no guidance *properly so called*.

But who is to decide what is "guidance properly so called"? If I say that all typical guidance is subject to objective reference to *consequences* which are more or less clearly foreseen, shall I be told that this is not guidance properly so called? Anyhow that is what I do say. And I must try to render clear what I mean. Now I may mean by the word "consequences" just what I mean by the word "effects"—neither more nor less. But here and now I do not. By effect I mean the outcome of action under influence. All effects are physical effects. By consequence I mean that to which there is objective reference subject to correlation with the outcome of action as the effect of in-

fluence in the physical system. In elliptical phraseology the consequence is always *more than* the effect in that it is the effect foreseen and thus also a consequence. As I put it, the consequence has a higher emergent quality which the effect lacks. According to the adage, the burnt child shows guidance of action in behaviour from which we infer some prospective reference to consequences. But it seems that, in the burnt moth, there is little evidence of such guidance. Here it seems that consequences are not foreseen, at the level of naive perception, though the effects of the candle flame may be disastrous. If this be so, in the given situation, consequences are not emergent in the mind of the moth.

Is this distinction between consequences and effects too fine-drawn to meet with ready acceptance? Surely, save in the manner of statement and perhaps in range of application, there is in it nothing new. It is in line with what Lord Balfour and others have to say on the interplay of "causes and reasons." It emphasizes the "means-consequence" relation on which Professor Dewey has much that is pertinent to say. It connects the twin concepts of means and meaning and, under correlation, it links up with physical causation. For (elliptically) "means are always at least causal conditions, but causal conditions are means only when they possess an added qualification; that namely, of being freely used, because of perceived connection with chosen consequences. . . . Similarly consequences (ends) are at least effects; but effects are not ends unless thought has perceived and freely chosen the conditions. . . . We live on the human plane, responding to things in their meanings. A relationship of cause-effect has been transformed into one of means-consequence."<sup>3</sup>

Notwithstanding some difference in modes of expression I think Mr. Dewey and I are at one in drawing a distinc-

<sup>3</sup> John Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, pp. 366-7; 371.

tion between effects in the story of physical causation and consequences which, for me at least, belong to the story of reference. Whether we speak of "transformation" (in some sense) or not, effects and consequences are so correlated as to justify the elliptical expression "guidance of action." But the correlation of physical events in a system of influence, with objective situations, perceptual or reflective, in a field of reference, need not imply interaction of matter or mind or of mind on matter. Neither correlate should be spoken of as the cause of the other. And it is this I think that most people understand interaction to mean. But the word "cause" is an umbrella under which rather diverse concepts take shelter. Be it noted then, that, as I here and now use the word, I always mean causation within a system of influence. On this understanding "causal interaction" between mind and matter is barred in that usage of words "which is vital to the doctrines I am preaching." Otherwise expressed there is no influence of mind on matter or of matter on mind.

So much with respect to a concept of guidance which does not necessarily imply that of interaction.

There remains, however, the question: In what way are those mental events which determine guidance under objective reference related to those physical (bio-chemical) events in the body which are causally effective in action under influence? We need here a word to which a special connotation shall be attached. I have been led to regard *concomitance* as the most suitable and the least ambiguous.

It is already extensively in use. But it is commonly restricted to psycho-physical events which, as physical, take place in the brain, or at an rate some part of a central nervous system of the synaptic kind. I proceed on the hypothesis that concomitance is coextensive with all physiological events throughout the organism. That allows for concomitance in the *Amoeba* or *Paramoecium* which has



no nervous system of the synaptic kind. It allows, too, for such concomitance in us as will embrace not only a restricted brain-mind connection but an unrestricted body-mind connection. I should therefore say: Just as all the physiological events in the body go together in substantial unity under influence to give what we call the life of a man, so do all the concomitant mental events go together in substantial unity under reference to give what we call the mind of man.

This is admittedly an hypothesis. Is there any empirical interpretation of the connection of body and mind that is *not* hypothetical? But there are other hypotheses. One is that many mental events are concomitant with physiological events of a specific kind, but that some mental events have no such concomitants. Another is that some physiological events have mental concomitants but that many physiological events have no such concomitants. The former, as commonly held by its defenders, comes to this: Certain "higher" mental events have no physiological concomitants; the latter to this: Certain "lower" physiological events have no mental concomitants. My hypothesis is that *all* physiological events (whether higher or lower in some sense of these words) have concomitants which are the "stuff" of mind; and that all mental events, whether lower or higher, have physiological concomitants which are the "stuff" of life. This, then, and nothing less than this where organisms are concerned, is what I mean when I use the word "concomitance."

May I now say that the natural entity which we speak of as body-mind is an integral cluster of events with two quite different sets of "properties" that are knowable, in two quite diverse ways, in this "attribute" or that. On my view such difference in attribute is the expression of different kinds of relationship within the same cluster of natural events—that is, within body-mind. But neither the prop-

erties under these two attributes—call them materiality and mentality if you like—nor the kinds of relatedness of which they are the expression, are (under my terminology) causally related. Neither stands to the other in the relation of cause or effect. It suffices to speak of them as concomitant.

The integral cluster of natural events which is body-mind has—or rather affords an instance of—substantial unity. In bodily regard the events go together within a system of influence under give and take of a specifically physiological character intrinsic to the body. In mental regard the events go together within a system of reference so far as this reference is intrinsic to the mind under what I speak of as “enjoyment.” The “tie” of their going together can thus be physically interpreted under influence or mentally interpreted under the relatedness which belongs to the order of reference. But, though it has two-fold expression, in this attribute or that, there is but one tie and but one substantial unity.

There is thus, in one regard the physiological or vital unity of life, and in the other regard the intrinsic unity of mind. The one is substantial unity as interpreted under influence; the other is substantial unity as interpreted under reference. But the unity of life does not “cause” that of mind; nor does the unity of mind “cause” that of life. Between life in physical regard and mind in other than physical regard, there is no causal interaction. There is, however, something unique and *sui generis*, for which “concomitance” seems the most appropriate name.

Something further may be added as to what I mean by “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” under usage which is in some measure modified to meet the special requirements of my thesis. Let us start with the body. In the present context the body is, *au fond*, a rounded off, “self-contained,” cluster of physical events which go together and run their

course in such manner as the physiologist and the biochemist discuss; and in such manner as leads ordinary folk to say that the body is alive. But, in a wider sense of the word, there are in nature as a comprehensive physical system, "bodies" other than living bodies; and there are plenty of relatively loose events which do not seem to be rounded off so as to constitute bodies. What rounded off physical body is correlated with that familiar object of reference which we call a rainbow?

The word "intrinsic" I use to label a set of events within a rounded-off body when we distinguish the influence under which there is change in their manner of "go" as also within that body. But there is also influence from one body on another; influence transmitted in ways which it is for the physicist to discuss; influence as a relation between bodies. The set of events outside the rounded-off body—the body of a man for example—influence that body "extrinsically." Apart, then, from such qualifications as would be called for in more ample treatment, one may say that intrinsic influence is within some given body duly indicated; extrinsic influence is between that body and other bodies or other physical events.

In the physical system of events—the existence and persistence of which we acknowledge—there is always give and take of extrinsic influence. Furthermore, though we may analytically distinguish the extrinsic from the intrinsic, influence is all of a piece. As Dr. Broad says:<sup>4</sup> "The material realm does seem to form one system in a fairly definite sense. . . . Moreover, the whole seems to be of much the same nature as the parts. The spatial and causal relations within a finite body and between its parts are of much the same nature as the spatial and causal relations *between* two finite bodies and within the material realm as a whole." And then he says: "Now, so far as

<sup>4</sup> C. D. Broad, *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, p. 32.

one can see, there is very little analogy to this in the mental realm."

Here and now, however, I am not concerned with Dr. Broad's thesis but with my own. I quote him only that I may indicate how far we agree and where we part company. I agree with what he says about the "material realm"; but, for me, proceeding on the hypothesis of concomitance and not that of interaction, there is analogy, in the sense of salient features common to both, in the "realms" of influence and of reference, in my sense of this word. The two realms differ in that there is no causal relatedness within a system of reference or between a system of reference and a system of influence. They differ, too, in that the relation of reference is quite different from that of influence. The one is distinctively mental; the other is distinctively physical. None the less, it follows from concomitance that just as within the body there are modes of influence, intrinsic therein, so too within the mind there are modes of reference, intrinsic therein; and that just as modes of influence within the body are of one texture with modes of influence between bodies, so too modes of reference within the mind, as a system of enjoyment, are of one texture with modes of reference to external objects, as I use this word.

At what I call the emergent level which the organism has reached in the course of evolutionary advance its life is within it. Of course, the body is responsive to influence from surrounding bodies, and, in responding, influences some of these bodies. With this readily observable give and take of influence we naturally start. But in due course we seek to learn what goes on within this life-center. Therein, it seems, are those multifarious actions and reactions which are necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, to enable us to interpret the intrinsic life and the extrinsic behavior of the organism. What one may speak of as the



contexture of life—the interwoven fabric of events which are very subtly inter-related under influence—has now been partially, but not yet completely, elucidated through the inquiries of specialists, especially those who supplement analysis in detail by presenting synoptic views of life in its concrete entirety, with substantial unity of all the several events as distinguishable items of stuff.

Even so, however, we are regarding body-mind under the concept of influence only. We are disregarding the factor of mind. We are dealing with the physical in abstraction from the mental. In the concrete instance there is not only body; there is body-mind. An adequate doctrine of body may be “necessary”; but to render an interpretation of observable events “sufficient” this doctrine of body must be supplemented by an adequate doctrine of mind. What form shall it take? It takes one of two quite different forms under the hypothesis of interaction and under that of concomitance.

We have seen that in what I call life a vast number of physical or bodily events, as constituent items of stuff, go together in substantial unity within a system of influence. My hypothesis is that all these items in the stuff of life have their concomitants in the stuff of mind; and that the substantial unity of life in one regard is, in the other regard, the substantial unity of *enjoyment* as intrinsic to the individual mind. What I mean by “enjoyment,” and in what manner it implies reference as the distinctively mental mode of relatedness, I can here and now but briefly indicate. I must be content to do little more than paraphrase a sentence of M. Bergson’s. His interpretation of life is very different from mine. But, speaking of the organism, he says that “all goes on as if the cell knew of other cells, what concerns itself.” The “as if,” I take it is here the sign of an hypothesis. My hypothesis is that all goes on within the body-mind, as if there were not only

a physical nexus of intrinsic influence, but also a mental nexus of intrinsic reference. But if life and enjoyment be concomitant, neither nexus is "independent" of the other, and yet neither nexus is the cause or the effect of the other. I know full well that a doctrine of such non-cognitive reference needs further and fuller elaboration. But this must here suffice.

It may be said, however, that it whittles down the concept of reference to something that the plain man can hardly recognize as such. We are bidden to suppose that concomitant with the inner life of an amoeba there is intrinsic enjoyment, of a sort, which somehow betokens relations of reference; and that when its body is influenced by other bodies there is extrinsic reference, in however primitive a form, to something in that which we speak of as the objective environment. That whittles down reference to proportions sufficiently slender. But I plunge a long way further down—even to the very foundations of events. Just as I conceive influence to be ubiquitous throughout nature, so too do I conceive reference as a mode of relatedness to be no less ubiquitous. Such is my hypothesis in its full range—assuredly no new one save in the form in which it is stated. For the property of materiality I substitute the relation of influence and what it entails; for the property of mentality I substitute the relation of reference. Then I say that under no circumstances does the one become the other. In more familiar terms mind does not arise out of matter. On this hypothesis no form of "emergent materialism" is tenable. And if it be said that the hypothesis is speculative, I reply that no less speculative is emergent materialism. Any hypothesis that is radical is bound to be speculative.

No doubt it will be asked: What evidence is there of reference as ubiquitous throughout nature? But clearly there are the prior questions: What is the nature of refer-

ence and what the evidence thereof anywhere in nature—say as distinctive of human experience?

We must turn, then, in further detail to reference in the extraordinarily complex form that is emergent in ourselves at our level of reflective thought. We must ask whether, in us, reference is not also exemplified in a simpler cognitive form under what we speak of as naive perception. And we must raise the question whether, even in us, reference is not in evidence at a yet lower level in the more primitive form that we may call non-cognitive. It is, I think, pretty obvious that all the first-hand data on which a theory of reference may be based must be sought in our own experience; and that our analytic mode of procedure, under the conditions imposed by the subject-matter of the inquiry, should be from above downwards. But this does not preclude a subsequent synthesis in reflective thought which purports to give a synoptic view of the progressive evolution, from below upwards, of an objective world of reference.

Now my hypothesis is that whereas influence comes in to some body-center from outside the body or from some other center within the body, extrinsic reference always goes forth from the center which is thus subjected to physical influence of some kind; and that, save as recipient of extrinsic influence there is not initially the kind of event from which, in mental regard, reference goes forth. In view of extrinsic reference *to* an objective world one must use some such expression as "goes forth," though there is no transmission of reference analogous to that of influence. That there is specialized provision for the transmission of influence within the body must here be taken for granted.

Starting, then, from the reflective level to which the human mind has attained, we must ask: What form does reference here assume? It commonly takes the form of that which, if I rightly understand, Dr. Broad speaks of

as "external reference."<sup>5</sup> Let me, however, put the position, as I see it, in my own way. I am, at any given moment, whatever else I may be, a system of enjoyment in which conceiving, perceiving, sensing, feeling fit or the reverse, and all else that one can speak of in mental terms as "ing" (imagining, remembering, and the rest) go together to constitute the "self of enjoyment" that is I. At the reflective level we are analytically concerned, let us say, with thinking. Correlative with this thinking—in a sense we may say the product of thinking—is the objective field which comprises all that is "thought of." To that objective field there is reference from the self of enjoyment—that is on my part as referring to that field. Reference "goes forth" from what for reflective thought is me to it. But within this objective field to which reference from me goes forth there is first *this* and then *that* which are the centers to which my thinking has reference at this moment and that. But when *that* becomes the dominant center referred to, *this* does not drop out of the objective field of reference. It is retained in the field of reference in a more or less sub-dominant form.

One has to put the matter very briefly and crudely, suppressing such qualifications as would side-track us. The point is that there is a quite legitimate sense in which it may be said that, within the field of objective reference, *this* has ("external") reference to *that*. But there is also a legitimate sense in which I may say that the objective field as a whole stands in ("objective") reference to me as a thinking self of enjoyment. Be it understood, then, that it is in this latter sense that I speak of extrinsic reference. But *this* and *that* are unquestionably related within certain fields of objective reference. May I, without doing violence to customary usage, speak of the relation then obtaining as that, broadly speaking, of meaning? And may I draw

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Broad, *op. cit.* External reference is discussed on p. 151; objective reference on p. 565.



a distinction between "meaning" in naive cognitive perception, and that higher order of meaning which I call "significance" for reflective thought? Then I regard meaning and significance as intervenient relations of the distinctively mental kind. It is through this intervenience that there is on my part transition of objective reference from *this* to *that*.

Now if I be allowed to characterize a field of cognitive perception as one in which there is always a relational network of meaning, it must analytically be distinguished on the one hand from a field of reflective thought in which there is always a relational network of significance, and on the other hand from a non-cognitive field in which there is immediate reference without any superadded network cognitive or reflective. But the distinction, so far as our own adult life is concerned, is frankly analytical, since there is reference at all three levels. There are not three separate objective fields of reference—reflective, cognitive, and non-cognitive—but one field of reference which we reflectively submit to distinguishing analysis. Subject to such analysis we may, however, say that a field of reflective thought with significant relations, involves cognitive perception with relations of meaning; and that this in turn involves non-cognitive reference in "bare sensory acquaintance." Apart from perception I cannot estimate the loss of candlepower in my electric lamp as due to whatever I may deem significant for the interpretation of this loss; and apart from immediate reference at what I call the non-cognitive level (bare sensory acquaintance) there would be no perception of a lamp with some estimated loss of candlepower. Such, in brief outline, is the way in which I seek to express a concept of levels of objective reference that is consonant with the doctrines I preach. It keeps within the story of reference and does not go beyond it. But here someone may say: If you acknowledge (as you

profess to do) a physical system of influence with which our so-called world of objective reference may be "correlated" (as you use this word), do you not—must you not—go beyond your story of reference? How else can you *get at* a trans-objective physical system—existent in its own right—with which your objective world may be correlated?

I must raise the prior question: Can one "get at it" save as that which is objective in a field of belief, acknowledgment, rational demand, presupposition, conviction—or however else it may be named? And has such acknowledgment—to select one word—place in any field of reference save that which is developed at the reflective level? Of course, all of us acknowledge something in gross and in detail. In gross you and I acknowledge what we are pleased to call the universe; in detail you may acknowledge interaction whereas I acknowledge concomitance. Forthwith my universe is very different in relational structure from yours. Which is *the* universe? And who is to decide whether your universe or mine accords with what we may both speak of as Reality and write with a capital letter?

We are in the thick of difficulties. In reflective thought one seeks to attain truth with reference to Reality. But, as Professor Alexander puts it, truth is not Reality itself but reality as possessed by the reflective mind. Save as thus possessed by mind, and receiving the mind's impress, Reality lies beyond the reach of reflective thought. Even if we "acknowledge" Reality as that which can be so possessed, acknowledgement itself falls under the rubric of possession by mind. Substitute for "acknowledgement," say, "belief," "presupposition," or some other word, and the position remains the same. Beyond reality as objective under reference we cannot get. The most we can do is to correlate the reality which we reach under reflective

thought with that with which we are perceptually acquainted under cognitive reference and with that which we infer as objective under non-cognitive reference. To this end we frame some schema which purports to afford an avenue of approach towards a constructive philosophy.

What do I mean, then, when I speak of correlating a world of objective reference with a physical system of influence? I confess that this way of expressing what I mean is elliptical. So I revert again to the concept of levels and restate thus: At the mind-level of perception (as I use the word) there is a world of objective reference, distinctive of that level, which we take naively and unreflectively at its face-value, subject to such network of meaning as meets the requirements of ordinary behavior. At the level of reflective thought there is the physical system which we accept under acknowledgement, subject to such a network of significance as meets the requirements of scientific interpretation. The one gives the objective world as it is seen, heard, tasted, touched and so forth, in so far as perceptual reference goes forth to it. The other gives the no less objective physical system (one must speak elliptically to avoid cumbrous circumlocution) which is objective to thought as well as to sensory acquaintance. There is need for correlating the one with the other in the hope that thereby we may at least contribute to a more adequate concept of reality as, for us, a system of events in spatio-temporal relatedness, exhibiting relations of influence and reference, and subject to concomitance without interaction. Of such a nature as this and nothing less than this, in its positive avowal, is the reality I acknowledge with the emphasis of conviction. I say "nothing less than this"—not "nothing more than this"—so I should add "in the naturalistic regard which is here my universe of discourse."

One may now remind those who have read with the care it deserves Dr. Broad's discussion of *The Mind and Its*

*Place in Nature*, of what he says on "inherence-from-a-place-in-a-place" as a relation which is simple and unanalysable.<sup>6</sup> Thus in visual perception we have to consider an emitting region, a region of projection, a pervaded region, and a pervading shade of color." What he means by this he has rendered sufficiently clear. By way of contrast let me state the position as I see it in a form accordant with my thesis—not with his. What on this view normally happens is reference, distinctively mental, from a place occupied by body-mind (*qua* body) to a place occupied by physical events which influence the body with which the mind is concomitant. Reference no less than influence is a relation which is ultimately simple and unanalysable. By "normally" one means what is meant by the physicist when he substitutes "in a homogeneous medium." If the medium be non-homogeneous reference is abnormal—that is, to an objective place other than that which is occupied by the physical events that are the source of influence on the body. Hence arises need for correlation of "sensible" place under objective reference and "geometrical" place assigned under a physical schema of interpretation.

There is also reference from a time to a time; and, if reference be instantaneous, while influence "takes time" in transmission, the date under objective reference always needs correlation with the date of physical emission. Furthermore the difference between the date of emission and that of objective reference may entail a difference between the "place" of emission and that of objective reference. But what we refer to a place at a moment is a group of objective qualities. Mr. Broad says that these qualities "inhere in a place from a place." In a little further detail, physical events in the emitting region determine under influence "certain events in our eyes, optic nerves, and brains; and the latter events are the immediate necessary and suf-

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 162, 168.



ficient material conditions of the pervasion of the external region by such and such a color from the region of projection which contains our bodies." On our hypothesis these events in our bodies are concomitant with those mental events in our minds in virtue of which we are selves of enjoyment. But we are also selves from which objective reference goes forth. For us then objective qualities—not so-called secondary qualities only but all objective qualities—inhere in their objective place under the distinctively mental relation of reference.

It will be sufficiently clear to those who are acquainted with Mr. Broad's thesis that mine differs *toto coelo* from his. For his contention is that "the pervasion of a certain place by a certain color from a certain region of projection is *not* dependent on this color being perceived by the mind which animates the organism that occupies the region of projection." And he adds, with the emphasis of italics: "*Nothing* depends for its existence on being perceived." For this, in sheer contrariness, I might substitute: *Everything* that is objective (in my sense) is "dependent" for its *objective* existence on perceptual reference—or on some other mode of reference, non-cognitive or reflective.

Now if, on my own terms, I may so far agree with Mr. Broad as to say that reference, perceptual or other, has no causal influence on the acknowledged course of physical events, he will not agree with me when I say that the course of physical events has no influence on perception as such. Physical events outside my body *do* causally influence those within my body. These events without and within my body, are physical in that they exhibit action and reaction in a system of influence. But they are not *only* physical since they are *also* related in a system of reference. I should not speak of the events in question as neutral, if this means that *neither* mode of relatedness obtains; for my contention is that *both* modes of relatedness obtain.

But on my view the more essential point is that, though both modes of relatedness obtain, neither is cause nor effect of the other—neither influences nor is influenced by the other.

On this showing perception, as such, is not influenced by the course of physical events. There is no one-sided interaction of matter on mind. But as we have seen, there is no other-sided interaction of mind on matter, according to my hypothesis of the nature of guidance.

If the acknowledged reality we call Nature be one and indivisible, we must not deal with reference in vicious abstraction from influence; and we cannot deal with influence apart from the reference implied in our acknowledgement thereof. Since, then, influence and reference are never divorced in concrete "fact," a story of reference takes influence for granted. And, at the cognitive and reflective levels of reference, a story of life in physiological terms of stimulus and response, takes for granted a story of *prospective* reference as distinctive of a mind at this stage of mental development. To affirm that, in the organism, all that happens should be interpreted subject to the concept of causal influence does not justify the assertion that, if this be so, guidance with reference to consequences foreseen—that is, typical guidance—cannot be interpreted on the hypothesis of concomitance without interaction. That there are difficulties may be freely and frankly conceded. But they cannot be faced until the full scope of the doctrines I am concerned to preach have received careful, candid, and critical consideration.

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## IDEALISM AND EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM

THE prominence of the concept of evolution in contemporary philosophy is due, by common consent, to the influence of modern biology. But this observation requires to be very carefully interpreted, if it is not to mislead those who know much of biology, but little of philosophy. It is a good many years now since Professor John Dewey wrote a paper on "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy," in which he heralded a new approach to all problems of human thought and conduct by way of treating all human activities as responses to stimuli, as efforts of the human animal to adjust itself to, and master, its environment. Here were the foundations of a "naturalistic" treatment of psychology, ethics, epistemology—in general, of a naturalistic theory of man. And the impulse had come from Darwin's theory of "evolution." But it is curious to notice that, alike in Dewey's original statement of that influence and in its subsequent development into behaviorism in psychology, instrumentalism, naturalism and realism in philosophy, it has been the *naturalistic* rather than the *evolutionary* side of this influence which has been dominant and abiding. Or, to put this more precisely, the conceptual apparatus of Darwin's theory of evolution—accidental variations, struggle for existence, survival of the fittest, etc.—has been dropped, nor have post-Darwinian developments in biology (e. g., theories of Mendel and Weissmann, with all the detailed researches to which they have led, or the rise of neo-Lamarckianism) exercised any marked in-

fluence on our evolutionary naturalists in philosophy. All that survives of evolution in the strictly biological sense in which it concerns the descent and differentiation of species, is a generalized *genetic* point of view, i. e., a method of studying the stages through which a character or function develops. On the other hand, even in the absence of the genetic point of view, it is the application to human life in all its aspects of the biological concepts of response to stimulus and adjustment to environment which makes psychology and ethics "naturalistic."

Moreover, biological concepts of evolution, after all, apply only to the phenomena of life, whereas the universe as a whole is the proper province of philosophy. Hence, the concept of evolution had to be stripped of its specific biological meaning and generalized by wider use. Thus, in actual fact, evolutionary philosophy owes much more to Herbert Spencer than to Charles Darwin. For, it was Spencer who, treating biological evolution as only one chapter in the whole story, expanded the concept of evolution to cosmic proportions and thereby made it the fundamental concept for a certain type of philosophical construction. True, no contemporary evolutionist has repeated Spencer's grandiosely futile attempt to sum up the whole story of cosmic evolution in a single formula. But many evolutionists at least try to set out the historical sequence of stages through which what Lloyd Morgan calls "the increasing richness in stuff and substance"<sup>1</sup> of the universe has been achieved, whether that sequence be Morgan's own pyramid of matter—life—mind, or Samuel Alexander's ampler progression from space-time to deity, and perhaps beyond deity—who knows?

Indeed, it seems to me that, of all the evolutionists whose writings I have read, Alexander is the only one who takes evolution seriously. He is the only one whose universe is

<sup>1</sup> *Emerson's Evolution*, p. 206.



*still evolving*, and who is prepared from indications in its present condition to forecast what the next stage is going to be, viz., the emergence of the new quality of "deity" in the birth of which the world is now travailing. By contrast, Lloyd Morgan's universe strikes me as *finished*—matter-life-mind: there is the whole story. Not, of course, that Lloyd Morgan says so in so many words. But it is implicit in his whole attitude and, symptomatically, in the neatly pointed apex of his pyramid.<sup>2</sup> One misses in Lloyd Morgan, Alexander's sense of the present being big with cosmic novelties of great moment about to emerge. Again, Roy Sellars's interest in the plan of evolution does not, so far as I can see, extend even so far as that of Lloyd Morgan. What Sellars values in the evolutionary point of view is the aid it lends to a naturalistic theory of mind, by treating mind as a product of evolution in the context of the physical world. Bergson comes nearest to Alexander in regarding evolution as a *creative* process still going on, but he, too, has no interest in working out any ordered plan of evolution; and if he were to do so his view of matter as due to the detension, or slackening, of the *élan vital* would inevitably put his theory into a class apart. His distinction between instinct and intelligence offers divergent lines, rather than successive levels (or stages) of evolution. In general, Bergson concentrates his efforts on intuiting the creative urge at the heart of the universe and on sharing the exhilaration of its showers of unpredictable novelties.

In this connection, it is worth noting that, compared with Lloyd Morgan and Sellars, both Alexander and Bergson, for all their efforts to incorporate the findings of science in their theories, are "metaphysicians" rather than "naturalists." Indeed, if it is the mark of a "metaphysician" to go behind the scientifically ascertainable facts of

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 11.

evolution, whether on the biological or the cosmic scale, in the search for a source or cause (agent) of evolution, then even Lloyd Morgan is a metaphysician, and Sellars's type of theory the only genuine "naturalism." For, does not Lloyd Morgan confess: "From the point of view of a constructive philosophy, I, for one, am unable to see how one is to explain all that goes on from start to finish without activity [=God]. The more adequately we grasp the naturalistic and agnostic position, the more urgent is the call for some further explanation which shall supplement its merely descriptive interpretation."<sup>3</sup> And thus Lloyd Morgan is led on to "acknowledge" by an act of faith, which corresponds to the Kantian "postulates of reason," divine activity and purpose as *omnipresent* throughout the whole scheme and process of evolution. Proof of God is impossible: enough that the acknowledgement of him is not inconsistent with the naturalistic picture and is empirically based on the feeling of being drawn upwards by an ideal.<sup>4</sup> Whence it follows that "evolution" itself has two distinct meanings, viz., (a) a naturalistic meaning—"the outspringing of something that has hitherto not been in being" [=emergence]; (b) a metaphysical meaning—"the unfolding of that which is enfolded" (the timeless activity of God for whom plan and execution are one and indivisible).<sup>5</sup>

It is easy to imagine how many an ultra-modern "naturalist," proud of having adopted a purely "scientific" view, will give a pitying shrug of the shoulders at what he will perhaps call Morgan's resurrection of "old-fashioned" theism. But, speculatively considered, this combination of naturalism and theism raises some of the profoundest, if also oldest, problems of philosophy. Emergent evolution is essentially a process in time; yet it is the expression of

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 206-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 208.

<sup>5</sup> *Loc. cit.*, pp. 111, 172.

an activity which is timeless. Such a view brings us full face against the problem of the "reality" of time—a problem made only the more urgent for us when we recall that both for Alexander and Bergson time is either the ultimate reality, or at least its essential mode of being. For Alexander, the whole evolutionary process is the outcome of the inherent "go" (so to speak) of time, of its creative restlessness. Bergson's *élan*, similarly, creates its inexhaustible novelties in the medium of real time. The Universe, as the Italian neo-Idealists say, is historical through and through. Yet, for evolutionists, its nature is historical in a peculiar sense. For, the past is not simply lost. Successive novelties emerge, but the results of earlier emergencies persist and condition the later. Matter comes before life in the temporal order of evolution, life comes before mind. But, also, life could not emerge except in material bodies, nor mind except in material and living bodies. Thus, the history is cumulative. The new emergents are added to, incorporated with, the pre-existing stock and the universe from stage to stage of these changes is enriched. Creative evolution clearly belies the old principle, *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. For it there is always more in the "effect" (the later stage) than there was in the "cause" (the earlier stage). Yet, it might have been thought that the dialectical weaknesses of such a construction had been explored more than enough, and its inherent contradictions exhibited once and for all. When the concept of evolution is applied on a cosmic scale to the universe *as a whole*, and time is declared to be real in order that the universe *as a whole* may successively be enriched by emergent novelties, it becomes necessary to rehearse once again the familiar criticisms, if only lest the speculative alternative which they imply be overlooked by a generation which is apt to be better versed in science than in philosophy. Here is the logic of the matter: "The whole cannot change. The whole I take to mean the universe,

all that in any sense is. It cannot change, because any change introduces something that is, and this, *ex hypothesi*, falls within the whole. The whole, if it changes, was not the whole, but something less. All that is includes all that can be; there can be nothing more than it."<sup>6</sup> Apply this to a cosmos in evolution. At any given stage we have "all that is." Presently, something new emerges and *is now*, in addition to what was there before, and still continues to be. Moreover, the new emerges out of what was there before, and requires, for its own existence, the continuance of what was there before. Is this really intelligible? And why does the emergent emerge just when it does and neither sooner nor later? I have no wish to be guilty of caricature, but the recipe for the sort of "creative evolution" by which the universe is supposed to evolve as a whole seems to be this: Assume that, at the start, something is going on, and anything may happen thereafter. Does this criticism, then, deny the fact of evolution? On the contrary, dialectical arguments never deny any genuine fact. They only show it to be "appearance," not "reality." Or, to put this point less technically: the subject of which we can truly predicate that it evolves in time is something less than the whole universe. Logically, it is a question of the "context" within which such a judgment is true; and "context" means that the subject is not the universe as a whole. Such a series as Matter-Life-Mind, or whatever else we take the order of evolutionary stages to be, may easily deceive us on this point. If it is expanded into the judgment that there was a time when the universe *as a whole* was nothing but matter, that next it (the universe) became living matter, and finally mind-endowed matter, the result is a metaphysical blunder. If "life" and "mind" have evolved from "matter," the only possible inference is that the universe was, and is, more than "matter." Thus,

<sup>6</sup> B. Bosanquet, *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 177.



time and evolution fall within it, and its nature as a whole is still to seek, and all that we experience in time, and infer to have existed, or to have come to be, in time, helps to reveal (i. e., contributes to our knowledge of) its nature as a whole. "The histories which are within the universe bring an eternal world into our experience."

Thus, the transference of the concept of evolution from its original biological context to the universe as a whole raises inevitably a complex of familiar speculative problems—the possibility of conceiving the existence of the whole universe as a temporal process; the unity of the universe in its self-enrichment by successively emerging novelties; the nature of the universe as a whole in the light of all its manifestations. It is where it raises these problems, openly or by implication, that evolutionism challenges comparison most pointedly with other types of speculative philosophy. In my judgment, the comparison is not in favor of evolutionism, for—speaking generally—the representatives of cosmic evolution ignore the dialectical difficulties inherent in their position, and, so far as they are "naturalists," they strive to fit their metaphysics into the framework of science, instead of treating the scientific view of the world in the wider context of what the whole range of human experience and thought reveals of the nature of the universe.

## II

Next to evolution itself, the topic of most philosophical interest and importance in evolutionary naturalism is knowledge.

<sup>7</sup> Bosanquet, *loc. cit.*, p. 190. For brevity's sake, I have touched above only on the abstractly logical side of the argument. Its other sides, involving especially the interpretation of moral and religious experience, are worth following up in Bosanquet's *Meeting of Extremes*. Cf. also my article on "Neo-Realism and Religion" in *Harvard Theological Review*, April, 1918.

On its "naturalistic" side, the most prominent motive in evolutionary naturalism is to fit mind and knowledge as "natural phenomena" into the context of nature. To treat mind (and knowledge as one of the functions of mind) as a phenomenon among other phenomena, conditioned by others, conditioning others in its turn, is the program. On this side, therefore, evolutionary naturalism is "realist" in character and aligns itself with other forms of modern realism against all forms of idealism which assign to mind in one way or another the central position in the universe. The concept of evolution furnishes here a convenient weapon against the *esse est percipi* principle which realists regard as the cardinal principle of idealism. For, if mind is accepted as a late emergent in the course of evolution, it follows obviously that the existence of the universe, prior to the emergence of mind, cannot be supposed to consist in its being perceived by mind. Nor is it only the *esse est percipi* principle which is thus overthrown, but a whole host of other philosophical difficulties is cleared out of the way at the same time. Notably, so Professor Sellars tells us, we get rid of the metaphysical dualism of Descartes and with it the soul-body problem conceived in terms of the interaction of two heterogeneous substances; also of the further (Kantian) dualism of a world of *facts* distinct from a world of *values*. Again, in epistemology, we avoid the separation of subject (Knower) and object (Known) as if they belonged to different worlds, and as if the subject knew only its own mental states ("subjectivism" eked out by the fiction of a "copy-theory" of truth). In short, evolutionary naturalism, on its realist side, sets itself, in Alexander's words, to "order mind to its proper place in the world of things."

Now, broadly speaking, it is easy to agree with evolutionary naturalism in its denials. The question is whether

its affirmations will stand. Does it really succeed in explaining knowledge as a natural phenomenon?

Before, however, we can examine this question, we must, in passing note the fact that realists, whilst agreeing on the program of treating mind as a natural phenomenon in a world which is independent of being apprehended by mind, differ widely from each other in what they assign to "mind" and what to "world" in their analyses of knowledge (or the "cognitive relation"). The "Critical" realists here oppose the "New" and the "Naive" realists, as we all know. Is the physical world, when object of apprehension, immanent in experience or does it remain transcendent? On this question the battle rages between "epistemological monists" and "epistemological dualists." Alexander limits mind to "enjoyed" acts of apprehension and treats whatever is apprehended as non-mental, independent reality. Sellars and Lloyd Morgan treat what is apprehended as mental, subjective, even "intra-organic," but referable to a non-mental independent reality. It would be easy to play the part of *textius gaudens*, and point to this fratricidal conflict among fellow-realists as presumptive evidence of a fundamental instability in the whole realist position. But, though many a telling debating-point might be scored by playing off realist against realist, I would rather examine the position on its merits. Only, for reasons of space, I must confine myself on this occasion to the examination of the "dualist" position as maintained with substantial agreement<sup>8</sup> by Lloyd Morgan and Sellars.

I draw attention, at once, to what is the crucial point, viz., the "naturalistic" context in which the analysis of mind and knowledge is to be undertaken. All context amounts to so many *presuppositions* taken for granted, and determining, as points antecedently fixed, the course of the subsequent analysis. The theory of mind and knowl-

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, *Appendix*, for the extent of this agreement.

edge to be constructed must square, so to speak, with the context initially assumed. Now, if this context is borrowed wholesale, as the "evolutionary naturalist" does borrow it, from the *sciences*—from biology, physiology, psychology—it follows that knowledge is used to explain and justify knowledge in a way which involves an illegitimate circle. For, the context of "nature," in which knowledge is to be explained as a natural phenomenon, is itself assumed to be known. Hence, whatever is said about knowledge as a phenomenon in this context must be consistent with the context itself being known, i. e., being what we think it to be. But if the account given of knowledge as a phenomenon in nature is such that it throws doubt on our knowledge of nature, i. e., on our claim that nature is what, in certain sciences, we think it to be, the argument destroys its own basis; the conclusion invalidates the premises on which it rests. Every science, as a branch of knowledge, reveals the nature of the objects with which it deals. To say that science "reveals" the nature of its objects is equivalent to saying that the objects really are what, as scientists, we perceive and think them to be, and this again, is equivalent to saying that we "know" the objects or that they "are known." To treat knowledge in *this* sense as a natural phenomenon, to be accounted for in a context conceived in biological and psychological terms, involves the circle of explaining and justifying our right to say that we "know," e. g., the physical world (i. e., that the physical world is what we think it to be), by means of an argument which, in employing as its premisses certain scientific theories of the nature of that world, takes that right for granted all along.

To put the criticism in another way: When we say that we "know," we claim for what we perceive and think a certain value, viz., "truth"-value, or a certain function, viz., the function of revealing the nature of the object as it is.



Now, under the title of "theory of knowledge" we may attempt *one* or *other* of two things, but we must *not* attempt *both* together, on pain of committing the vicious circle argument which I am concerned to expose. (1) We may either offer a theory of knowledge (or knowing) as an *event* or a sequence of *events*, occurring under *known* conditions in an individual mind. We can then make these conditions as "naturalistic" as we like, i. e., we can bring in, and base ourselves on, all else that is known and is relevant to our problem. We can use, without qualms, all the resources of physiology and biology, for we shall be using their propositions precisely not as events in any individual mind, but as "truths," i. e., as revelations of the real world in its bearing on the events to be explained here, i. e., on the perceptions and thoughts considered as events in an individual mind. In explaining these perceptions and thoughts as events, we either abstract from, or take for granted—it does not matter how we put it—their cognitive function, their character as knowing, i. e., as revealing the nature of objects. (2) On the other hand, we may mean by "theory of knowledge" an inquiry into the truth-value, truth-claim, reality-revealing function—call it what we will—of perceiving, thinking, reasoning *as such*. If this is our problem, we have no right to take the reality-revealing function of *some* cognitive acts for granted in order to justify our faith in the reality-revealing function of *all* cognitive acts. We have no right to start by assuming of certain systems of perceptions and thoughts, viz., those constituting certain sciences, that they reveal the real world, in order, on that basis, to explain and justify the reality-revealing function of perceptions and thoughts in general, including those entering into the texture of those sciences. Such a procedure would be parallel to lifting oneself up by one's own boot straps. In short, the circular argument of which I accuse the evolutionary natural-

ists consists in this that they mix up the theory of the occurrence of cognitive *events* with the theory of their cognitive (reality-revealing) *function*.

At bottom, the evolutionary naturalist's difficulties are due to the fact that his theory is simply an instance of a class of theories the common character of which is that they treat knowledge, in its character of "truth" or of "revelation of reality," as an empirically observable and describable relation between empirically observable and describable existents. But all such relations between such existents are objects of knowledge, are known. And no analysis of them, however searching or subtle, can explain or justify our confidence that they really are what we think them to be. The study of the "cognitive relation," as an empirical relation between empirical existents, and, therefore, as an object of "science"—this study, I say, presupposes the truth-value or reality-revealing function of the acts of perceiving and thinking by which we study this relation or (for that matter) anything else. This truth-value, or reality-revealing function, cannot, therefore, be made to depend on the issue of an argument which presupposes it all the time, and which, without that presupposition, could have no possible issue at all.

My argument, so far, has been in the nature of prosecuting counsel's speech for the prosecution. It is high time that I should now substantiate my charge by outlining, however briefly, the essential features of the evidence. Both Lloyd Morgan and Sellars begin with the typical "naturalistic" context. From the point of view of emergent evolution, so Lloyd Morgan reminds us, consciousness, or "conscious relatedness," as he generally prefers to say, has a history of bewildering complexity, for it comes late in evolution, and "requires the effective go of life as that requires the primary go of physical events."<sup>9</sup> Similarly, Sellars tells

<sup>9</sup> *Emergent Evolution*, p. 90.

us, that to understand knowledge we must regard it as a specialized activity on the part of percipients who, as psychophysical organisms, are scattered over the surface of the earth.<sup>10</sup> In such a context, the percipient or knower, must obviously be identified with the organism, the living body, surrounded by other bodies existentially distinct from it. For the percipient to know any other body (incidentally, what about knowing his own?), his body must enter into some sort of physical relationship with the other body. There must be stimulation (Lloyd Morgan's "advenient influence") from the one side and response from the other. But always the body perceived will remain "existentially distinct" from the percipient organism: it will transcend the latter; it will be "external" to it; it will remain literally where it always was—outside the other's skin. Meanwhile, the perceiving, as a conscious process or experience, together with all the nervous processes which it "involves" (Morgan), or with which it "is identical" (Sellars) will be existentially *in* the percipient. Whence it follows that the physical body known can never be brought into the field of experience, can never be an existential component thereof.<sup>11</sup> Interest now shifts to what goes on in the percipient's mind. There will be an "object" (Sellars), a "content" (Morgan), but, as mental and intra-organic, it will be existentially distinct from the external physical "thing" (Sellars) "object" (Morgan). It will be a mental sign of (Morgan), a "mental substitution for" (Sellars) the external thing. If we ask, How do we know it is a sign or what it is a sign for? we are told that we know it by an act of "acknowledgement," a "credal act," "not amounting to proof" (Morgan); by an act of "affirmation," which is not an inference, which is instinc-

<sup>10</sup> Paraphrased and abbreviated from an article on "Cognition and Valuation," p. 128 in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXV, No. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. here Sellars's article, "Concerning Transcendence and Bifurcation," in *Mind*, Vol. XXXI, No. 121.

tive, which constitutes the cognitive function of mind, which "grasps" the very object, existentially distinct though the latter remains all the time (Sellars). If we ask for evidence of these acts and of their power to transcend the contents of the individual's own mind, we are referred back to physiology and biology. Thus Sellars: "This approach enables us to discover the factors in the total experience of perceiving responsible for the element we called the affirmation of the object. The attitude or set of the organism in perception floods consciousness with a sense of something co-real to which it is responding."<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Lloyd Morgan, beginning with an "external world, in which things lie at a distance from the organism," and distinguishing thus the minded (=what is present to consciousness) from the acknowledged thing which exists outside the organism and its consciousness, declares that "behaviour towards *this* or *that* thing is the natural progenitor, under emergent evolution, of conscious reference to *this* or *that* object." Such is the "epigenetic origin" of the "projicient reference" which turns mental signs into knowledge—by faith, be it remembered, not by proof—of the non-mental thing.

If, lastly, we ask, What is the nature of the transcendent thing and how far do mental contents reveal that nature? I must confess that I have found no unambiguous answer in Lloyd Morgan. We have to make the best we can of such a statement as the following: "The properties which render physical things objective in mind are projiciently

<sup>12</sup> See article on "Epistemological Dualism versus Metaphysical Dualism," in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXX, No. 5, p. 487. The phrase "total experience of perceiving," in the above quotation, can hardly be meant to refer to the content of the percipient's consciousness. For, even if it be granted that the organism's motor-set contributes something to the content of consciousness, this could amount to a knowledge of the existence of a "co-real" beyond the organism only after affirmation has done its work, not before it, or in lieu of it.



referred to these things.”<sup>18</sup> By comparison, Sellars is both clear and ingenious, in that, refusing to conceive the physical existent as a “thing” in which sensuous “qualities” inhere, and rejecting any copying of qualities by the mental content, he boldly asserts an “identity of pattern” between transcendent thing and mental object. The physical thing is “patterned or ordered stuff” (what sort of stuff?), the mental object is also patterned or ordered stuff, but a different sort of stuff. Thus the two stuffs are existentially and numerically different, but the pattern in both is identical (being a universal). Hence, so far as identity of pattern reaches, the mental object enables us to know the nature of the transcendent physical thing, the existence of which we already know by “affirmation.”

I submit that in this summary of Sellars's and Lloyd Morgan's views an attentive eye will discover all the symptoms of the fallacy which I diagnosed above. First, various natural sciences are used as premises for the conclusion that the objects (or contents) of consciousness occur within the organism as part of its response to stimulation by physical objects other than it. Next, we are reminded that these mental and intra-organic objects (or contents) have a cognitive function. By means of them the organism knows itself as a physical thing in a world of physical things. They are the stuff of which the sciences themselves are made. But how invest them with a function which, in themselves, they are patently incapable of discharging? The answer is, By affirmation or acknowledgment, because these are the equivalent in consciousness of motor-response outside of consciousness. In scholastic language: affirmation is the *causa cognoscendi* of motor response to an independent physical world, which world, evoking motor-response, is the *causa essendi* of affirma-

<sup>18</sup> This leaves obscure both what exactly these properties are (e. g., secondary qualities as well as primary), and whether the projicient reference of properties to things is meant to be equivalent to the judgment that things really are so, or implies merely the relation of sign to significate. I suspect the latter.

tion. If this is not a circular movement from mental event to cognitive function and back again, what is?

Hence, I can not agree with Sellar's criticism of Whitehead,<sup>14</sup> for excluding theory of knowledge from his theory of nature, and restricting the latter to "the relations *inter se* of things known, abstracted from the bare fact that they are known." It is possible to include mind and knowledge in nature by treating them simply as events, as, indeed, they are treated by psychology. But it is not possible to answer, in the context of nature and of any natural science, the question, Is nature (or anything else) really what we experience and judge it to be? Yet this is what we mean when we say that we "know" nature (or anything else). So far as "idealists" have always seen the difference between these two points of view and pursued the latter on its merits into the distinction between "reality" and "appearances," which are yet "degrees of reality," they may claim to have done work of abiding value, which evolutionary naturalists, and others, forget or ignore at their peril.

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<sup>14</sup> See *loc. cit.*, *Mind*, Vol. XXXI, No. 121, p. 39.

## INSTRUMENTALISM

LATE in the seventies of the last century two singularly gifted Americans, working on independent problems, arrived at original conclusions bearing on the nature and function of human thinking. Out of the amalgamation of their views a new philosophy took its rise. The better known published result of these labors is a paper by Charles S. Peirce. In recent philosophic literature frequent reference has been made to his article, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," which appeared in January, 1878. In this article he attacked the doctrine that the clearness of an idea is an abstract quality which the idea wears on its face, discoverable by sufficiently persistent introspection. In contrast to this notion, Peirce maintained that "there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice."<sup>1</sup> He insisted that at the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be, we come down to what is tangible and practical. "Our idea of anything," accordingly, "is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself."<sup>2</sup> Or, to put it in another way: "The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule

<sup>1</sup> Peirce, C. S.: *Chance, Love, and Logic* (New York, 1923), p. 44. (Reprinted from *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. 12, pp. 286-302.)

of action, then no mere difference in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes."<sup>3</sup> The position was summarized by Peirce in this much-quoted passage: "Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."<sup>4</sup>

In so far as a philosophic movement may be said to have begun at a definite time, this essay has been taken to mark the beginning of Pragmatism. The word does not appear in the essay, although Peirce had been using it for two or three years in philosophical conversations;<sup>5</sup> but pragmatic doctrine is obviously there, and it is presented with perspicuity and force. As Peirce declares, his theory is the outgrowth of his laboratory experience. It is the expression of an attempt to slough concepts which have their "only true place in philosophies which have long been extinct," and to introduce the experimental, laboratory temper of mind into the whole range of human thinking. Thus the instrumental character of ideas is made to appear. They are shown to be rules of action, experimental means employed by man to get himself forward in the world.

In the same month and year was published the first essay from the pen of William James, under the title, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence."<sup>6</sup> The essay is sufficiently remarkable in itself, but it is even more significant as the prelude to all that James did as writer and philosopher. Not only is it written in the clean, fluent, urbane style for which James later became well known;

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>5</sup> *Monist*, Vol. XV, p. 166, note.

<sup>6</sup> In the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, January, 1878, Vol. XII, pp. 1-18. Reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews*, New York, 1920, pp. 43-68. This paper had been preceded by book reviews and literary notices extending through a period of ten years in which, as we can now see, there were adumbrations of what was to come.



not only does it exhibit the same catholicity of interest, analytical keenness, and constructive imagination conspicuous in his maturer years; but it presents and defends the teleological conception of the human mind, of which his philosophy as a whole is the enriched and deepened elaboration. Rejecting the conception of mental activity which regards it as an act of corresponding to a world antecedently given, he argues that "interests which we bring with us, and simply posit or take our stand upon, are the very flour out of which our mental dough is kneaded. The organism of thought, from the vague dawn of discomfort or ease in the polyp to the intellectual joy of Laplace among his formulas, is teleological through and through."<sup>7</sup> Again, in a penetrating passage prophetic of what James, as pragmatist, was to contend for, he says: "I, for my part, cannot escape the consideration, forced upon me at every turn, that the knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foothold anywhere, and passively reflecting an order that he comes upon and finds simply existing. The knower is an actor, and co-efficient of the truth on one side, whilst on the other he registers the truth which he helps to create. Mental interests, hypotheses, postulates, so far as they are bases for human action—action which to a great extent transforms the world—help to *make* the truth which they declare. In other words, there belongs to mind, from its birth upward, a spontaneity, a vote. It is in the game, and not a mere looker-on; and its judgments of the *should-be*, its ideals, cannot be peeled off from the body of the *cogitandum* as if they were excrescences, or meant, at most, survival."<sup>8</sup>

This essay—which clearly enunciates the active, reconstructive character of human intelligence and emphasizes the validity of such non-cognitive elements of experience as preferences and ideals, and which presages the doctrine

<sup>7</sup> James, William: *Collected Essays and Reviews*, p. 61.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

that truth is a working-value of ideas—is a second source of Pragmatism. The word source is used in the face of what we know to have been James's intellectual obligations to Peirce. When, twenty years after this time, James inaugurated the pragmatist movement so to speak officially, he acknowledged his indebtedness to Peirce in the handsome manner characteristic of him.<sup>9</sup> And the acknowledgment had its basis in fact. He had known Peirce, who was only three years his senior, from at least his nineteenth year, and he was a member of the Metaphysical Club, started by Peirce, where in the early seventies "the name and the doctrine of pragmatism saw the light."<sup>10</sup> There can be no doubt that Peirce's logical genius had an influence on the more artistic temperament of James. But James did more than merely develop the ideas he got from Peirce—which is the impression one is apt to carry away from what has been written on the subject.<sup>11</sup> Letters and memoranda dating from the years 1869-1872—the critical period in James's emotional and intellectual life—make it sufficiently clear that the germinal idea of the philosophy advanced in his first printed essay was born out of a struggle so intimate, personal, and momentous that he hid the depth of it from those about him. The problem was a moral or religious, rather than, as with Peirce, a logical one. It con-

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 410.

<sup>10</sup> *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIII, 719.

<sup>11</sup> There are some exceptions. See especially A. K. Rogers: *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, New York, 1922, p. 359ff.

It is true that Peirce, repudiating James' brand of Pragmatism, says, "No doubt he derived his ideas on the subject from me" (*Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIII, p. 719). But the remark must be understood in its context. Peirce is not implying that James takes credit for ideas which he had in fact borrowed. On that question we have this statement from Peirce: "There never was the smallest disloyalty on James's part. On the contrary, he dragged in mention of me whenever he could." (*Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIII, p. 719.) He is objecting to the strange doctrines which James has introduced. He feels that he must acknowledge responsibility for such *true* pragmatic elements as James's philosophy may include, but he wishes it understood that the philosophy current under the name Pragmatism differs profoundly from the theory that had its rise with him. (Cf. Peirce's reasons for changing the name Pragmatism to Pragmaticism. *Monist*, Vol. XV, p. 162.) See also, Violet Paget's stimulating book, *Vital Lies*, London, 1912, more particularly Vol. I, Chap. 1.

cerned man's place in the universe, a problem which at the time was disturbing many thoughtful youths who had come under the influence of Herbert Spencer's universalization of Evolution.<sup>12</sup> Put in a sentence the problem was this: Is man impotent and meaningless in the whole of things or are human individuality and power of initiative real? And until he had hit upon what seemed at least a possible way of validating man's significance, James was weighed down by a sense of frustration. How deeply depressed he was is vividly suggested by his portrayal of the experience which, thirty years later, he incorporated in his treatment of the "sick soul" in *Varieties of Religious Experience*, there attributing it to an anonymous "French correspondent."<sup>13</sup> "If I had not clung to scripture-texts like *The eternal God is my refuge*, etc. [so the account concludes] I think I should have grown really insane."<sup>14</sup>

Under date of April 30, 1870, a new note is sounded. "I think," James writes, "that yesterday was a crisis in my life. . . . Hitherto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative, like daring to act originally, without carefully waiting for contemplation of the external world to determine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring into; now I will go a step further with my will, not only act with it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality and creative power. My belief, to be sure, *can't* be optimistic—but I will posit life (the real, the good) in the self-governing resistance of the ego to the world. Life shall [be built in] doing and suffering and creating."<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> James's friend, John Fiske, had no difficulty in turning Evolution to moral and religious account, but Fiske was incurably optimistic. The two friends debated a phase of the subject in the *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. XLVI, pp. 441ff.; XLVII, pp. 75ff. And in connection with this debate James good-naturedly acknowledged a "spanking." James's article is reprinted in *The Will to Believe*, Chap. 7. See also Clark, J. S., *John Fiske*, Vol. II, pp. 192-199. Mr. Clark does not understand James and he is too worshipful of Fiske ever to question his position.

<sup>13</sup> *Letters*, Vol. I, pp. 144-147.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 148.

This note of victory was immediately induced by the reading of Renouvier, and James, it is well known, remained all his life "endlessly thankful" for the decisive impression made upon him at this time by Renouvier's "masterly advocacy of pluralism," but for which he fears he might never have freed himself from what he calls the "monistic superstition."<sup>16</sup> James's debt to Peirce, as we have indicated, was not of a superficial sort; it is expressed with his unfailing aptness in the dedication of *The Will to Believe*.<sup>17</sup> But it was Renouvier who touched the deeper need of his being; who gave him a supporting push at a critical stage in the ascent to a point of vision.<sup>18</sup>

It must not be forgotten that the man who is influenced has something to do with the influence. Unquestionably the 1878 essay owed much to others. James was an extraordinarily wide, appreciative, and meditative reader. It owed even more to the unique genius of its author. And this is true of his work as a whole. The contributions made by himself not only far outweighed what he took from others, but he gave to his philosophy the rare quality peculiar to it. There can be no doubt that James would have acknowledged the important bearing of his own mental and emotional idiosyncrasy; would have admitted that he became the Pragmatist he did become because (borrowing words of his own) the instability of his brain was "such as to tip and upset itself in just that particular direction."<sup>19</sup> We, looking back upon his thought from a position which sets it in perspective, can recognize that the philosophic current which he caused to move into the spiritual life of his time, while affected by the confluence of streams of in-

<sup>16</sup> James, William, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, p. 165.

<sup>17</sup> "To My Old Friend, Charles Sanders Peirce, To whose philosophic comradeship in old times and to whose writings in more recent years I owe more incitement and help than I can express or repay."

<sup>18</sup> See, among other things, *Letters*, Vol. I, 186. Cf. pp. 80, 149.

<sup>19</sup> "Great Men and Their Environment," in *The Will to Believe*, p. 249. This essay is of peculiar interest in this connection.



fluence, yet owed its volume, its contour, and its rhythm chiefly to James himself.<sup>20</sup>

When these essays by Peirce and James were published, a youth of nineteen was completing his college course in Burlington, Vermont, who was to give to Pragmatism the developed form by which it will probably be known in the history of thought. Graduating a year later, John Dewey had already heard the call of philosophy, but it was not a philosophy which reflected the American scene. That phase was still to come. Mr. Dewey began, as he himself tells us, as a Neo-Kantian.<sup>21</sup> As late as the beginning of the present century Peirce refused to accept him as a pragmatist, placing him with those who "hover between Absolute Idealism and Sensationalism."<sup>22</sup> This characterization overlooked developments which had been taking place for at least a decade. At the moment it was written Mr. Dewey was collaborating with Drs. Ashley, Gore, Heidel, McLennan, Moore, Stuart, and Thompson on a volume entitled *Studies in Logical Theory*, which, upon its publication in 1903, laid the foundation of the instrumental

<sup>20</sup> The limits set for this paper do not permit a discussion of Hans Vaihinger's *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*, a notable work also dating from the period under discussion and showing striking affinities with Pragmatism. The teleological character of mental activity, the instrumental function of ideas, the creative conception of truth—these, and other doctrines congenial to the pragmatic temper, are brilliantly defended. The erudition and originality of the author are conspicuous. Unfortunately the book was not published until 1911, a year after James's death. One can easily imagine the reception he would have endeavored to secure for it. The English translation did not appear in America until 1924. The reception of Vaihinger's work by the American pragmatists has scarcely been hearty. He, on his side, seemed anxious (in the Preface written nearly a generation after the completion of the book) to avoid being classed with the pragmatists. In a letter to the writer in the spring of 1925, Vaihinger explains that his objections were not aimed at James, Dewey, or any form of "critical Pragmatism," but at the "uncritical Pragmatism" which ignorantly distorts and exaggerates what is valuable in this philosophy. This regrettable failure in mutual acquaintance and understanding is well considered in James Gutmann's recent review of Vaihinger's book. (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 77-80.) I think with him that "there seems to be here an interesting and unconsidered instance of a significant community of thought." And I hope with him, that it may be replaced by "an international 'comparing of notes'."

<sup>21</sup> *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Vol. XXIX, p. 423. Reprinted in *Studies in the History of Ideas*, N. Y., 1925, Vol. II, p. 368.

<sup>22</sup> *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, p. 720.

school. James, with his usual sensitiveness and quickness of appreciation, hailed the book with enthusiasm. "I have the duty on Monday," he wrote, "of reporting at a 'Philosophical Conference' on the Chicago School of Thought. Chicago University has during the last six months given birth to the fruit of its ten years of gestation under John Dewey. The result is wonderful—a *real school*, and *real Thought*. Important thought, too! Did you ever hear of such a city or such a University! Here we have thought, but no school. At Yale a school, but no thought. Chicago has both."<sup>23</sup> Mr. Dewey's four chapters of thoroughly pragmatistic doctrine had been preceded, in 1900, by his equally pragmatistic paper, "Some Stages in Logical Thought," and the instrumentalism thus avowed has been expanded, deepened, and clarified during the intervening quarter of a century.

It is not without significance that Mr. Dewey, on completing college, broke with the tradition of going abroad for graduate work, and, instead, joined the small group of able young men who took advantage of the opportunity for graduate study then newly offered at Johns Hopkins. Nor is it without significance that he sought his career, although an academic one, not in the ripened East, but in the unformed society of the West. Although born in New England, he was a child of America. His academic service began in Minnesota only a decade and a half after the close of the Civil War, and his formative years, as a pragmatist, were spent in Chicago. From Michigan, in one of his earliest papers, published nearly forty years ago, at a time when democracy was under fire in the older centers of education, he became philosophic spokesman for the democratic ideal.<sup>24</sup> He was then a Neo-Kantian, and the paper shows interesting traces of this; nevertheless in his

<sup>23</sup> *Letters*, Vol. II, pp. 201-202.

<sup>24</sup> "The Ethics of Democracy," in *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, Second Series, No. 1 (1888).

defense and interpretation of democracy he laid down a cardinal principle of the philosophy now known as Instrumentalism. Democracy, as an instrument of a shared and progressively ennobled common life, has been and is the central aim of those who belong to this school of Pragmatism. A. W. Moore, one of the keenest, most valiant instrumentalists, finds it an implication of Pragmatism that "social organization be essentially (whatever its name) that of a social democracy as against all forms of hierarchy";<sup>25</sup> while B. H. Bode, another of the gifted leaders of this pragmatic persuasion, voices his faith in these words: "The whole drift of things has been towards the interpretation of the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness in the sense that we are members one of another, with a common share in our common life. No one, not even the humblest citizen is to serve simply as a hewer of wood and a drawer of water; but everyone is to be recognized as a member of a great brotherhood, and to share in the opportunities, the achievements, and the aspirations which are our common possessions. There are to be no peasants, no serfs, as there are no hereditary privileges and titles, because each citizen is to rise to the full stature of his spiritual manhood, even as a son in his father's house."<sup>26</sup> From J. H. Tufts, an outstanding member of the group, we have an illuminating study of the historical development of democracy intended to give us a juster and finer appreciation of our form of society;<sup>27</sup> and it need scarcely be mentioned that one of Mr. Dewey's most influential books is called *Democracy and Education*. One cannot read the writings of instrumentalists without sensing the depth of their democratic convictions. They think of Pragmatism as the philosophic counterpart of the democratic movement in

<sup>25</sup> *Pragmatism and Its Critics*, Chicago, 1910, p. 22. Cf. p. 72.

<sup>26</sup> From an address on "Our Great American Tradition," printed in *School and Home Education*, Vol. XLI, p. 94 (1922). See also *Fundamentals of Education*, New York, 1921, Chap. III.

<sup>27</sup> *Our Democracy, Its Origins and Its Tasks*, New York, 1917.

modern society, and it would not be wrong to say that for most of them Democracy is Religion.

This interest in democracy is no more characteristic than the sort of democracy it is attached to. In the early article by Mr. Dewey he stresses the necessity of making a distinction between the numerical and ethical concept. "To define democracy simply as the rule of the many," he there says, "as sovereignty chopped up into mince meat, is to define it as the abrogation of society, as society dissolved, annihilated."<sup>28</sup> Against this conception, conceived after the analogy of the abstractions of physical science, he objects throughout the paper. "There is an individualism in democracy," he admits, "which there is not in aristocracy; but it is an ethical, not a numerical individualism; it is an individualism of freedom, of responsibility, of initiative to and for the ideal, not an individualism of lawlessness. In one word, democracy means that *personality* is the first and final reality. . . . It holds that the spirit of personality dwells in every individual and that the choice to develop it must proceed from that individual."<sup>29</sup> And this he goes on to show involves democracy of wealth and industry, a society in which "all industrial relations are to be regarded as subordinate to human relations," in which economic and industrial life shall be a social function.<sup>30</sup> In more recent writings the emphasis is upon *distinctness* of personality. Society is deemed democratically efficient to the extent that it develops the incommensurable something which constitutes its citizens individuals. For "if democracy has a moral and an ideal meaning," says Mr. Dewey now, "it is that a social return be demanded from all and that opportunity for development of distinctive qualities be afforded all."<sup>31</sup> But this is the same conception fashioned

<sup>28</sup> *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, as cited, p. 7.

<sup>29</sup> *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

<sup>31</sup> *Democracy and Education*, p. 142.



in response to contemporary needs. It is at any rate democracy after this pattern—a life together which shall enhance the significance of each life—that these gentlemen have at heart and aim to conceptualize. Under the spell of this vision they speak in glowing terms such as these: “Democracy and the one, the ultimate, ethical ideal of humanity are to my mind synonyms.”<sup>32</sup> “This great national faith in the common man is the first political recognition, on a large scale, of the immeasurable worth of the individual human soul. It is our national holy of holies, the shining ideal which we call America the Beautiful.”<sup>33</sup> And if it be objected that such interests, while becoming to a social reformer, derogate from the dignity of a philosopher, an answer is at hand in Mr. Dewey’s latest book. “Social Reform,” he says, “is conceived in a Philistine spirit if it is taken to mean anything less than precisely the liberation and expansion of the meanings of which experience is capable. . . . Nothing but the best, the richest and fullest experience possible, is good enough for man.”<sup>34</sup> What therefore can be nearer to philosophy than the problem of rendering this best more general, more significant, and more secure, through the comprehensive criticisms of values?

Closely related to the social theory of Instrumentalism is its psychological theory. On the face of it, this is behavioristic. “I should also like to point out,” says Mr. Dewey in reference to a series of articles, “that the essays in their psychological phases are written from the standpoint of what is now termed behavioristic psychology.”<sup>35</sup> And this is certainly supported by many passages that might be cited from his writings, such as this one: “Concrete habits do all the perceiving, recognizing, imagining, recall-

<sup>32</sup> Mr. Dewey, in *University of Michigan Philosophical Papers*, p. 28.

<sup>33</sup> Bode, in *School and Home Education*, p. 94.

<sup>34</sup> *Experience and Nature*, pp. 411, 412. For some direct applications of this interest see Smith, T. V., *Notes on the American Doctrine of Equality*, Chicago, 1925; Thayer, V. T., “Democratic School Administration. in *Educational Administration and Supervision*, Vol. II, 361ff.

<sup>35</sup> *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. vi.

ing, judging, conceiving, and reasoning that is done."<sup>36</sup> Or again: "A mind or consciousness or soul in general which performs these operations is a myth";<sup>37</sup> and "the scientific man and the philosopher like the carpenter, the physician and politician know with their habits not with their 'consciousness'."<sup>38</sup> Yet in close proximity to these passages appear others of a different purport. The reader is told that habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not of itself stop to think, observe, or remember."<sup>39</sup> And a few sentences further on, the knowledge which lives in habits is denied to be knowledge, except by courtesy; and knowledge, in the strict sense, is said to be "knowledge *of* and *about* things, knowledge *that* things are thus and so, knowledge that involves reflection and conscious appreciation."<sup>40</sup> To which must be added the fact that the most widely known behaviorist is peculiarly anxious to protect behaviorism from being contaminated by pragmatic psychology,<sup>41</sup> and that the leading pragmatist reciprocates by accusing behavioristic psychology of "aping the manners of physics."<sup>42</sup> It is clear, then, that the movement with which the behavioristic tendency originated and which has steadily extended the range of the behavioristic principle of explanation, is yet fundamentally antagonistic to *pure* behaviorism.<sup>43</sup>

The difference between pragmatic and pure behaviorism has developed three main foci. The latter theory reduces human behavior solely to "a segment of the cosmic move-

<sup>36</sup> *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 177.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 182. A thoroughly characteristic discussion is Ethel Sabin's brilliant paper, "Giving Up the Ghost, in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVII.

<sup>39</sup> *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 177.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>41</sup> Watson, J. B.: *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, Phila., 1924 (2nd Ed.), pp. vii-viii.

<sup>42</sup> Dewey, J., in *The New Republic*, Vol. XLV, p. 361.

<sup>43</sup> This antagonism to behavioristic exaggeration is already suggested in Peirce's criticism of James's sensationalism, and James's criticism of Spencer's mechanical conception of mental action.

ment continuum,"<sup>44</sup> making psychology a branch of mechanical physics; the former insists upon the presence in human behavior of experimental, purposive, and meaningful activity, without which, according to this view, psychology is deprived of subject-matter. Back of this divergence and responsible for it is the determination of one set of investigators to take experience at its face value, and an equal determination of another set of investigators to reject so-called experience as a tissue of illusions and to accept as real only the world of electrons and protons.

If experience is taken as it comes, the instrumentalists hold, and not illegitimately reduced to something else, we must recognize a tentative, feeling-its-way kind of behavior met with nowhere in the realm of mechanics. In such cases the stimulating environment calls forth a variety of competing responses; these block one another, thereby disintegrating activity. The resulting state of the organism is one of equilibrium, of hesitancy. The process of changing this equivocal stimulus into a univocal one, thus making possible a unified response, is thoroughly experimental in character. The various possible competing actions are imaginatively projected and compared, until a mode of activity is achieved which can serve as a direct stimulus to overt action.<sup>45</sup>

Out of this type of experimental behavior grows purposive action, action guided by the thought of foreseen consequences. When a consummation has once been hit upon it may thereafter become an objective, an end of conscious endeavor. These ends do not exist outside of, or distinct from, action; they are instrumental functions of

<sup>44</sup> Weiss, A. P.: *A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior*, Columbus, 1925, p. 80. See also Chap. XVII.

<sup>45</sup> Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 189-198; Bode, B. H.: "What Is Psychology," in *The Psychological Review*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 250-258 (especially pp. 255ff.); "Consciousness and Psychology," in *Creative Intelligence*, New York, 1917, and "Intelligence and Behavior," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 10ff. See also, in the same volume, the highly suggestive discussion of a germane phase of the subject by H. W. Stuart.

behavior; but *in* this behavior they are deliberately employed to shape the course of events. Ends are aims, or, rather, *aimings*, by means of which activity is steadied and directed. Unique in their individual operation, they may nevertheless incorporate past experiences of the actor or draw upon those of others. They are conscious devices which, when employed, transform mere sequence of behavior into coherent projects for attaining foreseen consequences.<sup>46</sup>

A third divergence from Behaviorism grows out of radical disagreement on the subject of meaning. Instrumentalism holds that meanings indubitably occur. They are not psychic entities, though in view of their significance for life it is natural that some thinkers should hypostatize them as essences, thinking of them as by right subsisting eternally in the unchanging realm of spirit, though fortunately captured now and again in a brief, imperfect actualization, bringing sweetness and light to an earthly existence that is brutal and meaningless without them. Meanings are properties of behavior; they have their origin in language, in discourse. Mr. Dewey looks upon communication as the world's supreme wonder, because "it changed dumb creatures—as we significantly call them—into thinking and knowing animals and created the realm of meanings."<sup>47</sup> But language must not be confused with the signal reflexes of animals to which behaviorists would reduce it. Signaling acts are ego-centric, language is participative. A hen's clucking may call forth a response from a chick but it is not induced in any way by the response it calls forth. A gesture, say, gets meaning, as Mr. Mead well expresses the matter, when "the individual takes the attitude of another toward himself, and in some sense arouses in himself the tendency to action, which his con-

<sup>46</sup> See *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part 3, Sections 6-7; *Experience and Nature*, Chap. III.

<sup>47</sup> *Experience and Nature*, p. 166.



duct calls out in the other individual."<sup>48</sup> For "it is not enough that he should indicate this meaning—whatever meaning is—as it exists for himself alone, but that he should indicate that meaning as it exists for the other to whom he is pointing it out."<sup>49</sup> Signals become signs, sounds become words, when they occasion action which takes its specific character from being the common endeavor of at least two centers of activity; when they induce reciprocal cross-reference and joint anticipation which, when acted out, result in a conjoined undertaking, regulated, as to each partner, by his participation in the partnership. And when meanings have developed, they may, as Mr. Dewey says, "be infinitely combined and rearranged in imagination, and the outcome of this inner experimentalism—which is thought—may issue forth in interaction with crude or raw events."<sup>50</sup> Through the experience and expansion of meanings human life attains to the coherence of growth and the enrichment of culture.<sup>51</sup>

The views adumbrated in this too brief survey involve others. If in experience, taken as authoritative, genuine deliberation occurs and issues in the choice of an alternative that adds meaning to existence, then we live in a world which is in a real sense indeterminate; "a real world," as Mr. Mead puts it in one of the profound documents of philosophical literature, "which consists not of an unchanged universe, but of a universe which may be continually readjusted according to the problems arising

<sup>48</sup> Mead, G. H., *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIX, p. 161.

<sup>49</sup> Mead, G. H., *ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>50</sup> *Experience and Nature*, p. 166.

<sup>51</sup> Mead, G. H.: "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," in *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XIX, pp. 157-163. Compare with this his "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," in *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. VII, pp. 397-405. Dewey, J., *Experience and Nature*, Chap. 5. The coming decade should supply us with important data throwing light on the problem of meaning. Mr. Koehler's and Mr. Yerkes' studies of higher apes are reopening the question of the place of deliberately adaptive behavior in animal life. It would seem that pragmatists face the dilemma of granting more "mind" to apes or less to men.

in the consciousness of the individuals in society."<sup>52</sup> There is, then, freedom of action; not freedom to act unconditionally, but freedom in "formulating the ends toward which our conduct shall be directed."<sup>53</sup> In such a world the real and the ideal will be conceived to be continuous in the flux of events; *things* being achieved objects on which we can depend, *ideals* possible objects yet to be made into dependable things. And if the objects of experience are features of reality, ideas which lead us into propitious relation with them are true—true to us in our need. There is, consequently, no quarrel between pragmatistic philosophy and nature. Nature, it is true, is not assimilated to man's desires, but it is recognized as the condition of all achievement; and knowledge is the articulate awareness of the conditions. The quarrel of Pragmatism is with those social, industrial, and economic circumstances, those blind prejudices and customs, those inhibiting concepts regarding man and his environment which stand in the way of higher individual and communal attainment. Its goal is not narrowly utilitarian, as has been so often asserted and as often denied. Room is left, *most* room is left, in Mr. Moore's words, for "objects of contemplation, adoration, love, and worship."<sup>54</sup> It welcomes the opportunity to assist in redeeming knowledge from materialism, and appreciation from tribalism.<sup>55</sup> Rooted in American soil, growing in response to a newer civilization's hunger for higher satisfactions, Pragmatism is precisely the philosophy that strives to discover and to render pervasive and secure all that makes life meaningful and precious. The aim of philosophy so conceived, as we have been told by Mr. Kallen, who takes us back to the immortal James' "is the liberation and enlargement of human capacities, the enfranchisement

<sup>52</sup> Mead, G. H., *In Creative Intelligence*, p. 223.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>54</sup> Moore, A. W.: "Some Lingering Misconceptions of Instrumentalism," in *Journal of Philosophy*, etc., Vol. XVII, p. 515.

<sup>55</sup> Moore, A. W., in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXVII, p. 129.

of man by the actual realization of values. Where it is successful, beauty and use are confluent and identical with it. It converts sight into insight. It infuses existence with value, making them one. It is the concrete incarnation of Creative Idealism."<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Kallen, H. M., in *Creative Intelligence*, p. 467.

## LOGICAL THEORY

THE purpose of the following article is to give an account of some outstanding tendencies in contemporary logical theory in the English-speaking world. One important movement, however, need not demand our attention here. For, what is somewhat inappropriately labeled, in some quarters, "instrumental" logic, is discussed in another article of this series.

Almost any elementary text book is an epitome of these various remaining tendencies. Such a book usually follows, in fundamentals, the Aristotelian tradition. That is to say, it treats of propositions and their parts, of the forms of "immediate" inference, of the syllogism, of the several types of judgment, etc., etc. Just at the present moment it is fashionable to add supplementary chapters on symbolic or mathematical logic—chapters which rather inadequately and half-heartedly explain the application of symbolism to logical problems, and define such technical conceptions as "class," "relation," and "implication." This usually concludes the analysis and description of the so-called deductive inference. In spite of its failure—if indeed it may be called such—to devote more than passing reference to the labors of the logisticians, Mr. J. N. Keynes' *Formal Logic*<sup>1</sup> has earned its place as one of the classic works in this field.

As for induction, most logicians conventionally and uncritically assume that it is an "inverse" process, that it

<sup>1</sup> London, Macmillan Co.



somehow presupposes acceptance of the principle of the Uniformity of Nature, and that it results in the formulation of a general law covering, with a high degree of probability, *all* the "instances" of which only a certain number actually have been examined. Accordingly, there follows an exposition, more or less elaborate, of Mill's inductive methods, and of the use of analogy, statistics, and hypothesis, as aids to the inductive process. The special subject of mathematical probability often proves an embarrassing one, but tradition demands its inclusion as part of any complete introductory text book.<sup>2</sup> And other chapters may be added on the effect of evolution on logical theory, on fallacies, and—as the capstone of the entire structure—on scientific inference in general. It should be emphasized that as thus popularly conceived the problem of induction, like all inverse problems, becomes *ipso facto* indeterminate—the result of inductive inference can be only probable and not certain. The whole task of inductive logic therefore consists in the formulation of formal tests for the determination of various degrees of probability—a formulation based upon a division of induction into several different species, *e. g.*, complete enumeration, incomplete enumeration (or "imperfect" induction), etc. Thus in the conventional sense induction always has to do with a number of instances.

Some logicians, however, look critically upon this standpoint. The late Professor Cook Wilson, for example, argues (in his *Statement and Inference*<sup>3</sup> that the term "inverse" is not one-sided but two-sided, and that consequently there is serious danger of being misled by an uncritical use of the term when it is descriptively applied to a process of inference. Indeed, as Wilson further points out,

<sup>2</sup> Mention should be made here of Mr. Keynes' important and highly original work on this subject; namely, *A Treatise on Probability*. London, Macmillan Co., 1921.

<sup>3</sup> Published posthumously. Two volumes. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1926.

it is highly questionable whether induction is really a matter of instances at all. If we were to free ourselves from the perhaps unnecessary encumbrance of a word, and were to turn to an unbiased analysis of the process of scientific inference as our material, we might find ourselves returning in essentials to the Aristotelian view. That is to say, for Wilson induction seems on examination to be a "gradual process by which the mind comes to recognize, in the abstract and apart from all particular instances, a principle which it has been using in the particular instances."<sup>4</sup> Induction so conceived is not an inference of, or to, the validity of the universal law *from* the existence of the particular instances as such, but a process by which we are brought "to think of the universal principles in abstraction from the particulars in which we first thought the universal."

However that may be, our elementary text-book actually represents a loose conjunction of two or three different tendencies in contemporary logical thought, *e. g.*, that towards a greater formalization and *a priorism*, that towards empiricism and positivism, and that towards a development of Hegel's doctrines. As a practical expedient, demanded by the conditions of brevity, one may classify most present-day writers under one or the other of these three headings. (It is understood, of course, that the reader will bear in mind the important exception accounted for at the beginning.) Among the formalists one might include, pre-eminently, such authorities on mathematical logic as H. MacColl, and Bertrand Russell, in England, and Professors C. I. Lewis and Henry Bradford Smith, in America.<sup>5</sup> Mention should also be made of the original contributions to formal logic of Dr. Christine Ladd-Franklin, and more especially of her important articles in Bald-

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 582.

<sup>5</sup> For a bibliography see Lewis, *A Survey of Symbolic Logic*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1918.

win's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. Karl Pearson, author of the famous *Grammar of Science*,<sup>6</sup> is a prominent representative of the empirical-positivistic point of view, and Mercier's *A New Logic*<sup>7</sup> should also be noted in this connection. Lastly, there are many important works by writers whose doctrines may perhaps be most aptly described in a general way as a continuation of the Aristotelian-Hegelian tradition. In this group, in spite of very significant differences, we may include Mr. Joseph's *Introduction to Logic*,<sup>8</sup> and the well-known writings of Bradley, Bosanquet, Creighton, and others.<sup>9</sup>

There remain, for separate notice, certain interesting treatises which in a special way combine the formalistic and empirical standpoints. Professor Montague's *The Ways of Knowing* and Mr. Johnson's *Logic*<sup>10</sup> are works which share in common at least the general spirit of this movement. In order to appreciate the full significance of these works, however, we must first briefly call attention to some of the characteristic features of formalism and empiricism, respectively, as they appear in contemporary thought.

First of all, it is typical of the age that ordinary syllogistic logic should come in for serious criticism. The mathematical logician, and the empiricist, as well as those who have shared in the development of "modern" logic, fully agree that the conception of inference as syllogistic is incomplete and shallow. But the agreement ends where it

<sup>6</sup> Third Edition, London, 1911.

<sup>7</sup> London, Heinemann, 1912.

<sup>8</sup> Second Edition, Oxford, 1916.

<sup>9</sup> E. g., Bradley, *The Principles of Logic*, 2 vols., second edition, Oxford, 1922; Bosanquet, *Logic*, 2 vols., second edition, Oxford, 1911; Creighton, *An Introductory Logic*, fourth edition, New York, 1922. In the sequel these works will be referred to under the head of "modern" logic.

<sup>10</sup> Professor Montague's work appeared in 1925 (New York, Macmillan), and we refer here especially to Part I of that work, "The Six Methods of Logic." Mr. Johnson's work is still incomplete. He has published three volumes, entitled respectively *Logic*, Part I (1921); Part II, *Demonstrative Inference: Deductive and Inductive* (1922); and Part III, *The Logical Foundations of Science* (1924). A final volume on Probability is already in preparation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

began, for each group has its own idea of how to make good the deficiency. Observing incidentally that quantitative comparisons—equality, inequality, etc.—are not naturally expressible in syllogistic form, certain thinkers have gone on to analyze in detail the nature of mathematical inference. And while the principal stimulus for this investigation is doubtless the endeavor to establish a completely formal, abstract foundation for pure mathematics, one important side issue is the criticism of traditional syllogistic logic from this point of view. The syllogism, so the criticism proceeds, can treat adequately only of relations of whole and part, of class inclusion. But even in ordinary mathematics one encounters, as has been pointed out frequently enough, relations of quite different kinds. And, generalizing, we may conceive the main preliminary task of logic as that of discovering and classifying the various different possible types of relations by means of which experience may be ordered and organized. Then, regarding this task as accomplished, at least in principle, the mathematical logician will in the next place seek to define a set of conceptions and to formulate accurate and simple rules of operation for the guidance and control of any deductive inference whatsoever. When securely based upon such purely generalized “logical” grounds, pure mathematics would stand forth as *the* science of deductive reasoning, *par excellence*. In this sense of the word deduction means simply the rigorous application of the rules of substitution and “implication” to whatsoever subject-matter, while the correlative aim of the procedure is to guarantee the absolute certainty of its conclusions.

Generality and rigor are favorite watchwords of this school of thought. Other students of logic, however, point to the abstractness of the fundamental conceptions and the artificiality of the mechanical operations by means of inarticulate symbols, which, they maintain, is no less charac-



teristic of it. Deduction, on this other view, whether syllogistic or "mathematical," is at best only a means of verification; it can advance to nothing new, for, just by virtue of its adherence to abstract formalism, it is manifestly out of contact with any fructifying experience. The long dispute among formalists themselves as to whether thought really "creates" or merely "discovers" truth, substantiates, for the empiricist, this contention. Positively, the empirical logician holds that logic's main function is to determine the method by which new truth may be acquired. And, as we have already seen, all genuine knowledge must be founded on (sense) experience—or, what amounts here to the same thing,—on experience of particular instances or cases. The logic of induction accordingly emphasizes the experimental nature of concrete scientific inquiry, and satisfies itself with an account of how the employment of simple conceptions and rules lead the investigator to a more or less probable generalized conclusion. We reason, so we are informed, from certain cases in past experience, by application of the principle of similarity or resemblance, to other like cases in the present or future. It is implied that if we like we may discover, by an analysis of examples of inductive reasoning, the rules or "canons" which effect the operation of the principle.

We are now prepared to estimate the significance of the doctrines of Mr. Johnson and Professor Montague, regarded as a combination of these two superficially different types of logical theory. The possibility of such a combination<sup>11</sup> turns upon an independent analysis of the nature of mathematical inference. In brief, both of these thinkers question the somewhat widespread doctrine that mathematics is a pure deductive science; rather, they maintain,

<sup>11</sup> Or, to use a word suggested by Professor Montague (*op. cit.*), of such an "alliance." This authority finds that there are in all six possible "methods" in logic: *i. e.*, besides rationalism and empiricism, we have authoritarianism, mysticism, pragmatism, and scepticism.

all science employs both deductive and inductive methods. In other words, what differentiates mathematical inference from inference in the other sciences is the quality of absolute demonstrative certainty which attaches to its generalizations, as contrasted with the greater or less degree of probability which is all that can be claimed for the laws, say, of physical science. Again, both writers hold that the processes of deduction and induction are equally amenable to rule and that the principles upon which each depends can be clearly and distinctly formulated. Induction, for example, is simply a process of elimination. This is the real meaning of Mill's methods, which are rules or canons—perhaps in need of some critical revision—for the application of this process to various particular cases.<sup>12</sup> Deduction, of which, we are to remember, induction is the “inverse” process—also depends upon the determination of specific rules for combining and separating the epistemological atoms (or “particulars”) which according to this theory are the ultimate elements of the logician's universe.

Now it is at once obvious that these types of logical theory—the formalistic-deductive, the empirical-inductive, and the combination or alliance of the two—represent a considerable departure from the standpoint of Plato and Aristotle. Confining ourselves for the moment to the narrower issues, the most striking fact, doubtlessly, is the changed conception of the very function of logic. For Aristotle, in particular, logic was primarily the science which investigated the way in which the then existing bodies of knowledge had been acquired and systematized. It was an attempt to discover the presuppositions, and to analyze the structure of knowledge, as it existed, or could exist, *e. g.*, in the sciences, in the form of objective truth. And the persistence with which we still venerate the letter even where the spirit of this doctrine is notoriously absent, is a

<sup>12</sup> Joseph, Hobhouse, and others also concur, to a greater or less extent, in this view.

unique tribute to the genius which originally animated it. Nowadays, on the other hand, in the above-mentioned quarters at any rate, the function of logic is very differently construed. Instead of attempting to understand the process of reasoning or inference, by studying its characteristic products, it is decidedly the fashion to demand of the logician a set (or sets) of rules constituting a technique for the guidance and control of reasoning. This involves, of course, a very definite limitation and prescription of the intellectual activity to certain predetermined forms and ends. An unkind critic would even be tempted to say that the aim of such doctrines is to construct a mechanical substitute for the manual labor of the intellect.

With regard to the wider implications of these contemporary views only a word can be said. If logic is to become a technique of reasoning naturally certain fundamental problems arise which had no place on the classical view. For example, the so-called epistemological problem of how and what we can know, or of justifying our confidence in the operation of the technique, when applied to any given subject-matter, becomes of vital importance. And secondly there is the "metaphysical" or cosmological problem of independently determining the nature of the subject-matter-in-itself, as it is in its own existential right, apart from our knowledge of it. This problem, indeed, some would gladly delegate to science, and this—one may suspect—is what is sometimes meant by the declaration that philosophy must become scientific, or that in our study of nature we must carefully abjure all transcendentalism and metaphysics.<sup>13</sup>

In the space remaining at our disposal we must do our best to convey some idea of the significance of what we have agreed to call "modern" logic. This movement is often described as a continuation and development of

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the writings of Dr. Whitehead for an expression of the doctrine that a philosophy of nature might better be called a "pan-physics" than a metaphysics.

Hegelian principles and doctrines. Its leaders nevertheless recognize the need of adopting a critical attitude towards that great thinker, and they also freely acknowledge indebtedness to logicians of other schools—notably to Lotze, Sigwart, Jevons, Mill, and the neo-Kantians. They heartily acknowledge and support the criticism of the conventional syllogism, so far as it claims to represent adequately all possible types of inference. But candor forces them to apply the same criticism to the doctrines of many of the opponents of this so-called traditional view. In other words, many critics of the syllogism simply point to its inadequacies as a universal technique of reasoning. But, as intimated above, the ideal of these thinkers is to substitute a more adequate technique for the rejected one. Empiricists and formalists alike persist in the search instituted by Bacon and Descartes, respectively, for a sure and easy method of reaching truth. Symbolic logic on the one hand, and the tenacious persistence of the doctrines associated with Mill's canons on the other, are two manifestations of what is at bottom one and the same tendency. In his *Implication and Linear Inference* Bosanquet demonstrates this point very clearly. But surely, so the modern logician would contend, it is necessary to question this whole notion of a mechanical technique, operating by means of rules fixed once and for all. He would argue indeed that this is to endeavor to preserve the empty formalism of the Aristotelian tradition, rather than its spirit. In other words, as the modern logician sees it, contemporary logic must effect a concrete synthesis of the formalistic and empirical doctrines. Merely to combine them, in the fashion proposed by Professor Montague or Mr. Johnson, while an open confession of the urgent need of supplementing various inadequacies in each of these one-sided developments, is in effect never to raise the most vital question of all—



may be said indeed to be a most effective way of entirely disregarding it.

This problem, namely that of analyzing the structure and articulation of our actually existing knowledge, together with its correlate, that of examining at first hand the process by which it is being developed, becomes unavoidable in the long run, for Kant and Hegel as it was for the Greeks, and now again for us as it was for Kant and Hegel. And while it is certainly true that our solution of it is bound to differ from theirs, in many essential respects, yet the spirit and the ultimate goal of the inquiry remain everlastingly the same. The goal has always been, as Plato might say, a justification of the ways of mind to man.

In the words of Bradley, who perhaps as well as any one succinctly summarizes this standpoint in logic, "logic's direct and primary purpose is . . . to set out the general essence and the main types of inference and judgment [the categories], and, with regard to each of these, to explain its nature and special merits and defects. The measure here to be applied is the idea of perfect truth in the sense . . . [of systematic coherence]. Truth is reality taken as ideal, and that must mean reality taken as an intelligible system; and every judgment and inference therefore must be understood as directed and aimed at such reality. The degree in which the various types each succeed and fail in reaching their common end, gives to each of them its respective place and rank in the whole body."<sup>14</sup>

Abandoning as an artificial and one-sided abstraction the "linear" conception of inference,<sup>15</sup> modern logic insists that both induction and deduction are actual ingredients of every concrete process of inference, and are not, as is often

<sup>14</sup> *Principles of Logic*, second edition, p. 620. Cf. also F. J. E. Woodbridge, "The Field of Logic," in *Congress of Arts and Sciences*, St. Louis, 1904, Vol. I, pp. 313-330.

<sup>15</sup> The word, of course, is Bosanquet's. Cf. his *Implication and Linear Inference*.

uncritically assumed, separate and independent methods of reasoning. It is true, of course, that in the successive stages of the development of knowledge now the one, now the other aspect of thinking may assume temporary ascendancy, and it is probably also true—as Poincaré somewhere observes—that some minds have a natural preference one way or the other. These historical and psychological considerations would at least partially explain the persistence of the conflict between formalists and empiricists, and might also serve as an added stimulus to various special investigations, from the standpoint of modern logic. Perhaps the most pressing demands in this regard are for a detailed analysis of scientific inference conducted in the light of the genesis and historical development of leading scientific conceptions,<sup>16</sup> and for such a study as that projected by the late Professor Creighton on the significance of history and the historical method.

In conclusion it may be pardonable to add one further personal observation regarding the relation of logic to metaphysics. For it is a frequently repeated objection, accompanied by a tone of reproach, that modern logic finally merges with, or is inseparable from, a metaphysics. But surely this is inevitable, in the end, on any view; just as inevitable, we may say, but no more so, than in the case of ethics, or of theory of values in general. And a frank admission of this fact claims our enthusiastic support. For, negatively, such a view solves the vexed “problem of epistemology,” so-called, by revealing its unreality; while, positively, it establishes a definite foundation, critically aware of its own presuppositions, for a rational interpretation of human experience.

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<sup>16</sup> More especially, the nature and presuppositions of mathematical reasoning should be investigated. Cf. the present writer's preliminary study, *The Philosophical Presuppositions of Mathematical Logic*. New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1925.

## VALUE THEORY AND AESTHETICS

THE category of value is in a sense as old as philosophy, but in another sense the realm of values is new to exploration. During the last quarter century all the resources of psychological and logical analysis have been brought to the solution of problems of the relation of value to existence and reality, problems which if not new in their essence are new in their manner of formulation. The causes that led to the gradual shifting of the philosophical center of gravity from being to value need not be recounted here—to enumerate them would be to tell the story of the philosophy of the last decades. Enough that, in the words of Münsterberg, “through the world of things shimmered first weakly, and then ever more clearly, the world of values.” This realm of values is “there” to quote a recent writer. It is the sense in which it is there which constitutes the key problem of our epoch.

The beginning of the serious discussion of value in this country is connected by many writers with the appearance of Münsterberg’s *Eternal Values* and Urban’s *Valuation*, both having appeared before the English speaking public in the same week. And indeed it may be conveniently dated from the appearance of a special *Value* number of the *Psychological Bulletin* in October, 1909, in which these two trends in value theory were brought into sharp contrast. A review of *Valuation* and an article by Münsterberg on “The Opponents of Eternal Values,” defending his own position, served to set in clear relief problems which

were to determine the direction of discussion. In the meantime had appeared a new point of view and a new idiom (I refer to the pragmatic use of the value concept inaugurated by William James in the Lowell lectures), which served at the same time to make value a popular word and to introduce an approach to the problem which was to influence greatly the direction of thought on the question, at least in this country. The phenomenological, the axiological and the pragmatic points of view represented the three chief currents of value theory.

## II

The application of all the resources of psychology, analytic and genetic, to the value problem, was the natural result of a period in which the psychological-biological point of view was uppermost. The first and most important condition, both of the origin and development of ideas and judgments of value lies obviously in human desires and feelings, and ultimately in the impulses, instincts and tendencies which they presuppose. Every assertion of value it is immediately evident, is dependent upon the experiences of the affective-volitional life. The answer to the question, what goes on in consciousness when we value anything, seemed to offer the clue, not only to the nature, but also to the validity of the values themselves. An answer to the question of genealogy—how values came into being seemed to offer the clue not only to the question of what our human values are, but also to the evaluation of these values. These problems of the phenomenology of values were in fact set specifically by the investigations of the Austrian value philosophers. The thesis of Meinong (involving essentially questions of analysis) that value is feeling, but the content of feeling only when it is mediated by judgments or assumptions, not only gave the impetus to



numerous psychological studies, but served to raise the entire question of the relation of valuation to cognition. The second thesis, that of Ehrenfels, that value is desirability, and that this quality is to be determined by reference to underlying biological dispositions gave impetus to a method which was essentially genetic and evolutionary in character, and which, in its turn, served to set the problem of the relation of genesis to validity and value. Urban's *Valuation* may be described as an attempt to unite these two points of view in one phenomenological method.

During this period of value discussion a special department of "Values" in the *Psychological Bulletin* and a special rubric in the *Psychological Index* indicated the status of the subject, and the inclusion of values as a special field of psychology by James Ward in his monumental *Principles of Psychology* served to give the new subject a certain standing. The outcome of the studies of this period, although not without permanent and valuable results, was, nevertheless, in the main, to transfer the problem from the psychological to the logical and philosophical domain. The reasons for this lie partly in the history of psychology itself. The development of the purely biological conception of the mind with its extremes of "Behaviorism," led naturally to the dropping of the value problem. If, as a certain wit has said, Psychology first lost its soul, then its mind, and finally consciousness, it must by that very fact, lose values. But there was another and deeper reason. The enthusiastic studies of the psychology of values were really based on the assumption that if we knew what goes on in consciousness when we value we should know what value is; if we knew how values "came into existence," we should also be in a position to determine their nature and validity. The psychological-biological foundation of values appeared therefore to be not only the most natural, but also the primary, and one might say of absolute significance. The

gradual recognition of the insufficiency of this foundation—not the least on the part of most of those who had inaugurated the study of values, gave rise to what may be described as the *Axiological* point of view, of which the recognition that value is a logically primitive concept that can be neither defined nor validated in terms of anything else, was the determining character. The essential *petitio principii* of the psycho-biological point of view is the first axiom of these later developments.

### III

As all the resources of psychology had been brought into the service of the value problem, so now all the resources of logic and philosophy. This second stage in the development of value thinking in America may also be conveniently dated—from a meeting of the American Philosophical Association in December, 1915, at which the topic "Value and Existence," set by the Association itself, was vigorously debated. That the discussion itself did not take us very far, was the feeling of many of the members of the Association, but its real fruits were to be gathered in a series of articles which owed their origin largely to the stimulus of this meeting.<sup>1</sup> By this time fructifying germs of thought had come both from the neo-Kantian value philosophers in Germany and from the New Realists in England, who went at the problem from the logical and epistemological rather than the psychological point of view. The writings of Mr. G. E. Moore and Mr. Bertrand Russell, with their doctrine of the logically primitive character of value, and the investigations of the axiologists, Windelband and Rickert, with their discussions of the relation

<sup>1</sup> Prominent among these were: R. B. Perry, "The Definition of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI; W. H. Sheldon, "The Empirical Definition of Value," *ibid.*; W. M. Urban, "Value and Existence," *ibid.*, Vol. XIII.

of value to validity, served both to broaden and deepen our thinking on values.

One thing appeared clearly from the very first. The value concept was showing itself to be of extraordinary significance, not only in the technical discussions of the philosophers, but also in the more popular and semi-popular writings of the period. Only by use of the new idiom, popularized largely by the pragmatists, did it seem possible both to focus and to formulate the real problems which were forcing themselves upon the reflective consciousness of the time—the problems namely of the place or fate of values in a world as it was conceived by evolutionary naturalism. But it was also clear that this extensive popular use was made possible largely, if not wholly, by the vague and equivocal character of the term. A considerable portion of the effort of this period was, accordingly, devoted to the problem of definition.

Space will not allow me to consider the confusions of this period and the heroic efforts to clear up these confusions—the six different meanings of value distinguished by Dewey;<sup>2</sup> the “equivocation” in value pointed out by Pepper, and his distinction between immediate and standard values,<sup>3</sup> or the distinction between immediate and contributory made by Picard.<sup>4</sup> Of this phase, I will merely say that although to some such discussions seemed to lose themselves in arid controversy and unmeaning refinement of distinctions, this does not really represent their general import. Clarification came at many points: all these studies were of value and have resulted, not only in significant distinctions in terminology, but also in bringing to light

<sup>2</sup> “Valuation and Experimental Knowledge,” in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXI, p. 333.

<sup>3</sup> “The Equivocation of Value,” Berkeley, *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. 4, p. 107.

<sup>4</sup> “Value and Worth,” in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. IX, No. 18, and “Values, Immediate and Contributory.” Cf. also, R. B. Perry, “The Definition of Value,” in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI; and W. M. Urban, “Value and Existence,” *ibid.*, Vol. XI.

the implications and ultimate intentions of value thinking. I shall confine myself, however, to those points in definition which have finally become determinative of ultimate issues.

The lines have gradually formed on three main issues. There is the issue with regard to extension, between those who take the narrower view, confining the concept of value to the a-logical notions of the good, the useful and the beautiful and those who take a broader view, including in the concept the logical values of existence and truth. As regards intention the issues are more complicated, between those, in the first place, who define value as the relation between an object and the interest of a sentient subject, and those who define it in terms of relations not necessarily psychical; and secondly, between those for whom value is definable in terms of some relation and those for whom it is ultimately indefinable, either because it is a unique quality or some non-existent form of objectivity.

These differences have far-reaching implications and are determinative of ultimate philosophical positions. It is, however, from the last distinction that the maximum consequences flow. Those who say that ultimate values, i. e., the good, the beautiful, and the true, are ultimately indefinable mean by this that they are individual concepts and that their nature can not be apprehended by such general propositions as form the material of natural science. There is no higher genus to ascribe them, as species, and no simples into which they may, as complexes, be analyzed. All of which means that value is not reducible to non-value terms.

The category of "value," it must be admitted, like certain other fundamental notions (including existence itself) seems to be one of those things about which we know well enough, so long as we are not asked what it is. The idea that definition is always "stipulated," would of course.



make it allowable to take any one of these current meanings of value provided only that we use it consistently throughout our discourse. But the problem is not so simple as this. The problem of definition is not merely a question of verbal definition, of avoiding ambiguity. It has been much more the question how value, as understood by the modern philosophical consciousness, is to be conceived whether it is to be subsumed under categories of being, such as quality or relation or whether it is itself a unique category not reducible to non-value terms. It is the fact that all the metaphysical and epistemological questions of value are already predetermined by our definitions that has made the problem of definition so important.

#### IV

That which more than anything else, perhaps, raised the problem of value to its significant and determining role in the thinking of the present is the question of the relation of value to cognition. The thesis of Meinong, that value is the content of feeling only when feeling is mediated by judgments or assumptions, implies that valuation at least involves cognition, even if it is not itself cognitional. The contention of the axiologists, on the other hand, that cognition itself always involves evaluation or the acknowledgement of the value of truth, implies that in this act of acknowledgement is involved a knowledge of value. On either view, the relation of valuation to cognition is very close and the determination of this relation has been from the start in a sense diagnostic of theories of value.

Now I think it is fair to say that the very emphasis from the beginning on values as contrasted with facts involved the vague but implicit assumption that some element of cognition of "reality" is involved in valuation. When for instance it is said that "the values are there" whatever

"science" or naturalism may say of the world, it is assumed that they are entities objects to be known in some way. This immediately raises the question of cognition of value and with it the question of a distinctive value judgment, or of a noetic character to feeling.

The idea of "valuation as a logical process," asserted by the pragmatists (Dewey and Stuart), involves the notion of value as judgmental—"immediate appreciations being not values in the strict sense of the word." Judgments of value are objective in their import in the same sense as are the factual judgments in which the conditions of action are presented. In structure and in function the judgment in which the outcome of this process (of valuation) is presented, is *knowledge* [italics mine] and objective in the only valid acceptance of that term."<sup>5</sup> For the axiologists also valuation is judgmental. Value is predicated of an object by means of the same verbal form as a quality is predicated, but there is a difference in the mode of predication not brought out by the verbal expression. When we predicate value of anything we pass from the mere concept of the essence of a thing, with its qualities, to a bearing which this essence has on existence. It is worth existing or ought to be. It is the acknowledgement of this "ought to be" or *Sollen* that constitutes the cognitive element in valuation. Finally, if value is an indefinable quale, analogous to sense data, as in the view of certain realists, there must also be for them a unique type of cognition of these essences, namely, a cognition through feeling and emotion. On this view, "appreciation" is itself noetic and "judgments" of value are truth judgments.

Without going into these differences, it may be said that the issue is clearly drawn between those who say in the above ways, that valuation is itself cognitional and those who say that while valuation involves cognition, it is itself

<sup>5</sup> H. W. Stuart: "Valuation as a Logical Process, an essay in *Studies in Logical Theory*, by John Dewey and other writers, p. 323.

not cognitional. Those who take the latter position may argue with Perry,<sup>6</sup> that interest (feeling and desire) creates values, but does not and can not cognize them; or, with Sellars, that valuing is always an operation supplementary to knowing and has no part in the knowledge process.<sup>7</sup> In either case, the position follows, it is clear from the relational definition of value and the conception of value as a subjective *addendum* to reality. There is knowledge about value, but no knowledge of value. On the other hand, it is, perhaps, equally inevitable that those who hold that value is ultimately an indefinable quale or "objective" should also hold that it is the object of a unique form of knowledge, whether the knowledge process be emotional and intuitive or judgmental. Any discussion of the details of this debate is wholly beyond the province of this paper. Enough for our purpose to point out the great divide in modern philosophical thinking that results from the two different answers to this problem. The issue thus clearly drawn, like that involved in the definition of value, cuts deep. It is the question whether values are entities, objects, or objectives to be apprehended or known—whether there is knowledge of value, or merely knowledge about certain relations to which we have given the name values. The values are "there," *are* in some sense, but the sense in which they are is largely bound up with this question of cognition. If valuation is not cognitional of reality in some sense, they remain simply a subjective *addendum* to reality. If valuation is cognitional thus the values cognized are constituent elements of the world.

Even more fundamental than this question of the cognitional character of valuation, is the question as to whether cognition itself is essentially a valuational process. The saying of G. P. Adams, that "we miss the true inwardness of the epistemological problem itself unless we

<sup>6</sup> "The Definition of Value," in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI, p. 152.

<sup>7</sup> "Cognition and Valuation," in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXV.

realize that it is but part of the problem of values at large" expresses the matured convictions of a large number of those who have followed the value thinking of the last decades. It is the "value character of the theoretical" itself, the result of pragmatic and axiological developments in logic, which, more than anything else has served to give significance to the value problem. Deeper than any judgment, in the sense of merely bringing contents together in relations, there is, it is held, a "reflexive" act in which the judgment is claimed or acknowledged to be true or false. This act is essentially valuational in character, the point at issue between pragmatist and axiologist being mainly whether the values are relative or absolute.

The relation of cognition to valuation remains one of the unsettled problems of value theory. Yet it may be said without prejudice, I think, that the drift of opinion is towards what we may describe as the axiological point of view. That valuation has something of the noetic in it is probably the conviction of the majority of those that think about these questions. That the noetic has something of the nature of valuation in it, that significant judgments of existence and truth can not be made without acknowledgement of values, is perhaps the conviction of an equal number. However this may be, it is generally recognized that on the solution of this perplexing question—the relation of the "normative" to the "factual" turns the entire problem of the metaphysical status of values.

## V

With regard to this metaphysical question—of value and reality—our discussions have, as might be expected, reflected all the tendencies current in present-day philosophies. Indeed all the main divisions reappeared in the universe of value discourse. It is precisely the great signifi-



cance of value philosophy, as I view it—that it has forced all these philosophies to declare themselves on ultimate issues and to make themselves intelligible. From this point of view, three main types of value theory may be distinguished: the Idealist tendency, the Realist tendency, and the Pragmatic tendency.<sup>8</sup>

Of the two tendencies represented in the value number of the *Bulletin*, Münsterberg had said that they are complementary, that they completely supplement each other, representing the two fundamental aspects under which value can be studied. It is the position of Pragmatism, however, that both of these positions, the psychological or phenomenological and the axiological, represent a vicious abstractionism. The one fixes its eyes on the consciousness of value, the other on the objects of value, but neither has its eye on the value situation. The result is a cross-eyed effect instead of clear vision.<sup>9</sup> For the pragmatist, it is not fair to ask whether values are subjective and relative to human feeling, or objectively real. They are both. When the social nature of valuation is considered, the alternative between objectivity and relativity to human feeling is unsound. "As the outcome of the process of valuation is knowledge and objective in the only valid acceptance of that term, so the realms of fact and value are both real, but that of value is logically prior and so the more real."

Whatever may be said of Pragmatism's approach to values and its handling of the problem (I am not concerned here with evaluation) the fact remains that the significant issues continue to be between realistic and idealistic theories of value. Perhaps the same "instability of pragmatism" of which Perry speaks makes itself felt here also.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. David W. Prall: "The Present Status of the Theory of Value," *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Herbert W. Schneider, "The Theory of Values," in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV.

Such at least in my own belief.<sup>10</sup> In any case, the pragmatic solution of the problem of value and existence has not proved satisfactory and the real debate continues to be between the idealists and the realists.

In general, the most significant feature of the last decades has been the preoccupation with values combined with the revival of realism, and what the new realisms make of values is perhaps their most serious test. As regards value, there is no agreement among contemporary realists. There are those who, like Perry, hold the view that value is a psychological character which the object acquires only by a relation to the liking or disliking of a sentient subject. There are others who regard value as an indefinable quality which attaches to existences in the same sense that natural qualities such as red attach to their objects. Others, again (Santayana), hold that value attaches to essences rather than to either physical or psychological existence. Values are immediately objective, but to mistake them for existences is to suffer illusion. To enjoy them one must appreciate them without imputing existence to them.

Despite these marked disagreements, all realists are one in being realistic in a popular and important sense. All reject the axiological point of view, that value is in any sense an ultimate character or condition of existence. The differences among the realists are significant, especially on the question of the relation of valuation to cognition, but all agree that value, whether a psychological character or a non-mental essence, in in some sense an *addendum* to existence.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See my paper on "The Pragmatic Theory of Value: A Reply to Herbert W. Schneider," in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIV; cf. also Mr. Schneider's rejoinder in the same number.

<sup>11</sup> Statements of the realistic position may be found in Perry's different articles; cf. also J. F. Dashiell: *The Philosophical Status of Values*, New York, 1913.

Like the realists, the idealists also disagree on many points. One of the more important differences turns on the question of the relation of value to personality. Are values independent of persons or do they exist only in and for persons? There are those who like Leighton, hold that while "the problem of values is pre-eminently the problem of philosophy," this means merely that "the fundamental philosophical problem is that of the mind's valuing, purposing attitude-taking in knowing, contemplating, doing, worshipping in the course of reality and that we do not evade metaphysics or issue in a new era of thought, by talking about values in the abstract, rather than valuing selves."<sup>12</sup> Others hold that values are over-individual and over-personal and that if values are dependent upon mind, they are dependent only in the sense that truth and existence themselves may be said to be thus conditioned.

Yet here again, despite these differences, all are idealists in the important sense that value is an ultimate character or condition of existence. All agree that it is not a mere *addendum* to existence but part of the nature of the perceptual, the aesthetic or the historical object. This view may be based on the assumption that reality of any kind arises from an act of mind and that, since mind is essentially purposive, or directed to the good or value, reality, as the creation of mind, will necessarily be the embodiment of value. But it may also be based on something much more fundamental, on the axiom, namely, that "to separate value and reality is essentially contradictory." This axiom of idealistic metaphysics, however expressed, whether in the terms of Bonsanquet's identification of totality or individuality and value (that the clue to both reality and value is individuality and completeness) or in the more modest statement of the axiologists that while existence and value are not identical, they are inseparable (Windelband),

<sup>12</sup> J. A. Leighton, *Man and the Cosmos*, New York, 1922.

brings with it the belief that "the recognition that the givenness of objects and their existence involves valuation, is the first step towards a theory of values."<sup>13</sup>

## VI

From the very start, one of the chief motives of the philosophies of value was to work out the relations of the various values, economic, ethical, aesthetic, logical and religious and ultimately to construct a system of values. In the words of Münsterberg, "a mere belief in values and a preaching of them does not suffice. With a mere transvaluation of values little is accomplished until the deepest essence of valuation is revealed. What is lacking in our modern philosophy is a closed system of values."

The idea of a system of values is, however, ambiguous and for the same reasons that the term value itself is ambiguous. Whether value be taken in the narrower or broader sense, in its relative or absolute meaning, determines our conception and principle of system.

What are the values of life and how are they to be classified? How may we determine what is the most valuable end of human living, i. e., what is the standard, the scale of values? In answer to these questions books on ethics have been rewritten from the value point of view and beginning with Ehrenfels' *System der Werttheorie*, systems of values have been constructed. The basis of classification here becomes human needs and desires and the system is inevitably constructed from the genetic psycho-biological point of view. One may proceed purely empirically (for instance by the questionnaire method) and find out what men actually do value and an actual scale of values. Or one may follow the genetic method and in showing how

<sup>13</sup> For a statement and critique of idealistic views, including those of Münsterberg, Bosanquet and Urban, see G. P. Conger: "Some Idealistic Evaluations of Values," in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 20.



as evolution runs its course, there emerge certain adaptations which we call values and as mental evolution supervenes upon physical evolution there emerge on the reflective level of mind certain tertiary qualities, ideals of goodness, beauty, truth, etc., also by that very fact determine not only the nature of values but a system or scale of values.<sup>14</sup>

But this point of view, it is increasingly recognized, inevitably involves the *petitio principii* inherent in the entire psycho-biological point of view. We wish to validate these values by carrying them back to life. But in this it is already assumed that life and its continuance have value. For if these values get their significance solely from their teleological relation to life and its enhancement, surely life must get its significance from absolute values which it embodies. Otherwise life and its relative values lose all genuine meaning. From the more ultimate philosophical point of view, then, an ultimate knowledge of value is presupposed in any concept of valuable life. From this point of view the idea of a system of values has another meaning, just as the idea of value itself has another meaning.

This line of argument—made familiar by the axiologists, inevitably brings with it the idea of philosophy as a system of absolutely valid values. In this conception of a system of values the fundamental problem is obviously the relation of these values, the true, the good and the beautiful to each other; as well as the special question of the relation of the logical values of existence and truth to the a-logical values. The chief problem here, we may say, without going into details, is that of *co-ordination* or *subordination*. If values are unique, individual and indefinable, it seems to follow that they can not be reduced to each other and un-

<sup>14</sup> Typical of this point of view and method is an article by W. K. Wright: "The Origin of Values from Instincts," in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2. Constructions of such systems on a large scale are to be found in J. M. Baldwin's *Genetic Theory of Reality*, and S. Alexander's, *Space, Time, and Deity*.

derstood in terms of each other, and many, including Münsterberg and Croce, have drawn that inference: they are co-ordinate. On the other hand, subordination or the principle of scale seems to follow from the *a priori* nature of value. For it seems to lie in the very nature of values as such that given any two values one must be higher than the other. The principle of scale is the principle of subordination.

These statements serve merely to present the problem of the system of values. The problem itself is still unsolved. It must be admitted that as yet a completed scale of values does not lie open to our knowledge. It is true also that all attempts to reduce or subordinate one type of value to another have proved unsatisfactory. On the other hand, it seems equally certain that the principle of scale, of higher and lower, lies in the very nature of value itself, is intrinsic to the value concept, and that the principle of subordination must be ultimately determinative in any system of values. It is true that if we take the principle of totality or individuality as the clue to both reality and value, it is possible, in the manner of certain idealists, to reduce the principle of scale to the principle of logical system and make degrees of value correspond to degrees of totality or self-completeness. On this view a certain conciliation of the two principles is possible. But such a solution has seemed to many at least, to sacrifice all other values to logical values and against this sacrifice the modern value consciousness protests. In any case no completely satisfactory principle of system has yet been found.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Contributions to the discussion of this problem are found chiefly in other than American writings. The principle of co-ordination is, however, upheld in Münsterberg's *Eternal Values*; the principle of subordination, in articles by A. P. Brogan and W. M. Urban. See the former's paper, "The Fundamental Value Universal," in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVI; also W. M. Urban: "Knowledge of Value and the Value Judgment, *ibid.*, Vol. XIII. An interesting presentation of this problem and an evaluation of the contributions of Windelband and Rickert are to be found in a monograph by William Ray Dennes: "The Method and Presuppositions of Group Psychology," *University of California Publications*, Vol. V, No. 1.

## VII

It is at this point perhaps, that the development of our recent thinking on aesthetics may be most intelligibly considered. In general books on aesthetics have been mostly written by those who are desirous of applying modern psychology to the problem of art and those written by philosophers from the standpoint of a theory of the universe. But there is a third point of view making itself felt, namely that which considers aesthetics as a fundamental and irreducible form of valuation and as having a unique place in a scheme of values.

Space will permit me to consider the problem only from this latter point of view. The doctrine of the autonomy of the aesthetic values, developed in their several ways by both Croce and Münsterberg, has penetrated deeply into both the general and the specifically philosophical consciousness of the time. The nature of aesthetic value in general and the question of its autonomy specifically are among the most difficult questions of value theory.

The difficulties, as well as the confusions in this field may be seen in the fact that views as to the nature of the aesthetic range all the way from a denial of its character as value at all, to the view that all value is aesthetic. Aesthetic value is in general not recognized by the pragmatist, for whom valuation is judgmental. On the whole, the aesthetic experience would appear to be essentially post-judgmental and appreciative and on the principles of the pragmatic position, as an immediate appreciation, it has no logical function and must be denied the name of value."<sup>10</sup> For Prall, on the other hand (and for Santayana from whom this conception derives) valuation is immediate enjoyment" and value an essence. "Valuation is not a logi-

<sup>10</sup> Cf. H. W. Stuart: "Valuation as a Logical Process," an essay in *Studies in Logical Theory*, by John Dewey and other writers.

cal process" and "standard value is a misnomer." All values are in a sense immediate and aesthetic.<sup>17</sup>

Such wide variation as this indicates, not only the equivocations in value but also the uncertainty in our interpretations and evaluations of the aesthetic. So far as the last question is concerned, we can merely say that neither extreme represents the consensus of thought on this question. The ancient view that values are subsumable under the heads of goodness, beauty and truth, "a three-fold cord not lightly broken," may in general be said to be strengthened rather than weakened by modern value theory. All attempts to reduce the aesthetic either to truth or goodness leave a remainder. But it is equally certain that every attempt to break the three-fold cord results in highly unreal and sophisticated notions both of the aesthetic itself and of the other values of truth and goodness from which it has been separated. The idea that aesthetic objects constitute a world of "valuable illusion," that to enjoy them one must appreciate them without imputing reality to them, associated with the doctrine of the autonomy of the aesthetic, marks the point at which the aesthetic problem becomes crucial, not only for value theory but ultimately for metaphysics itself.

## VIII

Value thinking has not only played a determining role in those disciplines traditionally known as normative, it has not only been a fruitful motive in the contemporary reconstructions of traditional idealism and realism, but has also changed notably the perspective in which books on Ethics and "Introductions to Philosophy" have been written.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. D. W. Prall: "Metaphysics and Value," Berkeley, *University of California Publications*, Vol. 5; also "A Study in the Theory of Value," *ibid.*, No. 13.



Noteworthy efforts to utilize the results of value theory in ethics are Everett's *Moral Values* and Dresser's *Ethics in Theory and Application*. Both not only make use of the distinctive terminology of value theory, but attempt the construction of a scale or system of values. In a concluding chapter on "Ultimate Values," Dresser discusses the relation of value to reality. As regards Introductions to Philosophy, Bridgman discusses values in connection with the problem of universals.<sup>18</sup> Patrick makes the problem of values central throughout.<sup>19</sup> Conger has a section on "Philosophies of Value" which he uses as a transition from the "normative sciences" to the philosophy of religion.<sup>20</sup> Calkins in the last edition of *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, rewrites the chapter on "Contemporary Philosophy," chiefly from the point of view of changes brought about by value theory and the "axiologists." Her conclusion is that "axiology is consistent with any metaphysics except that of realistic naturalism."

In short, as has been said, "one would have to call a fairly complete roll of contemporary philosophers to exhaust the list of students of axiology." All this means that the traditional problems of philosophy have received a noteworthy revitalization and reinterpretation through the value concept and value thinking in general. It may be an exaggeration to say with Mr. Belford Bax, that "in the last resort all problems of metaphysics reduce themselves to problems of value," but it is certainly true that none of these problems is soluble without reference to value. In any case there can be no question that there has developed in modern thought a new point of view which has reached such a point of definiteness and consolidation as to receive a new name, that of Axiology.

<sup>18</sup> *An Introduction to Philosophy*, New York, 1925.

<sup>19</sup> *An Introduction to Philosophy*.

<sup>20</sup> *A Course in Philosophy*, New York, 1924. See also G. A. Wilson: *The Self and Its World*, New York, 1926.

It is ordinarily assumed that when a body of knowledge has attained sufficient integrity to be given a new name, it has at least a relative self-sufficiency. There are those indeed who, like Creighton, see no independent problem here. In a sense they are right. The questions we have been considering are questions that must be raised by any philosophy and in the attempt to answer them appear, as we have seen, all the differences of the schools. On the other hand, it may be said with equal truth that the almost simultaneous creation, on the part of so many of the new term, axiology, in contrast to epistemology was motivated by nothing less than an acute realization of the existence of problems that could not be adequately handled within the limits and with the methods of the old field.

Axiology may be merely a name for value theory in general. It may also mean a specific point of view regarding the ultimate problems of philosophy. In the latter sense the recognition of the axiological problem registers a relatively new situation. It epitomizes problems in a sense unique in the history of thought. What we have here is in fact a general and deep-seated conflict or rivalry in modern thought between the tendency to subject values to the scientific or logical consciousness and the tendency to submit science and logic to the demands of a more general evaluational consciousness. The insistence on the axiological point of view, like the insistence on the value judgment, as opposed to the judgment of fact, represents this latter tendency and reflects this deep-seated dualism in the modern consciousness. As we look back over the development of value thinking, including the struggle over definition, the dispute over the relation of valuation to cognition, the question of the subjectivity and objectivity of values, we can see that this has been the fundamental issue.

What is the significance, the implication of this fundamental issue? Underneath the entire development may be

discerned a pressing problem of the modern consciousness. The paradoxical combination of a growing preoccupation with values with a marked revival of realistic naturalism has created a new situation. There are those who feel the need of a transfer, so to speak, of values from their traditional "idealistic" basis to what they feel to be "the more solid foundation of realism and naturalism." The question is, can this transfer be made without relegating the values in general, and religious values in particular, to a realm of æsthetic imagination or fruitful illusion? There are those, on the other hand, who dwell on the uniqueness of the values of truth, beauty and goodness, declare them to be indefinable and irreducible, in this way not only removing them from the purview of science, but also claiming for them a validity superior to that of science. The question here is whether, if we follow this line of thought, we can say anything intelligible about values at all, for only that is a fact that is expressible in logical form, and where we have logical form we have "science" in some sense. The problem of values in modern thinking has raised the whole question of the definition and evaluation of science.

This chasm in modern thought is not closed and shows no signs of closing. It is all very well for the naturalistic thinker to say that "there is no doubt of the supreme importance of values for life, but this importance does not exempt them from the attempt to understand them, to make a science of them." But every one is aware that to make a "science" of them in this sense is to reduce them to non-value terms and that the mere assertion of their supreme importance begs the whole question of the relation of importance to reality. It is all very well for the idealistic philosopher to say that value is the clue to reality, and that "if the objectivity of value is denied no religious view of the world is possible." But here, again, everyone knows that this in-

volves making the evaluational consciousness ultimate and the reduction of existence itself (and the sciences of the existent) to a form of value and validity.

This chasm, I repeat, is not closed and shows no sign of closing. It is possible to say with Sheldon that both types of reduction, of value to existence, and of existence to value are equally possible and equally valid, and that it is simply a question of choice, according to their fruitfulness, which reduction we take.<sup>21</sup> Such a dualism can not, however, be ultimately satisfactory, and we are always confronted with the incontrovertible fact that fruitfulness is itself a value concept. The primacy of value seems inescapable whatever turn or twist of thought we take. Perhaps the best we can say (alike the most and the least) is that, while not identical, value and existence are inseparable. For some, as for Windelband, this is the "sacred mystery" that will never be solved. And it is perhaps the realization of this fact that constitutes the revival of mysticism so characteristic a feature of the last decade. In any case, this is the key question of modern thought.

For the modern man the values are *there*, not only pragmatically, so to speak, but in a new and more acute sense than ever, for theory also. It is the *sense* in which they are there which has been, and continues to be, the great problem of the world.<sup>22</sup>

WILBUR M. URBAN.

HANOVER, N. H.

<sup>21</sup> W. H. Sheldon: *Strife of Systems and Productive Duality*, Cambridge, 1918, Ch. VI.

<sup>22</sup> These last paragraphs were written before the meeting of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy. I can not resist the temptation to record the conviction that this chasm in modern thought does show signs of closing. The unanimity of representatives of all schools of thought, on the general position, that value and fact, or existence, are inseparable, was the outstanding feature of the discussions of the Section on Value. In general, the effect of the discussion was to suggest that there is, perhaps, no field in modern philosophy in which there is so much convergence of opinion towards agreement on fundamentals, and no field in which the discussion of technical problems has more clearly and definitely led to a deeper understanding of the problems that face the philosophy of the modern world.



## ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

ETHICAL thought in English-speaking countries has been strongly affected for the past few years by two influences. One is the general concern over the application of ethical principles to problems of social and political organization which was a natural consequence of the war. The other is the recent dramatic swing of psychology away from the analysis and description of mental processes to an experimental study of behavior, in whose motivation and control ethics is profoundly interested. So powerful, indeed have been these two influences in English-speaking countries that the ethical theory of the present period is less interested in the rational grounds of moral judgment than in the interaction of the human individual with his natural and social environment. As a consequence, the boundaries between ethics and sociology, politics and economics seem not as well-defined and certainly are not as well-observed as formerly; much present-day thought on these subjects proceeds on the assumption that the philosophy of practice is fundamentally one field within which ethical, social, political, and economic theory represent merely differences of interest and emphasis.

The war has not simply directed attention to pressing problems of political and economic organization; it has led, at least in the countries now under consideration, to a widespread movement away from idealism in ethics and in political and social theory. This has been due in part to the

belief prevalent in the war period that Hegelian idealism supplied a theoretical justification for the excesses of German nationalism, and in part to the spiritual exhaustion and disillusion of the post-war years. The first of these causes is responsible for Professor Hobhouse's spirited attack upon the idealism of Hegel and "his most modern and faithful exponent," Bosanquet, in his *Metaphysical Theory of the State*.<sup>1</sup> While this keen and vigorous critique is concerned primarily with political relations, it is like all its author's writings in the social field founded upon definite ethical principles. The three governing positions in the Bosanquet theory as Hobhouse finds them, (1) that we are morally free when our actions conform to our real will; (2) that our real will is the general will, and (3) that the general will is embodied in the State, he challenges, rejects as false, and denounces as socially dangerous. The human self he holds to be positively free when, hindered by no external influences, it develops the different parts of its nature harmoniously. But the will to effect such harmonious development (the *rational* will as Hobhouse prefers to call it) is not real in the average man nor completely real in the best of men. It exists only as a rational ideal in sharp opposition to our actual impulses which alone can claim really to exist. This rational will, furthermore, is in no proper sense a general or common will, nor does its expression require that the nature of the individual be shaped by, or merged in, the common mind, but rather that all minds be given a free scope for individual development. And finally it is an equally glaring error to regard the State with all its imperfections, injustices and stupidities as the embodiment of the interests of all its members as rationally harmonized.

Absolute idealism is not left without worthy defenders in the ethical field, however. Professor Turner<sup>2</sup> has essayed

<sup>1</sup> London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1918.

<sup>2</sup> *The Philosophic Basis of Moral Obligation*: London, Macmillan Co., 1924.

a restatement of the ethical implications of this philosophy in a book notable for clarity of sustained argument in the higher altitudes of philosophic thought. A truly philosophic ethics, he maintains as his central contention, must base itself upon pure obligation, but an obligation which proves itself perfectly consistent with rationality. Individual and social development is more and more freely directed toward the attainment of objective value which consists in completeness or perfection. The ultimate standard of completeness and of objective value is the dynamic process of the universe as a whole. In his selection of values the human individual remains entirely free. Nevertheless obligation remains as the characteristic feature of morality. It is an imperative to apply the principle of *pure* reason to reason in its practical connections and entanglements. The distinctive law of pure reason is that of organization which commands the inclusion of the part within the whole. For Reason declares the highest value to reside in the fullest measure of contribution to the maintenance and development of the Whole; and when we realize explicitly the true nature of the Whole then there is at once implied an inextinguishable element of absolute obligation.

Of the powerful influence of psychology upon the ethics of our day Professor McDougall's *Social Psychology* must still be regarded as the most important single source, considered both as the starting-point of the author's own further studies of political and ethical problems and as the target of criticism and attack by others. The full force of McDougall's well-known dictum that the instincts furnish the sole motive-force of human conduct is apparent when coupled with his further assertion<sup>3</sup> that all moral judgments spring originally from moral emotions. And inasmuch as there are no specific moral emotions, judgments of moral approval merely express and reflect the feelings

<sup>3</sup> In agreement with the conclusion reached by Westermarck in his *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*.

which accompany the arousal of certain primary instincts, and disapproval those which attend upon the arousal of others (perhaps more definitely grouped) like hostility and fear and aversion. Thus the first result of the impact of psychology upon ethics seemed revolutionary enough: reason was dethroned and the place of command given to impulse and emotion. But McDougall weakened the force of this blow by assigning to intelligence a crucially important function in moral and social control. In virtue of its powers of intellectual synthesis it forms conceptions which appeal to a number of instincts and enlist the support of their combined motive-force. Such is the conception of the self-as-subject-to-social-criticism which as the nucleus of the "self-regarding sentiment" is supported by instinctive fear, self-assertion, submission, and active sympathy in conventional morality. McDougall moves a step further toward idealism in his account of how through reflection and the influence of admirable example the individual forms abstract moral sentiments of honor, justice, generosity, etc., and finally attains to the master-sentiment for a perfected moral life, but always and even here as a self-playing-to-social-gallery and therefore moved by such impulses as self-display, submission, sympathy and the like.

More consistent with his starting-point and the tendencies of his thought as a whole is the explanation which McDougall offers in his *Group Mind*<sup>4</sup> of the way in which the self-regarding sentiment expands into national sentiment and becomes the psychological basis of political organization. Nationalism, or patriotism, as thus constituted, is the most powerful moralizing and socializing agency known to man, not even excepting religious humanitarianism. This is because the nation is the one group which the individual, through the efficacy of language, literature and historic tradition, can and does identify with

<sup>4</sup> Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1921.



himself. It therefore enlists in its support those strong egoistic instincts which respond to any thought of self-interest and reinforces them by powerful altruistic impulses. The greater instinctive appeal of nationalism over humanitarian ethics McDougall rationalizes<sup>5</sup> (shall we say?) by endeavoring to show that universalistic ethics is in many respects inferior to nationalistic and if consistently followed would be destructive of civilization.

The view that we find in the instinctive-emotional responses of the human species the ultimate source of all moral distinctions was promptly challenged by believers in the rational basis of morality. Canon Rashdall, whose death has been a grievous and irreparable loss to ethics, vigorously attacked McDougall's position<sup>6</sup> from the standpoint of that ethical idealism which he so masterfully expounds in his *Theories of Good and Evil*. As a psychological explanation of the way in which certain kinds of conduct came first to be approved and disapproved he admitted a great deal of truth in McDougall's account. But he contended, the objective validity claimed by moral judgments which constitutes the very heart of our reflective morality is left wholly unexplained. All scientific thinking is based upon certain ultimate principles which cannot be induced from experience but which are implied in all our thinking. The ultimate principles of morality are as much implied in our thinking about conduct as are the ultimate axioms of mathematics in our thinking about quality and number. We claim for the judgment "This is good" the same kind of truth that is claimed for mathematical or scientific or historical judgments. Furthermore, when reason judges an act to be right, reason itself furnishes the motive for performing it, and this is moral obligation. Here we touch

<sup>5</sup> In his *Ethics and Some Modern World Problems*: New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Is Conscience an Emotion?* Also an article in *The Hibbert Journal*, Vol. 19, pp. 449ff.

upon the crux of the controversy; the idealist holds that the idea of duty does indeed create an impulse to do what Reason pronounces ought to be done.

The objective validity of the moral judgment is upheld by Dr. G. E. Moore whose *Principia Ethica* appeared in a second edition in 1922 and exerts a considerable influence upon contemporary ethical thought. Moore's theory is notable because it represents rationalism or intellectualism in ethics divorced from idealistic metaphysics. To be good is not identical, the author asserts, with being willed or being felt in a particular way. Frequently, we do prefer what we think good but it by no means follows that what we think when we think a thing good is that we prefer it. Good is a simple, unanalyzable, indefinable, quality, as simple and indefinable as "yellow." Judgments of intrinsic moral value which attribute this quality to objects (if true at all) are true universally. Moralists have made the mistake of trying to define goodness by identifying it with something else, e. g., pleasure, or super-sensible reality, while the proper aim of ethics is to discover what other properties belong to all things which are good. This is equivalent to asking what kinds of things are good in themselves. Moore's answer to this question is that intrinsic or unmixed goods consist in the love of beautiful things or of good persons; esthetic enjoyment and personal affection possess intrinsically the quality of goodness.

The rationalistic school finds it easier to exhibit the inadequacy of "psychologism" in ethics than to answer the questions which it raises. For the concern of ethics is with human behavior, and human behavior has its psycho-physical antecedents—such factors as hereditary action-tendencies and environmental pressures, such processes as trial and error, and habituation, leading to "substitute stimuli" and "substitute responses"—which psychology is rapidly bringing to light. Such psycho-physical antecedents deter-

mine, or at least influence, the motivation of all conduct, including that which is consciously directed toward the realization of the Good. The need for a fuller explanation of the motivation of good conduct is doubtless responsible for a pronounced tendency among thinkers otherwise inclined to do full justice to reason to admit feeling to a place of equal importance in morality. For is not feeling the dynamic of action? And not merely that, does it not also exercise a selective function among prospective modes of behavior? Thus Mr. A. K. Rogers<sup>7</sup> holds that a thing is recognized as possessing goodness when the contemplation of it affords pleasure, in which case it calls forth the judgment of approval. The pleasure of approval is a sign of the attractiveness of a desire in an intellectual or anticipatory setting, a sign that we are on the right road to a satisfaction of our needs. The peculiarity of the sense of ought this writer finds in the feeling of repugnance or dislike aroused in us against something for which we have otherwise an active craving. Against what do we experience this emotional revolt? Against what is cruel and ugly, certainly. But more profoundly, against what is mean and small and essentially trivial. Accepting essential triviality as the mark of the morally bad, we ask why such triviality is morally offensive to us. The answer is, because of its *unreality*. An unreal act is an act which has no firm footing in our rational nature: contrariwise, acts have reality when they issue from a consistent and dependable personal character.

Professor G. C. Field<sup>8</sup> is pre-occupied with the same difficulty of accounting for the motivation of good conduct. Kant's theory he rejects because, after separating the good from all our actual wants, Kant is forced to assume that its mere intellectual apprehension is sufficient to move us to action, while as a matter of fact the bare knowledge of

<sup>7</sup> *The Theory of Ethics*: New York, Macmillan Co., 1922.

anything can never move us to action. Aristotle's doctrine of the mean he also subjects to a similar criticism. If the Good consists in the harmonious development of all the different tendencies of our nature we have still to find a *desire for the good* which is not merely a sum but a harmony of these different desires and impulses. The Good must consist in some form of self-activity on the part of conscious intelligent beings (there is this much truth in the Aristotelian ideal of contemplation) but it must also make effective connection with our practical activities. The ideal situation which meets both of these requirements is the relationship of love among conscious beings which involves perfect knowledge and understanding. With reference to the conflicting claims of reason and feeling to determine the moral judgment, Field emphasizes a difference between the subject-matter of the moral judgment and that of our "scientific" judgments. In the former case, we are judging about the actions and characters of ourselves and human beings like ourselves. And such being the case, it is not unreasonable to take a certain feeling of ours toward such forms of conduct as an indication that they are so related to our nature that they would be an element in what we desired above all else if we had full knowledge and understanding.

Perhaps the most satisfactory synthesis of these two apparently discrepant factors of reason and will, on the one hand, and impulse and emotion, on the other, is attained by Professor L. T. Hobhouse,<sup>9</sup> whose wide knowledge of the facts of mental and moral development and excellent powers of philosophical correlation enable him to deal very competently with a problem like this. All behavior, human as well as animal, has, he holds, its natural roots in hereditary instinct or impulse. Feeling is a mode of consciousness whose biological function is the governance of impulse

<sup>8</sup> *Moral Theory*: London, Methuen and Co., 1921.

<sup>9</sup> *The Rational Good*: London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1922.



in the interest originally of survival and later of that continuity and harmony of conscious life which reason demands. When impulse is directed by an anticipatory idea attended by a feeling, desire arises. Now any element in experience (impulse, idea or action, of ourselves or others) which excites a favorable or pleasant feeling tending to intensify, prolong, or renew it, is judged to be good. Conversely, any experience which excites an unfavorable feeling which tends to arrest or annul it, is judged bad. Hence, we may say that any experience immediately pleasurable arouses an impulsive judgment of approval which expresses the accompanying feeling. But this may be corrected by a maturer judgment of rational reflection which considers the experience in its wider relations. This also rests on feeling, however, the feeling which an act or situation arouses when connected with other acts and experiences. Since reason is the principle of inter-connection persistently applied, it correlates purposes in an operative system which postulates, (1) the harmony of all feelings in one system; (2) the harmony of all experience of all sentient beings with this body of feeling, and (3) the consistent and impartial application of the universal principles of practical organization to the world of sentient existence. But what of the obligation we feel to conform with the demands of rational goodness? On the view here taken, every judgment of the good involves the existence of an impulse-feeling directed toward it. Among the mass of impulses we must recognize a certain correlation which we can speak of as a specific impulse toward harmony by virtue of whose influence our various impulses tend to become an organized body, overcoming recalcitrant movements, however intensely felt, by the power of the organized mass. This organization, consistently and intelligently carried through is the practical reason. While the work of the practical reason is essentially creative it rests upon a real fact, a

certain unity pervading all mind. But the unity which it finds differs from the unity it seeks to create because of the obstacles which still exist to free and harmonious co-operation between men, such as physical barriers and opposing aims and interests.

In all these discussions of the relation of feeling and impulse to reason one factor has been omitted: *action*, in the sense of bodily movement. Instinct and impulse while aroused by an object perceived or thought of and involving a feeling toward this object is, primarily, a conative tendency seeking expression in bodily movement. Now such motor response has distinctive features of greatest importance for ethics. It is of the nature of thought to generalize, to range over a wide field, including the past and future as well as the present and to claim universal validity for its conclusions. And feeling, while it attaches originally to particular objects which stir impulses and awaken desires readily spreads to the general conceptions of thought. But action always has a specific occasion; motor responses are events occurring in the physical world and, like all physical events, they have their particular time and place. Behaviorism has in recent years been forcing upon our notice this objective expression, this external embodiment, of mind in motor activities.

It is the importance of action that Professor Dewey<sup>10</sup> emphasizes. Since in his view the primary function of thought is the guidance of behavior and action always occurs at a particular time and place, he holds that thought is peculiarly and properly concerned with specific practical problems. The doctrine of instrumentalism has of course a direct bearing upon ethics. The field of conduct is the field of action, and action is (in one aspect, at least) a motor response projected into the physical world and fol-

<sup>10</sup> *Reconstruction in Philosophy*: New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1920; *Human Nature and Conduct*: New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1922; *Experience and Nature*: Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1925.

lowed by a chain of physical events. This concentration on the part of pragmatists upon behavior has led to one result of highest significance for ethics. It has brought into the foreground one feature of action hitherto neglected but of great ethical moment, its *experimental* character.

As living individuals and social beings we have, according to Dewey, many diverse interests and desires. We seek to satisfy them through activities which social custom has made habitual. But these desires and impulses frequently come into conflict and the habitual activities employed in their service block one another. Such conflict of mutually incompatible goods defines a moral situation. The work of intelligence applying itself to the practical problem is to resolve the situation by analyzing out the component factors, tracing in imagination the consequences of alternative courses of possible behavior, and finally projecting a provisional plan of action that promises to effect such a reorganization of the activities involved in the existing situation as will enable them all to function with the maximum of freedom and harmony. But in carrying out its plan in action intelligence proceeds experimentally, i. e., subject to control by the consequences not altogether foreseeable which eventuate as the action proceeds, and stands ever ready to revise its plan in the light of new facts and unexpected conditions which are thus brought to light.

Thus, reason, according to Dewey, does not create or foreordain that harmony of interests and desires which constitutes the rational good. At the most it discovers this harmony in and through the active commerce which it directs between the individual and his environment; it brings to light new resources of satisfaction in the natural and social conditions of human existence. Inasmuch, moreover, as the moral end or ideal is essentially and necessarily a plan of action, its realization does not come as the far-off terminus of protracted effort; it is achieved in the course

of action which, so far as it proceeds harmoniously, brings with it an emotional appreciation of varied and mutually enhancing contacts with the natural world and with fellow-men. From these two facts a consequence follows which Dewey regards as of momentous importance to morality and, in fact, to the whole field of human practice. The deep gulf generally believed to exist between values as intrinsic and ideal on the one hand and instrumental and utilitarian on the other is completely bridged over. In the light of a true functional psychology morals can no longer be exalted as the sphere of purely personal relationships governed by *a priori* rational law while industry and commerce are depreciated as the field of technical art and mechanical invention concerned with the material necessities of human existence. Rather are both morality and industry practical arts, making progress so far as human intelligence is able by the use of its own proper methods of experimental enquiry and technical invention so to control and to transform the physical and social conditions of human life as to increase and diversify and harmonize the satisfactions which accompany the daily activities of men.

The doctrine of pragmatism has had a marked influence upon the political and social philosophy of our day. This is in a measure due to the incisive writings of Professor Dewey who is keenly interested in politics and internationalism, and profoundly convinced of the value of the instrumentalist logic as applied to these problems. Professor Laski,<sup>11</sup> for instance, adopts pragmatism as a philosophic basis for his attack upon the absolutist theory of the state and of national sovereignty. "What the Absolute is to metaphysics," he says, "that is the State to political theory." Tested by the pragmatic criterion, absolutism and monism in political theory have consequences which are morally dangerous and may be tragic, as the late war so

<sup>11</sup> *Sovereignty*.



conclusively demonstrated. From the theoretical conception of the Oneness of the State we pass to its absolute legal right and then to its absolute moral right. In the face of such unqualified national power, individuals abdicate their right of independent moral judgment and accept the dictates of the sovereign state as right whether their own consciences pronounce them right or wrong. The pluralistic theory of the state, on the contrary, is consistently experimentalist. It denies the rightness of force; it insists that the state like every other association shall prove itself by what it achieves. Sovereignty, therefore, in the case of the state as of all other organizations, means no more than the ability to secure assent on the basis of the useful services it renders to human individuals.<sup>12</sup>

Two recent books by Mr. Walter Lippman on public opinion<sup>13</sup> may also be cited in further illustration of the effect of instrumentalism upon present-day thought in the social-political field. Mr. Lippman believes that the hope to which democracy has pinned its faith of developing among the mass of its citizens by social education an opinion upon matters of public concern sufficiently well-informed and judicious to guide the direction of national policies is an unattainable and mistaken ideal. It is, of course, not difficult for a writer of Mr. Lippman's exceptional opportunities for observation and facility at characterization to find evidence striking enough of the incompetence of public opinion in modern democracies. But he believes that scientific justification for his thesis that an intelligent public opinion is an impossibility is furnished by the pragmatist principle that intelligence works effectively only when applied to the specific situations that arise in the lives of human individuals. Thus the average citizen thinks intelligently, can think intelligently, only of his own

<sup>12</sup> Professor Norman Wilde defends the authority of the state on the basis of an idealism that may be described as Ethical rather than Absolute. Cf. *The Ethical Basis of the State*.

business, his own profession, his own local and family interests. Affairs of government can be competently considered only by insiders who "know the ropes." Hence, all the citizen-body can expect or hope to do is by application of certain coarse but clear criteria to keep tab on the insiders and repel the efforts of special interests to control the processes of government for their own profit.

Moving still further "to the left" we may give passing notice to writers who make more radical use of recent discoveries in psychology and physiology in their treatment of social and moral problems. Thus, Mr. Joad,<sup>14</sup> who celebrates the complete failure of traditional ethics because of its metaphysical method of *a priori* reasoning and proposes to write an empirical or "common-sense" ethics, makes large use of the psychology of instinct with which he couples many of the facts and assumptions of psycho-analysis. "Impulse" he holds is the dynamic element in human life, the principle of growth and progress. It is an urge to action springing from the depths of our nature and conditioned by no consciousness of end or result. Some impulses, to be sure, develop into conscious desires and purposes; but impulse is primary and it rather than desire is to be looked on as the source of human conduct and the social order. The importance and rightfulness of impulse are witnessed by the facts which psycho-analysis has unearthed regarding the evil effects of thwarting or repressing these vital tendencies. Morality itself springs from an impulse, the impulse to blame. Man feels this impulse, then sets his reason to work to rationalize the censure he wants to inflict. Historically morality has to a great extent signified the control of the impulses of the young by those of their elders which has meant the control of our positive creative impulses by the negative impulses of fear

<sup>13</sup> *Public Opinion*: New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1922; *The Phantom Public*: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1925.

<sup>14</sup> *Common-sense Ethics*: New York, E. P. Dutton & Co.

and blame. Thus in the matter of sex relations, morality has taken the form of prudery, "the old woman's caricature of morality." Mr. Joad's doctrine of the "liberation of impulse" sounds like a recommendation to let ourselves go, and indeed, the burden of his teaching does seem to be to give expression to the life-force in the gratification of impulses, particularly while they retain their youthful fire and vigor. But he is at pains to deny that his theory justifies any indiscriminate indulgence of impulses. There is, he holds, an impulse in human nature which may be called *will* which seeks the fullest possible satisfaction of impulse as a whole and hence the best life. Furthermore, impulses fall into two classes, possessive and creative, of which the latter bring the fuller satisfaction because they facilitate the expression of other impulses and tend to create a social order offering more opportunities for satisfaction to all.

Finally we are interested to see what behaviorism as sheer physiology can yield in the way of ethical theory. To rebuke any possible incredulity on this point it will be sufficient to mention the ethics of Professor Givler.<sup>15</sup> The meaning of all terms, he tells us, consists in the action-patterns they arouse in us. Logical antonyms arouse antagonistic reactions. So "good" signifies an outgoing extensor reaction and "bad" a withdrawing or flexor reaction. Hence the virtuous man is the relaxed, resilient, coordinate individual and the vicious either the muscularly flabby or abnormally hypertonic organism. Virtue means the mobilizing or expending of energy to obtain a dependable good. As to what is dependably good, the author seems to regard some form of energism as the logical implicate of behaviorism. Extensor actions, he tells us, bring more of the world of action within our range and even the thwarted man imaginatively explores the environment to find substitute stimuli to release his energy upon. And only when

<sup>15</sup> *The Ethics of Hercules.*

a man's actions really enlarge his environment and provide him with increased opportunities for turning his wishes into wills is he in the highest sense ethically free.

A far cry it is indeed from goodness as the unique property of a will which is governed by pure reason to goodness as the characteristic of a motor reaction governed by extensor rather than flexor muscles. Yet such is the range and diversity of contemporary ethical theory. Despite this confusing divergence of viewpoint and conclusion (due in part to the disintegrating impact of new knowledge and world-shaking events) there are clear signs that progress is being made in solving the problems of human conduct in the moral and social field. Whatever the outcome may be of the present controversy among psychologists over instinct, the recent studies of instinct and emotion initiated by McDougall have thrown a flood of light upon the motivation of human behavior, and have given us a more adequate and concrete conception of the way in which man's practical reason obtains and extends its control over his conduct, as is witnessed by Hobhouse's synoptic and clarifying treatment. Dr. Moore has rendered ethics a signal service by showing that the objectivity of moral values can be successfully defended without appeal to any special metaphysical theory. And Professor Dewey, by demonstrating the experimental character of all intelligently-directed behavior, has brought to our attention a neglected factor of incalculable importance to moral and social science.

We make no real progress, I believe, in understanding the facts of morality if we do not recognize that the organization of human conduct and social relations is achieved under the direction of rational will as the one practical capacity common to all men which can claim universal and objective validity for its conclusions and its dictates. But this does not mean that the good life can be completely understood as an *a priori* prescription of reason, or that ethi-



cal enquiry can properly limit itself to a study of the logical inter-relations of moral judgments. On the contrary, reason's plans for the reorganization of human conduct can only be worked out by courageous, sagacious experimentation whose procedure and results are as much determined by the external occasions and conditions of human action, physical, physiological and social, as by the dictates of reason. Moral progress, as we all know, means the realization of ideals formulated and approved by rational reflection through the instrumentality of activities of the human organism in interaction with the forces and factors of the physical and social environment. This means that two very different spheres, each with its own distinct characteristics, that of intellectual synthesis and intelligent interpretation on the one hand, and that of bodily movement and physical change on the other, be brought into effective working relation. And here of course is the rub, the crucial difficulty of practical philosophy revived in our day by the rise of behavioristic psychology and reappearing as that of the relation of conscious intelligence to the motor responses of the human organism.

New knowledge of the working impulse and feeling has contributed materially to the solving of the problem. But we do also, I think, get decided help from a consideration of the outstanding position occupied by three motor responses in the behavior of man as an intelligent and social being. These three responses, depending upon structures peculiar to man are those of articulate speech, of manual contrivance and technical invention, and emotional expression and esthetic perception. These three responses owe their outstanding importance to the fact that while they are bodily movements occurring in the physical world they are nevertheless to a remarkable degree under the control of individual intelligence, and while they are developed and exercised under social guidance and confirmation they

are at the same time especially fitted to express what is unique and original in individuality. In virtue of these characteristics the responses mentioned become, as I have shown in a recent book,<sup>16</sup> media for the communication and expansion of intelligible meanings and satisfactions. Through speech, ideas, beliefs and opinions are exchanged, accumulated and correlated; through practical contrivance, industrial methods and appliances, social procedures and institutions are invented and put to social uses; through emotional expression with esthetic perception, meanings strongly felt but inarticulate are embodied in, and transmitted through, sense-imagery. These three activities are the basis of human association because through them men are able to participate in a common experience: to share in a common fund of knowledge, to co-operate in a common world-task, and to respond sympathetically to the salient features of our common human lot. Through these activities carried on in connection with the everyday activities of social life, men realize values, viz., those of true insight and mutual understanding, of fellowship in productive labor, and of imaginative sympathy, which are *objective* inasmuch as they are open to verification by all who make the specialized motor responses required for their realization. The accumulated products of these activities, scientific and historical writings, industrial art and social institutions, and creations of fine art in all its branches, constituting the sum-total of social culture, furnish the individual with a means of translating the facts of his life into terms of universal human experience and also with a set of generally accepted symbols in which to embody his own insights, inventions and appreciations, and thus to make them part of the permanent spiritual heritage of humanity.

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<sup>16</sup> *The Moral Standards of Democracy*: New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1925.

## HUME AND THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF INSTINCT

THE impression which the first chapter of McDougall's *Social Psychology* conveys to a reader is that something new in psychology has been discovered and formulated. According to McDougall, psychology is of unique importance for all the social sciences; and it is just this which in the past has been overlooked. Attempts to develop the social sciences have rested upon "vaguely conceived principles" or else upon "fragmentary and misleading psychological assumptions." Attention was almost exclusively paid to "the cognitive or intellectual processes" to the neglect of "the life of emotion and the play of motives." The method employed was that of introspection, which is best suited to the consideration of the former but least so that of the latter. One prevailing assumption was that "reasonable action is normal and natural to man." Such a view, according to McDougall, is due to a misunderstanding of the basis of human nature; and the only thing that can remove it is "a full and accurate account of those most fundamental elements of our constitution, the innate tendencies to thought and action that constitute the native basis of the mind."<sup>1</sup>

Such a study must be "an evolutionary natural history of the mind."<sup>2</sup> That method was pointed out by Darwin who, though suffering from an undue deference to the prevailing psychological doctrine of hedonism, was yet the first to enunciate "the true doctrine of human motives."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Social Psychology*, Chap. 1. The references throughout are to the 13th ed.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

The development of the science of biology and the work of Darwin were necessary before "a comparative and evolutionary psychology" could provide the needed basis for the social sciences.<sup>4</sup> "The continuity of the human mind with animal evolution as regards all bodily characters" had first to be established; and the way had to be prepared for the recognition of the "similar continuity of man's mental evolution with that of the animal world."<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, "it would be difficult to find any adequate mention of instincts in treatises on human psychology written before the middle of last century. But the work of Darwin and of Herbert Spencer has lifted to some extent the veil of mystery from the instincts of animals, and has made the problem of the relation of instinct to human intelligence and conduct one of the most widely discussed in recent years."<sup>6</sup>

McDougall's condemnation of philosophers and writers on ethics and the social sciences is severe; and it may be worth while just to devote some consideration to the claims which McDougall puts forth on behalf of his own psychology. There is no doubt that most students of McDougall believe that he has enunciated not merely important but *new* doctrines. It is necessary to remember that though one or two or even a number of instances can be cited where philosophers and social writers have held doctrines opposed by McDougall and defective, as he holds them to be, yet all philosophers may not be open to the charge. McDougall, in his somewhat general and vague condemnation, may himself be "hasty, incomplete, and misleading"; and it is due, in fairness to philosophers in general and to some philosophers in particular, to consider the question, In what respect is this psychology new?

The theory of one writer and philosopher especially stands out as being relevant to this question. That person

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22.



is Hume. Hume has been known and studied, and has exercised a tremendous influence. But his name is connected particularly with the theory of knowledge. His theory of the "Passions" has, it is to be feared, received less attention. Yet that theory is applied by him in his treatment of Morals and in his treatment of History and of Art. What this article will, therefore, attempt to show is that Hume's theory is, in the main points, very similar to the contemporary theory of instinct. It may differ in its terminology and in the detailed treatment of the emotional life; but such differences are found between even contemporary theories. The references to Hume will be mostly taken from the *Enquiry*. Hume himself says, in the advertisement to the *Enquiry*, that "most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume, were published in a work in three volumes, called a *Treatise of Human Nature*"; and Green and Grose in their Preface to their edition of Hume's works say: "Anyone who will be at pains to read the *Inquiries* alongside of the original *Treatise* will find that their only essential difference from it is in the way of omission. They consist in the main of excerpts from the *Treatise*, rewritten in a lighter style, and with the more difficult parts of it left out." But another result of the omissions requires to be noted. Omission involves selection, and gives a clue to what Hume was inclined to emphasize. In the *Enquiry*, in contrast to the *Treatise*, a doctrine of instinct seems to be more strongly emphasized and to stand out more prominently; and for this reason the *Enquiry* is most frequently referred to in the present article.

The contemporary theory of instinct maintains that there are primary innate tendencies at the basis of the human mind; and that, though these may vary relatively in strength between individuals of different races and be "favoured or checked in very different social circumstances

of men in different stages of culture," yet they "are probably common to the men of every race and of every age." "If this view, that human nature has everywhere and at all times this common native foundation, can be established, it will afford a much-needed basis for speculation on the history of the development of human societies and human institutions. For so long as it is possible to assume, as has often been done, that these innate tendencies of the human mind have varied greatly from age to age and from race to race, all such speculation is founded on quicksand and we cannot hope to reach views of a reasonable degree of certainty."

Hume, too, argues for the doctrine of the uniformity and constancy of human nature. "It is universally acknowledged, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all ages and nations, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. . . . Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and of furnishing us with materials, from which we may inform our observations, and become acquainted with the regular springs of human action and behavior. . . . But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment, which we could form of this kind, irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind; and no experience, however accurately digested by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose. . . . What would become of *history*, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian, according to the experience, which we have had of mankind?" What would become of *criticism*? Where would be the founda-

<sup>7</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

tion of *morals*? How could *politics* be a science?<sup>8</sup> Consequently, Hume seeks to show that "in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy."<sup>9</sup>

What Hume and McDougall alike seek to establish is the same—namely, a uniform and constant basis in human nature. And this is held to be necessary because without such uniformity there could be no social science. It might seem at first that there was a difference in the attitude of the two, that Hume regards history as merely a psychological study, as material for establishing psychological principles; while McDougall considers that a social psychology must first be established in order that history may be studied and laws of social organization discovered. But if McDougall's contention is accepted, that "the instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities" and "are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies,"<sup>10</sup> it seems that Hume's view of history must be accepted. History is merely a study of a material that reveals the constant basis of human nature.

What about the method whereby this doctrine of the constancy and uniformity of human nature is to be established? It is true that Hume had not the advantage of the Darwinian evolutionary theory; but he is credited by historians of philosophy with the definite introduction of the natural history method. This method is deliberately applied in the treatment of Religion, when he seeks to trace Religion to its basis and argues for the view that it is not primary or original but secondary in human nature. Religion "springs not from an original instinct."<sup>11</sup> Polytheism

<sup>8</sup> *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*, Sec. viii, Pt. I.

<sup>9</sup> *Dissertation on the Passions*, Sec. VI.

<sup>10</sup> McDougall, *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>11</sup> *Natural History of Religion*, Intro.

is the primary form of religion; and the first ideas of religion arose "from a concern with regard to the events of life, and from the incessant hopes and fears, which actuate the human mind."<sup>12</sup> Such factors are "the anxious care for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessities."<sup>13</sup> This treatment of Religion is very closely allied to that given by McDougall. The latter like Hume seeks to assign Religion to its basis in human nature; and both consider the religions of primitive men. According to McDougall, the wonder of primitive man" was especially aroused by those things and events which excited also his fear, by disease and death, pestilence and famine, storm and flood, lightning and thunder, and the powerful beasts of prey. . . . Therefore he walked in fear and trembling."<sup>14</sup>

Hume thus seems alive to the comparative and natural history method. It is not true that he confines himself to a narrow conception of psychology and psychological method; though he has recourse to human experience in the first place to discover the nature of emotional life; but any theory must admit that the first clues to conduct are to be found in man's own experience. McDougall lays stress upon the past tendency to consider psychology merely as a study of cognition, and insists that it must claim to be "the positive science of the mind in all its aspects and modes of functioning."<sup>15</sup> He also holds that, with certain qualifications, the aim of psychology may be taken to be that of rendering our knowledge of human nature more exact and more systematic.<sup>16</sup> According to Hume, moral philosophy is "the science of human nature"; and he points out that man may be considered as an active being, as requiring to regulate his conduct, or as a reasonable being,

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Sec. II.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Sec. II.

<sup>14</sup> McDougall, *Op. cit.*, pp. 304-305.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>16</sup> *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 1.



that is, as capable of gaining information about his own nature, about the principles which "regulate the understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behavior."<sup>17</sup> He views man as a "reasonable being," that is, as having a cognitive function; man as a social being; and man as an active being.<sup>18</sup>

Hume's conception of history as simply providing material for a discovery of the "regular springs of human action and behavior" is a recognition of "objective methods" and the acceptance of something more than the "pure psychology" of introspective description. The study of the differences of manners in different ages and countries shows what factors serve to obscure the uniformity of the human mind. Observation of variations in an individual's conduct at different ages provides for conclusions regarding the change of "sentiments and inclinations" which takes place according to the age of human creatures. Human behavior and conduct are thus studied by Hume in order to establish the psychological principles of human nature.<sup>19</sup>

But he links up human psychology with the nature of animals. He does not draw a sharp line of demarcation between men and animals. After pointing out the considerable use made of *Analogy* in all human "reasonings," he maintains that "these analogical observations may be carried farther, even to this science, of which we are now treating; and any theory, by which we explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin and connection of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other animals."<sup>20</sup> That "experimental reasoning" on which the whole conduct of life depends, is

<sup>17</sup> *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*, Sec. I.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding*, Sec. VIII, Pt. I.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Sec. IX.

possessed by man in common with the lower animals. By "experimental reasoning" Hume means to all intents and purposes a learning by experience, the determination of present conduct by past experience. It is not reasoning in a theoretical or speculative sense. Neither philosophers, children, nor the generality of men are guided in conduct by such theoretical or abstract reasoning. But "were this doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no doubt with regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from the rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without any exception or reserve."<sup>21</sup>

It is not necessary to show or to argue here that Hume did give a full analysis of animal behavior. It is only necessary to point out that he saw the relatedness of the animals and mankind at a time prior to the formulation of the Darwinian theory. He saw the need of checking his theory of human nature by a consideration of animal nature. Here he uses analogy; but that is what McDougall does;<sup>22</sup> and it is what must be done by any psychological observer. He does not draw between man and the animals the distinction, to which McDougall takes exception, that "animals are guided by Instinct and man by Reason."<sup>23</sup>

It is well-known to students of the history of philosophy that Hume argues that at the basis of all knowledge there is a non-rational factor. Knowledge rests upon a foundation which can find no justification either in pure reason alone or from experience. McDougall criticizes philosophers on the ground that they falsely assumed that men always normally act reasonably and make clever calculations about pleasure and pain and holds that the minds of such philosophers entertaining such "curious views" were

<sup>21</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 28. *Outline of Psychology*, p. 129.

<sup>23</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, p. 129.

"either constitutionally devoid of the powerful impulses that so often move ordinary men to actions which they know to be morally wrong and against their true interests and destructive of their happiness, or so completely moralized by strict self-discipline that these powerful impulses are completely subordinated."<sup>24</sup> This criticism does not in the least apply to Hume, who was yet a philosopher and an eminent one.

Hume dethrones Reason from its sovereign position in knowledge; but he does so also in regard to conduct. "And these decisions, though really the result of our calm passions and propensities (for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?) are yet said, by a natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure *reason* and reflection."<sup>25</sup> According to Hume, "men often act knowingly against their interest: It is not therefore the view of the greatest possible good which always influences them. Men often counteract a violent passion, in prosecution of their distant interests and designs: It is not, therefore, the present uneasiness alone, which determines them."<sup>26</sup> "Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, may be so eagerly pursued, as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease, interest, or safety; and, like some vindictive animals, infuse our very souls into the wounds we give an enemy?"<sup>27</sup> He maintains that "reason, in a strict sense, as meaning the judgment of truth and falsehood, can never of itself, be any motive to the will, and can have no influence but so far as it touches some passion or affection."<sup>28</sup> "The ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by *reason*, but recommend themselves entirely to the sen-

<sup>24</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 10.

<sup>25</sup> *Principles of Morals*, Sec. VI, Pt. I.

<sup>26</sup> *Dissertation on the Passions*, Sec. V, 4.

<sup>27</sup> *Principles of Morals*, App. II.

<sup>28</sup> *Dissertation on the Passions*, Sec. V, 1.

timents and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties."<sup>29</sup>

There is here in Hume no belief that reason is the determinant of human action. According to him what is usually called reason and what is so much recommended in moral discourses is "nothing but a general and calm passion."<sup>30</sup> It is Hume that enunciates the well-known doctrine that "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."<sup>31</sup> The basis of human action is thus non-rational. Reason neither prompts the act nor does it set the end towards which the act tends. Ends, rather, are relative to the non-rational side of human nature. This view is paralleled by that of McDougall. "The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of means."<sup>32</sup>

What, then, is the character of this non-rational basis of human nature and human conduct? If normally human beings are not guided by reasoning," nature must have provided some other principle, of more ready, and more general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life, as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation."<sup>33</sup> Hume's analysis of knowledge and conduct leads him back to something which remains inexplicable to reason, to something which must, to use a more recent phrase, be accepted "with piety," to some-

<sup>29</sup> *Principles of Morals*, App. I, v.

<sup>30</sup> *Dissertation on the Passions*, Sec. V, 2.

<sup>31</sup> *Treatise*, Book II, Pt. III, Sec. III.

<sup>32</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 44; cf. also pp. 379ff.

<sup>33</sup> *Enquiry*, Sec. IX.



thing which will provide "those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of *final causes*" with an "ample subject to employ their wonder and admiration."<sup>84</sup>

Though Hume uses the term "nature" in this connection, yet he does not claim that he has thereby rendered an explanation of anything; he is merely directing attention to what must simply be recognized. But in speaking of nature in that way, he has the good company of McDougall. "For it would be strange indeed if Nature, after successfully evolving through many millions of years all the wonderful varieties of nicely adapted animal behavior on the principle of Instinct, had suddenly deserted this principle for another. . . . And such a reversal of policy by Mother Nature would seem the more strange, when we see how, even far down the scale of animal life, Intelligence co-operates so beautifully with Instinct."<sup>85</sup> "The pairing instinct of the female bird is provided by Nature with a lock which can be turned only by a key of one specific pattern; the male is provided by Nature with that key." "But Man, though he is Nature's most favored child, was not constructed by her upon any new principle. He is only one among her many marvels, though the greatest of them."<sup>87</sup> Let Hume now be heard. "It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the labored deductions of the understanding."<sup>88</sup> So for Hume, too, "Nature" has made use of the principle of Instinct.

Hume, in stating his doctrine of knowledge, of the passions, and of morals, makes use of the term "instinct." All

<sup>84</sup> *Enquiry*, Sec. V, Pt. II.

<sup>85</sup> *Outline of Psychology*, p. 130.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 134.

<sup>88</sup> *Enquiry*, Sec. V, Pt. II.

mental operations are reduced by him to "natural instincts." The belief, for instance, which is the essence of cause and effect, is "the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is the operation of the soul, when we are so situated, so unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the mind and understanding is able, either to produce, or to prevent."<sup>39</sup> The belief that objects are independent, are real and have a continuous existence is an opinion which is embraced "by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of its suitability and conformity to the mind"; it is not one which "we form after a calm and profound reflection."<sup>40</sup> In resorting to this term "natural instinct" Hume is aware that he is explaining nothing. When he uses the word "custom" in connection with the principle of cause and effect, he says, "we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well-known by its effects." He goes on to state that this propensity is an "instinct" implanted by nature; it must be excited by nature, and "must arise from the particular situation, in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture."<sup>41</sup>

All this may at first seem somewhat remote from the modern theory of Instinct, and open to the objection of multiplying the number of instincts unnecessarily. So, too, may seem the view that reason itself is to be regarded as "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls."<sup>42</sup> But at this point it may be worth while to examine the two theories more closely. "In the typical

<sup>39</sup> *Enquiry*, Sec. V, Pt. I.

<sup>40</sup> *Treatise*, Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sec. II. Cf. *Enquiry*, Sec. XII, Pt. I.

<sup>41</sup> *Enquiry*, Sec. V, Pt. I and Pt. II.

<sup>42</sup> *Treatise*, Bk. I, Pt. III, Sec. XVI. Cf. *Enquiry*, Sec. IX.

case," says McDougall, summing up the significance of various instances of instinctive behavior,<sup>43</sup> "some sense-impression, or combination of sense-impressions, excites some perfectly definite behavior, some movement or train of movements which is the same in all individuals of the species and on all similar occasions; and in general the behavior so occasioned is of a kind either to promote the welfare of the individual or of the community to which he belongs, or to secure the perpetuation of the species." "Every instance of instinctive behavior involves a knowing of some thing or object, a feeling in regard to it, and a striving towards or away from that object."<sup>44</sup> Then finally the definition is given of an instinct as an inherited or innate psychophysical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least, to experience an impulse to such action.<sup>45</sup>

Let us now turn to Hume. How does he understand Instinct? It has to be admitted that Hume gives no systematic account of Instinct; but yet a theory of Instinct underlies his other doctrines. This is seen, for instance, in his discussion of Justice. According to him, the object of Justice is property. What is exactly the relation between them? He raises the question whether there is an *instinct* of justice which has property as its end or natural goal. He denies that property is connected with any instinct. "Though it seems a very simple proposition to say, that nature, by an instinctive sentiment, distinguishes property, yet in reality we shall find, that there are required for that purpose ten thousand different instincts, and these employed about objects of the greatest intricacy and nicest

<sup>43</sup> *Social Psychology*, pp. 25-26.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

discernment. For when a definition of *property* is required, that relation is found to resolve itself into any possession acquired by occupation, by industry, by prescription, by inheritance, by contract, etc. Can we think, that nature, by an original instinct, instructs us in all these methods of acquisition?"<sup>46</sup> "All birds of the same species, in every age and country, build their nests alike: In this we see the force of instinct. Men, in different times and places, frame their houses differently: Here we see the influence of reason and custom. A like inference may be drawn from comparing the instinct of generation and the institution of property."<sup>47</sup> In this argument Hume is assuming that an instinct is characterized by a definite simple object, and by the presence of a simple, uniform, and constant relation between that object and a "passion." Justice, on the other hand, is a rule that regulates the complex passions of men, and is based on a recognition of what is useful in respect of the whole civil society.

In his treatment of the passions he introduces a distinction between the *causes* of a passion and the *object* of a passion. Speaking of Love and Hatred, for instance, he says, "In these two sets of passions, there is an obvious distinction to be made between the *object* of the passion and its *cause*."<sup>48</sup> "Self, which is the *object* of the passion, must still be related to that quality or circumstance, which *causes the passion*."<sup>49</sup> Speaking of Pride and Humility he says, "We must, therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited."<sup>50</sup> His treatment of the passions is thus concerned with showing what circumstances, passions, and objects are uniformly found in experience to be

<sup>46</sup> *Principles of Morals*, Sec. III, Pt. II.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Dissertation on Passions*, Sec. II, 2. Cf. *Treatise*, Bk. II, Pt. II, Sec. I.

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*, Sec. II, 4.

<sup>50</sup> *Treatise*, Bk. II, Pt. I, Sec. II.



"conjoined." This is paralleled by the more modern treatment which resolves human action into a perception, an emotion, and a reaction towards an end or goal. Hume builds up his theory of Morals and of the passions, as well as his theory of knowledge, upon the argument that the mind "operates" in a perfectly definite way when placed in a definite situation or faced with definite circumstances, and that this "operation" is common or uniform in mankind and, to a certain extent, is common to man and animals.

The operation of the soul that is instinctive is "the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances." "When we are so situated" it is as "unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits: or hatred, when we meet with injuries."<sup>51</sup> It "must arise from the particular situation, in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture."<sup>52</sup> "There are bodily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of the object. . . . In the same manner, there are mental passions, by which we are impelled immediately to seek particular objects, such as fame, or power, or vengeance, without any regard to interest. . . . Nature must, by the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an original propensity to fame. . . . In all these cases, there is a passion, which points immediately to the object."<sup>53</sup>

After making the distinction between the *cause* and the *object* of a passion, Hume proceeds to raise the question whether the cause and the object of passions are *natural* and *original*. The test of being natural is constancy, uniformity, or steadiness. For instance, as regards the *object* of pride and humility, he says, "these passions are determined to have self for their *object*, not only by a natural but also by an original property. No one can doubt but

<sup>51</sup> *Enquiry*, Sec. V, Pt. I.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, Pt. II.

<sup>53</sup> *Principles of Morals*, App. II.

this property is *natural* from the constancy and steadiness of its operations. 'Tis always self, which is the object of pride and humility. . . . That this proceeds from an *original* quality or primary impulse, will likewise appear evident, if we consider that 'tis the distinguishing characteristic of these passions. Unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind, it could never have any secondary ones; because in that case it would have no foundation for action, nor could ever begin to exert itself. Now these qualities, which we must consider as original, are such as are most inseparable from the soul, and can be resolved into no other."<sup>54</sup> As regards the cause of these passions, he holds that it is *natural*. The question "whether the *causes*, that produce the passion, be as *natural* as the object, to which it is directed," can be soon answered "if we cast our eye upon human nature, and consider that in all ages, the same objects still give rise to pride and humility. . . . But tho' the causes of pride and humility be plainly *natural*, we shall find upon examination, that they are not *original*, and that 'tis utterly impossible they shou'd each of them be adapted to these passions by a particular provision, and primary constitution of nature. 'Tis absurd, therefore, to imagine, that each of these was foreseen and provided for by nature, and that every new production of art, which causes pride or humility; instead of adapting itself to the passion by partaking of some general quality, that naturally operates on the mind; is itself the object of an original principle, which till then lay concealed in the soul, and is only by accident at last brought to light."<sup>55</sup>

For Hume, therefore, at the basis of human nature there are certain primary impulses, which are naturally and originally connected with a simple and definite "quality" as their cause, and with a definite object or goal. These primary impulses are comparatively few in number. "'Tis

<sup>54</sup> *Treatise*, Bk. II, Pt. I, Sec. III.

<sup>55</sup> *Op. cit.*

the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every different operation." Where a multiplicity of things may act as causes of a passion, it is because "there are some one or more circumstances common to all of them, on which their efficacy depends."<sup>56</sup> It is this general quality which is originally and naturally connected with a passion. For Hume this conjunction of circumstances, a passion, and an object is ultimate. He simply assigns it to the "principles of the human frame" or to "nature," or to "the internal frame and constitution of the mind," or to "the particular fabric and constitution of the human species." This ultimate fact is what Hume understands as Instinct. "But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate Instincts."<sup>57</sup> The usefulness of the natural instincts is recognized by Hume, when he emphasizes the contrast between instinct and reasoning; but he does so also explicitly in certain passages. Passions arise "from a simple original instinct in the human breast" and have been implanted by nature for "salutary purposes."<sup>58</sup>

Hume's analysis of the various passions leads him back to some factor which admits of no farther explanation, but which must simply be accepted as an ultimate factor is what he calls "instinct." It is that which gives the distinctive feature to the passions. This has just been illustrated in the case of the passions of pride and humility. But the same applies to the other passions. We will cite another instance, namely, self-love and benevolence, because the

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> *Enquiry*, Sec. IX.

<sup>58</sup> *Principles of Morals*, Sec. III, Pt. II.

point which Hume makes in this connection is one which McDougall stresses strongly. The latter considers "the constantly renewed attempt to reveal altruism as arising essentially out of a more or less subtle regard for one's own welfare or pleasure" to be "absurd" and "a gross libel on human nature."<sup>59</sup> Hume is concerned to maintain that benevolence—a term covering a large class of altruistic passions or sentiments (in Hume's sense)—is not developed from self-love, but from instincts which are just as primary as those from which egoistic sentiments are developed.

As regards self-love, he says, "Nature must, by the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an original propensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition, or pursue it from motives of self-love, and a desire of happiness. . . . In all these cases, there is a passion, which points immediately to the object, and constitutes it our good or happiness; as there are other secondary passions, which afterwards arise, and pursue it as a part of our happiness, when once it is constituted such by our original affections. Were there no appetite of any kind antecedent to self-love, that propensity could scarcely ever exert itself."<sup>60</sup> Self-love, that is, is a complex growth that can take place only if some "instinct" is first present. Hume proceeds: "Now where is the difficulty in conceiving, that this may likewise be the case with benevolence and friendship, and that, from the original frame of our temper, we may feel a desire of another's happiness or good? . . . The social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence immediately, by a direct tendency or instinct, which chiefly keeps in view the simple object, moving the affections, and comprehends not any scheme or system, nor the consequences resulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others. A parent flies to the relief of his child;

<sup>59</sup> *Social Psychology*, pp. 70, 71, 190.

<sup>60</sup> *Principles of Morals*, App. II.



transported by that natural sympathy, which actuates him, and which affords no leisure to reflect on the sentiments or conduct of the rest of mankind in like circumstances."<sup>61</sup>

The recognition of this instinctive basis of human conduct leads to a definite doctrine of pleasure. McDougall objects strongly to Hedonism—"the doctrine that the motives of all human activity are the desire of pleasure and the aversion to pain."<sup>62</sup> Hume, though by no means always clear and consistent, is not to be identified with such a doctrine. The primary fact for Hume is the direction of activity towards some *object*. "There are bodily wants and appetites, acknowledged by every one, which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, and carry us directly to seek possession of the object. Thus, hunger and thirst have eating and drinking for their end; and from the gratification of these primary appetites arises a pleasure, which may become the object of another species of desire or inclination, that is secondary and interested."<sup>63</sup> Hume generalizes this and applies it to the "passions." "Nature must, by the internal frame and constitution of the mind, give an original propensity to fame, ere we can reap any pleasure from that acquisition, or pursue it from motives of self-love, and a desire of happiness."<sup>64</sup> Pleasure accompanies the attainment of the object of the passion; and, after it has been experienced, it may become the object of desire and be deliberately sought in a secondary sense. But obviously it can be sought only through the operation of the natural instincts, if these are the basis of conduct and are such as even reason cannot check. Pleasure, therefore, if it is consciously sought, must be in "conformity with the mind" or with the "natural affections." In fact, pleasure in a primary sense can arise only under these condi-

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, App. II and III.

<sup>62</sup> *Social Psychology*, p. 8.

<sup>63</sup> *Principles of Morals*, App. II. Cf. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 365ff.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

tions. "Some objects produce immediately an agreeable sensation, by the original structure of our organs, and are thence denominated Good; as others, from their immediate disagreeable sensation, acquire the appellation of Evil. Some objects again, by being naturally conformable or contrary to passion, excite an agreeable or painful sensation; and are thence called Good or Evil."<sup>65</sup> It is this, accepted by Hume as a fact, which lies at the basis of the virtues and of moral approbation and censure according to him, and which leads him to maintain the principle of Utility—the principle that the end which the virtues tend to "promote must be some way agreeable to us, and must take hold of some natural affection."<sup>66</sup> In this way, Hume, like the more recent theory, links up moral values with the instincts.

It is not the purpose of this article to argue that Hume develops a theory exactly similar to that of more recent times. Only a few of the main general features of Hume's doctrine have been mentioned in order to show how closely in its ideas and method of treatment it touches the more recent theory, and that all philosophy and psychology preceding the formulation of McDougall's theory is not subject to the criticism which the latter passes upon it. It is not possible to develop farther here the significance of various ideas which appear in his analysis of the passions—such as the distinction between "direct" and "indirect" passions, or between "simple" and "mixed" or "complicated" passions, or between passions that are, like pride and humility, not attended with desire and are "pure emotions" and passions that are attended with desire. "Impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colors, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that

<sup>65</sup> *Dissertation on the Passions*, Sec. I, 1.

<sup>66</sup> *Principles of Morals*, Sec. V, Pt. I.

uniform impression, which arises from the whole."<sup>67</sup> This property of the passions gives rise to "some of the most curious phenomena of the human mind."<sup>68</sup> In working out this idea, Hume finds that some passions are connected with others, such as benevolence with love, and anger with hatred, by "a natural and original quality" or in an "original and primary" manner.<sup>69</sup>

That Hume groups the passions in a way different from more recent theories is not a serious matter, especially in view of contemporary differences on the same problem. Contemporary theory is more elaborate in its treatment of the instinctive factor than Hume. It disengages the "instinct" from desire and "sentiment"; and seeks to give precise meaning to the various terms, instinct, emotion, desire, sentiment. Hume's terminology is in this connection very confusing; it must be confessed that it is difficult to grasp any precise meaning and distinction of meaning in the terms, emotion, passion, affection, desire, sentiment. He speaks, for instance, of an "emotion" attending a passion.<sup>70</sup> But ambiguity of terminology could be found also in contemporary theory. In recent times attempts have been made to connect instinct with physiological factors. But it may be questioned whether all such theorizing has thrown much light upon the Instincts or has carried one much farther than Hume's vague and undefined "human frame" or "constitution." Much of what is new in modern times consists of "hypotheses"; and Hume is sceptical of hypotheses. He insists upon "fact and observation."<sup>71</sup>

Finally attention may be drawn to Hume's comprehension of the problem which has recently been felt to arise from the theory of Instinct and to call for solution. "All

<sup>67</sup> *Treatise*, Bk. II, Pt. II, Sec. VI.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, Sec. IX.

<sup>70</sup> *Dissertation on the Passions*, Sec. VI, 1.

<sup>71</sup> *Principles of Morals*, Sec. I. Cf. *Treatise*, Bk. I, Pt. II, Sec. V, where however, he also touches upon a physiological theory of animal spirits, traces, and cells.

this is the effect of the natural and inherent principles and passions of human nature; and as these passions and principles are inalterable, it may be thought, that our conduct, which depends on them, must be so too, and that 'twould be in vain either for moralists or politicians, to tamper with us, or attempt to change the usual course of our actions, with a view to public interest. . . . All they can pretend to, is, to give a new direction to those natural passions, and teach us that we can better satisfy our appetites in an oblique and artificial manner, than by their headlong and impetuous motion."<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> *Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Sec. V.



## PSYCHOLOGY AS AN AMERICAN SCIENCE

UNLIKE Germany and Europe in general, the cultural expansion of the United States seems to have begun "from below" rather than "from above." The practical, the concrete, expressing itself in the erection of subways, skyscrapers and in wonderful inventions established itself here without the aid of traditions.

A glance at the table of Nobel Prize awards would confirm the view that American achievements have been in the sphere of the practical and utilitarian rather than the theoretical and artistic. There have been awards for physics, chemistry, medicine and peace endeavors but none for literature. Nor does it seem likely that the Nobel laureate in literature will be found in the United States for another decade or so.

And yet there is one department of cultural science which proved to be an exception to the general situation, and that is psychology, which, taken as a whole, at once evinced its ability to stand on its own feet without needing the support of Europe; and contributing to the general fund of the discipline fully as much as it was obliged to take from it.

If psychology is a theoretical science, we should hardly have expected it to show anything more than ordinary growth in the United States. It would therefore surprise many a reader to learn that this country enjoys the world leadership in psychology—not in all its branches, to be

sure, but certainly in its most important fields. Perhaps this hegemony is due to the fact that psychology is at least in part a very practical science, which would naturally explain the exalted place applied psychology holds in the United States. But one of the founders of psychology, William James, we must remember, flourished at a time when the practical aspect of his science was not yet in evidence. It was reserved for his successor Münsterberg, whom James had invited to Harvard while still in his twenties, to lend impetus to the new movement.

By another stroke of luck, which is only a synonym for a favorable piece of chance, Titchener was about the same time called from Oxford to Cornell, where he has now brought up a generation of experimental psychologists. The German traditions of Münsterberg and the Anglo-German training of Titchener were almost indispensable for the moulding of American psychology. In those days the German influence was quite marked. Nearly every important psychologist of that time had studied in Germany, in most cases sitting at the feet of the pontifical Wilhelm Wundt at Leipzig.

Rather than deprecate this foreign strain we should attribute to it the catholicity of American psychology as compared, let us say, with the insularity of British or the self-sufficiency of French psychology. If American text-books in psychology follow the German *Lehrbücher* in manner, we must not forget that the matter is of a native brand. In some respects the pupil has outgrown its preceptor. Applied psychology, though born in Germany, has made its most rapid strides in this country where it has been of great service during the World War and since.

The intelligence tests movement, again, which was inaugurated in France also found its best expression in the United States. It is here that the original Binet-Simon scale was revised, standardized, applied on a gigantic scale,

and theoretically discussed. The word "test" has now become an international term for which there is no satisfactory technical substitute. Certainly a change has come about in the annals of education, when instead of borrowing words from our more established cousins, we become their purveyors of scientific terms. No more are we obliged to resort to a German jawbreaker for the purpose of making clear distinctions. We are quite at home with our "I. Q.'s," "weighting," "pooling," and "skewness." It would not be an exaggeration to say that the literature on mental measurement as well as the number and variety of tests produced in America would more than equal the output along similar lines of all countries combined.

Experimental psychology in the United States does not hold such an enviable position, for although in matter of quantity, we may well compare with the Germans, one feels that the work of the latter is more solid, more comprehensive, and more detailed than our own, though not always so critical. The German investigator does seem more mature, but often he starts out with foregone conclusions which lead him to interpret his data in accordance with his theories. The scope of experimental psychology is so large that at least half a dozen publications in the United States are devoted to the presentation of such investigation as offer definite results. The series of monographs, composed mostly of doctoral dissertations, has now reached the thirty third volume, thus bespeaking the productivity of American laboratories.

The behavior of animals and lower organisms has been most carefully studied in the United States by men like Thorndike, Yerkes, Jennings, Parker, Loeb and Mast. Animal psychology prior to Thorndike rested largely on a number of anecdotes, uncontrolled experiments and random observations. It was through him and Yerkes that

a proper technique for the handling of such subjects was made possible.

There is, on the other hand, a decided ebb when we come to the field of abnormal psychology. Not only France with its celebrated Pinel, Esquirol, Liebault, Charcot, Bernheim and Janet, but even Germany, which had lagged behind in this branch, and Austria can easily claim an advantage to this day over our psychiatrists, psychopathologists, and abnormal psychologists. Morton Prince alone has made noteworthy contributions toward the problem of personality, hysteria, and allied topics. The others who have become professionally prominent either treat their subject altogether from a medical point of view or else embrace psychoanalysis as a panacea for all nervous and mental ailments.

Psychoanalysis, strange as it may seem to the layman and the wealthy ladies who pay hundreds of dollars for the privilege of recounting their experiences from alpha to omega, is looked upon with suspicion by the majority of psychologists not only here but also abroad. Not that Freud, Jung, Adler, Stekel *et alii* are regarded as charlatans, but because as Professor Seashore puts it in the most recently published text-book, “. . . Psychoanalysis is so complicated and so controversial, at the present time, that it cannot profitably be given a place in the elementary text-book” (*Introduction to Psychology*, p. 381).

Of course that would scarcely constitute an adequate reason for the aversion felt toward this new movement in academic circles. Surely it might reasonably be expected that psychologists would make every possible endeavor to gain insight into the hidden recesses of the mind—and that is what *prima facie* psychoanalysis would attempt to do. But we must bear in mind that in reality psychoanalysis, as formulated by Freud, stands for the doctrine that all human occurrences whether dreams, creative impulses, slips, or



even historical and social phenomena, not to mention nervous disorders, are due to the functioning of an unconscious wish, repressed in various degrees as a result of conventions, and center about the sex activity of man in some form or other, and largely in the period of early childhood.

The objections to such an all-embracing principle are many, and ignoring the inane opposition of the bigoted on the ground of religious and moral scruples, we find that psychoanalysis is indicted on the following counts:

(1) It overemphasizes a single factor, which while extremely important and apt to be overlooked by a number of cloistered university dwellers, cannot take the place of every instinct and emotion which play on the life of the individual.

(2) Psychoanalysis proceeds without regard for the body of accepted facts that psychology has succeeded in building up on the basis of experimental work, and subordinates the conscious, with which we are familiar, to the unconscious which, no matter how important it might be, is after all a matter of speculation, with the result that once your doctrine is constantly kept before you, your interpretation can be so manipulated, in view of the fact that sex affords such a rich symbolism, that every event will be subsumed under or will point in the direction of that principle, "All Roads Lead to Rome."

(3) The dissension on fundamental points in the psychoanalytic camp and the circumstance that almost each prominent disciple of Freud has formed a school for himself would tend to make it apparent that psychoanalysis is a sphere where, as in the days of ancient Israel under the rule of the Judges, "every man does what is right in his own eyes."

(4) The role and significance assigned to experiences of a sexual nature, especially those during infancy, seems

to be exaggerated; and many peculiarities and eccentricities can be explained in a much less circuitous manner.

(5) It has been questioned by Münsterberg and others, though without just cause, whether an unconscious or subconscious mind is not a contradiction in terms.

Add to these objections the further drawback that there is no possible demonstrable proof of any of the Freudian or Jungian mechanisms; and the skeptical attitude of the more outstanding American psychologists on this issue will be somewhat appreciated. To be sure, many cures have been effected by Freudian methods, but it must be pointed out, apart from the fact that the most solid ground of psychoanalytical teaching is to be found in the field of hysteria and other disorders, that fakirs, shamans, medicine men, miracle men, and faith healers of all sorts, at all times, and in all climes, have had considerable success with their patients. Such is the power of mind upon mind.

That Freud's suggestive theories should make a strong appeal to the social worker, the literary man and the nerve specialist need not surprise us; but we must remember after all that it is for psychologists to decide whether psychological doctrines are acceptable or not; and of course it will not be expected of them that they would allow their whole edifice to be demolished in order to make room for a structure which does not resemble their own.

It is only fair to say, however, that a number of the Freudian concepts such as "repression," "complex," "conflict," and "sublimation," are gradually being accepted into the orthodox circle, largely on the recommendation of practitioners who find the doctrines of Freud and his hostile associates almost indispensable as working hypotheses in the treatment of their patients. An indication of rapprochement may be seen in the symposium on the Freudian contribution to psychology, to which a whole session was de-

voted at the last meeting of the American Psychological Association.

Psychical research, while not strictly a department of psychology, is another piece of adjacent territory that the American psychologist is not willing to explore before he sees a good prospect ahead. This aloofness some sympathizers of psychical research will attribute to a professional timorousness; others will ascribe it to the want of a cosmic interest on the part of American psychologists. Neither charge, I believe, accounts for the situation which, to my mind, is merely the result of a practical training and a feeling that there has been too much fraud manifested in the past by so-called mediums and psychics to justify the expenditure of valuable time on dubious investigations. Then again, the exposure of operatives does not now attract the world's attention as it did fifteen or twenty years ago, when Eusapia Palladino was maneuvering in the psychical arena.

That psychoanalysis and psychical research should have a greater vogue in England than in the United States may strike the reader as surprising, but therein really lies a trait of difference between the two types of minds. The British mind is more mystical and not so practical as the American. To the former, anything is possible provided it is imaginable, or even conceivable.<sup>1</sup> The fanciful novels of H. G. Wells are really of a piece with the remarkable Scientific Romances of C. H. Hinton or the highly ingenious hypothesis of Whately Smith to explain the *modus operandi* of a discarnate world.

<sup>1</sup> Since writing the above, I was astonished to find in Kant's *Observations on the Sentiment of the Beautiful and Sublime* a passage discussing this very trait, "It has been remarked on a number of occasions," says the great German philosopher, "that the English, though indeed a wise people, may at the same time easily be inveigled, by the bold announcement of a wondrous but preposterous thing, as to lend credence at first, of which there are many instances. But a bold cast of mind, prepared by various experiences in which many remarkable things yet have proved true, easily breaks through the minor reservations by which a weak-minded and distrustful person would immediately be checked, in such way guarding himself temporarily against error, though through no merit of his own. Kant thus accredits British apparent credulity to a strength of mind, and not to an intelligence defect."

The fact that the British Society for Psychical Research has had among its officers and members some of the most distinguished scientists and thinkers in Great Britain has of course created a respectable, perhaps even an aristocratic atmosphere about the society, but that is to be taken rather as an effect than a cause of the comparative success which psychical research has been enjoying in England. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the British Society maintains a more reserved and circumspect attitude than its American sister society.

Reverting to our main subject, let us consider whether the Americans have made a specific contribution to psychology, something that marks them off from other nations in that sphere of endeavor. Some controversy may be aroused over this question and its answer, but if we lend credence to Watson's contention, then *behaviorism* is a distinctively American movement. (*Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*. Preface.) This assertion probably needs to be qualified, for Comte, a century ago effected his *salto mortale* by jumping clear over psychology and into sociology. Both he and Cournot thought that the only psychology which would prove scientifically possible was "cerebral physiology" or what we should call today neurology.

Watson, however, is correct in his claim in that it was reserved for the American psychologists to lead a concerted protest against a psychology which was based entirely on introspection, and though only one solitary member of the American Psychological Association insists that he does not know what consciousness means and that there is no such thing as a mental image, there are scores of others who believe psychology to be the science of behavior rather than one dealing with mind (mentalism), at which attitude the European psychologists are rather puzzled and somewhat amused.



Closely bound up with this revolt is the denial of inborn complex tendencies as such (instincts) which are declared to be by these protestants merely a series of reflexes conditioned by various experiences. Behaviorists in general combat the notion that purpose plays any part in the functioning of an instinct, or that the instinctive behavior is directed against any particular object. The mechanism is for them the all and all of every phenomenon.

At variance with the behaviorists, though not in direct opposition to them, are the dynamic psychologists who count Freud among their number. The dynamic psychologist is concerned with the *motive* in just as high a degree as with the *mechanism*. In fact the realm of motives is to him even more important than the world of mechanism. Dynamic psychology differs from what is commonly called structural psychology in allowing for *inference in mental life*, while structuralism would have nothing to do with what is not in consciousness. If you cannot introspect on the alleged fact it is of no consequence and we have no right to suppose that it even exists, according to traditional psychology. The dynamic psychologist, however, attempts to deduce its existence from the subsequent effects. A neurotic may not be aware of any particular mental conflict at a certain time, but the symptoms point to a conflict and the eventual cure corroborates the diagnosis.

It is not my purpose here to enter into the respective merits of behaviorism, introspectionism, and dynamic psychology (especially as I have done so at considerable length in my *Behaviorism and Psychology*) but merely to bring the issue clearly before us. American psychology, because of its variegated antecedents, is like a coat of many colors which to the indiscriminating eye, appear to merge into one another, but which the trained observer will immediately discern as representing different hues with the materialistic and mechanistic red of Loeb, Max Meyer, Watson,

and others at one end of the spectrum and the vitalistic and purposive violet of McDougall, Bergson, and Driesch at the other extreme.

Apparently the people of the more or less intelligent classes are not very much concerned over the theoretical differences in psychology, if we are to judge by the hold which this science has obtained in the public mind. Within the last year three popular magazines purporting to dispense psychology to their readers have been launched, while the number of so-called applied psychology clubs with their New Thought rituals have been increasing throughout this country and Canada. The fact that the word *psychology* has come to possess a market value for clever people is *per se* sufficient proof of its progress and practical appeal.

As to whether the United States will in time become the great psychological center to attract students from all parts of the world as did Germany and France before the war, is a question which at most can be answered only problematically. It is true that the works of our psychologists are becoming better known in Europe largely through translations. James's *Principles of Psychology* and *Briefer Course* as well as Titchener's *Textbook of Psychology*, have appeared in several European languages, some of J. Mark Baldwin's books and recently Warren's *Elements of Human Psychology* have been translated into French, while Münsterberg's *Psychology and Industrial Efficiency* appeared in Spanish. Woodworth's *Movement*, and Pillsbury's *Attention* were first published in French, and McDougall's *Psychology* was brought out in Yiddish and Italian, and other works of his are about to be translated into Japanese—for all that, it is doubtful whether the atmosphere of a Leipzig under Wundt or a Würzburg under Külpe could be duplicated here, or to turn to abnormal psychology and psychiatry, whether the aura of a Charcot in La Salpêtrière, of a Janet in the Collège de France, or a

Freud in Vienna could surround our foremost American psychologists with the same glow. It is *applied psychology* which will draw students from abroad, if there is to be anything like an academic invasion here; not that our applied psychologists are superior to our theoretical psychologists but because we happen to have the organization and the wherewithals to conduct investigations and obtain data in the most ramified situations. In other words, there is an American atmosphere in applied psychology, which, as I have shown in my *Moral Issues Involved in Applied Psychology*, causes European psychologists at times to look askance at us and calls forth, in some quarters, the derogatory reference to the "*Amerikanistische Tendenz*" in psychology.

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## HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

AT THE present time there is much need of a good, up to date, bibliography of historical studies in philosophy. An annual publication of a complete and critical bibliography of such studies as have appeared during the year would render a real service to scholars in this field. But, let it be understood, it is with no pretension to anything even approximating a complete reporting of publications that the following few pages are written. The aim of this brief survey is merely to give some indication, necessarily incomplete, of the nature and extent of the contributions which British and American scholars are making toward our better understanding and appreciation of the philosophers of the past. Having this end in view, we deliberately and with a certain recognized arbitrariness confine our consideration to *some* of the books on the history of philosophy, written in English, that have appeared during the last ten years. In the whole of English philosophical literature, one finds very few *comprehensive* histories of philosophy—works of the *allgemeine Geschichte* variety—which may be either pointed to with pride or viewed with alarm. “English writers have as a rule been most reluctant to produce histories of philosophy. They appear to be overwhelmed by a sense of the enormous difficulty of the task and of the awful dignity of the muse who presides over this form of composition.”<sup>1</sup> But *partial* histories, dealing with some aspect or period of the whole, are more numerous; and it will be well, perhaps, to notice first a few

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Alan Dorward, in *Mind*, N. S. 32 (1923), p. 501.



of the works of this order that have been published during the last decade.

1. "*Histories*" of *Philosophy*: Mention may be made first of two rather unpretentious works dealing with the philosophy of France. (1) Mr. J. A. Gunn has surveyed the movements of French thought since the middle of the nineteenth century in his *Modern French Philosophy: A Study of the Development Since Comte*.<sup>2</sup> Three main currents of thought are therein distinguished—the positivist, the neo-critical, and the spiritualistic—and traced through their divergent treatments of the problems of the age, under the none too definite captions of Science, Freedom, Progress, Ethics, and Religion. The method of historiography here employed, which subordinates the individual thinker to the treatment of general problems, is beset with difficulties—as M. Bergson recognized in his "foreword" to the volume; few have followed with any complete success the illustrious example of Windelband here. But Mr. Gunn's exposition—he disclaims any attempt at critical evaluation—affords in the main a lucid and instructive representation of French philosophy of the period since 1850. (2) Supplementing the preceding in several ways is a more recent volume by Mr. George Boas, discussing the first half of the century under the title, *French Philosophies of the Romantic Period*.<sup>3</sup> "The importance of a philosopher," writes the author (p. 307), "is not to be measured by the number of pages which he receives in a history of philosophy" [*sic!*] . . . but "is to be measured by the intimacy which he has with the civilization in which he works; by the effect he has upon that civilization or by the clearness with which he expresses that civilization's interests." Mr. Boas is concerned simply with "making the proper correlations" between the political and aesthetic developments in the age following the Revolution and its philosophies.

<sup>2</sup> New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1922.

<sup>3</sup> Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925.

Whatever one may think of the statement that "Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus had relatively little contact with their times" (or of its implications as regards their "importance"), one may still admit that, judged by the author's standard, the French thinkers with whom he deals "take on a striking importance."

Fields hitherto little familiar to English and American students have been cultivated advantageously in two scholarly works next to be noted. In *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy*,<sup>4</sup> Mr. Isaac Husik has done an admirable pioneer work. By "Jewish philosophy" the author here designates not the entire philosophical activity of the Jews during the middle ages, but rather—excluding mysticism and Kabbala—their *rationalistic* philosophy, whose task was primarily the "reconciling of two apparently independent sources of truth": "The Bible and Talmud were the documents of revelation, Aristotle was the document of reason" (*Preface*). (Is it not, then, rather a consequence of definition than a statement of historical fact that "Jewish philosophy never passed beyond the scholastic stage. . . . There are Jews now and there are philosophers, but there are no Jewish philosophers and there is no Jewish philosophy" [p. 431]?) Through eighteen substantial chapters, whose content is systematically ordered and clearly presented, Mr. Husik traces "the rationalistic movement in mediaeval Jewry from its beginnings in the ninth and tenth centuries in Babylon among the Karaites and Rabbanites to its decline in Spain and south France in the fifteenth century" (p. 428). Only those scholars who have intelligent access to the Hebrew literature of the period can pass judgment upon the accuracy of the author's interpretations. But it may be said that the work should have a generous measure of success in its avowed aim of appealing both "to the scholar and the intelligent

<sup>4</sup> New York, Macmillan Co., 1916.

non-technical reader"; appealing to the former certainly by its copious citation of sources in the notes, well relegated to an appendix, and appealing to the latter by its simple directness of statement and logically ordered expositions.

Professor Surendranath Dasgupta has published the first volume of his *History of Indian Philosophy*,<sup>5</sup> which will be completed in two volumes. Because Sanskrit and Pali sources of Hindu thought are inaccessible to most English and American students, this work by a recognized Sanskrit scholar is of considerable interest and importance. In its plan the book differs strikingly from any history of western philosophy; the difference is—as the author explains—necessitated by the nature of the subject itself. For in the evolution of Hindu philosophy one finds not a succession of one system or type of philosophy upon another which it tends to replace, but rather a parallel development of a limited number of rival systems. "Instead of producing a succession of free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish," writes the author (p. 63), "India had brought forth schools of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained and expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of rival schools." "The Hindus classify the systems of philosophy into two classes, namely, the *nastika* and the *astika*. The *nastika* . . . views are those which neither regard the Vedas as infallible nor try to establish their own validity on their authority. These are principally three in number, the Buddhist, Jaina and the Carvaka. The *astika*-mata or orthodox schools are six in number, Samkhya, Yoga, Vedanta, Mimamsa, Nyaya and Vaisesika, generally known as the six systems" (p. 68). Dasgupta asserts (p. 8) that "the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thought can

<sup>5</sup> Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1922.

be traced to sometime between 600 B. C. to 100 or 200 B. C. As time went on the systems began to develop side by side. Most of them were taught from the time in which they were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A. D. in an unbroken chain of teachers and pupils." Each of the successive chapters in this first volume of the *History* deals with one of these systems in its evolution throughout the whole of this long period. Of the evolution in general, Dasgupta writes (p. 64): "A system in the sutras is weak and shapeless as a newborn babe, but if we take it along with its developments down to the beginning of the seventeenth century it appears as a fully developed man strong and harmonious in all its limbs. It is therefore not possible to write any history of successive philosophies of India, but it is necessary that each system should be studied and interpreted in all the growth it has acquired through the successive ages of history from its conflicts with the rival systems as one whole." No one but a Sanskrit scholar could possibly judge the accuracy with which these Indian systems are interpreted; but every reader can appreciate the remarkable lucidity of Professor Dasgupta's style, no less than the learning that has entered into the production of this work for which the need is unquestioned.

Mr. W. R. Sorley's one volume *History of English Philosophy*<sup>6</sup> was designed "to trace the history of philosophy in Great Britain from the time when it began to be written in the English language"—with Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* (1605)—"until the end of the Victorian era" (*Preface*). It is based upon the chapters earlier contributed by Mr. Sorley to the *Cambridge History of English Literature*; thus, in its conception at least, it really antedates Mr. James Seth's study of *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*<sup>7</sup> with which it naturally invites com-

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 1920.

<sup>7</sup> London, J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1912. In the "Channels of English Literature" Series.



parison. Both authors seek to delineate the British national philosophy as its traits are exhibited in the succession of thinkers who have given it shape.<sup>8</sup> Neither of these works, however, seems essentially to modify traditional interpretations of the leading British philosophers, although Mr. Sorley has, in particular, well insisted upon keeping intact the *whole* outlook of the individual thinkers, as against the procedure which views them merely as examples of "empiricism," "realism," "materialism," or some other "ism." A special service rendered by this work—not, however, in a greater degree than by Mr. Seth's volume—is the attention it gives to the literary, as well as the doctrinal, significance of English philosophers. The estimate of Mr. Sorley's work expressed by a scholarly English reviewer seems, with its cautious restraint, eminently fair: "There is probably no other work from which the general student of good intelligence can learn so readily exactly what our philosophers have done to shape the general course of the stream of 'British thought' and to create its vehicle of expression."<sup>9</sup>

Mr. Seth commenting, in 1912, upon the "confluence of the two streams of English and American philosophy" prophesied that "in the future, the movement of philosophical thought in England and America will be a single movement."<sup>10</sup> And then, ten years later, came Mr. A. K. Rogers' interesting volume on *English and American Philosophy Since 1800: A Critical Survey*.<sup>11</sup> The nineteenth century—even though we are now well beyond it—continues to present grave difficulties to the historian of its philosophy; the more grave in proportion as he conceives the historian's task to involve a complete and orderly representation of

<sup>8</sup> T. M. Forsythe's *English Philosophy: A Study of Its Method and General Development* (1910), on account of its entirely different method, still furnishes a most valuable supplement to these works.

<sup>9</sup> Mr. A. E. Taylor, in *Mind*, N. S. 31 (1922), p. 208. Cf. Prof. Albee's review of the volume in *Philosophical Review*, 1922.

<sup>10</sup> *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy*, p. 358.

<sup>11</sup> New York, Macmillan Co., 1922.

the entire philosophical output of a period, or as he is beset with the conviction that history must be written as a chronologically continuous story without gaps. Mr. Rogers disclaims any primarily historical purpose in writing this book, and disarms some possible criticism through his insistence (in his *Preface*) that the "book as a whole is frankly propaganda, and designed to recommend one particular attitude as against conflicting attitudes." But if the book be propaganda, it is not obvious what special message it definitely proclaims. Although the author's primary interest was not in "the tracing of historical affiliations and historical causes," it is nevertheless likely that his success in his endeavor "as a historian to be accurate" in the expository portion of his task will remain one of the most permanent recommendations of the work. The volume is by far the most complete picture we yet have of the whole English-American philosophical family of the nineteenth century, comprising as it does not only all of the first rate, but most, perhaps, of the second and third rate minds as well.

A good bibliography covering publications of the sort here being considered would quite certainly include several significant titles besides those of the six works that have been singled out for mention above. The compiler of such a bibliography would certainly not be so far led astray by titles as to omit the expanded and thoroughly revised second edition of Mr. Ernest Barker's *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors*.<sup>12</sup> Professor A. E. Taylor's appraisal of that work seven years ago as "by far the best work yet in existence on the social and political side of Plato's philosophy"<sup>13</sup> is likely to remain a fair one for several years to come. Nor, further, would one fail to take cognizance of the real service that Mr. E. A. Burt has done all students of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by

<sup>12</sup> London, Methuen and Co., 1918.

<sup>13</sup> See his review of this work in *Mind*, N. S. 28 (1919).

his work, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science: A Historical and Critical Essay*.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps nowhere—certainly in no single English work—can one find so illuminating a discussion of the philosophical aspects of the achievements of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Gilbert, Boyle, and Newton. The book is a distinct contribution to the history of philosophy. Finally, one would certainly not forget to include the posthumously published *Lectures on Modern Idealism*,<sup>15</sup> by Josiah Royce. For where can one find more of appreciative insight into the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, or a more trustworthy and suggestive interpretation of that post-Kantian movement, than in those pages? Royce often modestly disavowed the role of historian of philosophy. Nevertheless, he not only drew constantly and largely upon the wisdom of the past, but he often enough repaid his indebtednesses by shedding much of the illumination of the interpreter upon it.

One of the most learned historians of Greek philosophy has recently proclaimed that, "No one will ever succeed in writing a history of philosophy."<sup>16</sup> Many of us share Mr. Burnet's opinion, even when the grounds of our conviction may be not quite identical with his. Of course, such an opinion purports more than the platitudinous observation that no one can ever reasonably hope to write *definitively* the history of any, or all, periods; that one's work may be improved upon by others who come after is not in itself to miss "success." Rather one who voices such an opinion has an eye not so much to the inevitable limitations of historians of any one age as to a special difficulty in the very nature of the task itself. But what, after all, *is* the task of a historian of philosophy? One more often meets with disclaimers of the title than with any thoughtful discussion of

<sup>14</sup> New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1925.

<sup>15</sup> These ten lectures, originally delivered in 1906 at the Johns Hopkins University, were first published by the Yale University Press, New Haven, in 1919.

<sup>16</sup> John Burnet: *Greek Philosophy. Part I: Thales to Plato*, p. 1.

the task disavowed. This would not be the occasion to discuss the problem even if the present writer felt that he had any new light to shed upon it. But it does seem to him clear, and a matter of importance, that some of our prevailing discouragement and failure grows out of a confused understanding of the task. At least let us ask: Is not the history of *philosophy* an enterprize that may be—nay, ought to be—clearly distinguished, e. g., on the one hand from the history of philosophical *writings* and *writers* and on the other hand from the history of “thought,” of “culture,” of “civilization,” or of something else—if such there be—even more vaguely inclusive? Of course, philosophy scarcely “exists” apart from writings and writers, nor out of relation to civilization! Yet why must the historian of it compete creditably with the “Absolute”—or be a failure? Why should we in the field of philosophical history in particular rebel against the limitations of an inevitable abstraction? Or again (having limited ourselves to philosophy), let us ask: Must we not clearly observe the distinction between the task, e. g., of purely descriptive and interpretative exposition and the quite different task of tracing causes and influences of philosophies? And need a history of philosophy, in order to “succeed,” perform both of these tasks? Indeed, would not success often lie rather nearer by the doing of one of these tasks adequately and consistently and without whimsically passing from one to the other? But, after all, Professor Burnet’s prophecy of an eternal shortcoming rests upon rather different reflections. He wisely observes that “philosophies, like works of art, are intensely personal things; and thence passes on to the more questionable proposition that it is *only* “in so far as the historian can reproduce the Platonic contact of souls that his work will have value.” Perhaps the fact of the matter is that, to be a good historian of philosophy one must needs be so much of a philos-



opher that the ubiquitous problem of the one and the many is apt to lay rather too burdensome a hand upon him qua historian. At least it seems to the present writer that it is in the interpretation of the "many" individual philosophies, rather than in the exhibition of the "one" through the continuous unfolding of successive philosophies, that English and American scholarship has chiefly furthered the history of philosophy. And we may now turn to some works which will serve to illustrate this service.

2. *Studies of Individual Ancient Greek Thinkers*: The philosophical literature of the twentieth century displays marked evidences of an increased interest in Greek philosophy, and perhaps in Platonism in particular. Students of the history of Greek thought are vastly indebted to English scholars in this field, notably to Mr. John Burnet and Mr. A. E. Taylor. Such students appreciate especially the vast learning and substantial scholarship, no less than the freshness of vision, which these men have brought to bear upon the vexed questions centering around the interpretation of the Platonic *Dialogues*; even while many are not ready to accept the whole of their positive results. Perhaps, among others, the problem of the "historic" Socrates is destined to remain a perennial one; it is certainly not the less apt to do so long as philosophical students feel satisfied in the assurance that, however historians of any generation may "solve" it, the *thought* of Plato's *Dialogues* is a secured possession forever. Yet, as Mr. Burnet simply observes, "In a way, no doubt, it does not matter whether we owe a truth to Pythagoras or Socrates or Plato but *it is natural for us to desire to know our benefactors and keep them in grateful remembrance.*"<sup>17</sup> And what historian, having any scruples of conscience about his "evidences," after encountering all that prodigious progeny of unscientific methods, the bewildering number of "real"

<sup>17</sup> *The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul*, p. 3. Italics my own.

Socrates'es, will not feel the force of Mr. Burnet's remark: "It would be better to say at once that we cannot know anything about Socrates, and that for us he must remain a mere  $x$ . Even so, however, the Platonic Socrates is actual enough."<sup>18</sup>

Of course, the revolutionizing labors of both Burnet and Taylor mostly antedate the period of the last ten years which is here being considered. But we should note in passing the continuation of their work. Particular attention should be called to the important address of Mr. Burnet on *The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul*<sup>19</sup> as well as to his recent edition of *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito*,<sup>20</sup> whose notes (like those of the earlier edition of the *Phaedo*) richly abound in suggestive information, accessible even to the reader of English with no Greek. And all teachers and students of philosophy who have marvelled at the excellence of Mr. A. E. Taylor's little volume on *Plato*<sup>21</sup> may now find, furnished by his latest study of *Platonism and Its Influence*,<sup>22</sup> a fresh illustration of how much a *master* of the subject can achieve with great brevity and simplicity. In this latest work the arrangement of the three chapters on the "Principles of Science," the "Rule of Life," and "Plato the Theologian" is reminiscent of the earlier volume; but this later study is occupied with the *tradition* and *influence* of Plato under these three heads. Assuredly the fulfillment of this little book is far beyond the author's modest claim (in his *Preface*) "not so much to supply information as to provoke the desire for it." The information supplied is very considerable; and the excel-

<sup>18</sup> *Greek Philosophy*, p. 128.

<sup>19</sup> The second annual "Henriette Hertz Lecture on a Master Mind," delivered Jan. 25, 1916, and published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press.

<sup>20</sup> Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924.

<sup>21</sup> London and New York, 1911. In the "Philosophies Ancient and Modern" series.

<sup>22</sup> Boston, Marshall Jones Co., 1924. In "Our Debt to Greece and Rome" series.

lently selected bibliography indicates where the best of further sources of information lie.

Students of Greek thought will find much value in three pleasingly written volumes by Mr. Paul Elmer More. *Platonism*,<sup>23</sup> the earliest of these, now stands as a sort of introduction to a series which will be complete in four volumes on *The Greek Tradition: From the Death of Socrates to the Council of Chalcedon*, of which the first two have so far appeared, viz., *The Religion of Plato*<sup>24</sup> and *Hellenistic Essays*.<sup>25</sup> Mr. More appears to accept in general—although it does not fall within the scope of his work to discuss the problems involved—the accuracy of Plato's picture of Socrates: "the biographical parts of the *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo* present a faithful picture of the man Socrates"; and he adds, "It is easier to believe in the power of Nature to create such a character than in the ability of an author to imagine it."<sup>26</sup> In his interpretation of Platonism, this scholar lays much emphasis on its "dualism"; not only—what is recognized by all—the dualism revealed within the soul especially through the moral consciousness, but a supposedly ultimate *metaphysical* dualism. It was this dualism, according to Mr. More, which the later Hellenistic philosophies sought to escape, and which early orthodox Christianity alone retained, thereby becoming the true inheritor of Plato's teaching. It is Mr. More's ambition in these volumes to interpret the thought tradition which received its initial impulse from Socrates, was developed by Plato, and—despite its perversion in Stoicism and neo-Platonism—entered into Christianity. Of this tradition, "Platonic and Christian at the center," he writes: "Without it, so far as I can see, we should have remained bar-

<sup>23</sup> Princeton University Press, 1917. An elaboration of five lectures first delivered at Princeton University on the Louis Clark Vanuxem Foundation.

<sup>24</sup> Princeton University Press, 1921. Cf. the appreciative review by A. E. Taylor in *Mind*, N. S. 31 (1922), p. 518.

<sup>25</sup> Princeton University Press, 1923. Cf. the review by H. N. Gardiner in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 33 (1924), pp. 612ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Platonism*, p. 3n.

barians; and, losing it, so far as I can see, we are in peril of sinking back into barbarism."<sup>27</sup> Mr. More's aim is not "so much to produce a work of history . . . as to write what a Greek Platonist would have called a *Protrepticus*, an invitation, that is, to the practice of philosophy."<sup>28</sup> These volumes do not, perhaps, evince the breadth and depth of historical background which distinguishes other work in this field; but they do contribute, I think, toward effecting that "contact of souls" which Mr. Burnet has said is a criterion of the value of an historian's achievement.

Plotinus<sup>29</sup> is a conspicuous instance of a great figure in the history of thought who has not hitherto received, in the English literature, the studious attention that is his due. By two volumes on *The Philosophy of Plotinus*<sup>30</sup> the scholarly Dean of St. Paul's—long recognized as a master among the mystics—has made a noteworthy contribution to historical studies. Dr. Inge confesses himself "to be a disciple and not merely a student and critic of the philosopher" whom for many years he has studied "as a spiritual director, a prophet and not only a thinker." But his most enlightening exposition of Plotinian mysticism is not rendered the less accurate or impartial, it would appear, by Dr. Inge's deeply-felt conviction that Plotinus is "full of intellectual light and guidance" and that we may today well "find in him a message of calm and confidence for the troublous time through which we are passing." Four lectures on "The Third Century" and "The Forerunners of Plotinus" constitute a well done introduction to the detailed exposition of the system, which is the main achievement of the work. The present writer would not venture his own

<sup>27</sup> *The Religion of Plato*, Preface, p. viii.

<sup>28</sup> This statement in the "Preface" to *Platonism* seems to be equally applicable to the subsequent volumes.

<sup>29</sup> *The Complete Works of Plotinus* have recently been translated into English by K. S. Guthrie (Alpine, N. J., Comparative Literature Press, 1918). See also the translation of the first four *Enneads* by Stephen MacKenna (London, P. L. Warner, 1917).

<sup>30</sup> London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1918.



judgment as to the accuracy, in several details, of this interpretation of the *Enneads*.<sup>31</sup> But he must confess that the later lectures, dealing with the practical aspects of the philosophy—rather than those dealing with the metaphysics—have seemed to bring him much light in a field that has always seemed one of the most inhospitable toward his efforts at understanding.

As an acquaintance with the Greek language becomes less and less a part of the equipment of large numbers of philosophical students, the greater is the significance attaching to such notable enterprizes of translation as that sponsored by the University of Oxford in the case of Aristotle's complete works. One of the first volumes of this translation to appear was the translation of the *Metaphysics* by Mr. W. D. Ross, one of the co-editors of the work. More recently, we have the substantial volume by Mr. Ross entitled *Aristotle*,<sup>32</sup> a work of mature scholarship. Its aim is neither to trace Aristotle's ideas to their earlier origins, nor to follow out their influence, but (as stated in the *Preface*) "simply to give an account of the main features of his philosophy as it stands before us in his works." The content of the Aristotelian treatises is, in the main, lucidly summarized in chapters dealing in order with the Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Biology, Psychology, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric and Poetics. How far such a method of exposition, which tries to lift its subject out of the stream of ideas in which his thought lived, is the way to the best understanding of a thinker, we shall not discuss. But the present writer misses in this book the exhibition, which he fondly hoped to find there, of a deep conviction—such as he knows Mr. Ross must feel—of the vitality and interest for our own day of some of Aristotle's problems and solutions. This is not to suggest—what I am far from believ-

<sup>31</sup> One may see for competent criticism the review by A. E. Taylor in *Mind*, N. S. 28 (1919), pp. 238-245.

<sup>32</sup> London, Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1923.

ing—that the study of the great minds of the past need be justified by the light they may shed upon present-day problems. But as little does it appear to me that a great philosophical system of the past need be distorted by being examined in the light of present day interests. It must be difficult, I should suppose, to write chapters on, e. g., Aristotle's biology or psychology with no references to the issues in contemporary philosophy of "mechanism and vitalism," "emergent" and "creative" evolution, "functionalism," "behaviorism," etc. But doubtless there are those to whom the seeming detachment of Mr. Ross's writing from present day concerns will seem the surest evidence of that objectivity which is always to be expected in the true historian. Certainly everyone will profit by the enormous learning that has gone to the preparation of this compact volume.<sup>33</sup>

3. *Studies of Modern European Philosophers*: Neither English nor American writers have, during the last ten years, enriched our understanding of the philosophers of the seventeenth century through any works comparable, e. g., with those earlier ones of N. K. Smith on Descartes, of Sir Frederic Pollock and Joachim on Spinoza, or of Russell on Leibniz.<sup>34</sup> But they have advanced considerably our knowledge of some British philosophers. This is conspicuously true in the case of three meritorious volumes, next to be mentioned, dealing severally with the three classic representatives of "English Empiricism." Each of these vol-

<sup>33</sup> Mr. A. E. Taylor's *Aristotle* (2nd ed., London and Edinburgh, 1919. In the series of "The People's Books,") is a small volume only in respect of the number of its pages, and loses not at all by comparison with the much more detailed exposition by Ross.

<sup>34</sup> This is not failing in appreciation of the book by Mr. Leon Roth on *Descartes, Spinoza and Maimonides* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924), with its fresh discussion of the old problem of the relation of Spinoza's thought to its Cartesian and Jewish antecedents; or of his recent editing of the *Correspondence of Descartes and Constantyn Huygens, 1635-1647* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1926). Nor do we overlook, e. g., the monograph by Mr. A. G. A. Balz on *Idea and Essence in the Philosophies of Hobbes and Spinoza* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1918) and other brief studies too numerous even to be listed here.

umes strives to correct prevailing misconceptions about the motivations of these thinkers; and all protest against the one-sidedness of view which results when these philosophers are looked upon merely as exponents of "empiricism."

The far reaching influence of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* upon subsequent philosophical history is universally recognized. But it may well be doubted whether this important document has ever received so fair or so masterly an interpretation as in Mr. James Gibson's *Locke's Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations*.<sup>35</sup> Mr. Gibson correctly observes (in his *Preface*) that the habit of regarding the movement in British philosophy which culminated in Hume "as the story of the self-refutation of certain of Locke's principles, has been largely responsible for the false perspective in which the *Essay* itself is too commonly viewed"; and he notes further (p. 182) that the fact that the *Essay* "constitutes the starting-point of the classical development of philosophy in England has led to concentration of attention upon its influence, to the comparative neglect of the sources from which it is derived." These limitations and defects in interpretation Mr. Gibson seeks to remedy. In "Part I" he sets forth "The Doctrine of the *Essay*" with a rare freedom from prepossessions about it. Insisting that the real motive of the work is epistemological, he observes (p. 1f.) that "any account of Locke's work which finds its main significance in an account of the genesis of our ideas fails entirely to represent either the aim or the outcome of the *Essay*, as these were conceived by its author. Great as was the importance which he attached to his theory upon this subject, it played only a subordinate part in the scheme of the *Essay* as he designed it; and any attempt to make it central alters entirely the perspective of the whole." How important it

<sup>35</sup> Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1917.

is for the interpreter of Locke to keep this point *always* in view becomes sufficiently clear in the excellent discussion of Locke's polemic against innate principles, the real point of which has often been missed. "Part II" discusses "The Historical Relations of Locke's Doctrine" most instructively. Especially helpful is the chapter treating of Locke's relations to his contemporaries—particularly his scientific contemporaries—in England. Professor Sorley in his *History* asserted (p. 104) that "John Locke may be regarded as, on the whole, the most important figure in English philosophy." Mr. Gibson, who cautiously refrains from evaluations of that sort and adheres strictly to his task of *understanding* Locke, has gone far in exhibiting the proofs for Mr. Sorley's statement.

Second among the books on British philosophy we may mention Mr. G. A. Johnston's *The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy*.<sup>86</sup> The author is not sparing of superlative estimates of his thinker: "Berkeley is naturally the keenest mind in the history of English philosophy" (p. 325), "perhaps the freshest and most original thinker in the history of British philosophy" (p. 12), and "Berkeley's literary style is the most delightful in the history of English philosophy" (p. 382). But despite such unrestraint, Mr. Johnston's work is on the whole a cautious and critical investigation of the evolution of Berkeley's theories. Especially good is the full and painstaking discussion in the chapter on the "Origins of Berkeley's Thought." As every interpreter must nowadays do, Mr. Johnston devotes much attention to the *Commonplace Book*, and gives a detailed and convincing discussion of the original order of its entries—with regard to which he differs significantly from the view of Campbell Fraser. While the author recognizes that Berkeley's "philosophical activity was not only influenced by the deist controversy, but was dominated by it,"

<sup>86</sup> London, Macmillan and Co., 1923.



he yet does not fall into the common error of supposing Berkeley's discovery of his central principle—*esse est aut percipere aut percipi*—to have been motivated by religious considerations, however much Berkeley welcomed what he later thought to be the agreement between his principle and religious orthodoxy. (It is not a little interesting to note that, instead of viewing the frequent avowals of orthodoxy in Berkeley's pages as exhibitions of the misplaced piety of an "Angelic" doctor, Johnston sees rather in them another instance of the practical sense of Berkeley whose eye was usually upon the "main chance" for ecclesiastical preferment! Cf. Chapter VII on Berkeley's "Philosophy of Religion.") Among many suggestive points, scattered throughout the book, is a fine discussion (p. 209ff.) of the way in which Berkeley's interest in the mathematician's employment of signs suggested his own metaphysical conception of signs. Two appendices to the volume discuss helpfully (1) the old question of Berkeley's relation to Collier, and (2) the philosophy of John Sergeant, who, strangely neglected by historians, it would appear "merits study by all who are interested in the philosophy of Locke and Berkeley" (p. 396).

In the third volume on British thinkers referred to above, *Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume*,<sup>37</sup> Mr. C. W. Hendel has made an extremely interesting contribution to our knowledge about one of the greatest figures in the history of modern philosophy. One could point to few, if indeed to any, studies of Hume in English literature which rival this in thoroughness and objectivity. Mr. Hendel corrects several current shallownesses of interpretation. E. g., Hume's critics have too often supposed that his declaration that observation of the mind reveals only a "mere bundle or collection of perceptions" amounts to a denial of personal identity. This, however, is to neglect Hume's no

<sup>37</sup> Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1923. Cf. the recent review by Mr. S. P. Lamprecht in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 22 (1926), pp. 411-418.

less significant words to the effect that "the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or existences. . . . In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to anything than to a republic; . . . the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts." In his chapter on "The Self or Personal Identity," Mr. Hendel shows a very just understanding of Hume. Other examples there are a plenty in the book. But one of its most striking and novel features is its concern with the theological motivation and implications of Hume's thought. In 1915 Mr. Hendel undertook—for a doctor's dissertation—a study of Hume "in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of Hume's position with regard to religion." To Hume has commonly been attributed a hostility toward religion and but a mild personal concern, at most, as to the *truth* of religious beliefs. Mr. Hendel urges quite convincingly that Hume's interest in "human nature"—especially his epistemological enquiries—was the direct outgrowth of an interest, reaching back to his early youth, in the theological problems of the day. He supposes also that the final outcome of Hume's lifelong reflections on religion was, in effect, to substitute a newer for an older standpoint of "naturalism" in religion—finding the basis which validates the belief in God's existence not in the evidences of external nature but rather in the "natural imagination" of man. It does not fall within the scope of Mr. Hendel's book to treat, save quite incidentally, of the ethical writings of Hume.

Recent years have witnessed the publication of two very notable volumes on the philosophy of Kant: *A Commentary to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"*<sup>88</sup> by Mr. Norman Kemp Smith, and *A Study of Kant*<sup>89</sup> by the late Mr. James

<sup>88</sup> London, Macmillan and Co., 1918; second ed., 1923. Cf. the excellent reviews by R. F. A. Hoernle in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 28 (1919), pp. 305-313, and G. Dawes Hicks in *Mind*, N. S. 28 (1919), pp. 217-229.

<sup>89</sup> Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1922. Cf. the same author's *Immanuel Kant*, being the "Hertz Philosophical Lecture" for the same year.

Ward. Were we bold—or foolish—enough to attempt an arrangement of the works mentioned in this survey according to the order of their merit and distinction, certainly we should have to place these two works very near indeed to the head of our list. Mr. Smith's impressive scholarship and powers of interpretation in this *Commentary* defy any brief reporting of his achievement. The work is now known to all Kant students as skillfully combining the functions of commenting with insight, and in order, upon the detailed passages of the *Critique* and of supplying a masterly constructive interpretation of the whole work. The interpretations of Kant by English scholars have often suffered from their Hegelian bias; one of the traits of Smith's work, which was promptly upon its appearance recognized with approval, was that he did not look upon Kant's role in history as that of a John the Baptist to Hegel. The incompatible tendencies in the *Critique* are not glossed over, but receive close critical examination. In this matter the author has thoroughly availed himself of the more recently known facts about the origin and history of Kant's text—acknowledging his great indebtedness to Adickes and Vaihinger in particular. The merits of such textual analysis appear to the best advantage, naturally, in the illuminating discussion of the various "deductions" of the Kantian categories. One excellent feature of the volume is its critical examination of Kant's relations to earlier thinkers. The second edition has added an Appendix on the bearing of Kant's *Opus postumum* upon the doctrine of the *Critique*.

In Ward's *Study of Kant*, the aim is to exhibit the informing and central insights of the Kantian philosophy viewed as a whole. Kant's doctrine is held to be essentially—and to its credit—"anthropomorphic," by which is meant that it is a deliberate attempt to interpret the World in terms of the Self as this latter is known in reflection. That Dr. Ward should find Kant's essential achievement to lie

in the direction of a further development of Leibniz' doctrine, should not be surprising to those acquainted with Dr. Ward's own *Weltanschauung*. Nearly the first fifth of the *Study* is devoted to a quite unusual tracing of Kant's intellectual development. In the later pages attention, well proportioned to its great merits, is given to the *Critique of Judgment*. It is high, but I think well deserved, praise that is given this work by a competent reviewer: "The proper comparison is with Caird's treatise, and despite the startling disparity of size. . . . Ward's discussion is, we may fairly affirm, no whit inferior in philosophical importance."<sup>40</sup>

Among recent books dealing with philosophers of the nineteenth century<sup>41</sup> possibly the most noteworthy is Mr. W. M. Salter's *Nietzsche the Thinker*.<sup>42</sup> "Criticism of Nietzsche is rife, understanding rare. . . . Few appear to have thought it worth while to study Nietzsche," the author writes in his *Preface*. That Mr. Salter has studied his subject, the present volume leaves no room to doubt. The Nietzsche of the successive "periods" is clearly and fully presented with abundance of well chosen quotations; and, throughout the interpretation is conspicuous for its sobriety and restraint—some might say, even to its detriment. Not often has Nietzsche been treated to so large a dose of the apparatus of scholarship; but the handling has certainly produced the most adequate exposition of its subject in the English language.

This review must mention in conclusion two collections of historical studies: (1) Under the editorship of the De-

<sup>40</sup> Mr. R. F. A. Hoernle in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 33 (1924), p. 290. Cf. the review of Ward's *Study* by N. K. Smith in *Mind*, N. S. 32 (1923), p. 479.

<sup>41</sup> In a complete survey, note would be taken certainly of many other works, such as, e. g., H. A. Reyburn's *The Ethical Theory of Hegel* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921) and W. T. Stace's *The Philosophy of Hegel* (London, Macmillan and Co., 1924).

<sup>42</sup> New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1917. Cf. the review by Miss Grace Neal Dolson in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 28, p. 554.



partment of Philosophy of Columbia University have appeared two volumes of the *Studies in the History of Ideas*.<sup>43</sup> The essays are varied in theme and quite unequal in merit. To the earlier volume, Professor Woodbridge contributed an excellent discussion of "Berkeley's Realism," and Professor Dewey, an interpretation of "The Motivation of Hobbes' Political Philosophy." To the later volume, Mr. S. P. Lamprecht contributes a study on "Empiricism and Epistemology in David Hume," and Mr. A. G. A. Balz on "Dualism in Cartesian Psychology and Epistemology"—both well documented and worth while studies. The second volume has also an interesting "Supplementary Essay" by Mr. Dewey on "The Development of American Pragmatism." (2) E. A. Singer: *Modern Thinkers and Present Problems*<sup>44</sup> consists of a series of studies of great persistent problems as they have been wrestled with by the classic thinkers: Bruno, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. The essays, historical in spirit, may, the author tells us, "stand for moments of any thoughtful life and will have done all they were intended to do if they inform such a life with, and give it a sense of, attachment to the world that has gone before it and is going on 'round.'" These essays should do more than this; they *will* charm the reader, through their incomparably exquisite style—almost to forgetfulness of the difficulty of the problems and to overlooking the great subtlety of the writer's handling of them.

SEYMOUR GUY MARTIN.

EVANSTON, ILL.

<sup>43</sup> New York, Columbia University Press, Vol. I, 1918; Vol. II, 1925.

<sup>44</sup> New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1923.

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